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THE POMP OF POWER 



THE 

POMP OF POWER 






"My son, you will be surprised with 
how little wisdom the world is governed" 

Axel Oxenstiern. 




NEW ^fSJF YORK 
GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY 






COPYRIGHT, 1922, 
BY GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY 






THE POMP OF POWER. I 



PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 



cm:' 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTBIR PAGE 

I THE ENTENTE I 

II PLAN XVII l8 

III THE FALL OF JOFFRE 44 

IV THE NIVELLE OFFENSIVE 57 

V UNIQUE COMMAND 9I 

VI THE ASQUITH DEBACLE IIO 

VII THE FRENCH POLITICAL WORLD 122 

VHI CAILLAUX I38 

IX MR, LLOYD GEORGE AND PARTY POLITICS .... 1 54 

X LORD NORTHCLIFFE AND HIS PRESS 183 

XI THE FRANKFORT INCIDENT AND MR. KRASSIN . . . 201 

XII THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES 215 

INDEX Z^"] 



THE POMP OF POWER 



THE POMP OF POWER 



CHAPTER I 

The Entente 

The co-operation between Great Britain and France which 
was destined to save civilisation had its origin in the Entente 
between the two countries conchided by Lord Lansdowne and 
M. Delcasse in 1904. 

That understanding was the logical sequence of German 
pohcy and of Germany's resolution to impose her will upon 
Europe. It was the inevitable result of the use Germany 
made of her victory in the War of 1870: which should for 
all time serve as a reminder to the conquerors of a day not 
to forget that their grandsons will pay for their errors. Bis- 
marck alone amongst the rulers of his nation saw the danger. 
But von Moltke and his supporters were able to override him, 
and he was forced to go with the tide. 

It was in 1875 that Great Britain received her first shock 
respecting the extent of German ambitions. The Times cor- 
respondent in Paris, the celebrated de Blowitz, was able to 
expose the design then being hatched to attack France again 
solely }Decause she was recovering too quickly from the effects 
of her defeat. It required the intervention of both England 
and Russia to prevent that outrage ; and possibly also to open 
the eyes of the Emperor, Wilhelm I., to the machinations 
of his Chancellor. Bismarck never forgot nor forgave the 
letter which Queen Victoria wrote his sovereign on this 
occasion. 

In his Reflections and Reminiscences Bismarck accuses 
Prince Gortchakoff of having concocted the whole story in 

1 



2 THE POMP OF POWER 

order to get the credit of being the preserver of peace. 
Gortchakoff, who by that time was jealous of the great repu- 
tation of the younger man, was not sorry when, on May loth, 
1875, he was able to send from Berlin (where he had gone 
with the Czar) the famous telegram, "Maintenant la paix est 
assuree." But the statement and the inference were founded 
on fact, however unacceptable Bismarck may have thought 
the form in which they were conveyed to the world. The 
real cause of the bitter reproaches with which he then and later 
assailed Gortchakoff was his annoyance at Russia having 
sounded the alarm. His reply when his own Emperor sent 
him Queen Victoria's letter two months later was in Bis- 
marck's weakest style. He made no serious case for the 
defence. But so far as possible he cleverly shifted the ground, 
which was one of his favourite proceedings when dealing with 
the rather slow-witted Wilhelm, 

In 1879 Germany laid the basis of the group of Central 
Powers by her treaty with Austria-Hungary. Three years 
later Italy was taken into the German fold. This consum- 
mation of the Triple Alliance put Germany at the head of a 
Coalition with a population aggregating 170 million. 

The Triple Alliance was to all intents and purposes offensive 
in its nature. It forced Europe (and upon more than one 
occasion) to accept its decisions by a clear warning that the 
only alternative was to fight. But obviously such a policy 
was a certain road to war. Any reasonable knowledge of 
history or any ordinary comprehension of human nature 
should have led to the conclusion that (despite geographical 
obstacles) this offensive Alliance would undoubtedly bring 
into being a defensive Alliance of other Great Powers, and 
that the final result would be a test of strength. 

It was only in 1892 that France emerged from an isola- 
tion which had lasted for more than twenty years. While even 
the treaty which was then made with Russia stipulated that 
it was dependent upon the maintenance of the existing ter- 
ritorial situation : for Russia made it plain that she would 
not support France in any attempt to recover Alsace and 
Lorraine. 



THE ENTENTE 3 

But Germany was still able to be coercive. In 1905 she 
demanded and obtained the retirement from the Quai d'Orsay 
of M. Delcasse, whose part in certain conversations with Eng- 
land she had not pardoned.^ Though it is fair to add that 
had the Prime Minister of the day (that eminent interna- 
tional financier but much less praiseworthy politician, M. 
Rouvier) supported his colleague, had he refused to allow 
his country to be humiliated, had he acted as did M. Clemen- 
ceau three years later, when Germany again attempted to 
dictate in the same fashion about the Casablanca deserters, 
the result would have been different. 

In 1906 came Algeciras. While in 1908, when Austria- 
Hungary annexed Bosnia and Herzgovinia, the Kaiser, in a 
speech of rare impudence, dared Russia to move. 

The latter incident was the high- water mark of German 
domination in Europe. It is probable that the Panther was 
sent to Agadir primarily in order to test the firmness of the 
understanding between Great Britain and France : although 
that is a question which cannot be elucidated until certain 
documents which have not yet seen the light of day are pub- 
lished. In any event, from that time the German Government 
realised that unless it reversed its own policy (and that course 
was never contemplated) the bond between Great Britain and 
France was likely to become stronger year by year. In the 
ultimate result this consideration was not without its effect 
in fixing the date of the conflict — a date chosen by Germany 
to suit her own interests. But in the meantime the Wilhelm- 
strasse did what it could to soothe British apprehensions, 
mainly through its unwitting tool. Lord Haldane. 

On the other hand, Agadir turned the tide in France. All 
who followed the course of national feeling in that country 
were struck by the significant change that was apparent in 
the years immediately preceding 1914. The catastrophe of 
1870 left a depressed race which had little faith in its own 

^ Since the above was written M. Maurice Paleologue has disclosed 
in a letter to Le Temps, dated 15th March, 1922, how M. Rouvier 
deliberately sacrificed M. Delcasse. The revelations made by M. 
Paleologue more than confirm the strictures I ventured to make upon 
Rouvier's conduct in this matter. 



4 THE POMP OF POWER 

rulers, and which only wanted to avoid, at any cost, another 
clash with Germany. When that danger threatened either 
an appeal was made to the other powers, or concessions were 
granted which could never have been wrung from France 
before 1870 or after 1910. M. Andre Tardieu has rightly 
said that the men of his generation, those who arrived at 
maturity about 1900, were too often prone to practise a 
patriotism of resignation. 

This revulsion was a natural reaction. Agadir merely 
served to make it clear to observers that a new sentiment had 
taken possession of the nation. The late Comte Albert de 
Mun, in a book written at this period, told of the difference 
to be found throughout the country. There was no longer 
the cry of peace at any price. Certainly there was no thirst 
for military adventures. But the predominant idea was that 
Germany had too often exacted too much by clanking the 
sword; that the time had come to settle matters once and for 
all; that it was better to fight than constantly to yield to 
blustering from Berlin. 

The country as a whole was finally convinced that war 
within a short time was inevitable; that it was made in- 
evitable by the determination of Germany to dominate. 

Upon this point the judgment of the people coincided 
with that of their political leaders. M. Poincare and M. 
Clemenceau would doubtless have agreed upon that question 
more whole-heartedly than they have agreed about anything 
else then or since : Poincare whom Clemenceau, aided by the 
late Camille Pelletan, did his utmost to defeat in the presi- 
dential election of 1913. M. Briand and Paul Deroulede 
would have been at one. M. Barthou gave a practical ex- 
pression of his opinion when he had the courage to sacrifice 
his popularity in order to secure the enactment of the Three 
Years Service. Even M. Leon Daudet was, upon this subject, 
in accord with men with whom he saw eye to eye about noth- 
ing else. All thought that war was probable; the majority 
thought it was certain. An understanding with Great 
Britain was therefore of the first importance. 

Unfortunately those in political power in England held an 



THE ENTENTE 5 

entirely different view about the future. They did not beHeve 
that Germany would ever attack France; and only admitted 
that, if the improbable did occur, German troops would doubt- 
less seek a passage through Belgium. At the beginning of 
1 9 14 they saw no force in the contention that Germany was 
not overtaxing herself to maintain an Army and a Navy which 
she did not mean to use the day when she could no longer 
get her own way without resort to force of arms. To give 
these politicians credit they were entirely sincere. Otherwise 
they would never have spoken with such freedom. In Janu- 
ary, 1 9 14, Mr. Lloyd George publicly derided the idea of any 
possibility of war; and urged that it was the opportune time 
to reduce the naval estimates. He would have uttered very 
different words had he imagined that Germany nurtured any 
aggressive designs. For upon a previous occasion — at the 
time of the Agadir trouble in 191 1 — he had not hesitated to 
warn that country of the risk she was running in language 
so strong and so plain that it had alike startled and halted 
the Kaiser's Government. But in 1914 the Liberals believed 
that the European situation was clearer and calmer ; and many 
lesser political lights spoke and thought like Mr. Lloyd George. 

These being the diverse views held in England and in 
France, it is interesting to examine what was in fact the 
agreement or arrangement which existed between the two 
countries at that time. 

In November, 1912, Sir Edward Grey wrote the French 
Ambassador, M. Paul Cambon, as follows : 

"On different occasions, during recent years, the French 
and British Military and Naval General Staffs have ex- 
changed views. It has always been understood that these 
exchanges of views do not affect the liberty of either Govern- 
ment to decide, at any time in the future, whether or not it 
should support the other by force of arms. 

"We have admitted that our exchanges of technical views 
do not constitute and ought not to be regarded as constituting 
an engagement which obliges either Government to intervene 
in an eventuality which has not yet presented itself, and which 
may never occur. For instance, the present division of the 



6 THE POMP OF POWER 

French and English Fleets does not rest upon an engagement 
to collaborate in case of war. 

"You have, however, remarked that if either Government 
had grave reasons to fear an unprovoked attack on the part 
of a third power, it would be essential to know whether, in 
that event, one power could count upon the military assistance 
of the other. 

"I agree that if either Government has reason to fear an 
unprovoked attack by a third power, or any other event threat- 
ening the general peace, this Government will immediately ex- 
amine with the other as to whether they ought not to act to- 
gether to prevent the aggression and to maintain peace ; and, in 
that case, to seek the measures that they might be disposed to 
take in common. If these measures necessitate military action, 
the plans of the General Staffs will at once be considered, and 
the two Governments will then decide upon the effect which it 
may be desirable to give to them." 



This tells the whole tale. There was no further or other 
diplomatic understanding*. Sir Edward Grey's letter calls 
for only one comment. While it was stipulated that the di- 
vision of English and French Fleets (whereby the latter was 
kept almost in its totality on guard in the Mediterranean so 
as to allow the former to concentrate in the North Sea) did 
not place any obligation upon Great Britain, yet obviously the 
result might be to put France at a disadvantage in the event 
of a sudden declaration of war. That is exactly what did 
occur in August, 19 14, when the French Channel coast was 
virtually without any naval protection. 

General Lanrezac has written " that England had promised 
her support to France in the twofold event of Germany being 
the aggressor and also violating Belgian neutrality; but that 
this undertaking was subject to such reserves that it might 
possibly only become effective too late. That statement is not 
in accord with the facts. M. Andre Tardieu gave a clearer 
and more accurate account of the situation when he said : 

^ Le Plan de Campagne Francois, P. 17 note. A similar statement 
was made in the Chanibre de Deputes during the debate on the Treaty 
of Versailles in 1919. 



THE ENTENTE 7 

"Even in the years preceding the war, in spite of the German 
danger which was felt to be rising, Great Britain was not 
bound. On August 2nd, 19 14, she was free, and could, in 
full independence, choose her own path." 

While in 191 9 the French Government, in a memorandum 
upon the Rhine Boundary which it submitted to the Peace 
Conference, referred to "I'engagement militaire defensif tres 
limite, qui en 19 14 liait a la France la Grande-Bretagne," ^ 

The truth was that upon several occasions during the years 
preceding 19 14 (and notably at the time of the Agadir crisis 
in 191 1 ) the General Staffs of the two countries had made 
plans, which had been changed from time to time, for the 
possible participation of British troops in a war between 
France and Germany. 

But there was no certitude that these plans would ever be 
used, for absolute reliance could not be placed upon English 
assistance. The Quai d'Orsay and the French General Staff 
held identical views upon this point. They thought, and 
hoped, that in any German violation of Belgian neutrality 
Great Britain would see an unavoidable casus belli. But the 
General Staff was obliged to make its plans without counting 
entirely upon this support ; or, at best, alternatively. 

The evidence given by General de Castelnau and Marechal 
Joffre before la Commission d'Enquete sur le Role et la Situ- 
ation de la Metallurgie en France, fully confirms this 
statement. 

General de Castelnau said : 

"Put yourself in the position of the person who, in 1912-13, 
established the plan of war. Had a prophet foretold that Eng- 
land would join with us and America also? Germany held at 
that moment all England and all America to feed her. 

"The President of the Commission : Did our General 
Staff make its plan having the idea that in the event of war 
Germany might be fed by England and America ? 

"General de Castelnau : It was a current idea. 

"The President : Nevertheless there was an agreement 
(accord) between France and England. 

' See Rapport General sur le Traite de Paix, P. 75. 



8 THE POMP OF POWER 

"General de Castelnau : Agreement ? I don't think so. 
What do you mean by England ? 

"The President : The British Empire taken as a whole. 
There was an understanding (entente). 

"General de Castelnau: What understanding? 

"The President : An understanding that should have en- 
sured at least a benevolent neutrality in case of a declaration 
of war. 

"General de Castelnau : I don't about that understand- 
ing. There had been interviews, conversation with the Eng- 
lish General Staff, yes. But never with the English Govern- 
ment, at least not to my knowledge." ■* 

Some days later the President of the Commission asked 
Marechal Joffre : "How could General de Castelnau say that 
he did not know of the agreement made with the English Gen- 
eral Staff upon the subject of an eventual participation of the 
English Army?" ^ 

Joffre replied : "I cannot tell you what General de Castel- 
nau said. It is certain that this agreement existed condition- 
ally, that is to say that England had not made any engagement. 
Therefore the measures to be taken if England joined and if 
England did not join were both considered. There were agree- 
ments between the General Staffs, but there were no 
diplomatic agreements, but only between the General Staffs. 
You know that England only came in some days after the 
outbreak of the war. Personally, I was convinced that she 
would join, but after all, there was no engagement on her 
part. There were only the plans on the means of embarking 
and disembarking, and the places which should be reserved 
for the troops." 

The remainder of Joffre's evidence on this point was (as 
on so many others) confused and contradictory. But upon 

* De Castelnau, as the President of the Commission, M. Maurice 
Viollette, subsequently remarked, was so scrupulous in his statements 
that whereas he had here used the word "Entente" in giving evidence, 
he changed it, in correcting the shorthand proof, to "Entrevues." 

^As a matter of fact, de Castelnau did not exactly say that he knew 
of no agreements between the General Staffs. He stated that he 
knew of no agreement between the two countries : but, as shown above, 
refers specifically to interviews between the General Staffs. 



THE ENTENTE 9 

the whole, while admitting that there was no certainty of 
British aid, he sought to excuse himself for not extending 
his Left further by suggesting that he counted upon six 
British Divisions.*' 

But the French General Staff was also hampered by not 
knowing what would be the attitude of Belgium in the event 
of her territory being invaded by German troops. This 
remained an enigma until the last moment. Lord French has 
said with reason that it is regrettable that Belgium did not 
decide earlier upon the line she should adopt in the hypothesis 
of a general war. Joffre has declared that he relied upon the 
collaboration of the Belgian Army since it was reasonable to 
suppose that certain forts would not have been constructed 
except for the express purpose of repelling any attack by 
Germany. But at best this was a supposition based upon prob- 
abilities. The question was always considered so doubtful 
that amongst the more important matters which the French 
General Staff had noted for special inquiry, in any period of 
political tension preceding a possible war with Germany, was 
whether the Belgians were making preparations in their for- 
tresses on the Meuse. No better refutation could be given of 
the German falsehood that Belgium had been lacking in loyal 
observance of the treaty that guaranteed her independence. 
But the resulting uncertainty was a handicap to the French 
General Staff. 

As a matter of fact it was only in July, 1914, that the Chief 
of the Staff, General de Selliers de Moranville, submitted to 
the Minister of War the plans for the mobilisation of the 
Belgian Army in the case of a German invasion ; while these 
plans contemplated not the defence of the Meuse, but "la posi- 
tion de Gethale." '^ 

It was only when Germany had served notice that she 
intended to disregard the neutral rights which she had guar- 
anteed that the attitude of Belgium was definitely known. 

The decision of the British Government rested upon more 

* Eventually only four divisions were sent. 

' Letter from General de Selliers de Moranville in Pourquoi Pas? 
August 8th, 1919. 



10 THE POMP OF POWER 

complex grounds. Whether or not England should support 
France was a question which gave rise to a certain division of 
opinion throughout the country; but to a much more acute 
and more dangerous one within the Cabinet itself. 

Mr. Asquith saw from the outset the risk of allowing France 
to be overwhelmed ; but, always a parliamentarian rather than 
a statesman, he did not press his view forcibly upon his col- 
leagues; nor is it certain that he would have done so in any 
event. Mr. Winston Churchill was throughout in favour of 
standing side by side with France. Mr. Lloyd George (then 
Chancellor of the Exchequer) was at first undecided, although 
upon the whole he seemed likely to be won over by the argu- 
ments of Mr. Churchill. But on Thursday, July 30th, a 
deputation of bankers and financiers represented to him that 
the interests both of the country and of the world at large 
demanded that Great Britain should stand aside and should 
not take part in any conflict.^ Such a decided opinion, coming 
from such a quarter, naturally had its effect upon Mr. Lloyd 
George. In the critical days which followed he still hesitated, 
but his tendency was then to favour the policy of non-inter- 
vention. This was also in accord with the view held at that 
time by the majority of the Cabinet. 

Sir Edward Grey seemed to be hoping against hope that 
war might be averted. It was to this sincere statesman a real 
tragedy to see the structure which he had built to maintain 
peace dissolving before his eyes. M. Paul Cambon has said ^ 
that during this terrible week there were in Sir Edward Grey 
two men, struggling against each other : the Minister of For- 
eign Affairs, who realised by the reports from all the 
Embassies that a war seemed inevitable, and the Idealist, who 
could not bring himself to take any step which might seem to 
bear the nature of a threat, for fear that he might thereby 
involve England in the struggle. 

The part taken by Lord Haldane is not so clear. As Sec- 
retary of State for War (in 191 4 he was Lord Chancellor) 

* A list of those who composed this deputation, together with their 
explanations to-day, would make interesting reading. 
^ La Revue de France, July ist, 1921, page 34. 



THE ENTENTE 11 

he had some years earlier been responsible for changes of a 
far-reaching nature in the Army and in the military system 
of the country. Those who are qualified to speak with 
authority upon such matters differ in their opinion of his 
work at the War Office. Others who after 1914 criticised 
Lord Haldane upon different grounds were perhaps some- 
times too sweeping in their condemnation. But to some extent 
he brought this upon himself. For while the value of his 
reforms may be a subject for discussion, it is a fact (proved 
by his own statements) that he was befooled by the German 
Emperor and his entourage. 

On account of his supposed knowledge of German men- 
tality, and his actual friendship with many German politicians. 
Lord Haldane was relied upon to advise Downing Street about 
the real intentions of the Wilhelmstrasse, and the state of 
public opinion in what he had once called his spiritual home. 
It is on record that he told the country that Germany had no 
warlike intentions, and that there was no reason to be alarmed. 
Later, but subsequent to the outbreak of war, he stated that 
he had really been uneasy ever since his last visit to Berlin. 
Whether or not he told that to his colleagues is less clear. But 
it is also less important. That only affects the question of 
Lord Haldane's sincerity. If he told the Cabinet and the 
country the same thing it means that he was hoodwinked in 
Berlin. That is the more probable, the most charitable, and 
on the whole the pleasanter explanation, though it is one which 
Lord Haldane's vanity would never allow him to proffer. But 
if he disclosed the danger to the Cabinet, and at the same time 
lulled the public into a false sense of security, his fault is 
greater and his responsibilities graver. 

The attitude adopted by the leaders of the Opposition, Mr. 
Bonar Law and Lord Lansdowne, in voluntarily promising 
to support the Government if it went to war, undoubtedly had 
an effect upon some members of the Cabinet. Nevertheless, 
the division of opinion (Lord Morley, Mr. John Burns, and 
Lord Beauchamp being unalterably opposed to any forcible 
intervention) still prevented a definite decision. On July 
27th, M. de Fleuriau, then Charge d'Affaires in London, tele- 



12 THE POMP OF POWER 

graphed to Paris that the German and Austrian ambassadors 
were letting it be understood that they were "sure" that Eng- 
land would remain neutral. While as late as Saturday, 
August I St, Sir Edward Grey, after a Cabinet Council held 
that day, informed M. Cambon that the Government did not 
feel able to decide in favour of taking part in a European war. 
The French Ambassador, in protesting, dwelt at length upon 
the gravity of such a course; and referred in particular to the 
fact that it was as a result of the arrangement between the 
General Staffs of the two countries that the French Channel 
coast was left open to German assaults. 

The Cabinet met again on the morning of Sunday, August 
2nd. There is some reason to believe (although any absolute 
confirmation is lacking) that Sir Edward Grey, while reiter- 
ating that he had taken no engagement as Foreign Minister 
which bound the country, and while himself not urging 
British participation in the conflict, intimated that if the Gov- 
ernment decided to take no action in the event of the violation 
of Belgian neutrality, his usefulness in Downing Street might 
be gone. There is likewise some ground for thinking that 
Mr. Lloyd George was less than ever disposed to support 
those who favoured acting closely with France. But one thing 
certain is that the meeting came to an end without any further 
decision having been reached. One Cabinet Minister subse- 
quently told me that he. Lord Beauchamp and others, who were 
in favour of England remaining neutral, left the meeting con- 
vinced that their view would prevail. ^"^ 

But later in the day there was another council. Matters 

then came to a head; and the Cabinet decided that a German 

^"In a recent interview (La Revue de France, July ist, 1921, p. 40) 
M. Cambon has stated that a great city financier, "Lord* X," was sum- 
moned to this morning meeting and asked to give his opinion. M. 
Cambon adds that "Lord X" has since often told him that he advised 
intervention, but that he has every reason to believe the contrary. 
One would naturally think that "Lord X" referred to the late Lord 
Cunliffe, then Governor of the Bank of England, and as such the finan- 
cial adviser of the Government. But M. Cambon's words rather 
indicate, without however making it absolutely clear, that it is a peer 
who is alive to-day. M. Mermeix has recently affirmed that it was 
Lord Rothschild, though his account of the view expressed by the latter 
differs somewhat from that of M. Cambon. (See Le Combat des Trois, 
p. 70.) 



THE ENTENTE 13 

attack on the French Coast would be considered a casus belli, 
and that the British Fleet would co-operate to repel it. 

In the course of the evening this decision was communi- 
cated to the French Ambassador. During his twenty years 
at Albert Gate M. Cambon's greatest hope had been for an 
effective alliance with Great Britain, his greatest fear that it 
might not be forthcoming at the supreme moment. That Sun- 
day night he judged the situation with his habitual discretion 
and acumen. He knew that his cause was won; that a great 
nation did not wage war by halves. The moment she decided 
to join forces at sea it inevitably followed that Great Britain 
would likewise support France on land. If anyone had doubts 
on that point they vanished when Germany waved aside her 
guarantee of Belgian neutrality, and Sir Edward Goschen 
asked for his passports. 

Unfortunately the military authorities were not of one mind 
about the use to be made of the Expeditionary Force. Some 
time was lost in awaiting the arrival of a French Military 
Mission. It then appeared that Sir Douglas Haig was in 
favour of delaying the despatch of the British troops until 
events showed whether it would be better to send them to 
Belgium or to France. While Lord Kitchener (who had be- 
come Minister of War) thought that it would be wiser to 
concentrate them near Amiens. But Sir John French, Gen- 
eral Wilson, and the majority agreed with the representative 
of the French General Staff, Colonel Huguet, that it was wiser 
to abide by the original plans, made before the war, whereby 
the British would take their stand behind Maubeuge in the 
Cambrai-Le Cateau zone. 

This indecision showed in the very first days of the war the 
vital weakness of Allies who had no complete preconceived 
plans of joint action. It was the basic error which was des- 
tined to prolong the war; and, at times, to jeopardise the 
issue. 

Germany began the struggle with the advantage of being 
the aggressor, who knew exactly what she meant to do, and 
had arranged how to do it. 

For some time after 1870 von Moltke (who remained Chief 



14 THE POMP OF POWER 

of the Staff until 1888) thought that Germany would be 
strong enough to take the offensive against both France and 
Russia in the event of a simultaneous war with each of those 
countries. It was his growing fear that the rapid recovery 
of France might render that plan unsafe, which led to the 
attempt to fasten another quarrel on that country in 1875. 
When that plot was exposed, von Moltke changed his plan to 
one which, devoid of all technical details, consisted in a de- 
fensive campaign as regards France, and an offensive one 
against Russia. 

In 1888 von Moltke was succeeded by Count Waldersee, 
who as Quartermaster-General had been his active coadjutor 
since 1882. At one time Waldersee favoured an offensive 
against France. But finally he maintained von Moltke's plan, 
with the reservation that if the time of year when hostilities 
broke out rendered a full offensive against Russia imprac- 
ticable, France would be attacked between Toul and Epinay. 

Three years later von Schlieffen (the greatest German 
strategist since von Moltke) succeeded Waldersee. He was 
soon called upon to reconsider the whole situation in view of 
the fact that an alliance between France and Russia had actu- 
ally been concluded. For some years he also maintained von 
Moltke's plan, although more through necessity than by 
conviction. But finally he adopted one which, in brief, con- 
templated an attack against the French centre, combined with 
an envelopment of the French Left. This naturally involved 
the invasion of Belgium. 

But later von Schlieffen evolved a second plan. As the years 
went by he constantly strengthened his Right; the very gist 
of his project being the envelopment of the French Left. By 
degrees he ultimately arrived at the idea of throwing nearly 
four-fifths of his mobilised forces upon the left wing of the 
French Army, while the invasion of Holland was not entirely 
eliminated from these calculations. 

The younger von Moltke, who became Chief of the Staff 
in 1906, inherited this plan. While he did not change its 
character he does not appear to have adopted it with any en- 
thusiasm. He had neither the courage nor the resolution to 



THE ENTENTE 15 

sweep It aside, but he nibbled at it. Von Schlieffen had 
constantly worried his assistants to make the Right stronger, 
but von Moltke strengthened his Left at the expense of his 
Right. Undoubtedly von Schlieffen's plan was an audacious 
conception; and it required a strong and bold man to put it 
into execution. But von Moltke was naturally feeble and 
vacillating.^^ 

Any country which does not ensure that its diplomatic and 
military authorities work closely together is courting disaster. 
Military measures taken without proper regard for the diplo- 
matic results (which again may entail military consequences) 
are equally as dangerous as diplomatic conventions made with- 
out due reflection upon their military repercussion. It may 
be impossible always to hold an even balance; but to do so 
ought to be the constant endeavour. Bismarck was always 
mindful of this national necessity. His action in altering 
in the very presence of von Moltke the Kaiser's telegram from 
Ems (which, in its original form, dashed the hopes of a war 
for which both had schemed and prepared) is an outstanding 
if unpleasant example of a Foreign Office and a War Office 
really working together. In the settlement of the terms of 
peace Bismarck and von Moltke each made concessions to the 
other; although the statement that the former was entirely 
opposed to the retention of Alsace and Lorraine must be taken 
with some reserve. But certainly the Chancellor and the Chief 
of the Staff were in full accord when in 1875 they would 
wantonly have attacked France had it not been for the inter- 
vention of Great Britain and Russia. 

After war had actually been declared Germany twice 
abandoned this sound policy; and acted upon Bernhardi's 
theory that the diplomatists should shape their course in such 
a way as will best carry out and second the designs of the 
High Command. In both instances the result was disastrous. 

" It is noteworthy that while von Tirpitz, and at one moment von der 
Goltz, urged the capture of Calais and Boulogne, so as to cut off the 
British troops from their base, the idea never found favour with the 
General Staff, because the very soul of its plan was the conviction that 
the success of the overwhelming blow it had prepared would entail the 
fall of all other objectives. 



16 THE POMP OF POWER 

The invasion of Belgium had the effect of immediately bring- 
ing England into the war. Great as was the initial advantage 
to be gained through entering France by way of the Meuse, 
it was more than offset by having the British Empire as an 
active foe from almost the first day of the war. While what 
little the diplomatists could do afterwards only aggravated 
the situation and increased the final reckoning. Germany still 
pays for those unfortunate statements that a treaty is a scrap 
of paper, and that necessity knows no law, in the distrust with 
which she is viewed by the world at large. Bismarck, always 
more adept than his successors, put the contention in a more 
convincing light when he once said "All contracts between 
great states cease to be unconditional and binding as soon as 
they are tested by 'the struggle for existence.' No great na- 
tion will ever be induced to sacrifice its existence on the altar 
of fidelity to contract when it is compelled to choose between 
the two." The soundness of that statement was illustrated 
more than once during the war. But it is one thing to de- 
nounce a treaty because it affects the safety of the State, and 
another for years deliberately to prepare to violate it for 
aggressive ends. 

Equally fatal was the military decision ruthlessly to press 
the submarine warfare regardless of the diplomatic conse- 
quence; which, in that case, was the addition of the United 
States to the list of Germany's opponents. 

These examples are glaring. But the British Government 
committed (and seems likely again to commit) a fault of an 
exactly similar nature. Indeed, in July, 1914, one vital dis- 
tinction between the position of Great Britain and Germany, 
to the disadvantage of the former, was that there was a prac- 
tical gap in the field which should have been closely covered by 
the combined work of the Foreign Office and the War Offfce. 
Since there was no defensive alliance between England and 
France the latter was forced to draw its plan of campaign not 
only in ignorance of the eventual attitude of Belgium (that it 
was perhaps impossible to avoid), but not knowing even until 
after the actual outbreak of hostilities whether there would 
be any British troops in the French line: not knowing, there- 



THE ENTENTE 17 

fore, to what point it would be necessary to extend the French 
Left. The evidence of Joffre and of de Castelnau, and above 
all Sir Edward Grey's letter to M. Paul Cambon, show that 
while there had been conversations between the General Staffs 
there was no diplomatic agreement. Even the interviews be- 
tween the staffs were so little binding in their nature that after 
the war began the question of where the British troops should 
make their junction with the French Army was again a subject 
of discussion ; while in the end only four divisions were sent 
instead of the six upon which the French General Staff had 
partially relied. 

At first sight the result of this limping policy would seem 
to bear hardly upon France. But the brunt was bound to 
fall with equal weight upon England. British troops were sent 
^to try to carry out a plan of campaign which had been drafted 
without the assistance or assent and without engaging the 
responsibility of any Englishman : a plan of campaign which 
foresaw nothing which did happen, and which made little or 
no preparation for much that was bound to happen : a plan 
of campaign which, in the words of a French critic ^^ who 
speaks with some authority, was "humanly impossible." 

" M. Fernand Engerand, Deputy for Calvados, See his work 
Le Secret de la Fronticre. 



CHAPTER II 
Plan XVII. 

Thirty days of warfare sufficed to prove that the strategy 
of the French General Staff was defective at every point. 
When this became apparent Joffre unfairly and ungenerously 
tried to throw the blame on his lieutenants and their men. But 
the facts are against him. General Bonnal has succinctly de- 
fined strategy to be the art of conception. It is now admitted 
by all except some of those responsible that the whole concep- 
tion of the plan of campaign was erroneous. 

Germany's declaration of war did not take France by sur- 
prise. For more than a generation she had prepared for the 
struggle. It is true that during the forty-three years between 
1 87 1 and 1 914 there had been forty-one Ministers of War; 
and undeniably such frequent changes were not in themselves 
favourable to the development of military plans. Yet despite 
this constant stream of arrivals and departures at the rue 
Saint Dominique the General Staff continued its work without 
any great interruption. During the period immediately pre- 
ceding the war there was, indeed, little or no undue 
interference on the part of politicians. 

France spent more on her Army than did any other country 
except Germany. From 1872 to 1895 the expenditure of each 
was about 14 milliards of francs. From 1896 to 1912 Ger- 
many spent 16 milliards 875 millions, and France 11 milliards 
418 millions. When the difference in population and in wealth 
is taken into account these figures show the extraordinary 
effort which France made to keep pace with her traditional 
enemy. 

Unfortunately the money of the French tax-payers pro- 
duced less than did that collected in Germany. The 
departmental system of the War Office was complicated, cum- 

18 



PLAN XVII. 19 

bersome, and lacking in unison. The German Minister of 
War had only four immediate subordinate departments. The 
French War Office had no less than fourteen, each independ- 
ent of the other. In an attempt to check the resulting 
confusion, another branch, the Direction of Control, was 
created. But this in no way lessened the evil. 

However, it is abundantly clear that the war did not take 
France by surprise. If she was unprepared, it was only in 
the sense that the General Staff had staked everything on a 
plan which was humanly impossible; while it counted so ab- 
solutely upon the success of that plan that it neglected to 
take even ordinary precautions to meet the situation which 
was bound to arise in the event of a reverse. 

In 191 1 General Michel was Vice-President of the Conseil 
Superieur de la Guerre, and also the designated Commander- 
in-Chief of the French armies in the event of war. In 
February of that year he submitted to the then Minister of 
War, Messimy (himself a soldier), a plan of campaign, based 
upon the theory that the Germans would invade France by 
the left bank of the Meuse, and would execute a turning move- 
ment on such a vast scale as would, from the outset, necessitate 
putting their reserves in the first line. Michel, therefore, pro- 
posed taking strategic safeguards against this movement, and 
also making a much more extensive use of the French reserves 
than had been previously contemplated. A month later Michel 
gave a conference in which he criticised and opposed the idea 
of an offensive a I'outrance, which was then so popular in 
certain French military circles. He thereby incurred the hos- 
tility of the younger members of the Staff as well as some 
of his own immediate colleagues; while even Petain, then a 
colonel, was heard to say that Michel had lost the confidence 
of the Army. 

In July Messimy obliged the latter to place part of his pro- 
posal before the Conseil Superieur de la Guerre. He received 
no support whatever, and Messimy, therefore, forced him to 
resign the vice-chairmanship as well as the eventual leadership 
in time of war. It is fair to add, however, that (as appeared 
later) Michel's report to the Minister of War was never sub- 



20 THE POMP OF POWER 

mitted in full to the Conseil Superieur de la Guerre/ and that 
it was only the suggestions about the utilization of the reserves 
upon which that body deliberated. 

It is questionable whether Michel was a strong man. Mes- 
simy never had any belief in his competency. Later, when the 
war broke out, he was Military Governor of Paris. Messimy 
said plainly that he thought him to be incapable and demanded 
his resignation, and when Michel demurred, he threatened to 
send him forthwith as a prisoner to the Cherche-Midi. But, 
whatever may be the measure of Michel's ability, later events 
proved that his vision of the future was correct. He foresaw 
both what Germany would do and what was necessary for the 
protection of France. 

Messimy considered appointing either Pau or Gallieni as 
Michel's successor. But the fact that both would retire in 
1912, on account of age, told against them: although by a 
special decree Gallieni was later retained on the active list 
without limit of age, upon the ground that he had held chief 
command in front of the enemy. Moreover, Pau (who was a 
veteran of the war of 1870) imposed the condition that he 
should have the sole power of appointment to the higher 
commands. 

Messimy, therefore, finally offered the post to Joffre, who 
was already a member of the Conseil Superieur de la Guerre, 
and who would not come under the age limit for several years. 
It was a decision which he regretted later. In January, 19 16, 
he wrote Gallieni that he was sorry he had not appointed him 
instead of Joffre; while his subsequent evidence before a par- 
liamentary committee seemed, upon the whole, to support the 
view that this was not an empty compliment, but the expres- 
sion alike of his sincere regret and of his real opinion. 

Joffre was an engineer officer. He had served under Gal- 
lieni in Madagascar, and had had other colonial experience. 
But he knew little or nothing of the interior working of the 
General Staff, and he would have refused the proposal had 

^ It was, of course, the General Stafif, and not the Conseil Superieur 
de la Guerre, which was charged with the duty of drafting the plan of 
campaign. 



PLAN XVII. 21 

not Pau encouraged him to accept it. It was Pau who sug- 
gested to him that, with the aid of de Castelnau, he would be 
able to meet the difficulties of the routine which he dreaded. 
Joffre, therefore, made it a condition of his acceptance that 
de Castelnau should be named as his assistant; and after 
twenty- four hours' reflection Messimy agreed. 

Joffre is, by birth and nature, a Catalonian. His tranquil 
and unshakable confidence in himself made him regard col- 
leagues (in the true sense of that word) as unnecessary, while 
his love of secrecy rendered them distasteful to him. As 
Vice-President of the Conseil Superieur de la Guerre he seems 
to have been omnipotent. At the meetings he would state at 
the same time both the question to be decided and his own 
decision : and it was rare that there was any opposition. 

He had never directly commanded any body of troops. He 
was incapable of directing any operations in the field. In 
giving evidence after the war, Messimy said it was, of course, 
known to everyone that it was General Berthelot, and not 
Joffre, who had commanded the operations. It is also highly 
improbable that he was able to evolve or draft any plan of 
campaign. Neither his previous career nor experience give 
any ground for thinking that he could do so. While his own 
testimony before the Commission sur la Metallurgie shows 
that he was hopelessly at sea about the whole matter. 

But he was capable of taking a decision upon the advice 
given to him by the subordinates who surrounded him and 
in whose attachment to himself he had confidence: and equally 
capable of holding to that decision with great tenacity. The 
very fact that he had few original ideas, but an imposing and 
massive exterior, made him exactly the man whom the Gen- 
eral Staff wanted as an exponent of the theories with which 
it provided him. General Lanrezac has aptly said that Joffre 
was really not an individual, but a "raison sociale." It was 
a firm which bore his name, but in which he was not the most 
active partner. For the General Staff was dominated by a 
group of comparatively young and extremely ambitious offi- 
cers, who were entirely possessed by the conviction that an 
offensive a I'outrance would win the next war with Germany 



22 THE POMP OF POWER 

and that nothing else could ; that the conflict would be of short 
duration ^ and the first battles decisive ; which latter opinion 
was also held by von Schlieffen. 

The chief protagonist of this doctrine was a brilliant and 
determined man, whose name was little known to the public, 
but who played an important part in shaping the plans of the 
French General Staff: Colonel (later General) Loyseau de 
Grandmaison, who was killed at Soissons.^ In the light of 
what the war taught, the theories of this heroic, but mistaken, 
officer make strange reading to-day. There seems to be an 
almost hysterical strain running through such sentences as : 
"The least caution in the offensive destroys all its efficacy and 
loses all its advantages. In the offensive, imprudence is the 
best safeguard. Only the offensive method can force the vic- 
tory. It is necessary to prepare it and to prepare others for 
it. Cultivating with passion, with exaggeration, and even to 
the smallest details of instructions, all that is marked by the 
offensive spirit; let us go to excess, and perhaps that will not 
be enough." 

The instructions issued to the Army, from time to time 
before 1914, during the period when Joffre was Chief of the 
Staff, bore out this teaching. For instance, in December, 
1913, it was even laid down that artillery should not prepare 
the way for infantry attacks, but should support them. For, 
as General Ruffey subsequently testified before the Commis- 

^ Bankers and economists likewise held the view that under modern 
conditions a general European war would be so onerous and so costly 
that the world could not support it for more than a few months. These 
calculating machines forgot to make allowance for certain elements 
in aroused human nature. The best prophet respecting the kind of 
warfare which would ensue was Bloch, a Polish banker, who in the 
'nineties practically predicted trench warfare and many other things 
which came to pass. But neither the work in which he propounded 
his theories, nor the museum which he established at Lucerne to illus- 
trate them, were taken very seriously. 

*The anonymous author of Le Plan XVII. (Payot, Paris), who 
is favourable to the General Staff, states (pp. 38-9) that nothing con- 
tributed more to render the doctrine of the defensive a I'outrancc popular 
in the Army than two lectures given by Lieutenant-Colonel de Grand- 
maison in the spring of 1911. He asserts that there is no doubt that 
these lectures had such an effect upon the High Command that it 
embodied in Plan XVH. the principles which Grandmaison had laid 
down. 



PLAN XVII. 23 

sion sur la Metallurgie, Joffre "was entirely subjugated by 
the young men of his entourage, and Hstened complacently to 
their views, which were often childish." 

In one sense it is true that only an offensive can lead to 
a decision. But that dictum does not mean that an offensive 
will always succeed. The time, to some extent the number 
of the opposing forces, and, in these days, above all, the 
comparative artillery strength must be taken into account. 
But while the French General Staff adopted the doctrine with 
enthusiasm, it entirely lost sight of these considerations. It 
might, with advantage, have remembered that after 1870 von 
Moltke said : "The French never having attacked me, I was 
obliged to take the offensive myself. But I only did so against 
my own will, for, in my opinion, I thus obtained' less decisive 
and more dearly-bought successes than I would have been able 
to get by a method more in conformity with my own ideas." ^ 

While, elsewhere, von Moltke, after referring to the heavy 
price which had always to be paid for an offensive a I'outrance, 
added : "I prefer the proceeding which consists in passing 
to the offensive after having repulsed several attacks." That, 
as Lieutenant-Colonel Thomasson has pointed out, is the very 
method by which Foch eventually won the war. 

Even Bernhardi, the great apostle of the offensive, has 
written : 'Tf we want to count upon military successes, we 
must not forget that attack is infinitely more difficult than ever, 
and that the assailant, to obtain the victory, needs to have a very 
marked superiority. It is the task of strategy to assure it." 

It was the greatest fault of the French General Staff, before 
1 91 4, that it entirely neglected or ignored that task, apparently 
believing that material disadvantages could be overcome by 
engendering, through constant teaching and orders, a spirit 
of aggression. 

Nor did all British military authorities share the blind 
faith of the French General Staff that an offensive a 
I'outrance was a sure road to a speedy victory. In August, 
1914, Lord Kitchener not only warned the French military 
mission that the war would be a long one, but he also expressed 

* Critique des Travaux dii Grand Etat-Major. 



24 THE POMP OF POWER 

the opinion that the French plan was dangerous. The French 
Mihtary Attache in London wrote to the rue St. Dominique 
that Kitchener was "entirely opposed to the offensive; if we 
listened to him we would remain on the defensive and await 
three successive attacks by the German forces; he is imbued 
with the principles of colonial warfare and knows nothing 
of the material and moral advantages of the offensive." ^ 

In 1913 a pamphlet appeared, entitled La Concentration 
allemande, which, to all intents and purposes, gave utterance 
to the view and plans of the General Staff. Although it was 
published anonymously, military circles were generally aware 
of the identity of the author. But it was not until 191 5 that 
Le Temps informed the public that it was Lieutenant-Colonel 
(now General) Buat, who had been a professor at the Ecole 
Superieure de Guerre, who was then on the General Staff, and 
who subsequently served throughout the war with great dis- 
tinction, being Major-General of the French Armies when the 
armistice was signed. 

In order to strike the imagination, Buat pretended that, 
while travelling in Germany, he had found a copy of the Ger- 
man plan of campaign, which had been left in a railway 
carriage. According to this, the Germans would enter France 
with twenty-two army corps — that is, one million three hun- 
dred thousand men — of whom nine hundred thousand would 
belong to the active army and four hundred thousand would 
be reservists, who would be given only such secondary mis- 
sions as the occupation of conquered territory. Part of these 
forces were to come by the right bank of the Meuse. Buat, 
therefore, concluded that the French forces ought to face 
north-east on a line extending from Bel fort to Mezieres. In- 
cidentally, he thus disclosed to the Germans the French plan 
of concentration. As a matter of fact, the then existing plan 
XVI bis provided for a concentration exactly from Bel fort to 
Mezieres, although its successor, the more famous Plan 
XVIL, extended the line to Hirson.® 

* See Rapport de la Commission sur la Metallurgie en France, p. 57 
' Plan XVII. was approved by the Government in the spring of 1913, 
and became operative in April, 1914. 



PLAN XVII. 25 

At the same time Buat entirely misconceived both the Ger- 
man plan and the numbers they intended to use.'^ It is true 
that German authorities had previously written that their 
forces would be divided into an army of shock and an army 
of occupation. Apparently Buat (as well as the General Staff) 
accepted this statement without hesitation. It is impossible 
to say now whether it was ever sincere or whether it was made 
simply in order to induce the German people to accept more 
readily the military taxation and burdens imposed upon them. 
The probability seems to be that it was the real plan until 
1 912. But there are many indications that from that time the 
intention was to use the reservists in the first line immediately. 
However, the French' General Staff accepted the German 
statements all the more readily because they fitted in with its 
own conviction that the French reservists would be useless in 
the first line. 

But in the work, Qiiatre mois de Guerre, published at the 
end of 1914 by the French General Staff for the use of the 
representatives of France abroad, it is calculated that the total 
German forces mobilised and actually used against the French 
armies during the first weeks numbered one million four 
hundred thousand men. The difference (one hundred 
thousand) between this figure and that in Buat's pamphlet is 
not enormous. But the real distinction lies in the use made 
of these troops. Buat calculated upon a shock army of about 
nine hundred thousand. As a matter of fact, there were 
thirty-four corps in the first line. For the reserves were used 
there from the beginning; and the work which the French 
General Staff had imagined would occupy them was done 
mainly by the Landwehr or other troops. The difference, as 
Lieutenant-Colonel de Thomasson has pointed out,^ was just 
equal to the two armies of von Kliick and von Biilow, which 

^ The author of Le Plan XVII., while favourable to the General 
Staff, admits (page 177) that its miscalculation about the German forces 
was the cause of the incomplete state of the French fortresses and of 
the insufficient preparation of the Army and of the entire country for 
war. 

* See Le Revers de 1914 et ses Causes, by Lieutenant-Colonel de 
Thomasson, pp. 114 and 126. See also Le Plan XVII., which gives a 
slightly different estimate. 



26 THE POMP OF POWER 

were destined to pass by the left bank of the Meuse. In 
brief, the French General Staff made an error of fifty per cent, 
in estimating the German shock effectives.^ 

Moreover, the General Staff did not think that the Germans 
v^ould come by the left bank of the Meuse, precisely because 
it was convinced that Germany would not put her reserves 
in the first line. Thus one error led to another. "Le com- 
mandement frangais ne pensait pas que le movement debordant 
a travers la Belgique di^it s'etendre sur la rive nord de la 
Meuse, parce qu'il ne croyait pas que les Allemands em- 
ploiraient leurs divisions de reserve en premiere ligne des le 
debut des operations." These are the words of General 
Mangin, a critic, who, other things being equal, is inclined 
to hold the scales somewhat in favour of Joffre. 

It was, therefore, in vain that Gallieni had warned the Gen- 
eral Staff that Mauberge should be further fortified; and 
while, apparently, a little more heed was paid to his advice 
about making greater provision for the defence of the left 
bank of the Meuse, between Verdun and Mezieres, yet the 
Staff began to study the question so tardily that nothing had 
actually been accomplished when war broke out. 

The tale is the same about heavy artillery. The records of 
the Conseil Superieur de la Guerre show that Gallieni drew 
attention to this crying need (as did also General Ruffey and 
General Dubail) in October, 1913, and again in March, 1914, 
as he had previously done in 191 1 in a report to the Minister 
of War. No attention was given to these remonstrances. 
It was thought that the lighter 75 would do everything.^*^ It 
needed a war itself to enforce Gallieni's contention. In the 
early days of the conflict nothing was more severely felt and 
no negligence was more dearly paid for than this lack of 
heavy artillery. It was only in 191 5 that it was finally sup- 

® According to General Percin's evidence before the Commission 
sur la Metallurgie, the total of the German forces was two million, as 
compared to Buat's estimate of one million three hundred thousand. 
But it is not clear exactly what Percin took into account in arriving at 
this figure. 

"The 75 was adopted when the late General Galiifet was Minister 
of War. 



PLAN XVII. 27 

plied, and that the necessary officers and men were instructed 
in its use.^^ 

In 1913 Joffre gave a lecture to the former scholars of the 
ficole Polytechnique. The text of his discourse, which did 
not deal much with strategy, was the necessity of preparation 
in time of peace : "In our days 'to be ready' has a meaning 
which it would have been difficult for those who formerly con- 
ducted war to understand. Everything must be organised, 
everything foreseen. Once hostilities have begun, no impro- 
visation will serve. What lacks then will lack definitely. The 
least omission may cause a disaster." 

Excellent words. But, in the way of material preparation, 
Joffre and the General Staff were grossly at fault in respect 
both to artillery, air armament, and many other minor 
matters. 

It has been contended that the General Staff was restricted 
because successive Governments would not allow a sufficient 
expenditure. Naturally there always is, and always will be, 
some contest upon the subject of expenditure between the 
Treasury and the heads of the military establishment : it 
would be an unhealthy sign were it otherwise. But the figures 
do not show that the French Parliament was niggardly. What 
is more apparent is that the money was often ill spent. While, 
in any event it is, in the last analysis, the duty of the General 
Staff to cut its coat according to its cloth, and not to attempt 
what it knows, or ought to know, is impossible of achievement 
on account of lack of means. 

But one of the very writers who has advanced this defence 
of Joffre and the General Staff has written elsewhere, in the 
same work, that in 1914 French soldiers "were still dressed 
as they were in 1830, when rifles only carried to a distance of 

^ Colonel de Thomasson does not attribute a "very great influence" 
on the result of the frontier battles to "the overwhelming German 
superiority in heavy artillery." But he admits that the French troops 
were often greatly shaken "by these great cannon, to which they could 
not reply." See Le Rcvers dc 1914 et ses Causes, p. 38. This weakness 
of the French Army was well known in Germany. Tirpitz has even 
recorded that on 6th July, 1914, the Emperor predicted that France 
would hold Russia back partly on account of her own lack of heavy 
artillery. 



28 THE POMP OF POWER 

200 paces, and God knows how many losses were imposed 
upon us by the kepi and the red trousers ; we had no machine- 
guns, few big cannon, and hardly any aeroplanes ; our cavalry 
thought only of brilliant charges, and our cavalry chiefs acted 
as if they did not know that horses must drink during the 
day and must rest in their stables at night-time; the majority 
of our infantry officers were badly trained; the tactical in- 
struction of their units, left at the free-will of each individual 
when it was made at all, lacked method and intensive training. 
The steps of progress when the combat was engaged, the nec- 
essary infantry period, the permanent use of cover, the close 
liaison between infantry and artillery, formations diluted to 
the extreme limit under shell fire, carefully prepared instead 
of premature attacks, etc., etc., all these practices were for- 
gotten because they were neglected in time of peace." ^^ 

Certainly, for the errors enumerated in the latter part of 
this sweeping condemnation it was the General Staff and those 
whom it directly commanded which was at fault, and not any 
Government. 

Plan XVII. was defective because it eliminated all idea of 
manoeuvre: and yet it was manoeuvre which eventually won 
the battle of the Marne after the General Staff's theory of 
I'ojfensive hrutcde et a I'outrance had completely broken down 
on its first trial. It might possibly have had some chance of 
success against a weaker enemy. It had none whatever against 
one who was stronger in numbers and who in all material 
respects was better prepared. 

This blind faith in a short war and a quick victory based 
on an offensive, and the consequent neglect of any provision 
for defensive warfare, led to an error of almost incalculable 
consequences. France drew about 90 per cent, of her ore 
production and 86 per cent, of her cast iron from the district 
of the Briey. Yet, incredible as it seems, the plan of concen- 
tration did not provide any defence of that region. ^^ It was 
left outside of the territory to be protected. Joffre himself, 
in giving evidence on this subject, said : "Plan XVII., as 

"See Le Plan XVII., by XXX (Payot, Paris), pp. 184-5. 
" Previous plans had been guilty of the same omission. 



PLAN XVII. 29 

well as preceding plans, left the Briey district outside of the 
zone to be occupied by the covering troops." The excuse 
proffered was that Briey was almost under the guns of Metz, 
and that its protection would have necessitated the investment 
of that fortified place — a difficult and dangerous operation. 
But that reply does not disclose the whole story. The report 
of the Commission sur la Metallurgie en France properly states 
that "the General Staff considered the problem of the Briey 
from an exclusively strategic point of view, upon the hypoth- 
eses of a short war, with an absolute faith in victory, and 
without having even contemplated the possibility of a 
reverse. ^^ 

If the General Staff had foreseen a four years' war it cer- 
tainly would never have abandoned to the enemy the metal 
of which France had such sore need. But it could see only 
one thing — the necessity for an offensive. It did not take 
even elementary precautions to guard against the effect of a 
temporary check or defeat. In the result France was obliged 
to bring metals from across the seas to replace what had thus 
been given to the enemy. While Germany, on her own ad- 
mission, was able to prolong the conflict as long as she did 
because these mines were in her possession. M. Loucheur has 
rightly said that the loss of Briey for the period of the war 
was a catastrophe. 

The parliamentary commission appointed to examine why 
Briey was left unprotected drifted somewhat far afield in the 
course of its inquiry. It was thus that Joffre, Messimy, and 
others were given an opportunity to make what explanation 
they could or would of their mistakes of judgment or execu- 
tion. 

To do Messimy justice, he did not seek to diminish his own 
responsibility as Minister of War during part of the period 
preceding 1914. He told the Commission that from 191 1 the 
violation of Belgian neutrality had been considered as certain, 
although it was thought that it would only be partial, and 

" See Rapport de la Commission sur le Metallurgie en France, 
Part II., p. II. 



30 THE POMP OF POWER 

would not affect the heart of Belgium. ^^ He admitted that it 
had been a great mistake not to make more use of the reserves. 
But he declined responsibility for the circulars of 19 13 and 
1 9 14, whereby Joffre had authorised commanding officers, in 
their discretion, to reduce the number attached to each active 
regiment; and had likewise laid down that reservists should 
only be employed for secondary duties, such as keeping ways 
of communication and the guarding of prisoners. ^*^ 

Finally, Messimy said that he thought it was useless to 
discuss whether, if it had to be done over again, he would 
"impose upon" Gallieni the post which the latter had "nobly 
refused" in 191 1. He admitted that he was far from being 
"in rapt admiration" of Joffre, who in August, 1914, had 
been unable to realise that the German Right was turning his 
Left, and who after the battle of the Marne had persisted in 
useless partial attacks ; but he summed him up as having a sure 
if slow mentality, and as possessing many of the qualities of 
a great chief. 

Joffre's testimony upon the same points differed somewhat 
from that of Messimy, while it was neither so clear nor so 
convincing. The questions and answers are worth quoting, 
if only because they show that his main anxiety seems to have 
been rather to make no admission of error than to help the 
Commission by throwing light upon the past. 

Referring to the fact that prior to 1914 Joffre had ignored 
certain warnings, the President of the Commission said : 

"It has been explained to us that the plan of concentration 
aroused the criticism of several members of the Conseil Su- 
perieur de la Guerre, and notably of General Ruffey and Gen- 
eral Gallieni, because it did not contemplate the hypothesis of. 
the invasion by the left bank of the Meuse, and especially by 
Lille. 

"^The reason (which seems obscure) for this belief must have been 
entirely of a military nature, for in no other respect could it make any 
difference whether the violation of neutrality extended to the whole or 
to part of the country. 

" I purposely do not discuss the contention that an increased use of 
the reserves would have rendered the Three Years' Service unnecessary. 



PLAN XVII. 31 

"JoFFRE : That greatly astonishes me, since in the General 
Staff we always had that idea of the attack. 

"The President : I did not have that impression when you 
read your memorandum, for, even allowing for the variant, 
Plan XVII. places the extreme Left of the French Army at 
Hirson. ... It has been explained to us precisely that at the 
moment when you submitted this plan to the Conseil Superieur 
de la Guerre General Ruffey and General Gallieni observed 
that it was disturbing, because in their opinion it was beyond 
discussion that the invasion of France would be by a large 
turning movement of the German Army, one which would 
embrace Lille and perhaps Dunkirk. Do you remember the 
remarks of General Ruffey and of General Gallieni? 

"JoFFRE : I have no recollection of them, but I do not say 
that they were not made. 

"The President: At the very moment when the Three 
Years' law was discussed — and I remember it very well my- 
self — observations were made to you regarding the hypothesis 
of the invasion by way of Belgium, and the vast movement 
which was, in fact, executed. Did not that lead you to reflect 
that Plan XVII. was perhaps not sufficiently prudent? 

"JoFFRE : All that is so vague that I cannot answer you." 

Joffre's evidence regarding the reserves was equally im- 
precise. He was indeed forced to admit that he had given 
orders which allowed a reduction. But when he suggested 
that all the reserves were utilized, figures were placed before 
him showing irrefutably that at the outbreak of war the depots 
were crowded with reservists, and that, moreover, there was no 
provision of rifles for them. Joffre's only comment was, "I 
would not dare to contradict you; I do not say either yes 
or no." 

Equally fruitless were the efforts of the Commission to 
discover who were the authors of the plan of operations. No 
one seemed desirous to claim that distinction. Joffre's testi- 
mony is at least curious, if not illuminating: 

"The President : Was the plan of operations discussed by 
the Conseil Superieur de la Guerre? 

"Joffre: No, that is not the business of the Conseil Su- 
perieur de la Guerre. 



32 THE POMP OF POWER 

"The President: How, then, was the plan of operations 
elaborated ? 

"Joffre: The plan of concentration is the function of the 
plan of operations. 

"The President : By whom was the plan of operations 
elaborated ? 

"JoFFRE : By the General Staff of the Army under my di- 
rection. 

"The President : General de Castelnau has testified that as 
Sub-Chief of the General Staff he was ignorant of the plan of 
operations. 

"Joffre: I cannot tell you about that. 

"The President : Who elaborated the plan of operations, 
and who collaborated with you in this work if the first Sub- 
Chief of the General Staff did not have any part in it? 

"Joffre : My recollections are too imprecise for me to an- 
swer you. If General de Castelnau has told you that he was 
ignorant of it, it must be so. 

"The President : I looked over his deposition again this 
morning, because this detail had struck me, and I desired to 
put the question to you. 

"Joffre : I don't remember. 

"The President: Who took part in elaborating the plan of 
operations ? 

"Joffre : I don't remember. 

"The President : It seems that you ought to be able to re- 
member the ofiicers with whom you worked; it was, in brief, a 
matter which must have caused you a great deal of worry. 

"Joffre : But all the General Staff participated. A plan of 
operations is an idea that one has in one's head, but that one 
does not put on paper." 

The examination on this point proceeded for some time 
with no further result, until Joffre finally declared, "You are 
asking me a bundle of things which I can't answer. I know 
nothing." 

Much clearer is what actually did happen. The war found 
the General Staff firm and consistent in its adhesion to the 
doctrine that an offensive should be persisted in, even if based 
upon incomplete information. An ill-advised advance was 
made, and the first practical result of these teachings began to 



PLAN XVII. 33 

be seen. According to M. Hanotaux (who may be regarded 
as an official historian of the Grand Quartier General)/'^ "mad 
bayonet charges were launched at a distance of a mile from the 
enemy without artillery preparation"; and the ill-regulated 
spirit of the offensive was one of the causes of the French 
reverses. 

But the General Staff clung to its erroneous preconceptions 
in the face of facts which convinced everyone else. 

In April, 191 4, General Lanrezac had been appointed to 
succeed Gallieni (who had then reached the age limit) on the 
Conseil Superieur de la Guerre; and the following month he 
received an order which invested him with the command of 
the Fifth Army in the event of war. This was the army 
which, according to Plan XVII., held the French Left. Lan- 
rezac did his utmost to persuade Joffre to give him the First 
Army (the army of the Vosges), on the ground that as he 
had been its Chief-of-Staff for five years he was thoroughly 
familiar with that theatre of operations. When Joffre re- 
fused to do so he began to study the situation in the north. 
He soon arrived at the conclusion that the Germans would 
unblushingly violate the neutrality of Belgium, and, making 
the most of that act, would come by the left bank of the 
Meuse. 

After Lanrezac had taken the command of the Fifth Army 
in August, 191 4, he discerned indications which confirmed 
this opinion. He was convinced that the German Right was 
stronger than Plan XVII. had anticipated it would be, and 
that it meant to make a turning movement by the left bank 
of the Meuse. On August 7th he sent his Chief-of-Staff to 
communicate this opinion to Joffre. But the only reply he 
got was that the "responsibility of stopping a turning move- 
ment against his Left was not his." On August 8th Joffre 
actually issued an order for "an offensive of all forces united, 
with the Right flank on the Rhine." The role of the Fifth 
Army was left undecided; but it was to be ready for either 
an offensive or defensive facing east. 

" See Rapport de la Commission sur la Metallurgie en France, 
Part II., p. 47, Note II. 



34 THE POMP OF POWER 

Another order from the Grand Quartier General, on August 
13th, showed that Joffre still thought that the danger lay in 
the east. On the following day Lanrezac himself went to 
see the Commander-in-Chief to urge his belief that an over- 
whelming German attack w^ould come by the left bank of the 
Meuse. Joffre replied, "We have a feeling that the Germans 
have nothing ready on that side" ; a view likewise expressed by 
his Chief-of-Staff. 

During all this period Lanrezac's advice was received with 
equal scepticism, whether he sent it by one of his staff or him- 
self spoke to Joffre. Various incidents show that the Gen- 
eral Staff thought Lanrezac was a nuisance, while he thought 
that they were fools; and that neither took any pains to con- 
ceal their respective convictions. 

On August 15th Lanrezac was finally allowed to make 
preparations for the possible execution of the movement 
towards the north which he had urged as a necessary measure 
of safety. But even on August i6th Joffre was responsible 
for a proclamation in which it was stated that the German 
attack by way of Belgium had "lamentably failed." ^* 

While as late as August i8th or 19th General Berthelot, the 
real director of operations, telephoned to the Minister of War, 
Messimy (who was getting anxious about the Left) : "The 
more we have against our Left the better it will be, as it will 
give us more chance to break their Centre." For, as Gallieni 
had discovered when he spent some hours at the Grand Quar- 
tier General on August 14th, Joffre and his subordinates were 
obsessed by the idea that they would break the German Centre 
and then make a turning movement against the German Right : 
an idea which was Napoleonic in its conception, but in nothing 
else, for it was based upon ignorance of or deceptive informa- 
tion respecting the enemy's forces and plans. 

The battle of Charleroi completed the demolition of the 
strategy of the General Staff, and forced Joffre to abandon 

" In giving evidence before the Commission sur la Metallurgie, Joffre 
was asked about this announcement. He made his favourite reply, 
"I don't remember." But when he seemed to question the authenticity 
of the document, the President of the Commission placed it before 
him. 



PLAN XVII. 35 

Plan XVII. As Sir John French soon discovered, he was 
not immediately able to substitute another in its place. 

It has been stated that after that engagement the British 
retreated before the French. But it is now definitely estab- 
lished that the contrary was the case. M. Gabriel Hanotaux 
has, indeed, written that the British order was given at five 
p.m. on August 23rd, and Lanrezac's order only at nine p.m. 
But he omitted to state that while it was Joffre who tele- 
graphed to the British Commander-in-Chief warning him 
of the extent of von Kliick's pressure, and announcing the 
French retreat, the latter retirement had already actually be- 
gun at that hour; while the British only commenced to retreat 
on the morning of August 24th, after fighting all night. 
French was so much taken aback by this proceeding that when, 
during a meeting at Compiegne, on August 29th, he was urged 
to co-operate in a certain movement, he recalled with feeling 
that only some days earlier the Fifth Army had commenced 
to fall back hours before Joffre had communicated to him 
that he had been forced to abandon his plan. 

On the contrary M. Fernand Engerand has written that 
"the retreat of the British followed ours, and did not pre- 
cede it : it is a duty of loyalty to say so, as also to admit that 
in the frontier battles the British Army, which its commander 
put on the defensive, was the only one, besides the French 
First Army, which could hold the enemy." ^^ 

M. Hanotaux, however, has repeated his misstatements in 
the face of various corrections. But the eminent academician 
can no longer be taken as an unprejudiced authority on this 
subject. In its report the Commission sur la Metallurgie 
pointed out ^^ that he may be regarded as an official historian 
of the General Staff. As such he might have employed his 
time to better advantage had he explained how it was that 
practically at the same time that Joffre advised the British of 
the danger and of the French retreat, which was then in prog- 
ress, he telegraphed (at 4.40 p.m.) to Lanrezac in the follow- 

" See Le Secret des Frontiercs, by Fernand Engerand, Deputy for 
Calvados. 
^" See Rapport de la Commission sur la Metallurgie, Part II., p. 47. 



36 THE POMP OF POWER 

ing terms : '*I request you to give me your opinion on the 
situation and what you count upon doing. You are in touch 
with Marshal French. How do you regard the situation, and 
what support is he able to give you?" 

The Commission sur la Metallurgie concluded,-^ with great 
reason, that these two messages are "absolutely contradictory," 
and that they give rise to "an obscure point which history will 
have to elucidate." 

The General Staff subsequently blamed Lanrezac for order- 
ing the retreat (as he did on his own responsibility) and break- 
ing off the conflict of Charleroi. That criticism may be left 
on one side with the remark that it has given rise to a dis- 
pute which bids fair never to be settled. Lanrezac's sup- 
porters contend that by his action he avoided a second Sedan. 
While the report of the Commission sur la Metallurgie says, 
without qualification, that "the battle of Charleroi was lost 
before it was begun ; the great merit of the Commander of 
the Fifth Army was to have dared to prevent it from turning 
to a disaster and to have taken upon himself to break the battle 
before the whole left wing of the Allies was enveloped." 

Upon the other hand, Lanrezac's opponents contend that 
the battle was never really engaged, and that he avoided it. 

Before the war Lanrezac had achieved fame as a military 
professor. He was one of the oracles of the French Army, 
although his theories were in contradiction with the doctrine 
of the offensive a I'oiitrance, to which the General Staff was 
wedded. Moreover, as has been shown, he was equally at 
variance with the views of the General Staff about the German 
plan of campaign. Events proved that he was right and the 
General Staff wrong. 

On September 3rd Lanrezac was relieved of his command. 
The reason given by one who apparently spoke for Joffre 
was that he did not adopt the views of the General Staff, 
while M. Hanotaux has written that it was because of his 
lack of liaison with the English. Certainly Lanrezac made 
an unfavourable impression upon Sir John French, with whom 
he had several unpleasant clashes. While his ejaculation on 
^ See Rapport de la Commission sur la Metallurgie, Part II., p. 108. 



PLAN XVII. 37 

August 29th, when Haig (acting under French's orders) did 
not give him the support which he had conditionally offered, 
was something worse than indiscreet.^" But though French 
and Lanrezac were temperamentally antipathetic the one to 
the other, the root of evil (as Lanrezac has since admitted) 
was that French, unknown to him, was bound by his instruc- 
tions never to place himself under the orders of any Allied 
general, and was restrained by the warning that he could 
not count upon any great or speedy reinforcements. 

In considering the case of Lanrezac, it must be remembered 
that even M. Hanotaux, the apologist for the General Staff, 
has written that "from the outset General Lanrezac insistently 
indicated the danger of a turning movement by Lower Bel- 
gium, but the Command was intent upon holding to its con- 
ception of an advance against the enemy's Centre." 

But even if a Commander-in-Chief is wrong in his strategy, 
he cannot afford to have a lieutenant who is inclined to dis- 
cuss rather than to execute his orders. It is at least ques- 
tionable whether Lanrezac, although undoubtedly a great and 
brilliant military theorist, is capable of leading troops in the 
field. The late General de Maud'huy proclaimed vigorously 
that Lanrezac had proved his worth in this respect while he 
commanded the Fifth Army in August, 19 14. Certainly his 
action in breaking off the battle of Charleroi showed that he 
was willing to shoulder responsibility. Possibly that course 
avoided a great disaster. But equally certainly it showed 
more prudence on Lanrezac's part than he had exhibited during 
the earlier days of the campaign, when he urged Joffre to 
allow him to sally northwards. While I am bound to add that 
the only member of his staff with whom I have had an oppor- 
tunity to discuss the matter stated vigorously and in detail 
that, although Lanrezac's preconceived theories were undoubt- 
edly right, he impressed him, after the first few days of the 

*■ When the news was brought to him, Lanrezac said : "It is treason" 
("C'est une felonie"). Lanrezac himself, without quoting his own words, 
admits that he expressed his ill-humour, and adds : "Of course, I 
never thought that General Haig, a true gentleman and a real soldier, 
was responsible." See Le Plan de Campagtie Frangais, page 231. 



38 THE POMP OF POWER 

campaign, as temperamentally unfitted to command in the field 
in time of war.^^ 

On August 25th Joffre acknowledged the failure of his plan 
by issuing a General Instruction, stating that it had been found 
impossible to execute the projected offensive. It is regrettable 
for his own fame that then and later he attempted to place 
the blame upon those who had done their best to execute his 
orders, and who had sacrificed themselves or who had been 
sacrificed in attempting to carry out the plans of the General 
Staff. All the generals commanding and their subordinates 
were not incompetent; nor was there any serious fault to be 
found with the troops. But the General Staff's strategy had 
broken down at all points. All attempts since made to reha- 
bilitate it have been of the weakest nature. The majority of 
French military critics admit, more or less openly, the vital 
defects in Plan XVII. They wisely think that there is glory 
enough for the French Army in the great strategic successes 
of the latter part of the war. But occasionally some of Joffre's 
friends make a feeble effort to prove that the General Staff 
was not guilty of any faulty dispositions. A recent instance 
of this kind was an article by General Dupont in La Revue 
Militmre Francaise.^^ The whole burden of his excuse may 
be summed up by saying that the General Staff thought that 
Belgium would make some compromise with Germany, and 
that the violation of the former's territory would only be par- 
tial. He advances several interesting reasons which the Gen- 
eral Staff had for holding that belief. But he seems to be 
unaware that he is thereby not refuting the charge of the 
basic error, but on the contrary is confirming it. Much more 
to the point is the judgment of Lieutenant-Colonel Grouard, 
who, in the same number of La Revue Militaire Frangaise,"'^ 
makes the categorical pronouncement that "le haut commande- 

^ But in reply to a direct query, his Chief-of-Staff, General Hely 
d'Oissel, wrote to Lanrezac in December, 1916, denying that he had 
ever said that Lanrezac "had lost his head," and rendering credit to 
the latter's strategic dispositions for the fact that the Fifth Army was 
still intact at the time of the Battle of the Marne. 

^ La Revue Militaire Frangaise, July, 1921. 



PLAN XVII. 39 

ment frangais avait fait preuve d'un defaut absolu de sens 
strategique." 

In giving evidence before the Commission sur la Metal- 
lurgie Joffre asserted that the battle of the Marne was the out- 
come of a plan which he had conceived on August 25th. The 
report of the evidence shows that the President of the Com- 
mission was not disposed to agree with that statement. Nor 
does it seem to accord with the facts as known. It is on record 
that after Charleroi, after Joffre had admitted the compulsory 
abandonment of his offensive, Sir John French tried, and tried 
in vain, to find out from him what was his new plan. Joffre's 
enigmatic reply at St. Quentin, on August 26th, certainly did 
not correspond to what French had the right to expect. While 
it was, indeed, French himself who was the first to propose 
that a stand should be made on the Marne. On September 
1st he submitted a memorandum embodying this plan, which 
Joffre rejected on the following day as being impracticable 
under existing conditions. 

In any event, the necessary precedent of the Marne was the 
Battle of the Ourcq, which was engaged by Gallieni and the 
troops which were defending Paris, 

It was precisely on August 25th, at 11.30 a.m., that Joffre 
received an imperative order from the Minister of War (Mes- 
simy) that if he was forced to retreat he should detach three 
corps for the defence of Paris. For the Government, which 
had been careful not to interfere with the Commander-in- 
Chief, and which had been kept in complete ignorance by him, 
began to be alarmed about the safety of the capital; and all 
the more so because, when Gallieni had spent a day at the 
Grand Quartier General, Joffre's Chief-of-Staff had con- 
temptuously intimated that the fate of Paris was of little 
account : ^^ "Une ville comme toutes les autres." 

M. Maurice Violette, the Chairman of the Commission sur 
la Metallurgie, seemed to believe that Joffre had only acted 
upon compulsion in allotting troops for the defence of Paris, 
although the latter persisted in affirming that this order had 

^ See article by M. Messimy in the Revue de Pans, September 15th, 
1921. 



40 THE POMP OF POWER 

not in any way influenced his conduct. That statement is in 
absolute disaccord with the report of General Hirschauer 
(who was sent at this juncture to visit the General Staff) that 
the order was resented : which is confirmed by Messimy. 
While opinion is not unanimous, there is no general belief in 
military circles, either in France or elsewhere, that the retreat 
was part of a strategic plan which ended in the battle of the 
Marne. Neither M. Hanotaux's somewhat ecstatic account, 
nor the more sober narrative issued by the General Staff some 
months later, carries any conviction. The latter is a glaring 
example of a work written with one eye on posterity."^ An 
unprejudiced French authority — Lieutenant-Colonel de Thom- 
asson — has pronounced it to be interesting only subsequent 
to its relation to the battle of the Marne, the account of the 
initial plan of campaign and of the frontier battles being almost 
unintelligible and manifestly prejudiced. 

In the period between the collapse of Plan XVII. and the 
battle of the Marne Joffre's greatest value as Commander-in- 
Chief of the French Armies was clearly shown. For if his 
primary errors and subsequent obstinacy were responsible for 
the disasters which delivered to the enemy nine of the richest 
departments of France and affected the whole course of the 
war, yet his imperturbable calmness was effective in preventing 
a difficult and dangerous retreat from developing into some- 
thing more calamitous. 

General Mangin has written that in the battle of the Marne 
there is glory enough for both Gallieni and Joffre. 

Apparently the latter was of a different opinion. For a 
year later, in 191 5, irritated and provoked by the fact that 
many persisted in giving the major credit to Gallieni, he 
endeavoured to fix the latter's role by giving him the following 
citation : 

"Gallieni, General, Gouverneur Militaire et Commandant 
des Armees de Paris : 

"Commandant du Camp Retranche et des arniee de Paris, 

*■ Quatre Mois de Guerre, written by the French General Staff in 
December, 1914, for the use of the representatives of France abroad. 



PLAN XVII. 41 

et place le 2 Septembre, sous les ordres du Commandant-en- 
Chef , a fait preuve des plus hautes qualites militaires : 

**En contribuant, par les renseignements qu'il avait recueillis, 
a determiner la direction de marche prise par I'aile droite alle- 
mande. 

"En orientant judicieusement pour participer a la bataille les 
forces mobiles a sa disposition. 

"En facilitant par tous les moyens en son pouvoir I'accom- 
plissement de la mission assignee par le Commandant-en-Chef 
a ces forces mobiles." 

It is indisputable that this citation is ungenerous in its 
terms. But the bulk of opinion goes further. The general 
judgment seems to be that it does not present fairly or accu- 
rately the part taken by Gallieni, and that it was a deliberate 
attempt to deprecate what he had actually done. The only 
permanent result has been an unpleasant impression that Joffre 
was unduly jealous of anyone sharing the glory. 

Gallieni had a letter of service which designated him as 
Joffre's eventual successor as Commander-in-Chief. But 
Joffre told the Minister of War that he did not care to have 
him at the Grand Quartier General; and he was therefore left 
in Paris, doing little or nothing. Later Gallieni was entrusted 
with the defence of Paris; and from a conversation he had 
with Joffre by telephone, on August 30th, he got the idea that 
the latter considered the capital was doomed. 

It was undoubtedly Gallieni who first saw the opportunity 
to check the enemy. In 1920 M. Poincare disclosed that on 
September 3rd, 1914, the evening before he issued the order 
to Maunoury to attack the German flank, Gallieni had tele- 
graphed to the Government at Bordeaux stating that he 
thought there was a good opening. M. Poincare added : "It 
is therefore certain that the Commander-in-Chief of the 
Armies of Paris had spontaneously, from the first moment, a 
clear vision of the battle to be engaged." ^^ 

On the other hand, Joffre's General Order No. 48 (which 
arrived at Verdun on September 4th) referred to a renewal 
of the general offensive being undertaken "in some days." 
" See Le Matin, September 6th, 1920. 



42 THE POMP OF POWER 

This coincides with a complaint attributed to Joffre, that Gal- 
Heni's action had forced him to fight before he was ready to 
do so. Moreover, in rejecting Sir John French's suggestion 
that a stand should be made on the Marne, Joffre had written, 
on September 2nd, that "On account of events which have 
taken place during the last two days, I do not believe it possible 
at present to contemplate a general manoeuvre on the Marne 
with the totality of our forces." ^^ 

Undoubtedly had the Battle of the Marne been lost Joffre 
and the General Staff would have been blamed. It is, there- 
fore, manifestly unfair to seek to deprive them of credit for 
that victory. But, without Gallieni, there would have been no 
Battle of the Ourcq; and without the Battle of the Ourcq 
there would have been no Battle of the Marne. -^ The facts 
justify Clemenceau, who, on November nth, 1918, in 
announcing the Armistice to the Chambre des Deputes, said: 
"Without Gallieni the victory would have been impossible." 

But the real victors of the Battle of the Marne were the 
men, French and English,^^ who, after suffering for weeks 
from the direct effects of the false strategy, the faulty 
preparations, and the imperfect information of the General 
Staff, did all and more than was asked of them. 

Von Kliick, in explaining why he changed the direction of 
his Army, throws this salient fact into clearer relief than does 
any French writer.^^ 

He had followed the theory of the younger von Moltke 
(which had, indeed, been emphasised at a Kriegspiel a couple 
of years earlier) that a fortified camp should not be attacked 

^In one publication the letter reads "Deux jours"; in another "Deux 
heures"; but "Deux jours" appears to be the correct version. 

^ If Joffre and the General Staff had any definite plan to engage 
a battle elsewhere, which was upset by Gallieni's precipitation, they 
have never revealed it, although they had an official opportunity to do 
so when they gave evidence before the Commission sur la Metallurgie. 

'" With some exceptions, French critics state fairly the part taken by 
the British Expeditionary Force in the Battle of the Marne. 

" Neither von Kliick nor other German commanders seem to have 
much respect for the strategic abilities of any French general except 
Foch. Regarding who was responsible for the German retreat and 
the necessity for it, see article by Captain Koeltz in the Revue de Paris, 
September 15th, 1921, where the evidence is summed up in favour of 
von Kliick as against von Biilow. 



PLAN XVII. 43 

until the armies in the field had been overwhelmed; while 
undoubtedly Gallieni did not play the game according to the 
German rule when he himself ventured forth without having 
been attacked. But while making an allowance for that sur- 
prise von Kliick said: "If you want the material reasons of 
our check, look in the newspapers of the day: they will tell 
you about lack of munitions, about a defective commissariat: 
all that is exact. But there is a reason which transcends all the 
others; a reason which, in my opinion, is entirely decisive. 
It is the extraordinary and peculiar aptitude of the French 
soldier to recover quickly. That is a factor which it is difficult 
to translate into figures, and which, consequently, upsets the 
most precise and far-seeing calculations. That men may 
stand fast and be killed is an understood thing which is dis- 
counted in every plan of battle. But that men who have 
retreated during ten days, that men sleeping on the ground 
and half dead with fatigue, should be able to take up their 
rifles and attack when the bugle sounds, is a thing upon which 
we never counted. It was a possibility of which there was 
never any question in our schools of war." 



CHAPTER III 
The Fall of Joffre 

Shortly after the Battle of the Marne the French Grand 
Quartier General was established at Chantilly. There it 
remained so long as Joffre was Commander-in-Chief, the first 
of several moves being made soon after he was succeeded by 
Nivelle. 

Joffre's supercession in December, 191 6, had consequences 
which affected not only the conduct of the war, but, indirectly, 
the relations between the Allies. An examination of the causes 
of that change, and of the incidents which led up to it, is 
therefore pertinent. 

The Battle of the Marne obliterated, for the moment, all 
recollection of the failure of the strategy of the General Staff. 
Joffre's unfortunate persistence in his mistake about the Ger- 
man plans was likewise forgotten. To be deceived about what 
the enemy is going to do is often the most fatal of errors. 
But in the course of human events it is also the most common. 
Any other general might have been equally deluded. But 
Joffre did what no other French general could have done 
during the long and disastrous retreat. It was said of him 
by one of his officers that, "II distillait la confiance et la 
tranquillite comme d'autres distillent I'inquietude et I'agi- 
tation." That was the quality which, to some extent, was 
responsible for the unbroken morale of the soldier in the line, 
which so greatly surprised von Kliick. 

But Joffre's habit of disclosing nothing and of refusing to 
discuss anything was even more notable in time of war than 
it had been in days of peace. 

On the morning of August 3rd, 1914, the generals who were 
in command of the various French armies were summoned to 
the rue St. Dominique to meet the Commander-in-Chief. 
After the usual salutations General Dubail, who commanded 

44 



THE FALL OF JOFFRE 45 

the First Army, got up and pointed out that during the 
offensive of his army against Strasbourg he would need strong 
forces to cover his Right and Rear along the left bank of the 
Upper Rhine. 

Joffre simply answered : "This plan is yours ; it is not mine." 

Dubail, thinking that Joffre had not understood him, again 
explained his point. But Joffre, according to Lanrezac, "his 
face beaming with his customary benevolent smile," replied in 
exactly the same words. There was general embarrassment, 
and the conference ended. "One of my colleagues, visibly 
moved," records Lanrezac, "asked me, in confidence, whether 
I thought that General Joffre had an idea. I replied 'Yes' 
without hesitation, but my mind was clouded by a doubt." ^ 

At Chantilly Joffre was equally taciturn and secretive. But 
the disasters of the first few weeks had had their effect. No 
more was heard of an offensive a I'outrance. That doctrine 
was definitely abandoned, nor were there any further instruc- 
tions about artillery following the infantry; on the contrary, 
it was now specifically laid down that the artillery should pre- 
pare the way for infantry attacks. 

In his general idea Joffre seemed to go from one extreme 
to the other. While at Chantilly he did not want to take 
any risk. His sole belief was in the guerre d'usure; and val- 
uable time and more valuable lives were wasted in many fruit- 
less and partial attacks. For Joffre was convinced that the 
war was already won, and that it was only necessary to let 
time do its work in order to witness the collapse of Germany.^ 
When a certain plan was proposed, involving the construction 
of factories for munitions or artillery, Joffre protested that, 
as the work would take the better part of a year, it was useless 
to begin it, since the war would be won before the end of that 
period. 

That Joffre was not generous, and perhaps not even just, 

^ This incident has been given by Lanrezac, and has also been 
recounted in various French works ; but I have taken the EngHsh 
version as quoted in an article on Lanrezac in the National Review, 
March, 1921. 

^ Sir John French has confessed that he also thought that the Battle 
of the Marne was the beginning of the end. 



46 THE POMP OF POWER 

was shown by his treatment of Gallieni. He was jealous of 
any possible rival, and always careful lest he should be sup- 
planted. When de Castelnau was appointed Major-General, 
he insisted that, before he was sent to Chantilly, his powers 
should be more limited than the Government had proposed. 
While when de Castelnau actually arrived at the Grand Quar- 
tier General he was practically isolated and left with little or 
nothing to do. Joffre did not even let the Government into 
his full confidence, and during the operations of September, 
1914, he wrote to Gallieni warning him against communicat- 
ing anything to the Cabinet, which was then at Bordeaux, 

On the other hand, he arrogated to himself the right to 
correspond with Allied Governments entirely independently of 
the French Government; and upon one occasion at least this 
course nearly caused great trouble with Italy. In his pleni- 
tude of power, he dealt penalties and gave rewards, and was 
certainly not sparing of the former. The number of Generals 
whom he "limoged" is almost incredible. It is fair to add that 
he was quite impartial, and that only military considerations 
and not political persuasions were ever taken into account. 

He himself was an avowed Republican; and a Freemason 
whom the Grant Orient had felicitated upon his promotion in 
191 1. A Frenchman of high standing in the political world 
and a close friend of Joffre's who went to see him at Chantilly 
once sang to me the praises of the Commander-in-Chief, end- 
ing by saying: "et surtout il est un bon republicain." 

But if Joffre's friends made that a point in his favour, he 
himself was never influenced by it in dealing with others; 
although one of the chronicles of Chantilly does state that he 
once got angry because there was no meat on the table on 
Good Friday. Nor, like Sarrail, did he ever try to make capi- 
tal out of his republicanism. 

But while he never played politics, he was, as Andre Tardieu 
once observed, "a born deputy," as those who intrigued against 
him more than once discovered. He knew how to make and 
how to keep friends in the political world for his own pro- 
tection. Perhaps the most potent and the most active of these 
was M. Hue, Director of La Depeche de Toulouse, a journal 



THE FALL OF JOFFRE 47 

which, on account of its wide electoral influence in several 
Departments, has always more power upon the Government 
of the day than almost any Parisian newspaper. 

The members of Joffre's Staff were firmly attached to him. 
They were indeed too ardent, and in the end harmed him. He 
himself was by no means indifferent to his own renown. 
During the months when he was at Chantilly after the Battle 
of the Marne, presents poured in upon him from every part of 
the globe, while letters from those calling him the saviour of 
the world to those which only made some trivial request came 
by the thousands. M. de Pierrefeu says that Joffre shut 
himself up by the hour reading these missives — a statement 
which it is somewhat difficult to accept. 

So long as Millerand was Minister of War Joffre was 
secure. No complaint against him got any consideration what- 
ever. But in October, 191 5, GalHeni succeeded Millerand in 
the Briand Cabinet. It was only a few weeks earlier (on 
September 25th) that Joffre had issued the ungenerous and 
misleading citation in the Ordre de I'Armee regarding Gal- 
lieni's conduct in September, 1914. This citation was given a 
year after the Battle of the Marne in order to check the 
eulogies of Gallieni's foresight which, to Joffre's annoyance, 
were still being widely spread. 

But when in office Gallieni did not once show that he had 
any personal resentment on account of this or other incidents. 
Upon ever occasion when he mentioned Joffre's name in debate 
it was to defend or to praise him. 

The first difference of opinion between the Minister of War 
and the Commander-in-Chief arose in December, 191 5, when 
Colonel Driant was at his own request heard by the Army 
Commission of the Chambre des Deputes. Driant was both 
a soldier by profession and also Deputy for Nancy. Inci- 
dentally he was the son-in-law of General Boulanger. He 
told the Commission that the Verdun district, where he com- 
manded a sector, was entirely unprepared to resist any attack. 
The Commission communicated this startling statement to 
Gallieni, who was all the more moved by it because he was 
aware of Driant's worth. On December i6th he wrote to 



48 THE POMP OF POWER 

Joflfre saying that the Government had received accounts to 
the effect that in certain regions, amongst others Verdun, the 
necessary trench work had not yet been done. He asked for 
an assurance that upon all points of the Front the organisation 
of at least two lines had been completed, and enforced by 
barbed wire and other obstacles. 

On December i8th Joffre replied that orders had been given 
on October 22nd; that their execution had been constantly 
controlled; and that at the places mentioned there were three 
or four successive positions of defence, either finished or on 
the way to completion. Having given this assurance, Joffre 
complained of the Government attaching any credence to such 
reports ; asked to be told who had made them ; and threatened 
to resign if he was again troubled in that manner. Gallieni 
wrote a letter which by its tone alone should have given satis- 
faction to Joffre, and the incident seemed closed. 

But Driant was right and Joffre was wrong. In January, 
19 1 6, when de Castelnau returned from Salonica, Joffre sent 
him to inspect Verdun. He found that the defences were 
entirely insufficient, and gave orders that a regiment of 
engineers should be despatched to do the necessary work. 
Unfortunately, the Germans did not wait, but attacked on 
February 21st, and carried all before them. It was in this 
combat that Colonel Driant was killed while he was trying 
himself to safeguard the retreat of his men. 

I am referring to the Battle of Verdun simply to show to 
what extent it affected Joffre. It is therefore only necessary 
to recall that on February 24th, after Joffre, following his 
usual custom, had gone to bed early, the news became increas- 
ingly grave. De Castelnau wanted to see Joffre, but the officer 
on duty did not wish to awaken the Commander-in-Chief. 
But as the news became more serious de Castelnau returned to 
Joffre's villa and insisted. When the latter had read the 
despatches he agreed that de Castelnau should go at once to 
Verdun, and invested him with full powers. The latter arrived 
there the following morning, after passing through scenes 
which bore witness that growing disaster threatened to become 



THE FALL OF JOFFRE 49 

a panic ; and, after doing what he could to restore confidence, 
summoned Petain. 

When details came from Verdun the Government realised 
that the assurance given in Joffre's letter of December i8th 
had had no solid foundation. Verdun was not fortified as 
he had said it was. Gallieni was especially affected by this 
discovery. It confirmed him in the view which he had long 
held, that there should be some definite control over the High 
Command. On March 7th he read at a Cabinet meeting a 
memorandum, the gist of which was that steps should be 
taken to limit Joffre's power and to prevent him from usurping 
the functions of the Minister of War. Briand, who, for 
national reasons, wished to retain Joffre, would have liked 
Gallieni to withdraw this document. But the latter persisted 
in demanding that consideration should be given to his recom- 
mendation. When Gallieni found himself unable to obtain 
satisfaction he resigned, being succeeded by General Roques, 
who was known to be friendly to Joffre. 

There had already been numerous attacks upon Joffre from 
outside, and throughout his opponents had been pressing the 
Government to limit his powers, if not virtually to dispossess 
him of the supreme command. During March and April, 
19 1 5, anonymous memoranda had been sent to various depu- 
ties and others. Presumably an effort was made to sow the 
seed upon fertile soil. But sometimes the judgment of the 
authors was at fault, and their compilations fell into the wrong 
hands. These accusatory reports criticised Joffre unfairly, 
both for what he had done and for what he had neglected to 
do. They further complained that it was improper that he 
should appoint to the high commands without any control on 
the part of the Government ; and alleged that those to whom 
he had given armies were for the greater part not good Repub- 
licans. The tendency of these documents was to assert that 
there was only one general to whom, both for military and 
political reasons, the Republic could safely entrust the conduct 
of the war — Sarrail. The internal evidence makes it clear 
that these reports must have been the work of someone on, 
or in close communication with, Sarrail's staff. Although, as 



50 THE POMP OF POWER 

M. Mirmeix has justly remarked, it would be unfair, in the 
absence of any proof, to presume that they were written or 
distributed with the knowledge or assent of that general. 

But what some were thus spreading secretly others were 
saying more openly. Finally, in a letter to Briand, dated 
November i8th, 191 5, M. Leon Accambray, deputy for Laon, 
advanced practically the same charges, with the addition of a 
direct eulogy of Sarrail. Accambray reiterated this when 
speaking in the Chambre des Deputes. But Briand, who, as a 
persuasive parliamentarian, has no equal in France, was deter- 
mined to retain Joffre. He used his influence over the Cham- 
bre, while at the same time he gave some more or less illusory 
satisfaction by making certain changes in the composition not 
of the Conseil Superieur de la Guerre, but in that of the Conseil 
Superieur de la Defense Nationale. 

In reality this left Jofifre's position unchanged, while, as a 
matter of fact, his authority had recently been extended. In 
July, 191 5, Joffre had removed Sarrail from the command of 
the Third Army, after the circulation of the secret memoranda 
(March-April, 1915), but before Accambray's letter to Briand. 
Sarrail's political friends (and he had always been active in 
politics) had made every effort to get him reinstated, but 
Joffre had held firm. The Government had, therefore, in 
August, 191 5, given Sarrail the command of the Army of the 
Orient, the formation of which began from that time. Joffre 
was unwilling to lessen his forces by allowing troops to go to 
Salonica. In his view it would have been unwise to run any 
risk of weakening the Western Front by sending men to rein- 
force such an expedition. Moreover, Lord Kitchener, then 
Minister of War, upon his return from Greece, in November, 
191 5, had pronounced absolutely against the proposed army. 
The question was to be finally decided at a conference of the 
Allies on December 4th. Briand, to whom history will give 
full credit for the Salonica expedition, showed his habitual 
cleverness. By one and the same stroke both secured the 
active support of Joffre at Calais (which doubtless turned the 
scale, although it did not then convince Kitchener), and satis- 
fied Joffre's susceptibilities about an independent army in the 



THE FALL OF JOFFRE 51 

East; for on the eve of the conference Joffre was named 
Commander-in-Chief of all the French Armies, which thus 
again made Sarrail his subordinate. 

So long as it was a matter of political manoeuvring against 
the friends of Sarrail and against those who thought that 
Joffre's powers were too extensive, and his conduct too arbi- 
trary, Briand was still able to control the situation. Neverthe- 
less, Jofifre's position was no longer the same. Gallieni had 
been a tower of strength, for his testimony in favour of the 
Commander-in-Chief was that of a soldier whose eminent 
services and brilliant talents were unquestioned — who had no 
political connections — and who, as was well known, had little 
reason to be friendly to Joffre or to the Grand Quartier 
General. But, precisely for the same reason, the fact that he 
had finally demanded the curtailment of Joffre's activities, and 
had resigned because Briand did not support him on that point, 
had undermined Joffre's position — and more so than was at 
first apparent, Roques had not the same military reputation ; 
while his very friendship with Joffre was rather a source of 
weakness in the Chambre, until his favourable report on Sar- 
rail (whose army he had gone to inspect at the demand of the 
Allies in November, 191 6) had silenced the latter's friends. 

Nevertheless, Briand would probably have been able to 
maintain Joffre had it not been for the Battle of the Somme. 
For it is a curious fact that the cumulative effect of Verdun 
and of the Somme were (though for very different reasons) 
responsible for the removal of Joffre on the one side, and on 
the other of Falkenhayn, who was succeeded by Hindenburg 
and Ludendorf. 

The disappointment in France at the result of the Battle of 
the Somme solidified the feeling that the country could not 
continue to stand the deadly but unproductive warfare of which 
Joffre was the admitted protagonist. In some quarters he was 
also now blamed for the Roumanian fiasco. The irritation that 
no effective control should have been exercised over the mili- 
tary adventures of a country which the Allies had aided both 
with supplies and technical missions was natural. But there 
were reasons, clear, if not at first obvious, why the Rou- 



52 THE POMP OF POWER 

manians were pretty well bound to have their own way. || 
While, moreover, they had had a right to count upon that ' 
promised Russian assistance which had not been forthcoming. 
In any event it was unjust to hold Joffre responsible for what 
happened merely because he commanded all the French Armies, ^i 
and had sent to Roumania General Berthelot, who had been '| 
his right arm at the Battle of the Marne. 

Briand, however, had no longer to meet either secret or i 
flimsy charges. He was faced with facts and with a current '| 
of public opinion, supported by such men as Paul Doumer, I 
whose close connection with Gallieni, during the siege of Paris, 
did not make him any more favourable to Joffre. 

If Briand could have had his own way he would have 
retained Joffre while restricting his powers, as he had always 
been willing to do so far as possible. It is doubtful whether, 
at this period, he had any great faith in Joffre as a military 
genius, or in the correctness of his mode of warfare. But he 
realised, as he had always done, that Joffre was an invaluable 
asset on account of the effect his name and personality had on 
the Allies. Above all, he thought that if unity of command 
were ever feasible, it would be easier to get the Allies to 
accept it under Joffre than under any other French General. 
How well founded was this belief was proved by the fact 
that when, eighteen months later, the question of a unique 
commander was being actively discussed. Colonel House, who 
represented President Wilson, at once suggested Joffre, 
although the latter had taken no part in the direction of the 
war during the previous campaign. But with his keen sense 
of political atmosphere Briand felt that this time it would be 
impossible to cover Joffre fully. Therefore, before the secret 
session of November 28th, 1916, he did his utmost to persuade 
the latter to agree to relinquish the direct command of the 
armies, while accepting some other and less well-defined post. 
But even to Briand, most seductive of statesmen, Joffre was 
adamant. He wanted what he had or nothing at all. He 
refused to resign. Let Briand remove him if he wished to 
do so. These sterile interviews succeeded each other for days ; 
some being held at the Elysee in the presence of Poincare. In 



THE FALL OF JOFFRE 53 

the meantime the secret session continued, but it was impossible 
to make any progress before Joffre's future was settled. 
Finally, on December 3rd, 191 6, Joffre yielded. The next day 
Briand told the Chambre des Deputes that Joffre was to leave 
Chantilly for Paris, that a new Commander of the Armies 
of the North and North-East would be appointed (who would 
have no control over the Army of the Orient) ; and that the 
powers of the Grand Quartier General were to be restricted. 

Upon this declaration the Chambre gave the Government 
the vote of confidence which Briand needed, A Presidential 
Decree of December 13th defined, but somewhat vaguely, 
Joffre's future duties : "Le General Joft're, Commandant-en- 
Che f, des Armees Frangaises, remplit aupres du Gouvernement 
le role de conseiller technique en, ce qui concerne la direction 
de la Guerre." 

It had been intended that Joffre should still retain most of 
his staff. A large house had been taken at Neuilly and was 
being put in order to receive them. Those who were to accom- 
pany the General had already arranged to leave Chantilly on a 
fixed day. But although Briand had come to terms with the 
Chambre he had still to get the assent of the Senate. The 
news of Joffre's proposed installation with his staff, against 
whom there had been so many complaints, was received unfa- 
vourably by Paul Doumer and his friends. It was thought that 
it would simply mean Chantilly in Neuilly : that the Govern- 
ment would not have that control, and that Nivelle (who, on 
December 13th, had been named to succeed Joffre in command 
of the Armies of the North and North-East) would not have 
that freedom of action which Parliament desired. The secret 
sessions of the Senate were held between December 19th and 
23rd. Briand recognised the determination of the majority. 
He therefore assured the Senate that Joffre would have no 
further independent power; and that instead of going to 
Neuilly he was to be at the Hotel des Invalides with a small 
secretariat. Upon this statement he obtained the vote. 

Briand, whose political position was already weakened, had 
placed the resignation of his Ministry in the hands of the 
President, and had received permission to form a new Govern- 



54 THE POMP OF POWER 

ment. This he had done on December nth, having a small 
Cabinet, with General Lyautey as Minister of War. The 
latter only arrived from Morocco some time later. He at once 
refused to take possession of his office on the ground that 
after his appointment, but before his arrival, certain steps had 
been taken without his knowledge and for which he would 
not accept responsibility. Amongst other things he complained 
of the appointment of Joffre as the Technical Adviser to the 
Government. In his opinion that was the natural function 
of the Minister of War, or of those whom he might call into 
consultation. 

Upon the other hand, it would seem that Joffre was not 
contented with his anomalous position, and that indirectly he 
made some overtures to secure the baton of a marechal of 
France, which had some weeks earlier been held out as a bait 
by Briand in his attempt to secure his resignation. Advantage 
was taken of this opening, and Joffre was relieved of the 
office he had held for less than two weeks : about the only thing 
he had done was to remove Foch from his command upon the 
plea that he needed a rest. On December 26th a Presidential 
Decree named Joffre Marechal of France, the first marechal 
created by the Third French Republic. 

From that day Joffre had no further part in the conduct of 
the war. 

Of the extent of Joffre's capacity it is difficult to judge. 

His calmness is as legendary as his taciturnity. He slept 
soundly during the most trying times. The late M. Etienne, 
once Minister of War, and always friendly to Joffre, acquired 
during the Battle of Verdun the habit of telephoning to Chan- 
tilly every evening about eleven o'clock. Needless to say, 
Joffre had then been asleep for some hours : an invariable 
answer which always satisfied M. Etienne. Equally well 
known is the story of how one day in August, 1914, he was 
lunching at British Headquarters when Sir John French (who 
had been singularly unsuccessful in trying to make Joffre talk 
about his plans) was called away suddenly by the news that 
part of his army was in a desperate position : and Joffre 
remained and calmly finished his own luncheon. 



THE FALL OF JOFFRE 55 

But these qualities of silence and impassivity which were 
at times an undoubted asset, were also perhaps at other 
moments injurious to his reputation. Not only did he say 
little but it seemed to be a positive effort for him to talk. One 
of Kitchener's colleagues in the Cabinet has mentioned that he 
was so silent that he generally appeared dense, if not stupid : 
but that from time to time, very occasionally — he made a 
remark which was like a brilliant flash of lightning in the 
darkness — it illuminated everything for an instant. But 
Joffre's silence was more complete, more consistent, and more 
stolid than that. It is therefore difficult to say whether it 
covered any original creative ideas. The impression which he 
gave to Lanrezac and other army commanders on August 2nd, 
19 14, was that it probably did not. His own evidence before 
the Commission sur la Metallurgie, and especially when 
attempts were made to find out how far he was responsible for 
the plan of 1914, and to what extent he had prepared for any 
eventualities, was lamentable. 

Joffre certainly was a formidable personage. But he was 
impressive partly because he did not and could not be made 
to talk, even when he might reasonably be expected to do so. 
His failure, or possibly his inability, to do so upon these latter 
occasions sometimes appeared to his personal disadvantage; 
and raised the doubt as to whether his silence originated 
entirely in his love of secrecy or in the fact that there was 
really nothing behind it which he could produce. 

It is curious to compare with this the characteristic way in 
which Foch converses. It was quite typical that on the his- 
toric day of the Doullens meeting he should have spoken as 
follows : "Heu ! Vous connaissez ma methode. Heu ! Je 
colle un pain a cacheter la, puis un la. puis un autre la — le 
Boche n'avance presque plus. J'en colle encore un. Et le 
Boche est fixe. On fixe toujours le Boche."^ 

This difference between Joffre's and Foch's style of con- 
versation was entirely illustrative of the diversity of their 

^ Anyone familiar with Sir Henry Wilson's conversation will note 
the remarkable similarity. Foch's words translated into colloquial English 
would sound as if they proceeded directly from Wilson. 



56 THE POMP OF POWER 

ideas about the way in which the war should be prosecuted. 
Foch's words picture graphically his mode of annoying the 
enemy, until he could seize the favourable moment to crush 
him. Joffre, on the other hand, believed in the guerre d'usure. 
He pinned his faith absolutely to wearing out the Germans on 
the Western Front. In this he resembled Sir William Robert- 
son. But Robertson always thought that the war would last 
some time, and was never at any moment confident that victory 
was near — if only because there were too many wicked poli- 
ticians in the world : whereas it was one of Joffre's fixed ideas 
that he was always on the point of winning the war, and that 
therefore it was unnecessary to provide for what might happen 
a year or so ahead. 

In the course of time it was seen that Jofifre's policy of war- 
fare was likely to prove more fatal to his own country than 
to the enemy : and this conviction led to the downfall of the 
victor of the Marne. 



I 



CHAPTER IV 
The Nivelle Offensive 

"En 191 5 nous avons marche comme des enfants, en 1916 
comme des vieillards : il faut enfin marcher comme des 
hommes." 

That was the current saying towards the end of 19 16. But 
to do that — to get away from the guerre d'usure — it was 
necessary to find a successor to Joffre, 

Many things had to be taken into consideration in making 
that choice, some of them not of a military nature. The 
French Legislature has a far closer control over the Army in 
time of war than has the British Parliament. Both the Cham- 
bre des Deputes and the Senat have Army commissions which 
do active work, and which few Governments can afford to 
ignore. In 1916 these commissions were given further powers, 
whereby some of their members became practically inspectors 
of, or delegates to, the Army. Such a system is in direct accord 
with the practice which prevailed during the Revolution and 
later. It is not for a foreigner to comment upon how far this 
is congruous, further than to say that its advantages would 
be manifest, even overwhelming, if the military and civil pow- 
ers were thus led to agree. Unfortunately, that is rarely the 
case. The more usual result is distrust on the part of the 
soldier, and recrimination on the part of the politician. 

All Parliamentary privileges had, at the outset of the War, 
been so overridden by Joffre that later there was almost a revolt 
in order to recover them. At the moment, therefore, the 
Government found it all the more necessary to consider political 
prejudices when choosing a new Commander-in-Chief. 

Several names were bruited abroad during the months pre- 
ceding Joffre's resignation. 

De Castelnau, having been Major-General since December, 

57 



58 THE POMP OF POWER 

191 5, might be said to be in the line of succession. It was true 
that he had not been the active coadjutor of Joffre, as was 
intended when he was appointed. But that was entirely due to 
the narrow jealousy of the Commander-in-Chief, who either 
kept him idle at Chantilly, or sent him on missions of inspec- 
tion to Salonica or Verdun : although his second visit to Ver- 
dun, when he went to save the situation, was of a more 
important nature. De Castelnau's military reputation was of 
the highest. He was remembered as the defender of Nancy, 
and as the victor of Grand Couronne. He was esteemed in the 
Army, and his name had become popular in the country. But 
while he had then never taken part in politics (he is to-day a 
deputy), he was thought not to be a very fervent Republican. 
He was known to be a practising Catholic : and, referring to 
some comments in the press, he one day laughingly introduced 
himself to Clemenceau as "le Capucin botte" : de Castelnau 
could afford to laugh at any insinuations that his religious 
belief affected the performance of his military duties. While 
how little he was a fanatic was shown by the composition of 
his staff at Chantilly: a chaplain (Father Pierre de Castelnau, 
his nephew) and three officers, one of whom was a Protestant, 
while another professed to be an advanced free-thinker. But 
to the members of the Extreme Left (aside, probably, from 
Gustav Herve, who had on a similar occasion chivalrously 
defended him) de Castelnau's appointment would have been 
distasteful. H they could not have Sarrail in supreme com- 
mand, at least they did not want to have "le Capucin botte." 

Sarrail was at all times a possibility. Pie was then in com- 
mand of the Army of the Orient ; but his political friends 
were perpetually urging that his proper place was at the head 
of all the Armies of the Republic. Sarrail was a general of 
considerable ability, and an energetic but turbulent personality. 
He prided himself above all on being a true Republican. 
Painleve said that he was the only really Republican general. 
More intrigues were set in motion for him than for anyone 
else, and in the end they harmed him. 

His conduct at the Battle of the Marne, where, in order to 
defend Verdun, he almost exceeded the latitude of discretion 



THE NIVELLE OFFENSIVE 59 

given him, entitles him to great credit, and it is too little 
known. In Macedonia he was, upon the whole, not so suc- 
cessful in his military operations. But he was the last man 
who should have been sent to command an Army made up of 
the forces of various Allies. He managed to fight with all of 
them long before he fought with the enemy. His way of show- 
ing his contempt for religion, which, as a free-thinker, he 
seemed to imagine it was incumbent upon him to do, 
was distasteful to English officers; who, whether or not they 
had any deep religious feeling, were imbued with the instinct 
of respecting the religion of others. Nor were they impressed 
by the constant flaunting of their Republicanism by a General 
and Staff whose primary duty was to win battles. With the 
Staffs of the Italian and Russian commands Sarrail was 
equally unpopular. 

Moreover, Sarrail appeared to busy himself with political 
intrigues more than anything else. It is true that he had no 
confidence in Constantin or in his word, and was inclined to 
treat that personage in the way he richly deserved. But our 
political manoeuvres were out of place in a General command- 
ing an Allied Army, and excited all the more apprehension 
because of Sarrail's well-known violent character. 

He was perpetually demanding that more troops should be 
sent to him, while he seemed to be doing little with the consid- 
erable number which were already under his command. Thus 
he gave rise to the complaints which soon began to rain thick 
and fast upon Paris from the different Allied Governments. 
They were complaints which could not be ignored, for England 
and Italy flatly refused to reinforce the Salonica Expedition 
until they had been completely reassured about the actual con- 
dition of the Army of the Orient, and had had some report 
upon the doings of Sarrail. It was in these circumstances 
that Briand agreed with the British and Italian Governments 
to send Roques, then Minister of War, to Salonica, to inquire 
into the whole situation. Roques's report was favourable. 
While its effect was strengthened when a few days later 
(November 19th, 191 6) Sarrail took Monastir. England and 
Italy were, or professed to be, content ; merely stipulating that 



60 THE POMP OF POWER 

henceforth Sarrail should confine himself to his military duties 
and leave political matters to those who were charged to con- 
duct them. 

Unfortunately the fault-finding did not cease for long. The 
idea was now widespread that Sarrail, using his Army for that 
purpose, wanted to overthrow the monarchy and set up a 
republic in Greece. It is probable that he never had any 
such well-defined intention, but both his general bearing and 
his manifold indiscretions were such that there was little cause 
to wonder if many believed this rumour. 

In December, 1916, Lord Bertie, who, in the name of the 
British Government, had already remonstrated about Sarrail, 
again impressed upon Briand that he must be kept apart from 
all political action : adding that, ahhough Sarrail was a French 
General, he commanded an Allied Army. 

This time Briand determined to let Sarrail speak for him- 
self. The English, French, and Italian Prime Ministers were 
to meet in Rome in January. Briand summoned Sarrail to 
come and explain his conduct, while on his part he agreed that 
his Government would abide by the decision of Lloyd George 
and Sonnino. 

Sarrail won the day. His appearance and his wonderful 
lucidity of expression had their effect upon Lloyd George, 
who pronounced himself satisfied. It is curious that the two 
French Generals who most impressed Lloyd George before 
they had actually succeeded (for the Prime Minister is as 
susceptible as anyone else to acquired success) were Sarrail 
and Nivelle : both for the same reason, their demeanour and 
the clearness with which they put their case and answered 
questions. 

Some months later the same allegations were again being 
made against Sarrail, and the satisfaction of Lloyd George 
had disappeared. But Painleve was then in power (first as 
'Minister of War in the Ribot Cabinet, and then as Prime 
Minister), and to Painleve Sarrail was sacred : the only Repub- 
lican General. The situation had then become critical in 
Macedonia, not only on account of the complaints of the 
Allies, but because of mutinies which had broken out amongst 



THE NIVELLE OFFENSIVE 61 

the French troops. Foch wished to send a Questionnaire to 
Sarrail, in an endeavour to find out the exact position. But 
such was Painleve's regard for the latter that he refused to 
allow even that to be done, despite Foch's urgent insistence. 

Painleve resigned on November 13th and on November i6th 
was succeeded by Clemenceau. The day after the Inter- Allied 
War Council meeting on December 4th (when the complaints 
about Sarrail had been reiterated) Clemenceau began to exam- 
ine the documents relating to the Army of the Orient. On 
December 7th Sarrail was ordered to return to France. To 
the questions which were put to him in Parliament Clemenceau 
answered bluntly that discipline had disappeared to such an 
extent that the Army was almost in a state of dissolution; 
while, if unity of command could not be rendered acceptable 
to the Allies in the Orient, there would be little chance of ever 
getting them to agree to it on the Western Front. 

Sarrail possesses military talent (although it was not shown 
to the best advantage in Macedonia), which is reinforced by a 
vigorous personality. There was every reason to believe that 
he would be one of the great chiefs at the end of the war. 
But his inability to keep clear of politics, and the intrigues of 
his friends for him and against his supposed rivals, practically 
ruined his career. 

He did, however, have one more chance. The incident is 
curious and typical. In the dark days of March, 19 18, Cle- 
menceau considered the possibility of appointing a Governor 
of Paris, who, by his energy, might perhaps inspire confidence, 
as Gallieni had done in 1914. It was suggested to him that 
the only available general with the requisite character was 
Sarrail. Clemenceau hesitated. But he finally directed that the 
offer should be made to Sarrail, who was sent for and told of 
the proposal. 

"I would only accept upon one condition," he at once 
answered. 

"What is it?" 

"That Caillaux should be set at liberty." 

He was reminded that he was being asked to perform a mili- 
tary duty, and that he could hardly make a political act — if not 



62 THE POMP OF POWER 

an interference with the course of justice — a condition of 
doing so. But Sarrail held firm, and when he returned the next 
day to give his positive reply he said that he had nothing to 
add to his former statement. When that was reported to Cle- 
menceau he asked how long Sarrail had to serve before he 
went on the retired Hst in the ordinary course. 

On April 14th, 1918, Sarrail was placed on the Cadre de 
Reserve. He was at that date only 62 years of age.^ 

But at the time of Joffre's retirement Sarrail was not an 
absolute impossibility as his successor. Nevertheless, his 
name got more advertisement than real consideration. His 
quarrel with Joffre, and the way in which his friends had 
subsequently forced the Government to give him another com- 
mand, had deepened the impression regarding his difficult char- 
acter. Except amongst the Extreme Left there was general 
relief when he was at a distance from Paris. 

Foch was naturally considered as a likely successor to Joffre, 
but, for reasons which are obscure, there were at this time 
persistent rumours that his health was undermined, and that 
he was too fatigued to be entrusted with a high command. The 
one thing which seems clear is that there was no foundation 
for these reports. They were, however, spread with such 
persistency that they undoubtedly injured his chances. His 
opponents of the Extreme Left were thus relieved from the 
necessity of combating his appointment. For, to some of 
these Extremists, Foch was objectionable because he, like 
de Castelnau, was a practising Catholic. 

During the few days in December when Joffre was Con- 
seiller Technique he removed Foch from his command of the 
group of the Armees du Nord. However, that did not affect 
the question, as the matter had already been decided. For 
Joffre took this step on the very same day, December 13th, 
1 91 6, that the name of his own successor as Commander-in- 
Chief was announced. In reality, Foch's health was so little 
impaired that, after reorganising the defence of the Swiss 
frontier in January, 19 17, and, later, going on a mission to 

* I do not cite my authority for this incident, but it was related to 
me by the politician who made the ofifer. 



THE NIVELLE OFFENSIVE 63 

Italy, he Was, in May, 191 7, appointed by Painleve Chief of 
the General Staif, which post he held until he took command 
of the Allied Armies. 

The appointment of Petain was also contemplated as a 
possibility. In August, 19 14, Petain was a colonel who was 
approaching the age when, holding that rank, he would be 
placed on the retired list. He had been a distinguished pro- 
fessor at the War School, and was known as a soldier who 
was devoted to his profession and seemed to have few interests 
outside of it. 

His advancement had been slow in time of peace, but it 
was strikingly rapid once the country entered on war. In 
October, 1914, he was given command of an Army Corps. 
His brilliant action at Vimy in June, 1915 (during what the 
French call the second Battle of Artois), again attracted the' 
favourable notice of Joffre, who, later in the same month, 
gave him the command of the Second Army in succession to 
de Castelnau, who was then promoted to command a group of 
Armies. He had participated in the offensive of the autumn 
of 191 5 (the Battle of Champagne), but during the winter 
his Army seems to have been dispersed : and he was alone with 
his staff at Noailles when de Castelnau summoned him to 
Verdun in all haste in February, 1916. At Verdun Petain 
added to his reputation. On his military record there were 
just grounds for considering his claims, together with those of 
Foch and de Castelnau, in selecting a new Commander-in- 
Chief. 

Sarrail (whose suspicions about other generals seemed to 
occupy a good deal of his thoughts) apparently had some 
doubts about the quality of Petain's Republicanism. He is 
said once to have warned Clemenceau against him : 

"He is not one of us." 

"Much I care about that, provided he can win a battle," 
Clemenceau had replied. 

As a matter of fact, Petain was not credited with holding 
religious opinions so pronounced or extreme as to hurt the 
tender susceptibilities of the Extreme Left. But he had 
another marked characteristic, very different, but in their eyes 



64 THE POMP OF POWER 

equally objectionable. He did not care for politicians, and still 
less did he care to have them paying visits to his Army. When 
they did come he was polite, and no more than polite. He left 
them in little doubt that in his opinion they were a nuisance. 
Equally independent and reserved, he was incapable of con- 
cealing his feelings or making any pretence. He made few 
friends, but he had a habit of saying things which were likely 
to make enemies. To Poincare he once remarked : "Personne 
n'est mieux placee que vous, M. le President, de savoir que la 
France est ni gouvernee ni commandee." 

Poincare, not unnaturally annoyed, replied: 

"Vous plaisantez, mon General." 

"Pas du tout,'' responded Petain. 

It is evident that a man who was so blunt and mordant in 
expressing his opinions would not be much liked by politicians. 
Nevertheless, it seemed probable that, in default of anyone else, 
he would have to be chosen : when suddenly a new name began 
to be mentioned. 

In August, 1914, Nivelle had, like Petain, been a colonel, 
but a colonel of Artillery. At the Battle of the Marne, where 
he commanded the artillery of the Sixth Corps, he had dis- 
tinguished himself by destroying six German batteries. Pro- 
moted General of Division (the highest rank in the French 
Army, the title of Marshal of France indicating a dignity 
and not a military grade), he later succeeded Petain, first in 
command of the XXXII. Corps, and later in that of the 
Second Army. It was in the latter post that his name sud- 
denly became known to the public. The Germans had taken 
the fortress of Douamont, and the Emperor had announced 
this capture to all the world in one of his customary pompous 
allocutions. But on November 15th it was recaptured by Gen- 
eral Mangin, who commanded under Nivelle. The exploit was 
brilliant, and its fame was increased by the way in which 
Wilhelm had boasted when his Brandenburgers had walked 
into the fortress. 

All this attracted attention to the commander of the Second 
Army. The senators and deputies who began to visit him 
found a soldier with whom they could talk. He was neither 



THE NIVELLE OFFENSIVE 65 

silent, like Joffre, nor biting, like Petain. While they were 
chiefly impressed, as everyone always was, by the clearness 
with which he explained everything — a quality which always 
endears a soldier to civilians. As he was a Protestant, the 
Extreme Left had no objections against him on the score of 
religion; while he had always kept clear of politics. ParHa- 
mentary opinion (upon which M. Briand was getting more 
dependent in proportion as his Government grew weaker) 
gradually centred upon him; and finally, on December 12th 
or 13th, 1916, Nivelle (whose mother was English and whose 
grandfather had been a British colonel) was appointed to 
succeed Joffre. Some two weeks later Lyautey's prompt 
action, as Minister of War, removed Joffre (as has already 
been related) from an ill-defined position, where he might 
have had some control over operations. Nivelle was then in 
supreme command ; not, indeed, with the same powers as 
Joffre had once exercised, but responsible to no one except the 
Minister of War. 

As Chef de Cabinet Nivelle brought with him to Chantilly 
(which the G. O. G. soon afterwards left for Beauvais) an 
officer whose name to this day remains little known to the 
public, but who, behind the scenes, played a principal part in 
the events which rapidly followed — Lieut.-Colonel d'Alenson. 
Noticeable on account of his extraordinary height, dark to the 
verge of blackness, thin as a skeleton — such was his appear- 
ance. In manner, taciturn and absent-minded. In conduct, 
self-willed to the limit of obstinacy: and enthusiastic for his 
own beliefs to the point of being a fanatic. It was d'Alenson, 
and probably d'Alenson alone, who was responsible for the 
absolute faith which Nivelle always expressed in the result of 
his operations, and in the extent of their success : although 
none of his generals seem to have shared his views on the 
latter point. D'Alenson was a dying man, as his appearance 
indicated. He was convinced that, following certain lines, 
Nivelle would win the war in time for him to see the victory. 
Instead, he saw Nivelle's failure, and only survived a few 
months thereafter. 

At Verdun everything had succeeded with Nivelle : it was 



66 THE POMP OF POWER 

therefore not remarkable that he counted upon those who had 
aided him there to second him in the greater task he was now 
undertaking: especially upon Mangin (one of the greatest of 
French fighting generals, and who, years before, had, with 
Marchand, faced Kitchener at Fashoda), to whom he gave 
the command of the Sixth Army, which numbered 350,000 
men. 

But although Nivelle was in supreme command, he inher- 
ited a plan of offensive which, in its main outlines, had been 
drafted by a meeting of Allied Generals held at Chantilly, 
November 15th and i6th, 1916, Acting upon this, Joffre, 
shortly before he retired, had prepared a plan whereby the 
French were to attack between the Somme and Lassigny, and 
the British between Bapaume and Vimy. Nivelle, however, 
changed the plan by extending the proposed front from Sois- 
sons to Rheims : and it was on this extension, by an attack 
on the "plateau" of Craonne, that he thought he would be 
able in some hours to force the German position. 

In order to carry out the whole plan Nivelle attempted to 
persuade Haig to take over the Front as far as Roye. The 
latter made various objections; and finally Nivelle went to 
London to try to wring from the Cabinet a decision which he 
had been unable to get from Haig. 

In this he was fully successful. Lloyd George, as well as 
the other members of the War Cabinet, were all impressed by 
his appearance, his confidence, and above all by his clarity of 
expression; while the fact that he spoke English probably 
counted not a little (even if unconsciously) with politicians 
who were by this time getting somewhat tired of being 
dependent upon interpreters. They cited Nivelle as the first 
French general they had met who would tell them freely what 
he meant to do, and who could also tell them in a way they 
understood. A month later (on February 15th, 191 7) Lloyd 
George, coming into a room where Berthier de Sauvigny (one 
of the French military attaches) was having a conversation 
with Colonel Hankey, told (I translate Berthier de Sauvigny 's 
own account of this conversation as given in an official pub- 
lication) "how profound had been the impression produced on 



THE NIVELLE OFFENSIVE 67 

the War Committee by General Nivelle. Doubtless, the pres- 
tige which Marshal Haig enjoyed in the Army and amongst 
the English nation would not allow them to subordinate him 
purely and simply to the French Commander; but if the War 
Committee recognised that this measure was indispensable, it 
would not hesitate to give Marshal Haig secret injunctions in 
that sense." 

On February 26th or 27th an Allied Conference took place 
at Calais. Lloyd George, Haig, Robertson, Briand, Lyautey, 
and Nivelle were amongst those present. The result of this 
meeting was a signed agreement whereby in effect the British 
Government recognised that the direction of the coming cam- 
paign should be in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief of 
the French Army: and agreed that, with certain limitations, 
Haig should, but for those operations only, be under the orders 
of Nivelle. 

This arrangement was made more difficult by the fact that 
Haig was now a Field-Marshal (which in the British Army is 
a rank and not simply a dignity), while Nivelle was only a 
General of Division, which corresponds to a British Lieutenant- 
General. But, nevertheless, once it was signed, Nivelle did 
not wait an instant to take full advantage of it. For on 
February 27th he sent (it is thought at the instance of d'Alen- 
son) a letter of instructions couched in terms such as would 
only be used by a superior officer to his subordinate. Apart 
from the tone of the communication, Haig probably was by 
no means in accord with some of the things he was directed 
to do ; for instance, that he should increase the importance of 
the British Mission at French G. Q. G. ; and that, upon his 
return from Russia (where he was then on a mission with 
de Castelnau, Lord Revelstoke, and others), he should place 
Sir Henry Wilson at the head of the Mission. 

Haig did not take the trouble to discuss the contents of this 
letter. He simply sent it to the Chief of the Imperial Staff, 
Sir William Robertson, together with a letter of his own (of 
which he sent a copy to Nivelle) in which he re-opened the 
whole question of his having been put under the orders of the 
French Commander-in-Chief. 



68 THE POMP OF POWER 

Haig might possibly have won his point ( for although Lloyd 
George was entirely against him, he did not care to take the 
risk of exasperating him to breaking point) had not Briand 
intervened. The French Prime Minister (who never found 
Haig very congenial) sent the British Government a message 
of the most vigorous nature, insisting that Haig should be 
made to respect the Calais agreement; and saying that "the 
repeated tendencies of Marshal Haig to evade the instructions 
which are given him . . , render the co-operation of the 
British illusory and the exercise of a unique command impos- 
sible." 

Briand's blunt statements led to another meeting in London, 
on March 13th, between the British War Cabinet, Ribot, Haig, 
and Nivelle. In the result Haig signed a letter stating that he 
accepted the Calais agreement, but specifying that, except for 
the period of the proposed operation, the British Army and its 
Commander-in-Chief were to be considered by Nivelle as 
allies and not as subordinates. The terms of the letter show 
that Haig was acting more upon compulsion than in accordance 
with his own wishes. 

Briand's telegram, however, was, in one respect, uninten- 
tionally unfair — when he suggested that Haig was in the habit 
of evading what he had undertaken to do. To say that there 
were never any differences of opinion between Haig and the 
French High Command or the French Government would be 
absurd. There were many. French statesmen thought Haig 
unduly obstinate, sometimes because he insisted upon follow- 
ing his own views instead of adopting theirs. One often heard 
Haig criticised. While I see in my diary for 191 8 the record 
of a conversation with a French Cabinet Minister (needless to 
say, not the Minister of War), in which were some forcible 
comments upon the British Commander-in-Chief. But even 
those who were not amongst Haig's admirers never then 
impugned his loyalty. Undoubtedly he did not care to be 
under the orders of Nivelle any more than he is supposed to 
have wanted unity of command until March, 19 18. But it 
may be taken for granted that if he objected to Nivelle's letter 



THE NIVELLE OFFENSIVE 69 

it was because he thought it was not in accord with the Calais 
agreement. 

This service, however, was the last which Briand was 
destined to render Nivelle. On March 15th Lyautey made a 
speech in the Chambre des Deputes which led to the downfall 
of the Government. He first provoked the anger of a number 
of deputies by intimating that he did not wish to imperil the 
national safety by disclosing certain things : and in the tumult 
which followed this statement he made other remarks which 
still further infuriated the Extreme Left. Unable to continue 
his speech he left the Chamber accompanied by M. Briand. 
The latter wished to arrange matters by some explanation. 
But to that Lyautey absolutely refused to be a party, and gave 
Briand his resignation. Two days later Briand himself 
resigned. 

The political world was not surprised when Poincare asked 
Ribot to form a Ministry. Ribot, in his day one of the greatest 
of French parliamentary orators, is of the same generation 
as Clemenceau. His career had been distinguished; and there 
was no section of the Chamber which did not hold him in 
respect. He was known to have little love for soldiers. Indeed, 
it was rather cruelly said of him that he had even more 
contempt for them than he had for the rest of mankind. 

The new Minister of War was Paul Painleve — whose tenure 
of office is even to-day more a subject of discussion than that 
of any other French minister throughout the war. 

Painleve,- who is a member of the Academic des Sciences, 
is the greatest mathematician in France, his only rival having 
been the late Henri Poincare. But nobody has the appearance 
of the usual scientist less than Painleve. Simple in his man- 
ners, unaffected in his conversation, impulsive, alert, ardently 
attached to whatever he believes, there is, withal, something 
almost naive in his composition. He is not only "tres honnete 
homme," but he gives in a marked degree the impression of 
being one. His first connection with political life was through 
the Dreyfus case. The prosecution, hearing of some con- 

' Apparently he is the only person who is able to give any intelligent 
explanation of Einstein's theories. 



70 THE POMP OF POWER 

versation he was supposed to have had with a cousin of 
Dreyfus, put in the dossier an account of it which was untrue. 
Painleve gave evidence at Rennes, when there was a dramatic 
confrontation with the author of the fabrication. It was 
through this incident that he came to know Clemenceau. For 
many years they were poHtical friends. But when Painleve 
was Prime Minister, Clemenceau assailed him so fiercely that 
to-day they no longer speak to each other. The war had 
already shown the difference between their views. Painleve 
was, for instance, firmly attached to Sarrail, whom he regarded 
as a Republican general. Clemenceau was indifferent on this 
point. It was, I thing, Painleve himself who once said 
reproachfully of Clemenceau that he did not care whether he 
won the war with the aid of God or of the devil : which was 
quite true. 

But Painleve is of another school. He would probably rank 
Jules Ferry as high as Gambetta among the statesmen of the 
Third Republic. He has a fear rather than any hatred of 
the Church ; a fear lest it may encroach. Yet he has none of 
the bitterness which in France so often characterises opponents 
of Roman Catholicism. 

Painleve had been Minister of Public Instruction and of 
Inventions in the Briand Cabinet of October, 191 5. But when 
Briand reconstituted his Ministry in December, 1916, he had 
refused to remain. For this there were several reasons. Pain- 
leve did not approve of the arrangement about Joffre because 
he though that it still left the latter in a position where he 
might interfere. But he has himself written that the certainty 
that Briand would not name Retain (and presumably that he 
would name Nivelle) as Joffre's successor was also one of his 
reasons for refusing to continue in office. 

This fact was well known; and is largely responsible for 
the controversy which is still waged regarding Painleve's con- 
duct in respect to the Nivelle offensive. Briefly, the friends of 
Nivelle allege that Painleve, by his interviews with various 
generals, inspired a lack of confidence in Nivelle; that he 
arrested the offensive; that his statements as to the losses 
incurred were incorrect; and finally, that if Nivelle had been 



THE NIVELLE OFFENSIVE 71 

allowed to continue he would have had still further and greater 
success. His more enthusiastic supporters go so far as to aver 
that the war would have been won in 191 7 instead of 191 8. 

It is undeniable that there are many and obvious objections 
to a Minister of War on the eve of a great offensive asking 
the lieutenants of the Commander-in-Chief for criticisms of 
the latter's plan. But in this instance it is to be remembered that 
it was not Painleve but Lyautey — Lyautey, a soldier and not 
a civilian — who had begun to ask the generals commanding 
under Nivelle for their views. Petain, when questioned, had 
made no secret of the fact that he could not foresee the great 
success which Nivelle anticipated with such confidence. 
Lyautey was so impressed by this statement that he com- 
municated it to the War Committee, which summoned Petain, 
who simply repeated what he had said to Lyautey. Nor was 
Petain the only one who did not have the same faith as 
Nivelle. Mazel, who commanded the Fifth Army, had also 
told Lyautey (it is not clear whether he did so at his own 
instance or in answer to questions put to him by the Minister) 
that he did not think he would be able to carry out successfully 
the part of the proposed operation which was assigned to him. 

The accusation that Painleve divided the High Command 
falls to the ground, Petain's criticism of the plan of offensive 
was the one which merited and received the most considera- 
tion : and that criticism had been made before Painleve was in 
office. When Painleve saw Lyautey upon taking his succes- 
sion, the latter told him what had occurred, and, according to 
Painleve's account, did not hide that he himself was uneasy. 

Moreover, two events took place immediately before Pain- 
leve became Minister of War which he may reasonably have 
thought would possibly affect the plans of the High Command. 

The Russian Revolution had led to the collapse of the Rus- 
sian Army, and it was probable that Germany might be able to 
send reinforcements to the West from that Front. Moreover, 
it had been an essential part of the original plan that Russia 
should attack at the same time as Great Britain and France.^ 

*It has been said (see Nivelle et Painleve, by M. Mermeix, pp. 67-8), 
and I believe rightly, that Painleve's attention was fixed on this point 



72 THE POMP OF POWER 

The other event was the unhampered retirement of the 
Germans. On March i6th they had in fact made their great 
retreat, leaving Roye, Lassigny and Bapaume. They had 
taken with them all their heavy artillery and other material, 
and had been allowed to do this at their leisure without being 
hurried by any attack. In return they gave the Allies a certain 
stretch of devastated territory, and rendered void in advance 
a great part of the proposed offensive. 

Three days after Painleve came to the rue St. Dominique — 
on March 22nd — he had a long conversation with Nivelle. 
According to his own account he told Nivelle openly (what 
Nivelle of course already knew) that his personal preference 
had been for Petain as the successor to Joffre : but that that 
belonged to the past, and that as Minister of War he would 
give Nivelle all possible support. 

Anyone who knows Painleve will readily believe that he 
was absolutely frank in his interview with Nivelle. 

The Minister then asked the Commander-in-Chief whether 
(in view of the two occurrences to which I have alluded) it 
might not be necessary to modify his plans. 

Nivelle replied that he had never seriously counted upon the 
offensive being assisted by the Russians attacking on their 
Front. While he was not alarmed by the possibility of more 
German troops being freed in Russia for the West. Accord- 
ing to Painleve, he remarked : "Plus il sera nombreux, plus la 
victoire sera eclatante." 

Nor did Nivelle show that he attached any greater impor- 
tance to the German withdrawal : though the fact was that he 
had, as a result, decided, on March 15th, to extend his Front 
for the attack beyond Rheims as far as Auberive. 

The truth is that Nivelle had been warned of this impending 
retirement, and had not heeded the warning. In his report 
on July 17th, 191 7, to the Army Commission of the Senat, 

by a memorandum drawn by his Chef de Cabinet, Colonel Heilbronner. 
M. Jacques Heilbronner, who is a Maitre des Requetes au Conseil 
d'Etat, rendered invaluable services throughout the war, especially as 
an intermediary between those in high authority. It may be said that 
while always remembering that he was a Frenchman he did not forget 
that his grandfather had been a British subject. 



THE NIVELLE OFFENSIVE 73 

Senator Henry Berenger says: "The Commander-in-Chief 
was in London — March 13th and 14th — when the first serious 
indications of the retreat opposite Roye-Lassigny were sig- 
nalled by General Franchet d'Esperey. Upon his return to 
Beauvais, at four o'clock on the morning of March i6th, Gen- 
eral Nivelle sent for General Franchet d'Esperey, whom he 
saw at I p.m., when he directed him to take the offensive the 
same evening in order to regain on all points close contact 
with the enemy." 

But Nivelle had been first warned of this retreat not, as this 
report would indicate, on March 13th or 14th, but ten days 
earlier. 

On March 4th, and after he had given a prior verbal opinion 
to the same effect, Franchet d'Esperey had written Nivelle, 
saying: "The ensemble of information which has been 
obtained for some time past shows that the enemy has prepared 
a retreat towards a new position situated at twenty kilometres 
from the present Front. Upon the existence of this plan of 
retreat there seems to be no room for any doubt : the con- 
cordant information given by prisoners, by the enemy's sys- 
tematic course of destruction in the zone which is to be aban- 
doned, by the retirement which has already been effected of a 
certain number of organisations (staffs, aviation parks, etc.), 
reveal clearly the intentions of our adversary." 

Franchet d'Esperey, in the same letter of March 4th, advised 
Nivelle that this retirement would be on a longer line than 
he had at first thought; suggested that it would therefore be 
necessary to modify the plan of the coming offensive; pointed 
out that the sooner an attack was made the more chance there 
would be of surprising the enemy in his preparations, and 
especially of capturing his artillery; and finally added that his 
own armies (Groupe des Armees du Nord) would be able to 
make the necessary attack upon six days' notice. 

Nivelle did not reply until March 7th, when he wrote that 
he saw no reason to modify the existing plan; and that he 
thought it was very unlikely that the enemy would voluntarily 
abandon the Roye-Soissons line. 

The variation is evident. On March 7th Nivelle did not 



74 THE POMP OF POWER 

contend that a German retreat ought not to modify his plan — 
he took no issue on that point with Franchet d'Esperey: he 
simply said that he did not believe that there would be such 
a retreat. 

To Painleve he said that it made no difference. While it 
has been recorded (although I am in no position to vouch for 
this) that he told a group of officers that, if he could have 
given orders to Hindenburg, they would have been to do that 
very thing. 

Even Mangin, who is not unfavourable to Nivelle, but is 
hostile to Painleve, says that Franchet d'Esperey notified 
Nivelle on March 4th, and adds : "Sceptical, General Nivelle 
at first decided to change nothing in his plan of operations." 

It was not the least of Nivelle's mistakes. 

At his interview with Painleve on March 22nd, and at 
subsequent interviews on March 26th and 31st, Nivelle 
expressed the most complete confidence in his plan. Its object 
was to effect a rupture by attaining the third and fourth enemy 
positions. The plan itself, devoid of all technical details, was 
that the Sixth Army (Mangin) should attack on the Aisne, 
and the Fifth Army (Mazel) should take Brimont. These 
operations executed, the Sixth Army would press towards the 
right, thus making a space into which would come the Tenth 
Army (Duchesne), which was to force further the enemy's 
retreat. 

Throughout Nivelle insisted that the rupture would be 
obtained in twenty-four or, at most, in forty-eight hours. It 
was later suggested that the exact time had simply been used 
as a phrase, and that Painleve had unfairly tried to tie Nivelle 
down to it. But leaving aside Painleve's statements about 
the various occasions upon which Nivelle made success within 
that period, a vital condition of the rupture, there is the evi- 
dence of what he said on that subject before Painleve was in 
office. 

On March ist, 1917 (Painleve became Minister on March 
19th) Albert Favre and Maurice Violette, who were mem- 
bers of the Army Commission of the Chamber of Deputies, 
made a report to the Chamber upon the interviews they had 



THE NIVELLE OFFENSIVE 75 

had with Nivelle and some of his generals at the Front. Their 
report shows NiA/elle as saying: "If within the twenty- four 
hours of the attack we are not able to take all the enemy's guns, 
including those of large calibre, it will have to be gone over 
again, and there will be nothing left to do except to stop the 
battle." The reporters add : "No doubt there may be a little 
exaggeration in this delay of twenty-four hours ; the circum- 
stances may impose the necessity of stopping before the third 
position, as we observed to General Nivelle. A reasonable 
delay of forty-eight hours, or, at most, of three days, may 
therefore be admitted. If the battle is not won within that time 
one may be sure it never will be. Everyone is in agreement on 
that point." 

Nivelle was equally confident that his troops would reach 
the third and fourth enemy positions. Micheler was less cer- 
tain. On March 24th he wrote to Nivelle expressing his 
doubts. Not receiving any answer, he took it upon himself 
to issue on March 26, an instruction in which, foreseeing 
resistance on the two last German positions, he recommended 
certain measures of prudence. But this was so little in accord 
with Nivelle's plans or beliefs that on April ist he ordered 
Micheler to change his instruction, pointing out that the suc- 
cess of the manoeuvres to obtain a rupture depended upon the 
surprise caused to the enemy by the sudden bursting of the 
troops upon the third and fourth positions. 

In brief, everything shows that whatever may have been 
Painleve's errors of judgment, he never had any cause (as 
he probably never had the desire) to press Nivelle to bind him- 
self to something definite. No commander was ever more 
ready than was Nivelle to say exactly what he was certain he 
would accomplish, and to fix the period within which he 
would do it. 

In the meantime Painleve was pursuing his conversations. 
His own impression was so firm (and Pain/eve is a man whose 
impressions are easily discernible), his lack of faith in Nivelle 
was so well known, that it is possible that this may have had its 
effect upon some of those whom he questioned; though it may 



76 THE POMP OF POWER 

be taken for granted that it did not in any way change Petain's 
replies. 

On March 28th Painleve had a conversation with Micheler, 
whom he had desired to come to see him at the rue St. Domi- 
nique. According to his own account, Painleve took this step 
at the repeated insistence of the late M. Antoine Dubost (then 
President of the Senate), who had twice urged him to see 
Micheler, on the ground that that general could give him in- 
formation of great importance. It is therefore open to ques- 
tion whether or not Micheler took the first step — whether he 
requested Dubost to get Painleve to send for him. 

Micheler told Painleve that the situation was entirely dif- 
ferent from what it had been in December, when he had agreed 
to carry out the plan : and he gave the technical reasons for his 
view. In his opinion a rupture was out of the question. If 
everything went well the troops might possibly be able to reach 
Laon. But it would be very difficult and costly. In reply to 
direct questions put to him by Painleve, Micheler said that he 
thought it would be dangerous not to make an attack, as that 
would offer the enemy an opportunity to take the initiative. 

On April ist Painleve saw Petain, whom he had not met 
since the preceding November. Petain gave a definite opinion 
that the offensive would be stopped at the second enemy posi- 
tion; and that it was illusory to imagine that it would get 
further. Even for that it would be essential to have good 
weather conditions, and to concentrate the artillery bombard- 
ment on the first and second positions. It would be an expen- 
sive operation, but it would be worth while. He agreed with 
Micheler that it would be perilous to abandon the attack alto- 
gether. Nevertheless, if nothing went wrong on the Trentino, 
he would not be afraid to put it off until there was better 
weather and the days were longer. 

On April 2nd Painleve saw Franchet d'Esperey in Paris. 
This general also had his doubts. He was preoccupied by 
the question of the Hindenburg Line — what was its actual 
strength. The G.Q.G. thought that it was without any depth, 
and would crack like a bit of paper. Franchet d'Esperey 
doubted the exactitude of this information. 



THE NIVELLE OFFENSIVE 77 

Painleve had already, on March 24th, had a conversation 
with Haig. He found that the general desire of British Head- 
quarters was to make an attack as quickly as possible. 

As a result of these various interviews Painleve called 
Nivelle to a conference which was held at the Ministry of War 
on April 3rd; the others present being the President du Con- 
seil, Ribot, Painleve himself, Admiral Lacaze, Albert Thomas, 
and the Minister of the Colonies, Maginot. 

At this meeting Painleve told Nivelle of the objections raised 
by his subordinates. Nivelle's confidence remained unshaken. 
He assured the Ministers that the two first positions would be 
taken without great loss — and that the others would also be 
captured. He reiterated that the rupture was certain. 

It is probable that Painleve would have been well advised, 
both for the sake of the country as well as for his own record, 
if he had left the matter at that: unless, indeed, he was pre- 
pared to take the responsibility of overriding the Commander- 
in-Chief — which would, of course, have entailed the latter's 
resignation. 

He had carefully (perhaps too carefully) collected the 
opinions of Nivelle's generals. He had, in the presence of his 
own colleagues, placed these views before Nivelle. The latter 
had held firm. Therefore, unless Painleve cared to act him- 
self, there was nothing more which could usefully be done. 

Unfortunately, on April 5th, Colonel (now General) Mes- 
simy, a deputy, who had been Minister of War in August, 
1 914, gave Ribot a memorandum which, he said, faithfully 
reflected the opinion of Micheler. This note was entirely 
against the offensive, claiming that while it would entail heavy 
losses it would give little real result ; and that in any event the 
time of year was unpropitious for such an operation. 

The Prime Minister thought it proper to call a Council of 
War. This was the famous Compiegne Council held on April 
6th, 191 7. Poincare himself was present, the others there being 
Nivelle, Retain, de Castelnau, Micheler, Franchet d'Esperey, 
Ribot, Painleve, Lacaze, and Albert Thomas. It will be no- 
ticed that this was a meeting of an entirely different character 
from the one held three days before when Painleve had sub- 



78 THE POMP OF POWER 

mitted to Nivelle the opinions of his generals. This was a 
Council of War, at which the President of the Republic pre- 
sided : and at which Nivelle and his generals were brought 
face to face. 

Painleve exposed the fears of the Government. Nivelle 
repeated his former assertions — a certain rupture within 
twenty- four hours. De Castelnau, who had just returned 
from Russia, admitted that he had had no opportunity to study 
the situation and therefore could pronounce no opinion. 
Franchet d'Esperey reiterated his doubts. 

Micheler's statement apparently led to some dispute between 
himself and Nivelle. But in any event Micheler did not go 
so far as had Messimy's memorandum : he afterwards told 
Ribot that the latter had exaggerated his views. 

Retain, who probably was somewhat bored by so much 
talking, said briefly that it was an illusion to think that they 
could get beyond the second enemy position : even that would 
be possible only if the attack was well prepared and the weather 
conditions were favourable. 

At one stage Nivelle offered to resign. The accounts of this 
incident vary. Probably Nivelle did not mean it seriously; 
certainly the Government did not take it seriously. 

The meeting ended without changing anything, except pos- 
sibly further weakening the confidence of some of Nivelle's 
generals. 

From that time the Government took no step regarding the 
coming offensive. 

The incident sheds an instructive light upon the relation of 
a Government and a Commander-in-Chief in time of war. 
Undoubtedly any Government (and perhaps particularly that 
of the French Republic) should in advance know and approve 
of an operation so important as the one in question. But a 
change of Government after a plan has been approved (even 
admitting that external events might be taken to have altered 
the position), but before its execution, creates a delicate situa- 
tion. Is the whole matter to be reopened? Or is it a legacy 
which the Government inherits? No one is obliged to take 
office if it entails an unacceptable legacy. In this instance, 



THE NIVELLE OFFENSIVE 79 

although there was no British intervention in the matter, yet 
both Haig (whatever his primary view) and the British Gov- 
ernment would undoubtedly have considered it a breach of 
faith had the offensive, agreed to in December, 191 6, been 
abandoned by the Ribot Ministry in March, 19 17. 

It may well be contended that Painleve would have been 
more logical if he had not accepted the War Ministry. One 
of the reasons why he refused to remain in the reconstituted 
Briand Government in December was (as already stated, and 
as Painleve has admitted) that he did not approve of the 
appointment of Nivelle; he thought that the latter's ability had 
not been sufficiently tried — and that Petain was the man for 
the post. But if in December he refused to join a Cabinet 
because, in fact, he had not sufficient faith in Nivelle, surely 
he put himself — and others — in an awkward position when 
he took office as Minister of War at a time when that general 
was about to launch an offensive — at a time when he himself 
thought it could not be arrested : for he subsequently stated in 
the Chambre des Deputes that it would have been nearly as 
impossible for him to have done it as to have stopped a train 
going at full speed. 

It is incorrect, as has already been pointed out, to accuse 
Painleve of having begun the conversations with Nivelle's 
generals. Petain and Mazel had already expressed their 
doubts to Lyautey. But Lyautey told this to Painleve when 
the latter took office; and Painleve would probably have been 
wise to have gone no further: for although the duties of a 
Minister of War are the same whether he be a soldier or a 
civilian, it is obvious that in carrying out these duties a 
soldier, in dealing with other soldiers, may, without detriment, 
do things which a civilian cannot. In any event Painleve does 
not seem to have obtained much more information than what 
Lyautey had already given him. 

But, if any serious objection can, upon the whole, be taken 
to Painleve's conduct, it is that he himself did not seem to 
be ready to assume any responsibility. 

Did he intend to stop the offensive no matter what Nivelle 



80 THE POMP OF POWER 

thought or what the generals said? Evidently not, or he 
would not have consulted one or the other. 

Did he mean to stop the offensive if Nivelle's generals 
thought it should be stopped? Impossible to say: for all of 
them, except perhaps Micheler in the Messimy note, thought 
that the attack should be made. 

Petain, upon whom Painleve placed most reliance, stated 
clearly that the attack, though costly, would be worth while, 
provided there was proper preparation, and that the weather 
conditions were favourable : but that he did not share Nivelle's 
sanguine expectations as to the extent of the result. What, 
therefore, was there for Painleve to do except to convey 
those opinions to Nivelle — who, no doubt, was already fully 
aware of them : unless he meant to stop the offensive or to 
relieve Nivelle of his command? 

But anyway, this information was given to Nivelle for- 
mally at the meeting of April 3rd. What justification is there 
for the War Council of April 6th, for which Ribot no doubt 
is partly responsible? The only possible answer is the Mes- 
simy memorandum. But in the first place it surely would 
have been a measure of ordinary prudence, before summoning 
such a Council, presided over by the President of the Republic, 
to have sent for Micheler and to have confirmed this secondary 
evidence : all the more so as Micheler had already discussed 
the whole subject at length with Painleve on March 28th, and 
had distinctly said that he thought it would be dangerous to 
abandon the offensive. In the result it appeared that the Mes- 
simy memorandum did not faithfully represent Micheler's 
views. But if it had, what did Painleve propose to do? Was 
he then going to stop the offensive? If not, what was the 
object of the meeting? One can answer, to discuss the whole 
matter again. But that is exactly what was wrong. 

The weak point in this part of Painleve's case is that there 
was an offensive in which he did not believe : and yet either 
he could not (as he alleges) stop it, or he would not take the 
responsibility of doing so. Nevertheless, if Nivelle had re- 
nounced his plan, would not Petain have agreed and done the 
best he could to arrange with Haig and Lloyd George? 



THE NIVELLE OFFENSIVE 81 

But Nivelle would not give it up; and Painleve wanted the 
result without taking the risk. 

It may be going too far to say that he diminished confi- 
dence in Nivelle (one may be sure that Petain, for instance, 
was not in any way affected), but he certainly did nothing 
to increase it : and that is perhaps one of the duties of a 
Minister of War. 

It is easy to criticise vaguely, and more difficult to say 
exactly what should have been done, even after the event. 
I have already suggested that Painleve should never have 
taken office (though I am well aware that at that time Par- 
liament and the country both wanted to see him at the War 
Office) when an offensive was about to begin under a general 
in whose capacities he had little belief. 

Once in office, holding the views he did, his best course 
was probably to delay the offensive until there was a certainty 
of better weather. The fact that Petain considered that 
course feasible should have given Painleve confidence; and it 
also provided him with someone to fall back upon in the event 
of Nivelle's actually resigning. 

But although Painleve may be open to some criticism upon 
the ground indicated, there is not, as I propose to show, any 
justification for the assertion that he stopped the offensive. 
Nivelle took the time he said he wanted, and stopped it him- 
self when he realised that it was impossible to achieve a 
rupture. Still less, in my opinion, is there any justification 
for the widespread story that through Nivelle's not having 
been allowed to have his own way the war might have been 
won in 191 7. I am inclined to regard that as one of the 
greatest fables of the period. It is true that Mangin says that, 
under certain circumstances, that result might have been 
attained. I gather (the passage is not very clear), that he 
means if Nivelle's method had been continued. It requires 
some temerity for a civilian to differ from that distinguished 
general; and I should not venture to do so were it not that 
there is equally eminent military opinion on the other side. 

It remains to record one curious and amusing result of this 
conflict between civilian and soldier. Mr. Lloyd George was 



82 THE POMP OF POWER 

so taken back by all the discussion it had aroused, and by the 
bungle which seemed to have resulted, that at a meeting on 
May 4th in Paris, he practically lectured the members of the 
French Government upon the necessity of soldiers keeping 
their plans to themselves, and not running the risk involved 
in disclosing them to politicians. That surely must have 
caused Haig, who was present, to ask himself grimly, "Is Saul 
also among the prophets?" 

The English offensive had begun on April 9th. The French 
attack upon which Nivelle had based such high hopes com- 
menced (after having first been fixed for April 14th) at six 
o'clock on the morning of April i6th. The weather was 
cloudy, and partly on that account there had not been the 
proper artillery preparation. In brief, neither of the conditions 
precedent which had been stated by Petain to be essential to 
even the qualified success which he considered possible were 
fulfilled. But what had perhaps not been foreseen by anyone 
(and certainly not by Nivelle), and what above all else stopped 
the advance, were the enemy's machine guns used in a quantity 
which caused amazement, and taking full advantage of the 
nature of the ground which the French had to cross. 

Nivelle's own account of this first day says that at noon 
it was evident that there was a "lutte acharnee" at the first 
enemy position : and he admits that it was only partially on 
the Fifth Army front that the second position was reached. 
He adds: "We are meeting everywhere with an obstinate 
resistance. The enemy, in order to replace his fixed machine 
guns which have generally been destroyed, is taking into action 
numerous light machine guns which the German Army have 
only used recently, and which the infantry are bringing out of 
the shelters." 

In brief, Nivelle's report of what did happen differs ma- 
terially from what he was confident would happen. 

Mangin himself admits that it was difficult for his army to 
advance. After going forward from 500 to 2,000 metres his 
troops were stopped. They began again, only to be checked. 
Mangin remarks that the battle had not taken the turn which 
was anticipated. 



THE NIVELLE OFFENSIVE 83 

On the morning of April 17th Nivelle stopped the advance 
of the Sixth Army (Mangin's). He had reahsed that there 
was now no question of breaking the enemy's Hnes. 

The result of these two days, as summed up by the report 
of Senator Berenger (who is considered as being friendly to 
Nivelle), is as follows: "It appears from this perusal" 
{i.e., of all the orders given during this period), "with a 
monotony which is truly tragic, that the abrupt halt (arret) of 
the regiments which attacked was everywhere due to the 
enemy's use of machine guns." 

M. Abel Ferry's report said : "We did not, alas, get to 
Laon, as the High Command had cherished the illusion that 
we should. We did not capture the first position at all points, 
we rarely took the second, and nowhere did we take the 
third. ... It must be admitted that the elan of the infantry 
was as in the first days of the war: and also that the destruc- 
tion wrought was equally as incomplete as during those early 
days. Our men were no longer thrown upon intact barbed 
wire, but they were thrown against intact machine guns." 

The plan of operations was changed on April 22nd. But 
I propose to refer only to two incidents which illustrate the 
continuous conflict between Painleve and Nivelle. 

Nivelle projected an attack upon Briamont. Painleve, 
through a conversation with Mazel, obtained an idea (and 
possibly an incorrect one) of the probable losses. According 
to Nivelle's friends, Painleve stopped the operation. The only 
proof in support of that statement (but one to which some 
weight must be given) is a letter from Nivelle to Painleve, 
dated April 30th, which reads as follows : 

"You informed me yesterday, April 29th, at 7 o'clock, by 
telephone, that the Cabinet, at a meeting held the same after- 
noon, had decided to suspend the operation of the Fifth Army. 
Not having received, according to regulations, a written con- 
firmation of this decision, which is important, both in 
principal and as a fact, I have the honour to ask you to be 
good enough to give the liaison officer who takes this letter 
such confirmation by letter." 

On the other hand, Painleve denies absolutely that he ever 



84 THE POMP OF POWER 

gave such an order. He states specifically that in the telephone 
conversation which he had with Nivelle on the evening of 
April 29th, the only reference to the Briamont attack was that 
he impressed upon Nivelle that he must first be in accord with 
Petain, who had that day been appointed Chief of the General 
Staff with extended powers ; and who, so far as Painleve knew, 
thought that Briamont would only be captured to be lost 
immediately. It is regrettable that Painleve has not published 
the reply which he sent to this letter of Nivelle's. It is in- 
conceivable that he should have been so imprudent as to leave 
such a communication (which he admits was delivered to 
him) without an answer. If there is no reply in existence 
he must fully realise this fact to-day; for he complains that it 
is Nivelle's letter which has allowed the circulation of a report 
that the Government had telephoned prohibiting the proposed 
operation. 

Some days earlier, on April 22nd, M. Ybarnegary, a deputy 
who was serving at the Front, was received at the Elysee, on 
his own demand, by the President of the Republic, to whom 
he declared that he spoke on behalf of his chief, General 
Hirschauer, and likewise interpreted the sentiments of the 
officers and men of his corps; that they were about to be 
ordered again to begin the Craonne attack which had been so 
fruitless and costly on April i6th; and that they were all 
firmly of the opinion that, on account of insufficient artillery 
preparation, as well as for other reasons, the only result would 
be a great loss of life to no good purpose. 

M. Poincare was alarmed by a statement made with such 
precision and upon such authority. It happened that Painleve 
was that day absent from Paris. Poincare therefore took it 
upon himself to have a telephone message sent to Nivelle, to 
the effect that he had been warned by those who would be 
charged with the execution of the proposed operation that they 
considered it premature and doomed to failure. 

Painleve subsequently confirmed the action which the Presi- 
dent of the Republic had thus taken. 

Nivelle, naturally irritated by this communication, replied 
that as a matter of fact no date had yet been fixed for the 



THE NIVELLE OFFENSIVE 85 

attack. He asked to be told which of his subordinates had 
acted in this way behind his back; and, at the same time, 
instituted on his own account an inquiry which proved futile. 

Whether or not Hirschauer or Ybarnegary had any good 
ground for believing that the attempt was on the point of 
being made again has been disputed. But in any event these 
two incidents prove clearly that Nivelle's usefulness was 
hampered by interference, and that his authority had been 
diminished. The Government had shown before the offensive 
that he did not possess its full confidence. In the offensive he 
had not achieved that success which he had almost guaranteed 
in advance. After the offensive the Government let it be seen 
still more openly that it placed no reliance upon him. In these 
circumstances it was as proper as it was inevitable that Nivelle 
should make way for someone else. On April 29th Petain 
was appointed Chief of the General Staff. Under the arrange- 
ment thus made Nivelle was unable to take any initiative 
except in accord with Petain, who had had no enthusiasm 
whatever for the plan of the offensive. For two weeks Nivelle 
remained in nominal command but without any actual author- 
ity. Finally, on May 15th, he was relieved. Petain was 
appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the North- 
East, and Foch Chief of the General Staff. 

In the disappointment which was universally felt 
throughout France at the result of Nivelle's offensive, a great 
part of the hostile criticism was directed against Mangin. 
Many stories were current about the manner in which he was 
said to have uselessly sacrificed his troops. The fact was (as 
Painleve admitted) that the losses of the Sixth Army 
(Mangin) were proportionately less than those of the Fifth 
Army (Mazel). Nevertheless, a popular outcry seemed to 
indicate Mangin as a victim. 

One of the allegations made by Nivelle's friends against 
Painleve is that he was responsible for Mangin's removal 
from the command of his army. All the evidence is against 
this contention. It appears that Nivelle himself broached the 
subject to Painleve on April 25th; and on the same day 
asked the Minister of the Colonies (M. Maginot) to appoint 



86 THE POMP OF POWER 

Mangin Governor of West Africa. This request he repeated 
to Ribot at a meeting held at the Foreign Office on April 28th. 
On both occasions he was told that it was out of the question 
that the somewhat turbulent Mangin should be sent to West 
Africa, where there had already been some trouble ; and that 
in any event Mangin would never accept. When this demand 
was rejected a second time Nivelle proposed that Mangin 
should be replaced, saying that, while he had not committed 
any error, yet, rightly or wrongly, he had lost the confidence 
of his subordinates. The Government consented to take the 
action which the Commander-in-Chief stated was necessary. 
It was agreed that Nivelle should himself inform Mangin of 
the decision the next morning, April 29th; and that the ar- 
rangement thus made should be formally ratified by the War 
Committee on the same day. 

Painleve did his part. The War Committee of the Cabinet 
approved of the decision which had been taken. Early in the 
evening of April 29th Painleve telephoned this to Nivelle; 
the latter replied that he had informed Mangin that he was 
removed for the reasons already stated; and also that Mangin 
was then on his way to Paris to place himself at the disposition 
of the Minister of War. 

Later in the evening Mangin appeared at the rue St. 
Dominique; but he then told Painleve a different tale, namely 
that Nivelle now admitted he could reproach him with nothing, 
and no longer insisted that he should be relieved of his 
command. 

Painleve replied that it was then too late. But the surprise 
which this incident caused him was increased when, on May 
2nd, he received from Nivelle the usual letter confirming his 
request that Mangin should be removed, but giving another 
pretext. Instead of repeating that Mangin had lost the confi- 
dence of his subordinates (the ground upon which the Cabinet 
actually had acted). Nivelle wrote asking that he should be 
given leave in order that he might rest, and added : "In the 
course of the recent offensive General Mangin, yielding to the 
ardour of a military temperament, did not bring to his cal- 
culations for the preparation of the attack the method and the 



THE NIVELLE OFFENSIVE 87 

precision which are necessary in commanding an army. I 
express the opinion that General Mangin, by his great quahties 
as a leader, by his character, and by the prestige which arises 
from his splendid military career, deserves to receive, when 
his holiday is finished, a new command at the Front." 

Painleve drew Nivelle's attention to the very vital difference 
between the reasons for which he had asked the Government 
to remove Mangin and those given in his formal letter making 
that request. Presumably there was no reply. But the reason 
of the sudden change is not far to seek. Mangin's ability to 
express his views with vigour and emphasis is well known. 
He told Nivelle forcibly what he thought of the way in which 
it was proposed to treat him. In the face of this determined 
man Nivelle ceded, and allowed him to go to Painleve saying 
that there was now no reason why he should be displaced. 
While when Nivelle finally was obliged to sign a letter asking 
for his removal he thought it better, on account of his inter- 
view with Mangin, to alter his reasons. 

No doubt Painleve himself thought that Mangin should 
lose his command. But clearly Nivelle took the initiative, 
possibly thinking that that sacrifice would calm the storm 
which had arisen on account of the comparative failure of the 
offensive. 

It remains to consider whether the offensive could be called 
a success, even if it did not realise all Nivelle's sanguine 
anticipations. 

Nivelle himself told Painleve on April 19th, and repeated it 
to Poincare at the Elysee on April 28th, that the battle was 
won. He admitted that it was less brilliant in its result than 
he had anticipated, and that the enemy lines had not been 
broken; but said that his initiative had been paralysed. 
Mangin also held the view that the operations were a success ; 
and contends to-day that they should not have been abandoned. 
That was not the general impression in the army. Petain, for 
instance, did not agree with this conclusion. 

Amongst politicians M. Doumer's judgment may be taken 
as sound and without prejudice, while his position as Chair- 
man of the Senate Army Commission gave him every 



88 THE POMP OF POWER 

opportunity of getting from day to day the information nec- 
essary to form a fair opinion. He stated that, making all 
allowances, it could not be denied that there had been a check. 
That view coincided with popular opinion. 

It has been asserted by Nivelle and Mangin that the Govern- 
ment magnified the losses, and that there were only from 
15,000 to 16,000 killed in the period between April i6th and 
26th, and not 25,000. 

Nivelle, in a note dated May 13th, which was subsequently 
used by Berenger in his report, places the number of killed 
at 15,589. But the value of this summary disappears when 
it states that the figure only includes those whose death has 
been certified by two witnesses.^ Moreover, if the number of 
prisoners was deducted from Nivelle's number of missing, the 
number of killed would be very much higher on his own 
showing. Mangin himself puts the number who disappeared 
at 20,500, and there were only 4,000 prisoners. 

G.Q.G. at first gave the figures for the period between 
April i6th to 24th as 25,000 killed; 96,000 wounded; and 
4,000 prisoners. And the Government, so far from increasing 
these calculations, reduced them somewhat in its statement to 
the Army, putting the killed at 20,000. But G.Q.G. sub- 
sequently changed its figures several times, and on one occasion 
put the wounded as low as 58,000 : explaining the difference 
from the original 96,000 on the ground of double counting. 

Painleve puts the total at 1 1 7,000, made up as follows : 
28,000 to 29,000 killed; 85,000 wounded, of whom 5,000 died 
in the hospitals at the Front ; and 4,000 prisoners. 

Of all the conflicting statistics those of M. Abel Ferry seem 
to be entitled to the most consideration. He accepted as a 
basis a total of 102,000 — 17,000 killed; 65,000 wounded; and 
20,000 disappeared. While as there were only 4,000 prisoners, 
this would increase the number of killed to about 28,000, 
after making a fair allowance for deserters and those who 
strayed away, and also taking into consideration the deduction 
of ten per cent., which Ferry said should be made on all his 

^ It is only fair to add that that is the French system, and was not 
invented by Nivelle. 



THE NIVELLE OFFENSIVE 89 

figures. On the other hand, 5,000 of the wounded who died 
in the ambulances at the Front between April i6th and 25th 
may properly be added to the number of those killed, thus 
making a total of 33,000. This supports Painleve's estimate. 

The large number of missing and the small proportionate 
number of prisoners is attributed to the fact that the Germans 
killed many wounded who were lying on the battlefield. In 
the result, the proportion of killed to wounded was high. 

The certain gains to be put against these losses are 20,000 
prisoners taken (the English took another 20,000), and a not 
very great advance. It was impossible to calculate the number 
of Germans killed. Ferry seemed to think that they may 
have about equalled those of the French. I understand, how- 
ever, that the German official figures, which have not yet been 
published, will show that between April ist and 30th the 
Seventh Army, the First Army, and the Right Flank Division 
of the Third Army, lost 50,866 in killed and wounded, and 
22,219 ^^ missing; making a total of 73,485. As these sta- 
tistics do not correspond exactly, either in the period they 
cover or otherwise to the French ones cited, it is impossible 
to deduce from them any absolute comparison. But it would 
seem clear that the German losses were certainly less than those 
sustained by the armies under Nivelle's command. 

But the effect of a great but not decisive battle upon the 
morale of the troops engaged is also a factor to be taken into 
account when deciding whether it was a success. 

That Nivelle himself may have suffered a bitter disappoint- 
ment in not seeing his hopes realised was one thing. But it 
was another and graver thing that the hopes he had incited 
in the armies should have come to nothing. Before the 
offensive he expressly encouraged the idea that it was the last 
great effort. Officers had been instructed to arouse the en- 
thusiasm of their men; and for that purpose part of the plan 
of operation was communicated to them. The various meas- 
ures taken in this direction were eminently successful. Before 
the offensive there was a general spirit of optimism. M. Abel 
Ferry recounted how the poilu was convinced that it was "le 
dernier coup." 



90 THE POMP OF POWER 

To raise to this point the expectations of men of whom 
many had been fighting for twenty months on their own soil 
was a dangerous move. The certainty of reaction in the event 
of failure to realise these great hopes must have been evi- 
dent. Nivelle himself must have been well aware of the risk 
he was taking; and all the more so because on February 28th 
he had written to the Minister of War exposing at length the 
"defaitiste" propaganda which was then being carried on in 
the army. 

When these hundreds of thousands of men saw all these 
promises of a speedy end of the war vanish, when they saw 
that it all remained to be done, and that there were yet many 
weary months of fighting ahead of them, there ensued a 
demoralisation such as the French Army has probably never 
seen. Battalions, regiments, even a whole division, mutinied, 
and, refusing to obey their officers, attempted to march on 
Paris. 

It was Petain's first work to restore discipline and to revive 
the morale of the armies — and probably only Petain's patient 
work could have done it.^ But the result was that for many 
months he was obliged to be on the defensive. Haig had 
thought the offensive should continue; and on May 4th Lloyd 
George had solemnly engaged the French Government to go 
on. But the Government promised what it could not do. Some 
important positions at Verdun were retaken between August 
and December; and on October 23rd the Battle of Malmaison 
was won. But for the greater part of this time, while Haig 
was continuing his vigorous operations, the French Armies 
were recuperating from the after effects of the Nivelle 
offensive.*^ 

° In a recent interview (published in Le Matin, September 21st, 1921) 
Ludendorf said : — "What General Petain did in 1917 was a magnificent 
work — more difficult and more important than winning a battle — the 
moral reconstruction of an army in which Bolshevist propaganda was 
making its ravages." 

" Since the above was written I have read M. Painleve's recent 
articles in La Revue de Paris, and Mangin's still more recent _ retort 
(Revue de Paris, March ist, 1922). Apart from some details, this new 
phase of the controversy leaves my view unchanged. 



CHAPTER V 
Unique Command 

Long before 191 8 it was apparent that the vital defect in 
the instructions which Kitchener had given to Field-Marshal 
French in August, 1914, was the strict injunction to remem- 
ber that his army was independent, and that he was never to 
be under the orders of any other Allied general. 

The subordination of Haig to Nivelle had ended when the 
latter was relieved of his command in May. The British 
Government saw no reason to place their armies under the 
orders of his successor, Petain : and all the less so because 
the morale of the French troops was seriously affected, and 
Petain was employed more in restoring that than in under- 
taking any serious operations. There was also another reason 
to which at the time the French did not give due weight. The 
British Ministers had not been greatly edified by the conflict 
between Painleve and Nivelle. While not pronouncing upon 
the merits of that dispute (nor were they unanimous in their 
views), the members of the War Cabinet could not understand 
how it was possible to expect success with such friction and 
interference. Lloyd George, who had never been much on 
the side of the soldier, was impressed by this example of what 
happened when politicians wanted to be generals, or, at least, 
wanted to control generals too strictly. So much so, that, as 
already related, he took it upon himself to read the French 
Government a lesson (which was very badly taken in some 
quarters) on the need of letting those in command keep their 
own counsel. 

It was obvious that, fighting in France, it was only a 
French general who could be Commander-in-Chief of the 
Allied Forces. Lloyd George, at one period, said that public 
opinion in England would never allow the British Army to 

91 



92 THE POMP OF POWER 

be under the orders of an Allied general, except possibly for 
the execution of a particular movement. But as time showed 
the weakness of a dispersed command the Prime Minister 
realised that public opinion would be obliged to bow to 
necessity. 

At the end of October, 191 7, Painleve, Franklin-Bouillon, 
and Loucheur came to London. Whatever the exact object 
of the visit, the conversation I had with the two former gave 
me the impression that they were not sorry to be away for a 
few days from questions in the Chambre des Deputes. It 
was, in fact, then evident to all that the Painleve Government 
was tottering. 

Nevertheless, it was during this visit that Lloyd George 
gave Painleve a letter which was the basis of a great change. 
This communication, which was dated October 30th, was in 
itself remarkable. At the outset it stated that the brutal fact 
which had to be recognised was that, after three years of war, 
and after the greatest efforts on the part of the Allies, Ger- 
many remained the victor. After an examination of the 
circumstances it concluded that the fundamental weakness of 
the Allies lay entirely in the lack of real unity in the conduct 
of military operations. It therefore proposed the creation of 
a Committee, "A kind of Inter-Allied General Staff," which 
would prepare plans of warfare and keep constant watch upon 
what was taking place. It was practically what had been sug- 
gested by a French Deputy, M. Jean Hennessy, in December, 

1916. This plan was formally adopted on November 9th, 

1 91 7, at Rapallo, the Caporetto having made it necessary that 
the meeting of the Allies should be held in Italy. 

It was arranged that the Supreme War Council should meet 
every month at Versailles. The only permanent members were 
the Prime Ministers. But there was also a staff of military 
advisers attached to the Council in order to co-ordinate the 
efforts of the Allies; and they made their headquarters at 
Versailles. The military representatives first appointed were 
Foch, Sir Henry Wilson, and Cadorna, General Bliss being 
added later to represent the United States. But Lloyd George 
was insistent that no Chief -of -Staff of any of the Allied 



UNIQUE COMMAND 93 

armies should be eligible, "His primary object being to exclude 
Robertson. Therefore, on December 4th, 191 7, it was decided 
that Foch should remain Chief of the Staff, and General 
Weygand was appointed in his place as the French Military 
Representative. In effect this made no difference. For, unlike 
Robertson and Henry Wilson, Foch and Weygand were as 
one; the latter, in fact, having been Foch's Chief-of-Staff up 
to this time. 

While the formation of the Supreme War Council was 
undoubtedly a move in the right direction, yet the whole 
scheme was not without a certain ambiguity. Lloyd George's 
letter had pointed out that of course the Council could not 
substitute itself for the various Governments, that it could 
only advise. In brief, it had no real executive power. It is 
probable that the Prime Minister always meant this as a first 
step towards unity of command, and that he considered that 
public opinion in England might be prepared in this manner. 
But it is regrettable that Painleve did not take advantage of 
the opening thus given to press for an immediate change. 
Lloyd George could not himself make such a proposal, but he 
might have yielded to it. Painleve must have realised a few 
days later the strength of the feeling which existed on this 
subject. 

On November 13th Millerand, who had not spoken in the 
Chambre des Deputes since 191 5, made it a direct question 
upon which he challenged the Government. The former Min- 
ister of War insisted that it was not sufificient to promise unity 
of action. The enemy had actual unity of command. Every- 
one knew the name of their Commander-in-Chief, and the only 
way that the Allies could have equally effective unity was by 
choosing without delay one supreme commander. 

The Government was sustained on this question, but a few 
hours later it was defeated upon another vote. Painleve re- 
signed, and was succeeded by Clemenceau. 

In certain quarters in England the institution of the Ver- 
sailles Council was not regarded with any favour. The fact 
that the British representative was Sir Henry Wilson did not 
lessen this resentment. Wilson, who, in the South. African 



94 THE POMP OF POWER 

War, had been a protege of Lord Roberts, was afterwards the 
head of the Staff College. He had always urged that prepara- 
tions should be made for sending an expeditionary force to 
the Continent in the event of war. But he thought that the 
plan, as finally drafted, was defective, both in respect to the 
number of troops and otherwise. A legend (for which it is 
impossible to vouch) has it that, when lecturing one day at the 
Staff College, he pointed to a town on the map and said : 
"There, or just about there, gentlemen, is where the British 
Expeditionary Force will run a great risk of being defeated or 
surrounded." The place indicated was Mons. When the war 
broke out he was Director of Military Operations. In the 
ordinary course he would presumably have become Chief of 
the Imperial Staff when that post was given to Sir William 
Robertson. But he forfeited this, ostensibly on account of 
the part he had taken in the Curragh trouble. 

No doubt Wilson's attitude at the War Office during that 
crisis had something to do with Asquith's decision; but cer- 
tainly the Prime Minister was not sorry to find a reason that 
allowed him to pass over Henry Wilson. He had not for- 
gotten how, some time before the war, Wilson, despite his 
objections, had insisted upon reading at a meeting of, I think, 
the Committee of Imperial Defence a memorandum setting 
forth the unprepared condition of the country and of the army 
in the event of any conflict. 

In the last days of July, or the early days of August, 191 4, 
Lord Haldane, during his fugitive re-passage at the War 
Office, sent Wilson to the French Ambassador, M. Paul 
Cambon, to make a proposal that Great Britain should give 
only certain limited and indirect support to France. The exact 
facts regarding this incident are still obscure, but it has already 
been stated in print that it occurred, and Lord Haldane did 
not take that opportunity to make any denial. While, in an 
account published some time ago in the National Reviezv, 
Mr. Leo Maxse related how he was in constant communication 
with Wilson during those days; that at one stage the latter 
told him that the outlook had darkened regarding the participa- 
tion of England side by side with France; and that this, 



UNIQUE COMMAND 95 

through Mr. George Lloyd, M. P. (now Sir George Lloyd 
and Lieutenant-Governpr of Bombay), led to the leaders of 
the Opposition, Lord Lansdowne and Mr. Bonar Law, writing 
a letter promising support, which forced the hand of the 
Government. But what Mr. Maxse does not tell (and possibly 
did not know) is that Wilson was entirely pessimistic that 
day, precisely on account of the mission with which he had 
been charged by Lord Haldane. 

In any event, the offer was considered unsatisfactory, and 
was rejected by M. Cambon. It is safe to assume that Wilson 
must greatly have disliked being the bearer of such a communi- 
cation, for he had long been a firm friend of France and of 
the French. Convinced that there would be war with Ger- 
many, he had been in the habit of spending some weeks in 
France every year, generally using a bicycle, exploring the 
country and learning the roads which it might be useful to 
know in the event of an invasion — knowledge which was of 
practical service during the retreat in August, 1914. More- 
over, Wilson was, before the war, on friendly terms with 
many French officers, and notably with Foch. 

He was with Sir John French during the retreat after Mons, 
and it was his tact which prevented a disagreement between 
Gallieni and French just before the Battle of the Marne. The 
former seems to have suspected, without being sure, that it 
was Wilson who had thus eased a strained situation. The 
French always remembered this incident, and (as has been 
mentioned), when Nivelle sent his famous letter to Haig, on 
March 4th, 191 7, after the Calais Conference had given him 
supreme command, one of the points on which fie insisted was 
that Wilson should be attached to French Headquarters as 
soon as he returned from Russia. 

Haig and Robertson were both strongly opposed to the 
establishment of the Supreme War Council, told their objec- 
tions to Lloyd George, and repeated them to everyone else. 
It is probable that Lord Derby, who was then Secretary of 
State for War, and Robertson's firm supporter, did not, at 
first, look upon it with any great favour. Wilson had great 
difficulty in getting the staff he required for his work at 



96 THE POMP OF POWER 

Versailles. I recollect his saying one day, before he returned 
there soon after his appointment, that if "Eddie Derby" — as 
he called Lord Derby — did not soon give him what he wanted, 
he would resign. Then, cheering up, he added that, anyway 
"X" (naming a certain general) would always do his best for 
him at the War Office while he himself was absent. 

I did not add fuel to the flame by telling Wilson that, the 
evening before, I had happened to meet "X" at dinner and 
that, in discussing the situation afterwards, he had said to me 
that Wilson was not the man who should have been sent to 
Versailles, and that the appointment was a bad one. I have 
always found that, although soldiers complain about politicians 
intriguing, they can do their fair share in that way. 

Nevertheless, the Versailles Council did finally get under 
way, but at no time did it possess the sympathy of either the 
Commander-in-Chief or the then Chief of the Imperial Staff. 
Haig disliked it instinctively. Robertson felt that it might be 
the first step towards unity of command, which he had always 
pronounced to be "radical, untimely, and dangerous." In fact, 
Robertson's one plan seems to have been that of wearing down 
the Germans : killing on both sides, finally leaving the Allies 
with something over. It was exactly the "guerre d'usine" 
which had been the fixed idea of Joffre, and which led to his 
downfall when it was realised that that meant the maximum 
sacrifice of human life and the minimum exercise of human 
intelligence. 

The immediate result of the friction caused by the creation 
of the Supreme War Council was a constant stream of 
rumours of resignations and dismissals. On Saturday, De- 
cember 29th, 191 7, a well-known Frenchman came to see me 
in Paris, and told me that Lloyd George had unofficially 
informed those in high authority in France that he intended 
to replace Haig by Robertson, and Robertson by Wilson. I 
got permission to communicate this to Wilson, who was then 
at Versailles; but, despite its source, it seemed to me a wild 
rumour, or, at best, a statement which had become twisted 
in the telling. For, although it was quite possible that Robert- 
son might some day be replaced by Wilson, it seemed highly 



UNIQUE COMMAND 97 

improbable that Robertson would ever succeed Haig. It was, 
therefore, with some interest that I subsequently read in 
Colonel Repington's "Diaries" that on January loth, 1918, 
he was told in Paris by an unnamed Frenchman that it was 
being said again that Haig would be replaced by Robertson 
and the latter by Wilson. 

In the meantime Foch and Wilson had proposed the forma- 
tion of an Executive War Committee. Its primary object was 
to form a reserve by withdrawing from each Allied Army such 
number of divisions as the representatives of the Allies on 
this military committee might decide. Obviously, such a 
body infringed upon the full powers of the Commander-in- 
Chief. But its necessity was equally obvious, for the basis 
of the Foch plan of campaign for 191 8 was a Reserve Army 
which could strike when and where occasion might demand. 
Such a force could never be formed by commanders in the 
field. Nor was it meant that it should be under their orders 
until, possibly, after it was thrown into action. 

Robertson seemed to think that the appointment of this 
Committee might diminish what he considered the evils of 
the Supreme War Council. The belief that he might be named 
to represent Great Britain may have had its effect upon his 
judgment. It has been said that Henry Wilson suggested 
that Robertson should be the British Member of the Board. 
I am unaware whether this is a fact. But when the composi- 
tion of the Committee was settled at a meeting of the Supreme 
War Council towards the end of January, 1918, someone 
mentioned Robertson, and Lloyd George then renewed his 
objection to any country being represented on such committees 
by its Chief-of-Staff, and proceeded to name Wilson.^ 

That was the beginning of the end. Early in February 
came the long-expected break between the Prime Minister and 
Robertson. The immediate cause was an acrimonious dispute 
between the Chief of the Imperial Staff and the War Cabinet 
about the Versailles Council. 

* Painleve has related how insistent Lloyd George had previously- 
been upon this condition, which he had made a sine qua non in respect 
to the military advisers of the Supreme War Council. Its primary 
object was to make Robertson ineligible. 



98 THE POMP OF POWER 

There was never any question about the services which Sir 
WiUiam Robertson rendered to his country, or about his 
absolute devotion to duty. But he was sincerely imbued with 
the idea that the function of the Government was to raise men, 
more men, and still more men, and to allow him to have these 
men killed ofif without any comment or control. He apparently 
believed that all the political people were incompetent, when 
they were not something worse. The war was finally won by 
the very principles which Robertson had rejected as dangerous, 
which he did his utmost to obstruct, and for the tardy adoption 
of which he is to some extent responsible. 

The publication of Colonel Repington's "Diaries" showed 
Robertson's belief in himself, distrust of others, narrowness 
of vision, and absolute lack of any plan except that of the 
"guerre d'usure." 

As between Lloyd George and Robertson, it was a clash of 
two natures which were absolutely incompatible. Probably 
neither gave the other credit for all the qualities he possessed. 
In any event, Lloyd George disliked Robertson, and Robertson 
had no confidence in Lloyd George. It was inevitable that 
they could not continue to work together, and equally 
inevitable that Robertson should be the one to go. It was, 
however, unfortunate for Robertson that his too ardent friends 
would insist upon contending that no one else could do his 
work, and that, if he went, it was a political job. The truth 
is that, for reasons which might, perhaps, be described as 
temperamental, Robertson never fully appreciated our French 
Allies, and, possibly, was never fully appreciated by them. He 
was, no doubt, a very good watch-dog to see that the French 
did not get the better of us in any way. But that attitude 
was not one which contributed towards the Allies getting the 
utmost possible out of their mutual co-operation. 

An incident which occurred at this time showed how wide- 
spread was the sentiment which had been manufactured about 
Robertson, as may be seen from the following extract from a 
diary I kept at the time : 

"Henry Wilson's appointment to succeed Robertson was 
known on Saturday, February i6th, and was in the Sunday 



UNIQUE COMMAND 99 

papers. I spent an hour with Wilson Sunday morning at 
Eaton Place, and he reminded me of what I told him in Paris. 
I asked Wilson about the general situation, and he said that 
there were various places where the Germans could break 
through 'as if it were paper.' He felt quite certain that the 
big German offensive would be on the Western Front. 

"I was struck by the way in which he spoke about Haig. 
I reminded him of when, through Haig, he had had no billet 
the summer before ; how, upon his return from Ireland, he had 
spent an afternoon with me in my empty house (everyone being 
in the country), and had expressed the fear that he might not 
be employed again during the war, and of what had led to his 
being given Eastern Command soon afterwards. 

"Wilson took absolutely the proper tone about Haig, and 
showed none of that bitter hostility which the friends of Haig 
and Robertson always show about Wilson. He said he had 
no illusion about Haig being a military genius: that if there 
was to be a great offensive on our part, Haig would certainly 
not be the man for the place : but that what we had first to look 
forward to was to being on the defensive; and that no one 
could do that better than Haig ; that he would be very sorry to 
see him go ; and that he meant to support him by every means 
in his power. He added that when we came to having an 
offensive there would probably be a Generalissimo, and he 
hoped it would be Foch. 

"We discussed Lord Derby's position, and I expressed the 
view that, within the last ten days or so, Lloyd George had 
detached him from Robertson, and that Lord Derby would not 
resign. Wilson said it was impossible. He had committed 
himself too far. 

"When I returned home the latter part of the afternoon I 

found that Lord Beresford - had twice telephoned to me. I 

^ Few men of his generation got such insufficient credit for their 
attainments and foresight as did "Lord Charles." His popularity entirely 
overshadowed his abiHties. The current saying that sailors thought he 
was a politician, while politicians could only see in him a sailor, gave a 
grossly unfair impression. He was a man of strong personal likes and 
dislikes, the former often based on instinct, the latter always founded 
on fact. But his judgments were sober, sound, and full of common 
sense, although his manner of expressing them was often breezy. 
Long before the majority of his fellow-countrymen he saw much that 
was to happen, and gave warnings which were neglected. His other 
qualities, especially the strength of his friendship, and the sincere affection 
he was able to inspire, rest in the recollection of those who knew 
him. 



100 THE POMP OF POWER 

therefore telephoned to Great Cumberland Place, and he told 
me that there had been a meeting there that afternoon, Lord 
Salisbury and a number of others ; that they were all indignant 
about Robertson's dismissal, and that they meant to bring the 
matter up in the Lords. Lord Beresford also assured me that 
it was a fact that Lord Derby was going to stay at the War 
Office, and gave me the authority for the statement. I tele- 
phoned this to Henry Wilson, whose surprised ejaculation was 
forcible. 

"I went to see Lord Beresford early on Monday morning, 
and pointed out the embarrassment that might be caused by a 
debate of the kind which he and his friends contemplated. He 
admitted that, but said they thought it was their duty; that 
Lloyd George was getting rid of Robertson because the latter 
would not stand any of Lloyd George's trickery, and that any- 
way Robertson was a great soldier. 

"I took that opening: I said that nobody could possibly be 
more ignorant of military matters than I was; and that for 
anything I knew to the contrary Robertson might be ten times 
a greater soldier than Wilson. But that what I did know was 
that Robertson did not get on with the French; that, despite 
any strength of character he might have, it was a fact that he 
was a Waterloo Englishman — one who thought that any Eng- 
lishman was worth three Frenchmen, and one who was quite 
unable to prevent the French from seeing that he thought so. 
I said that it did not require any knowledge of military matters 
to know that it was of the highest importance that if we were 
going to have Allies, we should work hand in hand with them 
— that I did know something about the situation in France : 
and I also supported my statement by showing Lord Beresford 
two or three letters. 

"I also referred to the fact that Henry Wilson was persona 
gratissima with the French, and especially with Foch. 

"To my great satisfaction. Lord Beresford came round to 
the view that working together was more important than any- 
thing else. He promised to see that nothing was done (at his 
request I sent him a memorandum), and that ended the matter. 

"During his conversation it appeared that (although they 
were both Irishmen) Lord Beresford and Henry Wilson had 
never met. When I was lunching with the Beres fords a 
couple of days later they asked me to ask Henry Wilson if he 



UNIQUE COMMAND 101 

would come to dine, and to fix a date with him, and that Lady 
Beresford would then write to him. This I did. Wilson was 
much interested by what had happened, and chose Thursday, 
March 21st. He called for me that evening, and told me he 
had just left the King, who was very much agitated, as the 
expected Offensive had begun. 

"When we got to Great Cumberland Place there was a mes- 
sage that the Prime Minister wanted to speak by telephone 
with Sir Henry Wilson. In Great Cumberland Place the tele- 
phone is somewhere in the subterranean regions, and Wilson 
therefore had to be conducted to the cellar. The same thing 
happened while we were at soup, and twice again during the 
dinner. I heard afterwards that Lloyd George had quite lost 
his head. There were sixteen at dinner: the Beresfords, 
Henry Wilson, Lord and Lady Salisbury, Lord Hardinge, Lady 
Lytton, Sir Edward and Lady Carson, Sir Frank Swettenham, 
Sir John Cowans, and Theresa, Lady Londonderry. I can't 
remember who were the others. 

"Towards the end of dinner we got the intercepted German 
wireless, according to which we had lost more than 15,000 
prisoners. They put it to Wilson, who said it was about what 
he had expected the first day. 

"It was an interesting dinner, partly because some of those 
present thus met Wilson for the first time on what must have 
been one of the most critical days of his career. His calmness, 
his confidence in the ultimate result, while at the same time not 
making any predictions other than to say that we might yet 
have worse days before we saw better, made the effect which 
they deserved to make." 

The great effect of Wilson's appointment was that there was 
now a Chief of the Imperial Staff who was strongly in favour 
of unity of command; whereas his predecessor, Robertson, 
had always been bitterly opposed to that idea. 

The attacks upon Henry Wilson continued for some time. 
They were inspired by indiscreet and irresponsible friends of 
Robertson's, and were supported mainly by Colonel Repington, 
who, to a belief in Robertson, added an avowed enmity to 
Wilson. The origins of that personal feeling are well known. 



102 THE POMP OF POWER 

If Repington sincerely thought that the appointment of Wilson 
was wrong and that Robertson's services as Chief of the 
Imperial Staff were essential to winning the war, he would 
have been well-advised had he even gone out of his way to 
show that his own dislike of Wilson counted for nothing when 
considering matters of national importance. Unfortunately, 
he was at no pains to hide his manifest prejudice. His articles 
at first caused some amazement in France. But once the 
nature of his relations with Wilson was understood (I was 
obliged to refer to them myself in the course of an interview, 
and I believe that others did likewise), the value of his com- 
ments upon this particular subject was discounted by the 
French Press. 

The result proved Repington to be entirely wrong. He 
was adverse to unity of command, and he wrote that the war 
would never be won unless Robertson was brought back. In 
the end the unique command opened the way to a victory which 
rested upon principles entirely opposed to those advocated by 
Robertson. Moreover, at a time when in France he was 
making some parade of his friendship for our Ally, Repington 
wrote (as is stated in his own Diary) a memorandum for the 
Dominion Prime Ministers, in which he accused the French 
of wanting to force unity of command simply in order that 
they might be able to make use of British troops for their 
own purposes. Such a proceeding is hardly creditable, either 
to Repington's sagacity or to his good faith. 

Henry Wilson always took these attacks in good part, 
although, I think, he had some contempt for Repington's folly 
in letting the world see how he was influenced by personal 
animosity. 

He realised long before he succeeded Robertson (and had 
often stated) that his opinion about the way the war should 
be conducted differed radically from that held by the latter. 
But he regarded that simply as a divergence of professional 
opinion. Nevertheless, as the attacks proceeded, he thought 
that Robertson's friends were doing him an ill-service. He 
wrote me about this matter as follows : 



UNIQUE COMMAND 103 

"26, Eaton Place, S. W. i. 
"24, iv, 18. 
"Dear X., 

"Many thanks for your cutting, which is, I think, true. 
Someone ought to defend Robertson against the disgraceful 
attacks in the M. P. and Globe. In effect, these attacks consist 
of saying that Robertson categorically warned Govt, that they 
were steering straight for disaster; that the Govt, flouted his 
advice, and then that Robertson continued to draw his full pay 
and live rent free in York House, knozving we were doomed. 
"I can't believe it, and someone ought to save him from such 
disgraceful attacks, 

"Yours, 

"H. W." 



At the outset of the 1918 campaign the Allied troops 
actually at the Front were somewhat inferior in numbers to 
the enemy, although, probably, better supplied with materials 
of war. The Allied forces in France (which phrase does not 
include the American troops) reached their height in the 
spring and summer of 1917; but thereafter it was necessary 
to allow large numbers of men to return to carry on the life 
of the country : to work on the land as well as in the factories. 

The question of effectives was, therefore, a source of con- 
stant pre-occupation, and also a cause of continuous irritation 
between London and Paris. Nothing excited Clemenceau so 
much. Whenever his mood was not of the best, he seemed 
to turn to this subject. He had more than one clash with 
Lloyd George, and the latter finally told him that he was at 
liberty to send to England and have a report made upon what 
had been done with the men raised, and whether it was possible 
to get any more from the country. For Clemenceau was in 
the habit of protesting that, if the figures supplied by the 
British Government were correct, he could not imagine what 
had become of all the men who had been called to the colours. 

It happened that there was a French expert on Man Power, 
Colonel Roure, who had had great success in his own country. 
Clemenceau took advantage of Lloyd George's offer and sent 



104 THE POMP OF POWER 

Roure to England; but his mode of conducting his investiga- 
tion (and probably other things) simply led to further friction. 

However, the predominant importance of the Man-Power 
question was clearly realised by the Versailles War Commit- 
tee. This body, of which Foch had been made Chairman, 
immediately began to try to organise the reserves necessary 
for the 19 1 8 campaign. The plan had the evident complica- 
tion that Foch was to get armies which were presumably to 
be under his command, by detaching troops from the armies 
of Petain and Haig, as well as some to be sent by Italy. 
Nevertheless, in pursuance of this scheme, the French Third 
Army was withdrawn from the Front, where it was replaced 
by Cough's unfortunate Fifth Army. The French First 
Army and some other divisions were also added to these re- 
serves for the Army of Manoeuvres, as it was called. 

Foch w^as anxious to constitute this Army as speedily as 
possible. He thought that the Germans would attack either 
near Cambrai or near Rheims, and the plan was to keep his 
forces near Paris, ready to strike whichever way the attack 
was made. 

But a difficulty arose about the contribution which was to 
be made by Haig. It was on February 6th, 1918, that the 
Inter-Allied War Committee wrote to the Commanders-in- 
Chief stating the number of troops each was expected to send 
for the Reserve Army. The French and Italian replies were 
received within two weeks. But it was only on March 2nd 
that Haig wrote refusing to contribute any divisions to the 
General Reserve except the British Divisions then in Italy, 
and which, in any event, were not under his command. 

The result of this was that the Italians withdrew their 
promise to send troops, and the contemplated "Army of 
Manoeuvres" practically ceased to exist except on paper. That 
was, in fact, the last of Haig's various refusals to abide by 
the promises and arrangements made by his Government. It 
was also the most costly. 

It is difficult to imagine any legitimate reason for Haig 
having thus withheld his reply until the very eve of hostilities. 
Moreover, he had been present at Versailles when the Supreme 



UNIQUE COMMAND 105 

War Council adopted the plan of campaign for 1918. He 
must, therefore, have known that a Reserve Army, to strike 
as Foch might direct, was the very essence of that plan. 

The Assistant Secretary of the Supreme War Council, 
Captain P. E. Wright, has written : "It may quite well be 
that he did not understand what was being done. My own 
impression of him during the discussion was that he entirely 
failed to follow what was being discussed." The tone of 
Captain Wright's comments upon Haig seem to show a cer- 
tain prejudice. "A man both obtuse and extraordinarily slow. 
. . . On a very low plane of human intelligence." 

Yet it must be admitted that French military leaders and 
statesmen who throughout the war (and since) showed in 
private conversation their admiration of the diverse qualities 
of various English generals — Wilson or Allenby, Plumer, 
Home, or Byng — were never able to perceive in Haig the 
slightest power of conception or the faintest tinge of imagina- 
tion : nothing beneath his charming manner but an obstinacy 
which was shown chiefly by his tenacity in insisting upon his 
own prerogatives. Even to his troops he was little known. 
No stories or anecdotes are evoked by his name. Unlike any 
other commander, he went through the war leaving no record 
of any mark made in council, or of any great deed achieved 
on the field for which he was primarily responsible. 

It has also been stated by Captain Wright that Haig re- 
fused to detach any troops for the Reserve Army because 
he and Retain had met towards the end of February, and, un- 
known to Foch, had made a plan which was inconsistent with 
the one already adopted. It is true that at one period there 
were rumours in well-informed circles that Haig and Retain 
had arrived at some arrangement which would render abortive 
the idea of Foch's striking Army, But rumours were then 
rife, and, in the absence of some proof, it is preferable to 
think that it was only a rumour. Confirmation, however, of 
the feeling which prevailed about Foch's plan is to be found 
in an account which Colonel Repington gives of a conversa- 
tion he had with Foch at Compiegne on February 6th. Retain 
then said that he did not mean to allow Foch to interfere with 



106 THE POMP OF POWER 

his reserves, and that he would resign if necessary. He added 
that he was sure that he and Haig would agree, and that they 
could "carry on." 

If by chance that lying jade, Rumour, was for once right 
— if Haig and Petain did concoct a plan — then they at the 
same time prepared a calamity. When it was apparent to 
Foch that he was not going to have any Reserve Army it 
was equally apparent to him that Cough's Army would be 
destroyed if the enemy attacked at that point, and that any- 
way there would be disaster somewhere. On March 14th, 
1918, there was a meeting in London. Foch has himself 
recently recounted what happened. 

By this time his relations with Clemenceau had changed. 
Some months earlier there had been general amazement in 
Paris at the influence which Foch seemed to have acquired 
over the President du Conseil. That influence probably ex- 
aggerated, although undoubtedly they were then on the best 
of terms. But in March, 191 8, and thereafter, Clemenceau, 
while using Foch, missed few opportunities to be unpleasant 
to him. As Foch himself says : "Je ne sais pas s'il m'aimait, 
mais il ne me le temoignait guere." It is difficult to say 
exactly who or what was responsible for this change (one 
which was later destined to prove fatal to Clemenceau's can- 
didature for the Presidency), but perhaps Mandel (Clemen- 
ceau's Chef du Cabinet, and now a deputy) was not foreign 
to it. 

Foch says : "I had been appointed to command the 'Army 
of Manoeuvre,' which did not exist to any great extent. At 
this meeting I asked the English to contribute effectives for 
this Army. Marshal Haig declared in the name of the Gov- 
ernment, which was represented particularly by Mr. Lloyd 
George, that it was impossible. I began to reply with some 
vivacity. 'Keep quiet,' M. Clemenceau said to me forcibly; 
*I am the person to speak in the name of the French Gov- 
ernment, and I accept Marshal Haig's reply.' I said to my- 
self : 'Wait until to-morrow, and I will say something.' The 
next day, when the Council was on the point of breaking up, 
I spoke, and this time I was not stopped. I declared that a 



UNIQUE COMMAND 107 

formidable offensive was being prepared. I added : *I know 
what the battles of the Allied armies are like. I have taken 
part in them on the Marne and in Italy. Here is what is neces- 
sary in the way of liaisons. Here is how we should under- 
stand each other. Here are the precautions we ought to take, 
etc., etc. But I warn you that nothing is ready to repel the 
offensive, and that there may well be a disaster.' It had its 
effect on them. And some days later, at Compiegne, and then 
at Doullens, they remembered what I had said." ^ 

The result of the German attack was (as Foch had pre- 
dicted) the complete defeat of Cough's Fifth Army, as there 
were not sufficient reserves which could be brought up in time. 
Foch's plan had simply been that, as the Germans might at- 
tack either the British or French line, there should be a re- 
serve army within striking distance : for it was obvious that, 
in an attack, the Germans could throw in forces which would 
put either the British or French Army alone at a marked 
numerical disadvantage. Haig had frustrated this plan. He 
thus found himself (as Foch had foreseen, but as Haig was 
incapable of realising until it was too late) fighting the major 
part of the German Army with his own weaker and unsus- 
tained force. It required the greatest defeat which the Brit- 
ish Army has ever known (for so the Battle of St. Quentin 
has been justly described) to make him comprehend the situa- 
tion. 

On March 26th the capture of Amiens seemed immi- 
nent, and Haig ran every risk of being driven back 
to the coast. He at last saw his error, and also that he 
had created a situation which was beyond his power to con- 
trol. He therefore telephoned that morning to London ana 
asked Lloyd George to come over, stating that in his opinion 
it was now essential to have unity of command. Lloyd George, 
being unable to leave London, sent Lord Milner. The meet- 
ing took place at Doullens, on March 23rd, 1918. Foch has 
given the following account of it: "At Doullens there were 
Lord Milner, Marshal Haig, M. Poincare, M. Clemenceau, 
* Interview with Marechal Foch in Le Matin, November 6th, 1920. 



108 THE POMP OF POWER 

M. Loucheur, and General Petain.'* For my own part, I 
was not content. According to all I had learned, General Petain 
was preparing to retire on Paris, and Marshal Haig towards 
the sea. It was the open door to the Germans. It spelled 
defeat. 'We might,' said M. Clemenceau, 'give Marechal 
Foch the command of the Armies which are operating around 
Amiens.' It was Marshal Haig who opposed this suggestion, 
stating that there was only one reasonable solution, and that 
was to give me command of the Allied Armies on the Western 
Front. M. Clemenceau agreed, and so it was decided." 

This account differs somewhat in its details from other 
reports of this historic meeting at Doullens. It omits all 
reference to the part taken by Lord Milner, for it was the 
latter who, when he saw that matters were proceeding slowly, 
and that Foch's dissatisfaction was increasing every minute, 
took M. Clemenceau aside, suggested to him that the supreme 
command should be given forthwith to Foch, and then spoke 
about it to Haig, upon whom he had earlier in the day urged 
the desirability of that course. Foch's own account shows 
that Haig, then comprehending the danger, was against any 
half measures, and preferred to see Foch in supreme com- 
mand. It was none too soon. 

It was thus given to Foch, who at one time during the war 
had been left practically idle, to finish the struggle. 

Gallieni, to whom history will always give the credit for 
the Battle of Ourcq, was "rintelligence meme." The same 
phrase was used by two French statesmen in depicting to me 
his qualities. 

Joffre, although his plans were wrong, his preparations 
lacking, and his operations faulty, was able to inspire a con- 
fidence which was not always justified by the circumstances. 
But it played its part in warding off danger. 

Petain's character perhaps entitles him, more than any other 
French general, to be called a great man. As a soldier he 
failed in little or nothing he undertook. No one else could 

* Sir Henry Wilson was also present. Lord Milner, in the account 
he has given of the Doullens meeting, tells how he motored to it with 
Wilson, who urged upon him the necessity of Foch being given supreme 
command. 



UNIQUE COMMAND 109 

have restored the morale of the troops as he did in the weeks 
following Nivelle's offensive. But Petain's failing (as failing 
it is from a military point of view) is that he was too care- 
ful. He was never quite ready for the big offensive : either 
there were not enough troops in the line; or artillery was 
lacking; or reserves were not sufficiently strong. He aimed 
at a degree of preparation and perfection which it is difficult 
to achieve in practice. It is unlikely that the war would have 
been finished in 1918 had he been in supreme command. 

Foch is sometimes reproached with thinking that France 
is made for the Army, instead of the Army for France. The 
truth within that exaggerated statement is that he is a sol- 
dier through and through. He is also the greatest strategist 
the war produced. It has been said that he had the advan- 
tage of taking supreme command after four years of war- 
fare, when he could profit by the lessons and by the mistakes 
of others. In a measure that may be correct, but it is more 
to the point to consider the position which existed when Foch 
was actually given a free hand. On March 14th he predicted 
what would happen because he had not been allowed to con- 
stitute a proper Reserve Army. His prophecy was fulfilled 
to the letter. When the meeting took place at Doullens the 
British Army had sustained the most stupendous defeat in 
its history. The whole situation was gravely compromised, 
and the peril of irremediable disaster was more impending 
than at any time since September, 1914. As Foch himself 
remarked to Clemenceau in a moment of impatience at Doul- 
lens: "You give me a battle which is already lost, and you 
ask me to re-establish it. I accept, and you think you are 
making me a present. It needs all my candeur to accept under 
such conditions." 



CHAPTER VI 
The Asquith Debacle 

The dramatic fall from power of Mr. Asquith, in Decem- 
ber, 1 91 6, vitally affected the whole course of the war. 

Asquith had first made his name by a brilliant career at 
Oxford, where Jowett had predicted his success in the world. 
Coming to London, he was called to the Bar, eventually 
achieved a certain practice, and in due course went into Par- 
liament. Although without family influence or private means 
he was from the outset marked for political office. His name 
became better known in the country through his success as 
Sir Charles Russell's junior in the Times Parnell proceedings 
before the Royal Commission, although it should be added that 
he never obtained any commanding position as a lawyer. 

His second marriage both broadened and changed his life 
and affected his whole career. He was at that time Home 
Secretary. Soon afterwards his party went into Opposition; 
and he himself broke an unwritten rule that a former Cabinet 
Minister should not return to practice at the Bar. He came 
back to office with Campbell-Bannerman, whom, a few years 
later, he succeeded. 

Possibly the country was fortunate in having Asquith at 
the head of what was then the extreme party in the State. 
There was at least the assurance that nothing would be done 
too hastily. A man of great intellect, but with none of the 
makings of a great man; with no high ideals, but with no 
petty characteristics, he rarely imitated, and habitually he 
temporised as long as possible before arriving at a decision 
upon the proposals of others. Although very unfair use was 
made of his favourite saying, "Wait and see" (a phrase which 
was equally unfortunate as President Wilson's quotation 

110 



THE ASQUITH DEBACLE 111 

"Too proud to fight"), it is undeniable that it truly expressed 
his mentality in the latter days of his political power. 

All that he asked was to remain at lo, Downing Street 
and to guide the affairs of the country with as much dignity 
and as little trouble as might be possible. In the ordinary 
course he doubtless would have been Prime Minister for a 
number of years. But sooner or later there probably would 
have come a conflict with Mr. Lloyd George. The latter 
was in every respect the antithesis of his chi^f : a man of no 
intellectual accomplishments and of little knowledge, who felt 
at home only in the company of those whose attainments in 
that respect were at least not superior to his own. Dominated 
sometimes by high ideals and sometimes actuated by mean 
motives, he had withal many of the parts of a great man; 
and still more of the qualities of a great national leader. But 
it was not so much the difference in character which rendered 
inevitable the clash as Mr. Lloyd George's overweening ambi- 
tion to be in supreme power. Nevertheless, any contest be- 
tween Asquith and Lloyd George might not have terminated 
to the advantage of the latter in normal times. The war gave 
him his opportunity. 

Soon after August, 1914, it was apparent that the truth 
of Macaulay's dictum that a successful peace Prime Minister 
might be a failure in time of war was illustrated in the per- 
son of Mr. Asquith. He was neither resolute in council nor 
did he possess any personal power to arouse the country. 
When he had been on the verge of defeat he had accepted 
the proposal to form a coalition, which he had previously 
spurned. But any live leadership was still lacking. When 
Parliament prorogued in the summer of 1916 it was after a 
session in which the vacillations of the Government had first 
amazed and had finally alarmed and exasperated the nation. 

Nevertheless the Cabinet started the Autumn Session with 
better prospects than it had earned any right to expect. But 
within a few weeks its inherent weakness again began to be 
apparent. By the month of November the country was dis- 
gusted. While at the same period Mr. Lloyd George was say- 
ing openly to his intimate friends that the war would be lost 



112 THE POMP OF POWER 

if Asquith continued in office. He sincerely believed (and 
with reason) that he was the man destined to show the way 
to victory. 

But it was difficult to see how matters could be brought 
to a crisis except by Mr. Lloyd George himself taking a 
personal political risk; and that he was always indisposed 
to do. He wanted a "palace insurrection," a rebellion from 
within, which would oust Mr. Asquith and carry him to Down- 
ing Street. He was, therefore, obviously obliged to depend 
upon the adhesion of the leaders of the Unionist party. The 
most essential point was to obtain the support of Mr. Bonar 
Law. Although perhaps even that might not have sufficed 
to carry the day had not Mr. Balfour also deserted Mr. 
Asquith. 

In many respects the details of the intrigue are still un- 
known or obscure. The person who had the greatest part 
in carrying it to a conclusion was Lord Beaverbrook, who 
then, as Sir Max Aitken, sat in the House of Commons as 
member for Ashton-under-Lyne. It is doubtful whether 
Aitken conceived the original idea. The probability seems 
to be that it originated with others ; and that it was in casting 
around for someone to influence Mr. Bonar Law that they 
disclosed the project to Aitken. 

The latter was already credited with being mainly respon- 
sible for the choice of Mr. Bonar Law as leader of the Union- 
ist party upon the resignation of Mr. Balfour. At that time 
the logical selection was either Mr. Walter Long or Mr. 
Austen Chamberlain. The party was divided in its views; 
and neither Mr. Long nor Mr. Chamberlain was anxious to 
force a vote on such a question. Aitken saw the opportunity 
and took steps to ensure the election of Mr. Bonar Law. 

His success upon that occasion was the more remarkable 
because he had then been in England for only two or three 
years, and was largely unknown. Beaverbrook is by birth 
a Canadian, like Mr. Bonar Law, to whom he. is distantly 
related. As a result of various financial operations, he had 
made a considerable fortune before he was thirty years of 
age. No reasonable explanation has ever been given in Eng- 



THE ASQUITH DEBACLE 113 

land for the antipathy to Aitken which was then so wide- 
spread in Canada. Possibly it must be regarded as an ex- 
emplification of the saying that a prophet has no honour in 
his own country. For no specific allegation has ever been made 
against him; while the companies which he promoted not 
only made money for their promoter but for those who in- 
vested in them.^ Colonel Repington mentions in his Diary 
that a Canadian lady told him why Aitken was so disliked in 
Canada. It is regrettable that he did not share that, as he 
did so much other private information, with anyone ready 
to pay two guineas. 

Later (and after the events to which I am now referring) 
Beaverbrook did his utmost to obtain a favourable press in 
Canada, When he became Minister of Information (and 
no one who was at the meeting of the Unionist War Commit- 
tee will ever forget the strange reasons which Mr. Lloyd 
George adduced for having given him that post) he succeeded 
to some extent. 

A small body of recognised experts on foreign affairs, who 
had done that part of the work before the Ministry was in- 
stituted, refused to serve under Lord Beaverbrook. They 
emigrated to the Foreign Office, where their services were 
accepted and retained by Lord Hardinge, whom Beaverbrook's 
protests left coldly indifferent. The latter reorganised his 
department by bringing in a number of men distinguished 
in the literary world, and others well known in the City. But 
a large percentage of the rank and file were Canadians, whose 
experience of foreign affairs and whose knowledge of for- 
eign languages was as limited as that possessed by Beaver- 
brook himself. The result was that the work of the Ministry, 
aside from the cinematograph and amusement part (which 
was excellently done), was greatly below the required level. 
It was a constant source of polite amusement to the Maison 
de la Presse, of which the founder and guiding spirit was 

^ I am aware that a director of the Canadian and Pacific Railway 
Company, the late Sir Stamford Fleming, did attack Aitken in the 
Press regarding certain private transactions they had had together; 
but the matter never proceeded further than Fleming stating his own 
view of the disagreement. 



114 THE POMP OF POWER 

the astute and accomplished PhiHppe Berthelot, who knows 
all the things of which Beaverbrook is so essentially ignorant, 
but who, on the other hand, could never have amassed the 
money which Beaverbrook made in the promotion of com- 
panies. 

However, the Ministry of Information spent lavishly, as 
the accounts show; and part of the expenditure went in pay- 
ing the expenses of Canadian (as well as other overseas) 
journalists who were brought to England. All this had some 
effect in dissipating the strange unpopularity which Beaver- 
brook had incurred in his native country. Although as late 
as December, 1918, such a well-known newspaper as the 
Ottawa Citizen stated bluntly that he could never be elected 
to any office in Canada. 

But in the autumn of 1916 Lord Beaverbrook (as he 
shortly afterwards became) took a leading part in bringing 
together the elements which overcame Mr. Asquith. It is 
known that he himself kept a diary, in which he recorded 
minutely what took place during those momentous weeks. 
Probably all the facts will never be known unless that journal 
is one day made public. Even then it will have to be accepted 
with reserve. Sir Edward (now Lord) Carson told me that 
the part of it which he had seen attributed to him a role he 
had never played. The truth is that Carson was then, as 
always, aloof from all intrigue. 

Aitken used his influence over Bonar Law to good effect. 
It was understood that as a reward he was to become Presi- 
dent of the Board of Trade in the new Government. But 
strong objection to that appointment came from various quar- 
ters. To his annoyance the office he coveted was allotted 
to Sir Albert Stanley; and he himself was consoled by a 
peerage. 

After all that has occurred during the last five years it is 
to-day difficult to realise what a step it then was for Tories 
deliberately to oust the Liberal Asquith in order to place in 
office and to serve under their own hete noir, the Radical 
Lloyd George. The primary instinct against such a course 
must have been specially strong in the breast of Mr. Walter 



THE ASQUITH DEBACLE 115 

Long, who had himself served under Lord Sahsbury, and 
who was the last of the country squires to make a mark in 
the House of Commons. 

I saw Mr. Long upon various occasions during these weeks. 
Upon my return to England in October, 191 6, after a month 
spent abroad, I found a letter from him requesting me to 
call at the Local Government Board. At that interview he 
asked me to find out what I could regarding the prevalent 
feeling about the Government, and to let him know in the 
course of the following week. 

Quoting from my diary : "When I saw Mr. Long sub- 
sequently I mentioned that the feeling towards the Coalition 
seemed very much better than it had been in August; that 
the Government was not only stronger in the country than 
it had been at the end of last session, but that it was stronger 
than it had any right to expect; that many people who had 
opposed the Coalition were now only too anxious to accept 
and support it on the ground that men who had for two years 
conducted such a novel business as a great war must necessarily 
know more about it than any others, even if they had not been 
the best men in the beginning. I added that Mr. Asquith's 
speech had made a wonderful impression, and that if he only 
kept the promises made in it the Government should be safe; 
but that if, on the other hand, he did the same thing as last 
session, introduced bills and withdrew them, and showed 
one way and another that he did not know his own mind, 
the situation would be worse than ever, as people's hopes 
had now been raised. Mr. Long disagreed with me as re- 
gards the Government running any chance of being defeated. 

"Two or three days later I got a telephone message from 
Mr. Long, and when I went to see him he asked me to 
write a letter embodying what I had said, as he wished to 
show it to Mr. Asquith. I was leaving for Paris at five 
o'clock that afternoon, and therefore wrote very hurriedly 
and rather badly a letter to that effect in the intervening couple 
of hours." 

Quoting further from my diary towards the end of Novem- 
ber, 1916: "I saw Mr. Long last Thursday, spending more 



116 THE POMP OF POWER 

than two hours with him. He knew that I had already seen 
X. I suggested that exactly what I pointed out in my letter 
had happened; that the Government had made the same mis- 
takes as last session, and that as a result they were worse off 
than ever. He said that that was true, and also admitted that 
things could not go on as they were. I then pointed out that 
the only possible successor to Mr. Asquith was Lloyd George ; 
that it might be disappointing that no Conservative or at least 
no one of a different political tradition from Lloyd George 
could be found who was capable of being Prime Minister, but 
the fact was that no such person existed. 

"Also that Lloyd George was surrounded by a band of flat- 
terers who were urging him to make the attempt ; and that 
if he ever screwed up his courage to doing it without the as- 
sistance of the Unionist leaders, and was successful, he would 
be cock o' the walk. Mr. Long seemed rather taken aback by 
this, and kept on repeating 'Cock o' the walk.' He then, how- 
ever, made a point that even if Lloyd George made the attempt 
he would be defeated in the House of Commons. The sug- 
gestion was curious as showing how a man who has lived 
the greater part of his life in the House may be absolutely out 
of touch with public feeling once that feeling gets out of its or- 
dinary channel. I told Mr. Long (and I believe it to be true) 
that nothing would help Lloyd George more than an open state- 
ment that he did not agree with the way the war was being con- 
ducted, followed first by his resignation, and subsequently by 
his defeat in the House because the Party Whips were against 
him ; that in that event he would soon force a General Election, 
and would undoubtedly come back triumphant, the country be- 
ing heartily sick of the House of Commons and its ways. More- 
over, that, although resignation was a risk which was often 
fatal in English political life, yet that the times were extraor- 
dinary, and that there was no possible parallel to be drawn 
between the resignation of Lord Randolph Churchill and that 
of Mr. Lloyd George, whom the country, rightly or wrongly, 
wanted to see Prime Minister. I added that the only thing 
which would prevent the matter going through would be 
whether or not Lloyd George had the pluck to make the plunge 



THE ASQUITH DEBACLE 117 

unless he had what he considered sufficient Unionist support 
first promised him. On this point I admitted I was in some 
doubt. 

"Mr. Long first referred to the possibility of a General Elec- 
tion, and mentioned — what I knew — that dissolution was the 
prerogative of the Prime Minister. But he added what I did 
not know, namely, that on one or two occasions Prime Minis- 
ters had exercised that prerogative without giving their col- 
leagues any warning. I think he said that Mr. Balfour's dis- 
solution was one of those occasions. 

"He then proceeded to recall how when Mr. Joseph Cham- 
berlain had differed from the other members of the Govern- 
ment he had come to a Cabinet Meeting, had told them so 
frankly, and had then resigned. And he said that if Mr. Lloyd 
George would only adopt that plan instead of working outside 
the Cabinet he would probably get more support than otherwise, 
and in quarters where he did not expect it. 

"However, Mr. Long was mainly insistent that a deputation 
should see Mr. Asquith to get him to change his ways. I ven- 
tured to argue that all the deputations in the world were hardly 
likely to change the character of a man of sixty-five; that, as 
Mr. Long himself had been impressing on me, there probably 
was no specific thing which the present Government was not 
doing which Mr. Lloyd George could say he would do, but 
that he would do things more quickly, which in time of war 
was almost as important as a question of policy; and that the 
procrastination which was the Prime Minister's fatal defect 
was not likely to be changed by any deputation. However, I 
asked Mr. Long whom he suggested should be on this deputa- 
tion. He mentioned the names of Lord Cromer, Lord Milner, 
Sir Starr Jamieson, and one of the Rothschilds. In casting 
about for a fifth he mentioned J. P. Morgan. I pointed out 
that Morgan was an American. Mr. Long would hardly be- 
lieve this, and at first insisted that Morgan had become a nat- 
uralised British subject. 

"At Mr. Long's request I said that I would see X and would 
then write in the course of the next two days. He asked me to 
see Mr. Bonar Law and discuss the matter with him also. I 



118 THE POMP OF POWEK 

told him that I did not think any good purpose would be an- 
swered by my seeing Mr. Bonar Law, whom I knew very 
slightly. 

"At the end of this conversation Mr. Long, whose political 
connection probably goes back farther than anyone in the 
House of Commons, bar five or six, told me several interest- 
ing things about the past. He related how he had made up 
the quarrel caused by Randolph Churchill opening a letter 
which was not addressed to him. He mentioned that he him- 
self had been put on political committees by Disraeli ; and said 
that he remembered Disraeli even further back than that ; that 
Disraeli had stayed at Rood Ashton when he (Mr. Long) was 
eight years old, and that he remembered him patting him on the 
head, saying that he hoped he would go to Parliament, like 
his father and grandfather, and then, admiring the steel on his 
velvet suit, and making them the vehicle of a rather fulsome 
compliment to Mr. Long's mother upon her taste in having 
chosen them. 

"The following day I wrote to Mr. Long saying that it ap- 
peared to be too late for a deputation, even admitting that it 
might have been useful at any time, and adding that the main 
point now was that the matter should not go further without 
the support of Unionist leaders other than those who preferred 
to cleave to Mr. Asquith." 

The Thursday following: "Mr. Long telephoned yester- 
day morning asking me to meet him at two o'clock, an easy 
hour for him, as he never takes any luncheon. I walked with 
him from the Local Government Board Office to Lansdowne 
House, and waited for him while he saw Lord Lansdowne. On 
the way through the park he amused me by pointing out how 
well Lord Crewe, whom we happened to meet, had done for 
himself in life, considering that he had no great abilities, al- 
though a charming manner. A barony turned into a marqui- 
sate, the Garter, and the leadership of the House of Lords, al- 
though he is able to speak so little that even in the Lords it is 
more mumbling than speaking. But Mr. Long added that 
Lord Crewe's speeches were as pleasant to read as they were 



THE ASQUITH DEBACLE 119 

otherwise to listen to. He also said that Lord Crewe wrote 
very good verses, evidently an inherited talent. 

"Mr. Long was rather put out by a leader in yesterday's 
Times advocating a dictatorship of three. I told him that no- 
body considered that that was practicable. He said he real- 
ised now that the view I had taken last week was right, that 
the matter had gone too far, and that Asquith would probably 
go. He added that he expected that Lord Lansdowne himself 
would go likewise. I said that from what I had been told by 
X. I had no reason to think that Lloyd George would ask 
Lord Lansdowne to stay; but I did understand that it was 
agreed that he (Long) should be asked to remain. 

"I do not know what Lord Lansdowne told him, but he 
seemed decidedly more cheerful afterwards." 

Wednesday following. "Asquith has definitely gone. When 
there was very little risk Lloyd George finally got worked up 
to making his ultimatum. It really amounted to a demand 
that the whole responsibility of the war should be given to a 
small committee, in which Asquith should practically not have 
any vote. Asquith saw the King on Saturday and then went 
to Walmer. This was the cue for Lloyd George, who sent a 
message that the matter could not wait, and must be decided 
immediately, or otherwise his resignation must take effect. 
Asquith came back on Sunday; and that afternoon the Union- 
ist members of the Government wrote him that they resigned 
if Lloyd George did. In fact, they did send in their resigna- 
tions, but withdrew them when Asquith replied that the matter 
raised by Lloyd George was not settled. Asquith then ac- 
cepted Lloyd George's terms. But on Monday, urged by some 
of his political friends (and chiefly, I understand, by Mc- 
Kenna), he withdrew his acceptance. He then saw that he 
would be deserted and was forced to resign. The King sent 
for Bonar Law, who said that he would try to form a Govern- 
ment, but, as a matter of fact, he did not make any attempt 
to do so. Before the King gave the task to Lloyd George 
there was a conference at the Palace between Lloyd George, 
Asquith, and Bonar Law. I believe that Asquith would then 
have been willing to accept the terms imposed by Lloyd George ; 



120 THE POMP OF POWER 

but the latter was only too glad to have him out of the way, 
and would only consider the proposal formerly made as being 
definitely rejected. In the result Lloyd George undertook to 
form a Government, and is now doing so." 

Saturday following: "Mr. Long sent me a message asking 
me to come to the Local Government Board and go with him 
to Paddington, as he was leaving for Rood Ashton for the 
week-end. He is, I think, rather glad to be Colonial Secre- 
tary. But he was very much annoyed by an attack in the Times 
this morning saying that he and Mr. Balfour ought to have been 
left out of the Government. As a matter of fact, Lord North- 
clifife is very prejudiced against Mr. Long. About two weeks 
ago, when this affair was coming on, X. spoke to me about a 
dinner he thought of arranging to bring them together; but 
later he said he had decided not to do so, as Northcliffe might 
quite possibly be rude to Long." 

Briand, like Asquith, resigned in December, 1916. But 
the effect of these two changes of Government was vastly dif- 
ferent. Briand reorganised his Cabinet, pending his retire- 
ment three months later, when he made way for a successor 
who, for the time being, more fully enjoyed the confidence of 
Parliament. But the disappearance of Mr. Asquith in Eng- 
land signalled a revolution in the mode of conducting the strug- 
gle. Thereafter the country was inspired to make efforts and 
to submit to sacrifices of which neither its Allies nor its ene- 
mies had thought it capable. The winning of the war was 
placed before and above all else. The accumulations of the past 
and the prospects of the future were alike used towards that 
end without any count being taken. The statesman who was 
thus able to call forth the utmost vitality and resolution in 
his own country soon took the leading part in the councils of 
the Allies. 

Macaulay once wrote that "Of almost every man who has 
been distinguished in the political world it may be said that 
the course which he pursued, and the effect which he produced, 
depended less upon his personal qualities than on the circum- 
stances in which he was placed," It is not decrying Mr, Lloyd 



THE ASQUITH DEBACLE 121 

George's merits to say that he and the occasion were made for 
each other. 

The passage of Mr. Asquith meant something else, which, 
while less important, was nevertheless far reaching. It sounded 
the knell of Gladstonian Liberalism ; and, by a curious chance, 
enabled the Conservative party to ward off its own dissolution, 
and possibly to get a new lease of life, by adopting a great 
Radical leader. 



CHAPTER VII 
The French Political World 

The present period in French political history dates from 
the day when it became apparent that M. Clemenceau would 
not be elected President of the Republic. Although Cle- 
menceau had at first waved aside the suggestion that he should 
go to the Elysee, he finally admitted that he was being "car- 
ried" there by the force of public opinion. It was only three 
days before the election that the carefully prepared intrigue saw 
the light of day. Marechal Foch was in no small degree re- 
sponsible for its success, although not for its inception — a fact 
which would not have been generally known had it not been 
for the indiscretion of I'Abbe Wetterlee. 

Many months before Clemenceau had decided that if he 
could arrange it, M. Millerand should be his successor as 
President du Conseil. Millerand had been Minister of War 
in 191 5. His administration of that office has been greatly 
criticised. It is difficult to form a judgment as to the justice 
of the allegations made against him. In brief, they amount 
to an accusation that his policy was such as to waste the lives 
of many tens of thousands to no good purpose. The feeling 
about this is still so bitter that within the last eighteen months 
the Rapporteur General of an important Parliamentary Com- 
mittee, who has been a member of more than one Cabinet, men- 
tioned to me that he never went to see Millerand (who was then 
Prime Minister) about the reports to be made, as he wished to 
avoid any contact with him; but that, of course, he was 
obliged to receive le President du Conseil when the latter re- 
versed the usual procedure and called upon him. 

Clemenceau had not been upon good terms with Millerand 
for some years. The difference originated before the war. 
There is a certain piquancy in recalling that when the Govern- 

122 



THE FRENCH POLITICAL WORLD 123 

ment left Paris to go to Bordeaux, in 1914, Millerand's last 
warning to the Military Governor who was left in charge — 
Gallieni — was to beware of what Clemenceau might attempt 
to do. Nevertheless, when some four years later Clemenceau 
wanted a Haut Commissaire for Alsace-Lorraine he turned to 
Millerand, disregarded the past, and persuaded him to accept 
the post. Later he decided that Millerand was the man upon 
whom he could best rely to ensure the execution of the Treaty 
of Versailles. I see by my diary that as early as April, 1919, 
a person well known in the French political world brought 
me that news. 

Millerand had taken certain steps towards the constitution 
of a Cabinet with the idea that Clemenceau would be Presi- 
dent of the Republic. When in the middle of the week it was 
evident that M. Deschanel's ^ friends (or M. Clemenceau's 
enemies) had gained the day, it was probably necessary to make 
a few changes. 

The election at Versailles was devoid of interest. The re- 
sult was a foregone conclusion. It was very different from 
the day seven years previously when Clemenceau and M. Ca- 
mille Pelletan had done their bitter utmost to defeat Poincare 
and to send M. Pams to the Ely see. It was also a dull day in 
Paris. Mr. Lloyd George was not, despite the statement in 
the newspapers, at Versailles, as in other circumstances he 
doubtless would have been, to honour M. Clemenceau. In- 
stead, he lunched somewhat gloomily at Claridge's Hotel, and 
had much to say about the ingratitude of nations. 

Woodrow Wilson repudiated ! 

Clemenceau rejected ! 

Was anyone safe? 

Apart from supervising the execution of the Treaty It was 
thought that any Government would have to consider the re- 
vision of the Constitution. In England the power of the Cabi- 
net has steadily increased at the expense of Parliament, which 
to-day is much less potent than It was a quarter of a century 

^ To a foreigner it is curious to notice that one of the most striking 
things in M. Deschanel's appearance is the scar of a wound which he 
received in a duel with M. Clemenceau many years ago. 



124 THE POMP OF POWER 

ago. One of the results of five years of warfare has been to 
lessen the direct responsibility of Ministers of the Crown to 
the House of Commons, and to place the Prime Minister al- 
most in the position of a president of a republic. 

But in France Parliament has increased its influence out 
of all due proportion. It has absorbed the greater share of 
the power, leaving, on one side, a President who is to a large 
extent a figure-head, and upon the other an underpaid judiciary 
which is dependent upon its will. It was thought that this 
might be rectified, and that the whole balance might be read- 
justed, by augmenting the powers of the President, which 
would add to the security of the Government of the day. The 
project secured all the more adherents because the men of the 
Republic have never forgotten that the Constitution of 1875 
was drafted by a Royalist majority : while there was a general 
impression that a mistake had been made in adopting the Eng- 
lish in preference to the American system. 

It was, I think, Sir Henry Maine who wrote that the King 
of England reigned without governing, that the President 
of the United States governed without reigning, but that it 
had remained for the President of the French Republic neither 
to govern nor to reign. The accuracy of this statement is 
questionable. The French constitution gives the President very 
considerable power; although it is true that every presidential 
decree must be countersigned by a minister as well as signed 
by the President. But no President has ever cared to take any 
initiative or to exercise his full powers since the misfortune 
which befell Marechal MacMahon on the Seize Mai. While 
the fact that the office conferred little real power was accen- 
tuated in recent years by the coincidence that neither M. 
Loubet nor M. Fallieres, though both worthy men, were of a 
calibre which enabled them to be anything but respectable 
nonentities. 

M. Poincare, with his great intellectual attainments, and be- 
hind him his career as a leader of the Paris Bar, would in 
normal times doubtless have made some effort to break away 
from what had become a tradition ; for although "un homme 
timide" — of which one of the results is his apparent coldness 



THE FRENCH POLITICAL WORLD 125 

— M, Poincare is a man of considerable resolution. But the 
advent of the war forbade any experiments of that kind : and 
even M. Poincare's personal letter to King George in the days 
preceding the declaration of hostilities had to be assented to 
by his ministers. 

But M. Poincare himself, although he recently wrote that the 
inaction imposed on a President of the Republic was galling, 
strongly urged in the same article that no attempt should be 
made to revise a constitution which, upon the whole, had well 
served its purpose for half a century. 

Apparently M. Millerand concurred in the view that the 
powers are in the constitution if the President wants to ex- 
ercise them. For although some days before his election in 
September, 1920, he issued a statement to the effect that if he 
became President he would take an active part in directing 
the policy of the country, he did not intimate that he thought 
that involved any constitutional change. 

On the other hand, M. Briand was one of the many who 
some years ago were credited with holding the opinion that 
some revision was essential in order to increase the independ- 
ence of the executive and to lessen the overwhelming influence 
of Parliament. It is probable, however, that he was well con- 
tent not to raise the question. For within the past two years 
there has been a very general revulsion of feeling, and for a 
curious reason. An eminent statesman, who was a member 
of M. Briand's Cabinet, told me on several occasions during 
the war that one of the first duties of Parliament after peace 
was obtained would be to extend the presidential powers. Since 
then he and many of his political friends have changed their 
mind. The lesson they saw in the case of Mr. Wilson was that 
it is better to have a President whose powers are too limited 
than one whose powers are too wide. 

The political position of France differs from that of Eng- 
land in that there are at least half a dozen men who might be 
called to be Prime Minister to-morrow without evoking any 
surprise in the country. There are almost innumerable for- 
mer Prime Ministers. The list is not exhausted by citing 
MM. de Freycinet, Ribot, Clemenceau, Caillaux, Barthou, 



126 THE POMP OF POWER 

Viviani, Millerand, Doumergue, Painleve, Leygues, Briand, 
Meline, and Monis.^ 

Some of these can never again be in office on account of 
their advanced age. Others are unHkely to be so for various 
reasons. But there remain a number who are quite "Minis- 
trable" : while it would be difficult to give a full list of those 
who have held some Cabinet rank and who are possibilities as 
Prime Ministers. 

Aristide Briand, who was recently President du Conseil 
for the sixth time, is 59 years of age. He is an avocat who 
has not practised for many years. M. Briand is supposed 
to be indolent, but upon occasion no one can show more firm- 
ness and energy. He made his reputation as reporter of the 
law separating Church and State. But the feat which clings 
most to his name is the quashing of a widespread railway 
strike, by calling the employes to the colours, and thus placing 
them under martial law. 

Although he began his career with socialistic tendencies 
Briand has long been practically an independent. For some 
years his name was not inscribed upon the list of any group, 
but lately he has been classed as a Socialist Republican. He 
is the greatest of French parliamentarians ; so far ahead of 
everyone else that he is often inclined to trust somewhat too 
much to his power to win the day from the tribune. H he is 
not the greatest of orators amongst the deputies, he is second 
only to Viviani, whose speaking is of quite a different order. 

M. Briand is probably the only French politician, except 
M. Poincare, who can hold his own against Mr. Lloyd George ; 
although he is thought to have been too yielding at Cannes. 
This is partly because he is somewhat of the same type. M. 
Millerand is perhaps a strong, and is certainly an obstinate 
man. He always knows his case thoroughly as befits a lawyer. 
But, as was patent when he was Prime Minister, he cannot 
"manoeuvrer sur place," a defect vital to anyone dealing with 
Mr. Lloyd George. 

Briand also had the advantage of the guidance, and of trust- 

' Since writing the above another former Prime Minister has died : 
M. Combes. 



THE FRENCH POLITICAL WORLD 127 

ing to the guidance of, M. Philippe Berthelot, The latter is 
the most remarkable member of a remarkable family. His 
father, a celebrated scientist who was almost equally well known 
as a free-thinker in a former generation, made a brief appari- 
tion at the Quai d'Orsay as Minister of Foreign Affairs. One 
of his brothers is M. Andre Berthelot, who is both a senator 
and a figure in the world of high finance. 

Philippe Berthelot is one of the ablest and perhaps the 
most "seduisant" man in France. His literary and artistic 
interests and talents, coupled with his delight in the intercourse 
of others, have made him a notable figure in all classes of 
Parisian society. His work as a diplomatist has always borne 
witness to his strong personality. He has created many attach- 
ments, has aroused some enmities, and excited more jealousies : 
but generally he has been able to dispel prejudices which were 
acquired before their holders had met him. 

M. Berthelot's ill-wishers thought that the troubles of a 
bank of which his brother was the chairman afforded an open- 
ing for checking a career which was too brilliant to please 
many of them. They made the most of the opportunity; 
whilst on the other hand some of those who had reason to be 
grateful to him did not rally to his support until they saw 
which way the wind blew. But the incident served to show 
Berthelot's courage and imperturbation.^ 

* Since the proof of this chapter was corrected, M. Berthelot, at the 
instance of M. Poincare, appeared before a Disciplinary Council 
charged with having sent on his own authority, but signed in the name 
of successive Ministers of Foreign Afifairs (M. Leygues and M. Briand), 
certain telegrams designed to strengthen the position of La Banque 
Industrielle de Chine, of which his brother was chairman. As a result 
of the finding of this body M. Poincare decided that he should be sus- 
pended from the Diplomatic service for ten (lo) years. As Philippe 
Berthelot is now 56, this practically ends his career at the Quai d'Orsay. 
He has thus paid dearly for whatever error he may have committed. 
But his country is also a loser, for France does not at present possess 
. many diplomatists of Berthelot's calibre. It is worth recalling that in 
IQ20 a determined effort was made by Berthelot's friends, both in 
France and in England, to secure for him the succession to M. Paul 
Cambon. The fact that, at this juncture, M. and Mme. Berthelot had 
the honour of lunching alone with the King and Queen was advanced 
as showing the welcome which he might expect as Ambassador. But 
it is to my personal knowledge that Berthelot's partisans were unable 
to get any encouragement from M. Millerand, who was then Prime 
Minister. M. Painleve would also, at this time, have liked to follow 
M. Cambon at Albert Gate. 



128 THE POMP OF POWER 

At the Quai d'Orsay he has nearly always rendered himself 
indispensable to the Minister of the day. It is true that M. 
Ribot never entirely overcame a fear that Berthelot might ab- 
sorb some of his own jealously guarded power, or might become 
too influential. But M. Clemenceau, who arrived at the For- 
eign Office holding Berthelot in detestation, within a few 
months placed the greatest reliance upon him and had the 
greatest confidence in him. 

When Lord Derby came to Paris as Ambassador, Lord 
Bertie told him to beware of one man among all others — Ber- 
thelot. For the latter had never been able to advance in Lord 
Bertie's good graces any more than he has in those of M. 
Poincare. This warning, coming from one who had repre- 
sented his country for so many years in Paris, was not a good 
recommendation. But within eighteen months the new Am- 
bassador had formed his own opinion. I recollect Lord Derby 
recounting to me this injunction of his predecessor, and his 
own impression that while Philippe Berthelot was supremely 
nationalist, he was a sincere friend of Great Britain, and a 
firm supporter of the Entente. 

But with Briand M. Berthelot has always been on the closest 
terms. It was indeed the idea that Berthelot was essentially 
Briand's man which had primarily indisposed M. Clemen- 
ceau towards him. With the return of Briand to the Quai 
d'Orsay Berthelot's position was assured, while it was further 
fortified by the retirement of M. Paleologue, who is generally 
held responsible for the ill-advised recognition of Wrangel 
by M. Millerand's Government. 

In the autumn of 1920, when the Leygues Ministry was 
only a stop-gap, it was felt that only a Briand Cabinet (or 
possibly a Poincare-Briand combination) would be strong 
enough either to induce Mr. Lloyd George to take steps to 
enforce the execution of the Treaty, or to act alone if Great 
Britain declined to move. From the day he formed his Gov- 
ernment M. Briand showed that he was impressed by the fact 
that France has counted upon and must get from Germany 
the reparation contemplated by the Treaty: while as a practi- 
cal politician with a keen sense of atmosphere he realised that 



THE FRENCH POLITICAL WORLD 129 

the temper both of the country and of Parliament was such 
that any Government which did not make headway in that di- 
rection would not last long. But although M. Briand is both 
by nature and by experience better fitted than any other 
French statesman to hold his own against Mr. Lloyd George, 
and while he is not excelled by the British Prime Minister 
either in resourcefulness or in force of character, he was al- 
ways at a certain disadvantage in his negotiations with Down- 
ing Street. 

Mr. Lloyd George starts with a certain preponderant au- 
thority by reason of the fact that he is the sole survivor of the 
makers of the Treaty. But Briand's European reputation in 
the conduct of foreign affairs was a sufficient set-off to a 
claim the value of which is daily becoming more doubtful : 
it is not a proud boast to have manufactured a machine which 
one cannot or will not make operative. 

Mr. Lloyd George is secure in his majority. Relatively 
he is a permanency. When he deals with any French Minister 
of Foreign Affairs he knows that at the next conference he 
may be faced by another — one more or one less tractable. 
He knows that the result of the negotiations of the day, and 
even his own conduct, may have its repercussion in the French 
Parliament, and may result in the downfall of the Govern- 
ment. Many Ministers have passed in and out of the Quai 
d'Orsay while Mr. Lloyd George has remained firmly in power. 
Even if there be any basis for the accusation that he some- 
times subordinates his foreign policy to his political pros- 
pects, he is only bound to do so in view of the next General 
Election, in view of what the country may say at the polls at 
some more or less distant date. His fate is not always in the 
balance from day to day. 

Mr. Lloyd George is in office by virtue of a Unionist ma- 
jority. At times his Government has done things of which 
that majority did not sincerely approve. More than once, 
alike after the Armistice and since the Treaty of Versailles was 
signed, the Unionist War Committee or its successor sent pro- 
testing deputations to the then leader, Mr. Bonar Law, to state 
emphatically that the party was not in accord with the pro- 



130 THE POMP OF POWER 

posals of the Government. More than once Mr. Bonar Law 
intimated in his quiet and precise manner that the alternative 
might be a General Election ; and the members of the deputa- 
tion returned to whence they came with their tails between 
their legs. 

Mr. Lloyd George, however, has no rival in the House of 
Commons. He certainly would have had nothing to fear had 
Mr. Bonar Law not retired. 

But the situation of M. Briand or of any French Prime 
Minister, is manifestly different. A Government which wishes 
to enforce the execution of the Treaty is confronted by the 
united opposition of all the socialist deputies; while it must 
also count upon a certain number of adverse votes from 
nearly all the other groups — some on the ground that it has 
been too exacting, and others, for the reason that it has been 
too feeble, either in its demands upon Germany or in its con- 
versations with the British Cabinet. 

In the vote taken on May 26, 1921, when M. Briand asked 
the Chambre des Deputes to approve what he had done in 
London, the Government was sustained by a majority of 234, 
the figures being 391 as against 157. 

But this minority of 157 was made up as follows: 

14 members of the Republican and Socialist Entente; 

27 members of the Republican Democratic Entente; 

12 members of the Republican and Democratic Left; 

16 Independents; 
7 Radicals and Radical Socialists ; 

48 Socialists ; 

14 representatives of the Left; 

12 Socialist Communists; 
7 Deputies belonging to no group. 

Of the forty-seven deputies who abstained from voting, for- 
ty-five belonged to one or other of the groups above men- 
tioned, but the remaining two were members of the Republi- 
can and Social Action ; while of the eighteen deputies who had 
leave of absence, one belonged to a group not yet named, the 
Socialist Republican. 

It is obvious that a legislature divided into so many diverse 



THE FRENCH POLITICAL WORLD 131 

fractions is at all times a mine which may explode and shat- 
ter the Cabinet of the day. Any one of a dozen combinations 
may cause the outburst. The Prime Minister is therefore 
obliged to walk circumspectly. If members of the House of 
Commons do not approve of Mr. Lloyd George's policy he can 
send them back to their constituencies — to expensive uncer- 
tainty. But if the deputies do not approve of the President 
du Conseil they can cast him out of office without themselves 
running any risk of having immediately to answer to their 
electors. Of the science of managing the French Parliament 
M. Briand is the greatest living exponent. 

It is noteworthy that M. Barthou was in the Briand Cabi- 
net, and is in the Poincare. For it is Barthou who in May, 
1920, made in the Chambre a bitter attack upon Lloyd George's 
treatment of France and his disregard of French rights under 
the Treaty. Barthou had been incited by Briand to speak in 
this sense; although I believe that Briand thought he went 
too far, and congratulated him less when he descended from 
the tribune than he had encouraged him before. It is a curious 
coincidence that the very same afternoon Lloyd George spoke 
in the House of Commons and made certain references to 
the position of France which for the moment went far to re- 
move the dissatisfaction then felt in that country. But the in- 
clusion of Barthou in recent Ministries is a forewarning that 
the French claims were at last to be forcibly maintained and 
vigorously pressed. M. Barthou is one of those who may 
possibly again be Prime Minister. He was responsible for the 
Three Years' Military Service Law, passed shortly before the 
war : a courageous act which earned him the undying hatred 
of the Socialists. He is equally well known for his literary 
and historical works, and is as proud of being a member of 
the Academic Frangaise as of his political distinction. 

The two men who were Clemenceau's most trusted colleagues 
at the Peace Conference are still in the Chambre — M. Lou- 
cheur and Andre Tardieu. The former is a contractor, who 
before the war had amassed a fortune which the subsequent 
course of events is said greatly to have increased. He has 
all the characteristics of an energetic and practical man of 



132 THE POMP OF POWER 

business, added to an exceptional power of lucid expression 
when dealing with figures.'* 

In several conversations which I had with Loucheur in 
1920, before he again took office, I gathered that he thought 
that Lloyd George was not giving France proper support in 
enforcing the execution of the Treaty. He made no secret 
of the fact that if he was in power he would protect French 
interests by independent action. This statement he subse- 
quently made good by conducting direct negotiations with 
Ratenau for the reparation by Germany of the devastated 
districts, 

Loucheur is politically ambitious. That led him to aid Bri- 
and in forming his Government and thus to break with the 
more devoted followers of M, Clemenceau. Of the latter the 
most conspicuous is Andre Tardieu. In 19 14 he was one 
of the editors of Le Temps, and was also known as the author 
of several books on foreign afifairs. After passing some time 
at the Front he made his reputation as French High Commis- 
sioner in the United States. Upon his return Clemenceau took 
him into his Cabinet. Tardieu is undoubtedly the ablest man 
of his generation (he is to-day 46 years of age) in political 
life. His manner, however, makes him more enemies than 
friends. At present he spends his time, both in the Chambre 
and outside, in defending the Treaty and denouncing those 
who do not see to its execution ; apparently forgetting that he 
himself is one of those mainly responsible for neglecting to 
include proper automatic penalties for its non-fulfilment. 

Loucheur and Tardieu were the only two members of Cle- 
menceau's Cabinet who could speak openly to and hold their 
own against him. After Clemenceau resigned they were politi- 
cal alhes until they differed about Loucheur entering the Briand 
Ministry. 

In the Senate one of the outstanding figures is Paul Doumer, 
who was recently Minister of Finance.^ 

■* The five Fretich representatives were Clemenceau, Pichon, Klotz, 
Tardieu, and Jules Cambon. Loucheur was not a plenipotentiary, but 
he shared with Tardieu the burden of the heavy work. 

* Doumer's quasi-agreement in August, 1921, with the representatives 
of Great Britain and Belgium about the division of the money then paid 



THE FRENCH POLITICAL WORLD 133 

Millerand, Briand, and others were at one time Socialists, 
although to-day none are stronger champions of established 
authority. But Doumer has always been a Republican of the 
early type, making his own way in the world by his own ef- 
forts ; simple in his mode of Hfe; and impeccably honest. 
About fifteen years ago he was nearly elected President of the 
Republic; the margin by which Fallieres defeated him was 
not very great. Later he was Governor-General of Indo- 
Chine. When the war broke out he stayed in Paris when the 
Government (of which he was not then a member) and others 
went to Bordeaux. On September 4 he wrote to Gallieni 
the following letter : 

"MON CHER GENERAL, 

'*Je viens vous faire un amical et pressant appel. 

"Puisque les choses de la politique ont tourne de telle sorte 
que je n'ai pu participer au pouvoir, a I'heure seule ou le pou- 
voir est tentant, donnez-moi, je vous prie, la possibilite d'agir 
de travailler a la chose publique. 

"Appelez-moi pres de vous a un titre quelconque. 

"Par exemple, creez a votre Cabinet un service ou un secre- 
tariat des aiTaires civiles, et appelez-moi a le diriger. 

"Je vous debarrasserai des broutilles, dans le mesure oil vous 
deciderez, et je vous preparerai les elements de solution des 
affaires importantes. 

"Je sais commander; je saurai done obeir. 

"Et puis, ce que me fait vous demander cela avec insistence, 
c'est que la defense de Paris pent devenir difficile, que les 
heures tragiques peuvent arriver et que je voudrais pouvoir 
tomber, en service, a cote de vous, et non comme un badaud 
qui va voir ou pleuvent les coups. 

"Si vous prenez tout de suite une decision favorable, 
envoyez-moi simplement un ordre. Sinon, donnez-moi rocca- 
sion de vous voir. 

"Votre tout devoue, 

"(Signe) Paul Doumer, 

by Germany met with the disapproval of his colleagues, and nearly 
led to his resignation. Doumer and Loucheur, two men of a different 
generation, different training, and a different experience of life, are 
known to be antipathetic ; and it is no secret that Loucheur coveted 
Doumer's post. 



134 THE POMP OF POWER 

"II va sans dire que si je suis appele au Gouvernement mili- 
taire j'y consacrerai tous mes instants et ne m'occuperai plus 
de rien autre." 

Gallieni telegraphed to the Government to ask if he might 
accept Doumer's offer, and received a reply telling him that 
he might use his own discretion. Later another message came 
saying that the Cabinet had decided that it could not authorise 
him to do as Doumer had suggested. But Gallieni had al- 
ready acted, and Doumer, who had begun at ten o'clock in the 
morning, had completed his organisation before noon. 

Later, Doumer, as President of the Army Commission of 
the Senate, was one of those active in insisting that the powers 
of Joffre should be curtailed. 

When Briand made him his Finance Minister he was Presi- 
dent of the Senate Finance Committee. 

Few men in France were more sorely tried than M. Doumer 
during the war, his three eldest sons all being killed. 

M. Viviani is the greatest orator in France. He has been, 
and in all probability will again be Prime Minister ; but at the 
present time he shows no desire for any immediate return to 
office. M. Painleve (whose career has been recounted at 
some length in a previous chapter) is also not at the end of 
his political career, but he is obviously out of touch with the 
present Chambre des Deputes. 

There remains M. Poincare, the strongest and most uncom- 
promising protagonist of the integral execution of the Treaty : 
although in his opinion the Treaty does not go far enough; 
as was shown when he was the sole supporter of Foch's pro- 
tests against the abandonment of the French demand for Al- 
lied occupation of the Rhine country. 

As President of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Sen- 
ate he was a power with which the Government of the day 
had to reckon. Moreover, his influence was increased by his 
political articles in the Revue des Deux Mondes, Le Temps, 
and other publications. It was no secret that he refused to 
join M. Briand's Government in December, 1920, because 
he hoped one day to be at the Quai d'Orsay, while probably 



THE FRENCH POLITICAL WORLD 135 

being at the same time President du Conseil, This aspira- 
tion has since been realised. 

M. Poincare is Hkely to have more affirmative success in 
negotiations with Mr. Lloyd George than is any other French 
statesman. Unlike Briand he will keep the British Prime Min- 
ister at arm's length. Doubtless he will achieve more by that 
method; for few politicians can gain anything by coming to 
close quarters with Lloyd George. But Poincare will treat in 
that fashion as much by necessity as from premeditated de- 
sign. It is impossible for him to unbend. He is not genial 
as was always M. Briand. He will not lose his temper as did 
sometimes M. Clemenceau. But unceasingly he will be re- 
served, and almost stern. He will be quite unafifected by the 
Prime Minister's moods. The expansive and irritable mo- 
ments will leave him equally indifferent. The one will not 
amuse him ; the other will not abash him. The Welsh charm 
will not fascinate the inexorable "homme de Lorraine." Poin- 
care will be tenacious for what he considers the rights of his 
country ; and it will be beyond even the Prime Minister's well- 
known powers to divert him from the object he is pursuing. 
Moreover, he will be on his guard. For when he read the Gov- 
ernment report of the San Remo conversations he was im- 
pressed by the fact that Mr. Lloyd George had spoken in no 
friendly way of the French claims. 

Poincare's lucid intelligence and orderly mind recoil from 
the new system of successive conferences, which settle little, 
and which leave nothing settled for long. He has already ex- 
pressed his abhorrence of what he calls "cinema diplomacy." 
His own position is clear. Time and again during the last two 
years he has put on record his view that France must get 
what the Treaty gives her. So long as Mr. Lloyd George ad- 
mits in the main M. Poincare's contentions on that subject, so 
long (but so long only) will they agree. Their conversation at 
Boulogne was satisfactory precisely because Poincare got his 
way upon all the essential points. 

Poincare also has the country, and probably Parliament, 
more solidly behind him than had any of his predecessors 
since Clemenceau; and it is Mr. Lloyd George who has put 



136 THE POMP OF POWER 

them there. He is the first President of the Repubhc who has 
ever held office after leaving the Elysee, although there is to- 
day another in the Senate — M. Deschanel. 

The General Election of 19 19 produced some surprises in 
the way of unexpected defeats, but two years have not brought 
forward many new men of outstanding promise. 

One of the most marked figures in the new Chambre is 
General de Castelnau. When the election of Millerand to suc- 
ceed Deschanel as President of the Republic brought the mem- 
bers of the Senate and the Chambre together I noticed that de 
Castelnau was almost the only one for whom there was any 
spontaneous applause when he ascended the tribune to cast 
his ballot. Undoubtedly that was largely a personal tribute: 
but de Castelnau is a possible Minister of War. 

In the Chambre a young deputy, M. Forgeot, has given 
proofs of an eloquence which is impressive at the moment, but 
which is as yet devoid of a sense of parliamentary atmopshere. 
In the Senate M. de Jouvenel (who is one of the editors of 
Le Matin) quickly made a name by a few speeches which were 
equally interesting and thoughtful. But upon the whole it 
does not seem to be a Parliament of new talents. 

It is a current saying that the new Chambre does not repre- 
sent the country; that it leans too much towards the Right, 
and that it is reactionary. I am inclined to think that that 
estimate is inaccurate. The Chambre reflects the feeling of 
France that Germany must be made to pay; and the fear of 
France that the extreme Left would not see that that was done. 
Moreover, the Socialists, the Communists, and all the groups 
which in France correspond to the most advanced wing of the 
Labour Party, are at present hopelessly divided, and engaged 
in active warfare among themselves. This arises partly from 
the fact that many of them, being small proprietors, are op- 
posed to Bolshevism. But the courage shown by Clemenceau 
and his immediate predecessors during the war in not adopting 
Lloyd George's policy of yielding to all demands, leaving the 
future to right matters, is one of the reasons why in France 
there have been fewer labour troubles than in England, and 
no unconstitutional menace to the State, 



THE FRENCH POLITICAL WORLD 137 

There were many predictions that the senatorial elections 
in January would show that the Left was gaining; but in 
the actual result there was practically no alteration. The three 
elections which took place in July, 1921, were, considered to- 
gether, a reverse which may possibly indicate that the Bloc 
National has passed its high-water mark of power. But their 
importance should not be exaggerated as local influences played 
an important part. 

The change will probably not come until the country feels 
more assured than it does to-day that Germany will meet her 
obligations. 



CHAPTER VIII 

Caillaux 

No study of political possibilities in France would be com- 
plete if it ignored M. Caillaux. It is quite possible that he 
will never return to power. On the other hand it is not beyond 
the bounds of possibility that he may once again be President 
du Conseil. I consider that contingency more unlikely than 
otherwise; but, in view of what may develop in regard to the 
execution of the Treaty of Versailles, not entirely out of the 
question. 

Joseph Caillaux is now 59 years of age ; practically the same 
age as M. Briand, who was born a few months earlier. 

I have neither any sympathy for, nor faith in, the policy 
which throughout his political career M. Caillaux has con- 
stantly advocated. I believe that it would have been as fatal 
to his own country as it was in some respects inimical to Eng- 
land. But it is impossible to accuse Caillaux of being an op- 
portunist — much less a political adventurer. Upon this latter 
point there is in England a very general misconception — quite 
in keeping with our prevalent ignorance about the political 
personages of other countries. I was once asked by a mem- 
ber of the then Government how Caillaux managed to get a 
foothold in public life — whether he had not begun as a dema- 
gogue. The fact is that no one is less of a political filibuster 
than Caillaux. Many French hommes d'etat of the present 
day have by their own praiseworthy efforts raised themselves 
to power and eminence from origins which were quite obscure. 
Others owe their prominence to intrigues which are less laud- 
able. But Caillaux was born in the political purple. He is, I 
think, the only Cabinet or ex-Cabinet Minister alive in France 
to-day who is also the son of a Cabinet Minister. 

138 



CAILLAUX 139 

Caillaux's father was a member of the Due de Broghe's 
Government at the time of the Seize Mai episode. 

This political connection, as well as the fact that he sprang 
from perhaps rather better stock than the majority of French 
politicians, has been partly responsible for a certain arrogance 
which sat oddly upon the. leader of a Radical party. M. Jo- 
seph Reinach once said to me : "Caillaux was brought up on 
the laps of duchesses"; referring to the world into which he 
was brought in contact through his father's friendship with 
the Due de Broglie and others of the Faubourg St. Germain. 
While he recounted how he was equally annoyed and shocked 
(for M. Reinach, as became the disciple of Gambetta, was 
first and last a Republican) when, in the lobby of the Chambre 
des Deputes, Caillaux said with some contempt of one of their 
colleagues who had interrupted their conversation: "il n'est 
pas de notre monde." 

Joseph Caillaux inherits from his father (who was at one 
time president of the P.L.M. Railway) a rhoderate fortune. 
For some years he was in the Government service and rose 
to be an Inspector of Finance. In 1898 he was elected as 
one of the deputies for the Department of the Sarthe. Within 
a year he became, through a succession of accidents. Minister 
of Finance in the Waldeck-Rousseau Government. 

Caillaux's policy before the war may fairly be summed up 
by saying that he wanted to see a general settlement of all out- 
standing differences with Germany — believing that the safety 
of his own country and the peace of Europe would in that way 
be better preserved than by a close alliance with Great Britain. 
He was not opposed to an Entente ; still less was he hostile to 
England. But he was firmly convinced — as were many French- 
men before him, and as are many to-day — that, if there was any 
partnership, England would get the lion's share, and would 
simply make use of France to serve her own ends. "Desin- 
teresser I'Empire Germanique, comme fut desinteressee la 
Grande Bretagne, par des concessions raisonables, c'est la 
vrai politique. II ne me faudra recourir a une autre que si 



140 THE POMP OF POWER 

rAllemagne se montre trop exigeante." Such is Caillaux's own 
statement of his foreign policy,^ 

I believe that Caillaux was profoundly wrong in his view 
that France would be the loser by an alliance with Great Britain : 
though circumstances force me to admit that those in power 
in England to-day are doing their utmost to prove to France 
that he was right. But whatever his error of judgment, it 
was an opinion which, as a Frenchman, he had every right 
(if not much reason) to hold. 

But, going one step further, Caillaux has been accused of 
making a bad bargain for, or of betraying (the stories vary 
between these two degrees), his own country in the Agadir ne- 
gotiations. 

Laying aside rumours, and basing one's judgment only upon 
admitted facts and documents, the truth seems to be as follows : 
when M. Caillaux became President du Conseil in 191 1 he 
asked M. Leon Bourgeois to become Minister of Foreign Af- 
fairs. M. Bourgeois, following his almost invariable custom 
(it is no secret that he has refused nearly every office in the 
State more than once), declined. M. Caillaux then offered the 
post to M. Poincare, who likewise rejected the proposal. In 
his embarrassment he then turned to M. de Selves. M. Cail- 
laux himself has written that he was encouraged to take this 
course by M. Clemenceau, who, when Prime Minister, had 
himself thought of sending M. de Selves to the Quai d'Orsay. 
Be that as it may, this apparently innocent appointment was 
destined to be the cause of lasting trouble for M. Caillaux. 
No one who knows the former Prefet of the Seine will question 
the statement that he is one of the most amiable of men — per- 
haps too amiable. It is only a few months ago that he was 
ousted from the Chairmanship of the Senate Committee of 
Foreign Affairs in order to make way for M. Poincare — the 
contention of his opponents being that, in his desire to please, he 
constantly yielded to the wishes of the Government of the day. 
In brief, M. de Selves' predominant characteristic has always 
been tact rather than strength of character. This agreeable 
personage was ill-fitted either to keep in check that restless 

^Agadir, p. 132. 



CAILLAUX 141 

activity which ahvays led Caillaux to dabble in something 
closely resembling intrigue; or to hold his own against the 
somewhat brutal, but very competent M,. Kiderlen-Waechter 
in the crisis which was fast approaching. For it was only some 
days after M. Caillaux took office that Germany sent the gun- 
boat Panther to Agadir. 

Who was responsible for and what was the object of that 
action are still open questions. It has been suggested that it 
was simply one of those impulsive movements of the Kaiser 
which so often embarrassed his advisers. I see little to support 
that hypothesis, and much to lead one to believe that it was a de- 
liberate action of the German Government at the instigation of 
the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, M. de Kiderlen-Waechter. 
What is more doubtful is the motive. My own view is that 
the primary purpose was to test the strength of the understand- 
ing between England and France. The astute Kiderlen-Waech- 
ter was somewhat at a loss to know to what extent the Entente 
was solid — what strain it would really bear if words had to 
make way for deeds. But what he clearly understood was that 
some knowledge upon this point was essential for the direction 
of German foreign policy. He realised that the result of this 
despatch of the Panther would indicate whether France could 
still be bullied, or whether it was the beginning of a new period 
when bluster alone would no longer serve any useful end. 

The premature death of M. de Kiderlen-Waechter was un- 
doubtedly a loss, the full effect of which Germany only felt 
during the war. He was somewhat coarse both in his percep- 
tions and in his ways. His mode of Hfe undermined his con- 
stitution and shortened his days. While he was in frequent 
friction with his subordinates in the diplomatic services be- 
cause their wives did not always care to receive a certain lady 
with whom his relations were a subject for much comment. 
It was typical of him that he saw nothing extraordinary in 
choosing a period when the situation between the two coun- 
tries was very critical to make an excursion across the fron- 
tier with the Baronne de Y. Although they were travelling in- 
cognito there was always a possibility that the German Secre- 
tary of Foreign Affairs might be recognised; which, in the 



142 THE POMP OF POWER 

exasperated state of public feeling, might have led to an un- 
pleasant incident. The Quai d'Orsay was alarmed. Caillaux, 
therefore, instructed the Prefet of the Department in ques- 
tion to welcome the German statesman ofificially, and even 
went to the length of having a photograph taken of him and 
his companion, Kiderlen-Waechter was greatly annoyed at 
this interruption of his holidays; but he was obhged to beat a 
precipitate retreat to Germany. However, what he lacked in 
finesse he made up for in the directness of his actions and 
the clarity of his vision. He was under no delusion about 
the dangerous incompetency of the Kaiser or the mediocrity 
of the Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg. His letters to his 
friend, the Baronne de Y. (of which only a part have been 
published), makes this delightfully clear. In his correspon- 
dence the Kaiser is known as "la fourrure," and the Chancellor 
of the Empire as "la petite bete." Kiderlen-Waechter through- 
out shows his contempt for a pair whom he calls "les deux 
vieilles femmes." In July, 191 1, the British and German 
fleets were to meet in Norwegian waters, where they were 
both manoeuvring. Unfortunately the date was one day be- 
fore the Kaiser's visit to Norway came to an end. Kiderlen- 
Waechter took alarm. "Avec son temperament, en vue de 
deux grandes flots, il perdra tout equilibre, depassera les 
bornes, et fera Dieu sait quelles betises," he writes to the 
Baronne de Y. The Foreign Secretary, therefore, discloses 
his fears to our Ambassador, Sir Edward Goschen, and gets 
him to arrange that the date should be changed. Telling the 
Baronne de Y. what he has done, and referring again to the 
Kaiser, he writes : "Dans son exuberance il dirait et ferait 
des choses qui rendraient les Anglais mefiants, parce que — 
ne connaissant pas son etourderie — ils croiraient qu'il veut les 
compromettre aux yeux de leurs amis. . . . Et avec tout cela, 
nous n'aurions, en realite, aucun but politique, rien que I'amuse- 
ment de la fourrure." 

In the negotiations which ensued Berlin was the centre.. 
France was ably represented by M. Jules Cambon. But from 
the outset that eminent diplomat seemed to feel that the support 
of the Quai d'Orsay was not sufficient, and that in order to 



CAILLAUX 143 

ensure a successful conclusion it was desirable that M. Caillaux 
himself should take an active and personal part. As early as 
July loth, 191 1, M. Cambon wrote a confidential letter to M, 
Caillaux: "C'est M. de Kiderlen qui conduira la negociation 
au point de vue allemand, mais il est bon qu'il sente qu'au 
point de vue frangais vous y avez la main." 

It is clear, both from this and from subsequent letters of M. 
Cambon's, that Caillaux's intervention was at the suggestion of 
the French Ambassador himself — who considered that it would 
be in the best interests of France. Caillaux promptly sup- 
ported the Ambassador. Whether in so doing he usurped the 
functions of the Minister of Foreign Affairs is another and a 
more trivial question. Undoubtedly Caillaux offended M. de 
Selves and his friends — and in the end paid dearly for do- 
ing so. 

I have no intention of entering into the details of that con- 
flict. But Caillaux's greater and higher responsibility — his 
duty towards his country — is covered by the fact that it was 
in answer to the Ambassador's own appeal that he came to his 
assistance; and that in the result the successful issue of the 
negotiations was largely due to Caillaux himself. Such at 
least was the opinion of M. Cambon — whose judgment is not 
to be lightly disputed. Writing to Caillaux on October 23rd, 
191 1, from Berlin, he expresses the hope that he may be in- 
troduced to Madame Caillaux when he next goes to Paris, and 
adds : "Et je serais heureux que ce voyage put etre prochain, 
car ce serait la preuve que la negociation a laquelle vous 
avez preside et qui fera tant d'honneur a votre prevoyance 
d'homme d'Etat est heureusement terminee." While on No- 
vember 3rd the Ambassador writes again : "Je crois que je 
puis enfin vous feliciter d'avoir mene a bien par votre perse- 
verance et votre volonte, personelle I'oeuvre de notre accord 
marocain." 

There remains the more grave accusation that M. Caillaux 
had negotiations with the German Embassy in Paris, through 
a private channel unknown either to M, Cambon or to M. de 
Selves. The facts are that between July 25th and 28th a cer- 
tain M. Fondere, who was of French nationality, acted as 



144 THE POMP OF POWER 

intermediary between M. de Lancken, Counsellor of the Ger- 
man Embassy, and M. Caillaux — the intrigue having been set 
in motion by M. de Lancken. On July 28th M. de Selves 
communicated to M. Caillaux two telegrams which have since 
become famous under the name of "les depeches vertes." These 
were two despatches from the German Ambassador, M. Schoen, 
to the German Foreign Office. For some unknown reason the 
German Embassy sent these telegrams in an old cipher which 
had not been used for some time, and of which the French 
Foreign Office had the key. The messages were therefore de- 
ciphered by M. de Selves' subordinates; and as is customary 
in such cases, the translations were written upon green paper. 
The telegrams contain an account of the Fondere-Lancken con- 
versations which is more or less (although not exactly) in 
accord with that given by M. Caillaux himself. The really 
important part is the last sentence of the second telegram, dated 
9.35 p.m., July 27th: "Caillaux demande instamment qu'on 
ne fasse rien connaitre a Cambon de ses overtures." 

On the morning of July 28th M. de Selves communicated 
these intercepted telegrams to M. Caillaux. According to the 
latter's report of this interview, M. de Selves made no com- 
plaint about M. Caillaux having had negotiations which had 
been kept secret from him, but did draw Caillaux's attention 
to the statement which exacted that the Wilhelmstrasse should 
say nothing about them to M. Cambon. Caillaux denied that 
he had ever made such a request ; and said that, on the con- 
trary, he was simply getting information v/hich might assist 
M. Cambon in his conversations with Kiderlen-Waechter. In- 
deed, on July 29th Caillaux did actually send M. Pietri to 
Berlin to tell M. Cambon of the Fondere-Lancken conversa- 
tions. Would he have done so had it not been for the dis- 
covery of the telegrams by the Ouai d'Orsay? Was Kiderlen- 
Waechter right when, in writing to the Baronne de Y. on 
July 29th, after saying that Lancken had come from Paris 
to discuss the Fondere conversations, he comments on Cail- 
laux's desire of secrecy, adding that he had known for some 
time that there was a certain rivalry between Cambon and 



CAILLAUX 145 

Caillaux as to which should have the credit of making a sat- 
isfactory arrangement with Germany? 

My own beHef is that Caillaux probably was responsible 
for the injunction contained in the telegram. But I am in- 
clined to think that the whole affair arose not from any desire 
either to impede or to forestall M. Cambon, but simply from 
the tendency to intrigue which has its birth in Caillaux's inces- 
sant activity — in that inability ever to wait and let things take 
their course, which has perhaps been more fatal to him than 
has anything else. 

But in all that it is impossible to see anything except a cer- 
tain lack of correction, and a procedure which might have 
been dangerous. In the result no harm was done. At the 
conclusion of the negotiations M. Cambon was able to felicitate 
M. Caillaux upon what he had accomplished in terms which 
were not merely those of perfunctory politeness. More than 
that, when Caillaux was on trial after the war the matter of 
his conduct at this period was referred to by the prosecution. 
M. Jules Cambon was called as a witness. He had nothing to 
say or allege against M. Caillaux. 

So much for Agadir. 

In 19 1 3 came the tragedy which interrupted M. Caillaux's 
political career; and it was only a few days after Madame 
Caillaux's acquittal in 19 14 that Germany declared war. 

To understand Caillaux's conduct during that period it is 
necessary to consider his character and temperament, 

Joseph Caillaux is a man of marked capacity, untiring en- 
ergy, and great resolution. He is self-reliant and overbearing, 
intellectually and otherwise. Against that it must be put that 
he possesses both physical and moral courage in a degree 
somewhat above the average. He is in no sense what the 
French call "sympathique." Although not an orator of the 
calibre of Briand or Viviani, he may be called almost a great 
speaker. But even then his voice, with its metallic tinge, his 
bearing, which suggests the arrogance of his nature, and his 
somewhat awkward, though always vigorous, gestures are all 
against him : the first impression is unfavourable, and one is 
only won over by a certain lucidity of expression and a com- 



146 THE POMP OF POWER 

pactness in argument which are none too common amongst 
French politicians. He is often described as "fastueux," but 
as a matter of fact he Hves very simply at Mamers ; and it is 
fair to add that he is greatly beloved in the little town where 
he has passed all his life. He is reputed for his financial 
knowledge and ability. But he is not, like the late M. Rouvier, 
a financier who became a politician, but a politician who, to 
some extent, has devoted himself to finance. I am aware that 
he spent a number of years in the Administration des Finances. 
But he gave up that career while still young, and it was only 
after being Minister of Finance that he became a director of 
various banks and companies. His general knowledge is 
wider in its basis than that of most of his political contem- 
poraries. But it is not a knowledge which has grown sufficiently 
to influence his ideas. Indeed, his weak point intellectually 
is the absolute fixity of his views, which are unchanging. In 
that respect Briand and Caillaux are the two extremes. The 
one idle by nature, though rousing himself to bursts of en- 
ergy; open to all ideas, and subtle to the last degree. The 
other hard working and industrious, but unaffected by any- 
thing outside except in so far as it can be used in support 
of his acquired opinions. Caillaux lacks judgment — and per- 
haps the politician who said that he lacked "bon sens" was 
right. He has the unfortunate faculty either of surrounding 
himself with or allowing himself to be made the centre of people 
who range from plain undesirables to dangerous adventurers. 
This arises partly from his restlessness, and partly from the 
fact that he is a man of few friendships; for Caillaux, any 
tool is better than no tool, and his choice of tools is never 
very great. 

He is ambitious, and has an absolutely sincere belief in his 
own capacities. His greatest defect — or, at least, the defect 
which has proved most fatal to him — is his absolute incapac- 
ity at any given moment to bide his time, to let things take 
their course. This curse leads him into unnecessary intrigue 
when things are going well ; and into useless and futile strug- 
gles when the tide is against him. He is neither a great man, 
nor has he many of the elements which go to make a great 



CAILLAUX 147 

man; but one who, within certain Hmits, has abihties of a 
high order, which he can drive with a vigour which is 
quite extraordinary. 

One of his fixed ideas is his conception about England and 
the British Empire. To some extent he belongs to the school 
of Rouvier. The latter, when, as President du Conseil in 
1905, he forced M. Delcasse to leave the Quai d'Orsay at the be- 
hest of Germany, said : "Une alliance Franco-Anglaise serait 
la guerre et la defaite. Ma main secherait plutot que de signer 
pareille alliance." Caillaux's opinions about the exact value of a 
close alliance with England are not the outcome of any hos- 
tile feeling. On the contrary, he has a certain respect and re- 
gard for British institutions. But he held (and still holds) 
the view that the Greater Britain has passed the apex of its 
greatest power and prosperity ; that Ireland is a problem which 
will never be solved ; and that India will lead the way towards 
a general dissolution of the Empire. 

If Caillaux had been well-advised he would from the out- 
set of the war have either stayed at the Front or remained 
quietly at Mamers. Had he followed that course, had he dis- 
creetly held himself apart from any participation in political 
life, and also sedulously avoided all incidents which would 
turn public attention in his direction, it is more than likely that 
he would have at least formed part of some Cabinet. But to 
expect that he would or could have adopted such an attitude 
is to misconceive his very nature. He could not bear to see 
great events taking place in the world in which he had for 
years been one of the masters, and where he was now relegated 
to what almost amounted to exile. He could bear it all the less 
because he thought that those in power were doing ill what 
he could do well. For instance, in a private conversation in 
December, 19 14, he remarked that he could not understand 
why the Government was not then issuing a great National 
Loan ; that with France to some extent delivered by the Battle 
of the Marne, there was a chance to do that successfully which 
might not occur again if the war was prolonged ; and that the 
money thus obtained would be cheaper than what the Govern- 
ment would be obliged to get abroad in the event of the war 



148 THE POMP OF POWER 

lasting two or three years longer. His feverish restlessness 
would not permit of inaction. His audacity led him into indis- 
cretions of which his lack of judgment did not allow him to 
realise the full enormity. 

At the beginning of the war Caillaux became a Paymaster 
with the Army. While at the Front he is said (rightly or 
wrongly) to have come into violent collision with several of- 
ficers, some of whom were English. Probably the Govern- 
ment was only too glad to send him far away on a commer- 
cial mission to Brazil and the Argentine. There he met by 
chance a young man, Minotto, employed by the Guaranty Trust 
Company of New York, but who apparently was of German 
extraction. Caillaux seems to have talked with some freedom 
to Minotto, who reported the conversations to the German 
Ambassador at Buenos Ayres. After his return to France 
he was approached upon several occasions by people who were 
acting at the instigation of Germany. It is clear that Cail- 
laux would have nothing to do with them — and that he told 
them plainly to leave him alone. It is not clear that he told 
the Government of these overtures. Caillaux affirmed that he 
had communicated the facts to M. Briand, which the latter 
denied. 

Later, in December, 1916, he went to Italy to join Madame 
Caillaux. The evidence shows that in the ordinary course he 
had conversations in Rome with various Italians (and there- 
fore subjects of an Allied country) ; and notably that in talking 
to Signor Martini he expressed doubts whether France could 
win the war if the next offensive failed; and said that it would 
then be necessary to make peace, even if only part of Lorraine 
was obtained ; although she would not be expected to give back 
the German colonies. 

I must confess that, out of sympathy as I am and always 
have been with Caillaux's policy, I yet cannot see anything 
unpatriotic in such conduct. If he had made any propaganda 
it would appear in a very different light. But these views were 
communicated to a politician with whom he was exchanging 
views in the course of a private conversation. I can only 



CAILLAUX 149 

compare it to a remark made to me at about the same time 
by a member of the British Government. We had been dis- 
cussing the same question — the sole question of those days — 
the war : and in answer to something I said this personage 
repHed : "That is all very well, but you see only the French 
side. I hope I may be wrong, but I don't think we will be able 
to wrest Alsace-Lorraine from Germany, and we can't, as you 
suggest, be expected to go on fighting for the impossible 
only to please France." 

That was the perfectly sincere opinion of a patriotic man — 
expressed in a conversation after luncheon with one whom he 
knew to be strongly in favour of the French claims. I find 
it difficult to draw a distinction between that and Caillaux's 
words to Signor Martini. 

But if there is any doubt about Caillaux's wrong-headed 
policy being inspired by what he firmly believed was for the 
good of his country it would, I think, be dispelled by a con- 
sideration of what was found in the safe at Florence — that 
famous safe which disappointed so many expectations. This 
document gave the outline of what Caillaux proposed to do if 
and when he came into power. It presaged the making of peace 
after the Government was formed : that is, a Caillaux Gov- 
ernment would come into being because the country wanted a 
Caillaux policy ; while the following passage is significant : 
"Dans quelques conditions qui se fasse la paix — apres victoire 
obtenue par le nouveau Gouvernement, ou que le Gouverne- 
ment soit forme pour la conclure — ne rien faire, ne rien con- 
clure, sans un mandat special du pays." 

A man who drafts a plan in the expectation of being called 
to office, and who lays stress on his intention not to conclude 
any peace or to take any definite step without a special 
mandate can hardly be called a potential dictator; still less a 
traitor. 

Equally indicative are the names of those whom the memo- 
randum mentions as possible collaborators — a curious medley, 
of whom I cite only a few: Jean Dupuy; Pichon (the faithful 
shadow of Clemenceau) ; Charles Humbert; Longuet, the So- 



150 THE POMP OF POWER 

cialist; Malvy,^ after whose name Caillaux himself added an 
interrogation point; and FrankHn-Bouillon. 

While as ambassadors Caillaux thought of Briand; Bar- 
thou ; Painleve ; Leygues, whom he intended to send to Italy ; 
and Doumergue. 

There is in fact nothing extraordinary about the whole docu- 
ment. Caillaux thought that by the course of events he would 
probably be brought into office (the memorandum itself men- 
tions M. Caillaux as President du Conseil, thus fixing his 
role) and he considered in advance what he would do when 
that day came. 

This is absolutely in keeping with Caillaux's conversation 
with Signor Martini when he said that he did not expect the 
Briand Ministry to last long; and that afterwards it would 
be a question whether he or Clemenceau would form a Cabi- 
net (M. Barthou being out of the running on account of his 
supposed clericalism). Caillaux added that there might pos- 
sibly be a Painleve Government in between ; but that the Presi- 
dent du Conseil who followed, whether it was Clemenceau or 
himself, would stay in office until the end of the war. 

In some respects it was impossible to foresee events more 
clearly. Ribot succeeded Briand ; and Painleve followed Ribot. 
Indeed, when the latter resigned, he tried to reorganise his 
Cabinet, but failed because Painleve refused to remain, stating 
that he did not believe that a stable Government could be con- 
stituted without the aid of the Socialists. But when Ribot 
thereupon abandoned the attempt Painleve himself formed a 
Ministry in which there were no Socialists. Painleve's subse- 
quent explanation of this apparent contradiction was that 
otherwise Poincare would have sent for Clemenceau : which 
perhaps may not seem to everyone a sufficient reason for the 
inconsistency. As a matter of fact Poincare had warned 
Painleve that if he refused the task he would be obliged to en- 
trust it either to Clemenceau or to Caillaux; and that he did 
not intend to send for Caillaux except as a last resort. 

^ It was M. Poincare himself who insisted or anyway desired that 
Malvy should be retained in various War Cabinets as Minister of the 
Interior. This fact was communicated to me by one of Malvy's colleagues 
in the Cabinet. 



CAILLAUX 151 

Clemenceau did follow Painleve and did remain in office un- 
til the conclusion of the war. 

Despite this account of Poincare's conversation with Pain- 
leve (which has already been published, and so far as I am 
aware has not been denied) I doubt if he would have called 
Caillaux to the Elysee had both Painleve and Clemenceau re- 
fused or been unable to form a Government. 

But I admit that the President of the Republic might have 
been obliged to summon Caillaux if it appeared that the war 
was lost : and I am not prepared to say that the war would 
have been won .without the assistance of the United States, 
upon which neither Caillaux nor anyone else could rely at the 
date of his conversation. 

But it would have been more interesting had Caillaux gone 
one step further in disclosing his vision of the future, if he 
had told Signor Martini how he thought Clemenceau would 
treat him if he should become Prime Minister, and how he 
proposed to act towards Clemenceau should he come into of- 
fice himself. Caillaux was as well aware as anyone, and bet- 
ter than most people, that Clemenceau never played gently. He 
must have known what to expect. I stated publicly myself 
that I thought it probable that Clemenceau would order Cail- 
laux's arrest, and I was only stating what many thought. 

The fact is that it had come down to a clash, not between 
two men, but between two policies ; and it being war time one 
or the other had to be suppressed. Had Caillaux been called 
to power it would have been his duty to stop the publication of 
L'Homme Libre, or L'Homme Enchaine, as I think it was 
called at this period, and to have silenced Clemenceau. I do 
not doubt that he would have done so. 

Possibly the methods adopted by Clemenceau were somewhat 
rough, but I am unable to imagine why anyone should have 
expected him to act otherwise. Moreover, it is difficult to 
see what else could have been done with Caillaux — an auda- 
cious and turbulent man of great ability, who had some fol- 
lowing in the country. An eminent French statesman who 
might very possibly have had to deal with the situation told 
me that he had had a solution ready — he had meant to send 



152 THE POMP OF POWER 

Caillaux to Madeira. But my imagination does not allow me 
to see Caillaux — without a trial and condemnation — going 
into exile. 

On the other hand, it would have been both wiser and more 
courageous simply to have suppressed Caillaux for the period 
of the war without sowing far and wide the statement that he 
was a traitor — a statement which, when the time came, it was 
impossible to prove. I will finish this part of the story briefly. 
The accusation formulated against Caillaux at his trial was 
based upon Articles 78 and 79 of the Penal Code, which relate 
to the crimes of relations with the enemy and attempts against 
the security of the State. Upon these he was acquitted by a 
majority of the High Court (in other words, the Senate sit- 
ting as a special tribunal). But the Court then decided to ap- 
ply to his case Article 'jy, which refers to "correspondence 
with the subjects of an enemy without having the object of 
establishing relations with the enemy or of assailing the se- 
curity of the State." 

Upon this count Caillaux was convicted and sentenced, the 
"correspondence" being his conversations with Minotto in 
South America, though it is fair to add that apparently Cail- 
laux had no reason to think that Minotto was in any way 
German, 

I have set forth at length the gist of Caillaux's trial solely 
for one reason — to make it clear that he was not convicted of 
any crime which makes his return to power an absolute im- 
possibility. It is true that his interdiction does not expire 
until after the expiration of the present Parliament. There- 
fore, barring a pardon or remission by the President, he will 
be unable to be a candidate at the next General Election. Upon 
the whole I think the chances are against his again being 
Prime Minister, and none the less so because Briand's enmity 
stands in the way. Only a few months ago (December 23rd, 
1920) Briand wrote to the Figaro protesting against his name 
having been coupled with that of M. Caillaux, adding: "It 
is, I repeat, a gross calumny, the stupidity of which must be 
immediately apparent to all those who have been in political 
life for the last fifteen years, and who cannot be ignorant of 



CAILLAUX 153 

the fact that M. Caillaux and myself have always been irrecon- 
cilable opponents." 

But if France goes from bad to worse financially the country 
might turn to Caillaux. Even his enemies admit or exaggerate 
his financial genius. Still more so might he seem the saviour 
if the Treaty of Versailles proved to be a broken reed — if no 
money was obtained from Germany — -if Caillaux's warning 
that England would protect herself and leave France in the 
lurch should turn out to be true. In that event Caillaux might 
again be President du Conseil; for which he would have to 
render some thanks to Mr. Lloyd George, in whose hands his 
future now possibly rests. 



CHAPTER IX 
Mr. Lloyd George and Party Politics 

Even Mr. Lloyd George's opponents will admit that his por- 
trait, as recently drawn by the unknown "Gentleman with a 
Duster," does not err on the side of generosity. The Prime 
Minister's anonymous critic names many defects, the existence 
of some of which is sufficiently patent to all, and of others is 
questionable. But where the picture is false is in its lack of 
lights and shades. It is "tout d'une piece." No mention is 
made of the qualities which enabled Mr. Lloyd George, more 
than any other politician, to save his country from the threat- 
ened domination of Germany. The author of "The Mirrors 
of Downing Street" is not alone in regretting that the man who 
was able to do that was not one to delight in the company of 
Mr, Edmund Gosse rather than in that of Lord Riddell : that 
he has neither the historic name of Lord Lansdowne nor the 
scholarship of Lord Morley : that he lacks the suavity of Mr. 
Balfour and the dignity of Mr. Asquith. The regret is com- 
prehensible. But what is less clear is the omission to bring 
out that it was this man of another type and of a different 
fibre who alone was capable of rousing the mass of his fellow- 
countrymen to make the requisite effort at the most critical 
moments.^ 

For it was only Mr. Lloyd George amongst English poli- 
ticians who could inspire or excite any enthusiasm. 

* Captain P. E. Wright, the Assistant Secretary of the Supreme War 
Council, in citing Mr. Lloyd George as the only man who could have 
won the war, and in taking issue with attacks upon the Prime Minister, 
qualifies his praise as follows : — "In spite of his oblique and subterranean 
methods ; his inveterate taste for low and unscrupulous men ; of the 
distrust felt for him by his favourites, even at the height of their 
power; of his superficial, slipshod, and hasty mind, this determination 
of character made him, without any assumption on his part, the leader 
of the Alliance." 

154 



LLOYD GEORGE— PARTY POLITICS 155 

Moreover, he was (with one exception) the only English 
parliamentarian who made any marked impression upon the 
political leaders of Allied countries. That did not arise from 
the fact that he was Prime Minister. It was a judgment formed 
in the earlier days of the war. In the summer of 1916 I hap- 
pened to be having a conversation with a French statesman 
when a news agency despatch was brought to him repeating a 
London rumour that Mr. Asquith contemplated resigning on 
account of the trouble which had grown out of the Easter 
rebellion in Ireland. The discussion which ensued as to the 
likelihood of this being a fact was ended by my French friend 
shrugging his shoulders and remarking: "Qa. ne fait rien, 
pourvu que M. Lloyd George y reste." French lack of appre- 
ciation of Mr, Asquith's qualities was always remarkable. 

Not only were Lloyd George's abilities appreciated by the 
French, but upon the whole his chameleon-like traits tended 
towards useful co-operation. He was able to impress his per- 
sonaHty upon the various French politicians who were Presi- 
dents du Conseil in the course of the war ; and to establish 
workable relations with all of them — differing in character 
and in temperament as they did the one from the other, 

Briand is to some extent a man of his own type, with the 
saving grace of being more detached in his personal interests 
and fairer in his judgment. Briand rated Lloyd George's 
qualities and defects at their proper value. He did not exag- 
gerate either the one or the other ; nor did he take his outbursts 
too seriously, Ribot is by nature cold and suspicious. From 
the outset he distrusted Lloyd George. It must be admitted 
that eventually the facts bore out his instinct. Painleve was 
probably on closer personal terms than were any of his pred- 
ecessors with the British Prime Minister. The latter admired 
the limpid honesty of Painleve's nature ; and was not oblivious 
to the fact that he himself was the stronger character. 

It would be difficult to find two men less appreciative of 
each other's good points than were Clemenceau and Lloyd 
George. At least each was more prone to think of the other's 
defects than of his qualities. Clemenceau is essentially what 
the French call a mauvais coucheur. He is hard, often rough, 



156 THE POMP OF POWER 

satirical to the point of being cruel, and few men can work 
with him unless they entirely accept his ascendency — as did 
the faithful Pichon. But there is nothing small about him. 
His courage, moral as well as physical, is perhaps his outstand- 
ing characteristic. He is absolutely veracious, not only be- 
cause he would think it cowardly to be otherwise, but also be- 
cause his pleasure is to get his own way by pluck and audacity. 
He holds sentimentalism in horror. But he himself is by no 
means devoid of true sentiment. Those who can remember 
the way he used to look at the poilus at the Front will know 
that. But any feelings of Clemenceau's which come to the 
surface are sincere and abiding. 

Unfortunately he recoiled from the fact that Lloyd George's 
cleverness was based upon a certain mental agility rather than 
upon a foundation of conviction. He sometimes doubted his 
word. He always distrusted his courage.^ While the Welsh- 
man's vanity, as shown by his sensitiveness to criticism, was 
a source of much mocking comment. 

Upon the other hand Lloyd George chafed under Clemen- 
ceau's varying attitude, which, according to his mood, ranged 
from pleasantness to raillery. He professed to make allow- 
ance for him on account of his age. I recollect his telling me 
that Clemenceau objected to his seeing, when in Paris, any 
of the other French politicians with whom he had formerly 
acted during the war ; and that, in order not to irritate an old 
man, he had agreed not to do so; making, however, an excep- 
tion of Albert Thomas. 

For Thomas was the one of all others with whom Lloyd 
George was most at his ease. I think it was the fact that 
Thomas took Claridge's Hotel in Paris (which had just been 
finished in 1914) as the Ministry of Munitions, which led 
Lloyd George to begin his commandeering of London hotels. 
In any event when Thomas was a member of the Ribot Cabi- 
net, and in Russia on a mission, it was said that he maintained 
a correspondence or private communications with Lloyd 
George; and that his advice was not always in keeping with 

*It is sometimes stated in France that during: the dark days of March, 
1918, Clemenceau showed to better advantage than did Lloyd George. 



LLOYD GEORGE— PARTY POLITICS 157 

Ribot's views or policy. The intermediary was reputed to be 
M. Mantoux, a Frenchman who before 1914 was a professor 
at London University ; and who later rendered valuable services 
as an interpreter (he was one of rare excellence) at the Allies' 
meetings and subsequently at the Peace Conference. His re- 
ward, like that of Albert Thomas, was a post in the League of 
Nations organisation.^ Mantoux was originally not an ad- 
herent of Clemenceau's. The only time I ever heard him dis- 
cuss the situation was soon after the latter became Prime Min- 
ister; when he predicted to me that Clemenceau would not be 
in office for three months. I imagine that the latter knew 
Mantoux's views and took an opportunity to warn him to re- 
serve his political conversation to interpreting the words of 
others. For when some time afterwards I related this conver- 
sation to Henry Wilson he remarked that that gave him the 
clue to a certain incident : that at one English-French meeting 
Clemenceau absolutely refused to have Mantoux as interpreter; 
but had allowed him to act at the next one, apparently thinking 
that one lesson had sufficed. 

During the war, and in their considered reflections since, 
French hommes d'etat have, for the greater part, been unani- 
mous in thinking that the only two first-rate statesmen we had 
(first-rate in very different ways) were Lloyd George and 
Lord Milner. Winston Churchill often excited interest and 
sometimes a fugitive admiration : but he was not a possession 
which they envied us. Sir Edward Carson aroused curiosity. 
But he was and always remained a mystery. During the 
Peace Conference Lord Robert Cecil earned great respect, 
though he was generally thought to be a dangerous fanatic 
on some subjects. Mr. Balfour was accepted as a personality 
— more than that — as a charmeur; but a diplomat who had 
known his uncle and knew his cousin once said to me : "Un- 
derneath the surface Mr. Balfour is mainly negative : and I can 

' M. Albert Thomas, as Director of the International Labour Bureau, 
receives a salary equivalent to more than 350,000 francs at the present 
rate of exchange. Like all salaries of the League of Nations it is paid 
in pounds sterling and is not subject to any income-tax or super-tax. 
Thomas is doubtless the most highly-paid Socialist politician in the 
world. 



158 THE POMP OF POWER 

give you a negative comparison of him. He is a Cecil — with 
all the cynicism of Lord Salisbury, and with all his contempt 
of what is not of his world, but entirely without Lord Salis- 
bury's firm determination to fight a losing battle to the end; 
while on the other hand he has none of the generous but mis- 
placed enthusiasm of Lord Robert." 

At the Peace Conference Mr. Lloyd George again did good 
work for his country. This required high efficiency in the 
exercise of a certain talent, political juggling: a talent which 
Mr. Lloyd George possesses in an exceptional degree. The 
rights or the wrongs of the Treaty do not enter into this ac- 
count. All conferences of the conquerors in a great war show 
the more despicable side of human nature. Those w^ho have 
been sworn allies in the face of a common foe invariably 
have disagreements more or less deep when the work of the sol- 
dier is finished and the politicians begin to apportion the spoil. 
More often than not the extent of the discord is limited only 
to the need which the victors think they will have of each other's 
support and assistance in the future. 

The Congress of Vienna has long been the classic instance. 
In history its place will now doubtless be taken by the Paris 
Conference — with all its intrigues, and its manifold signs of 
meanness ; its hypocrisies : the promise that there should no 
longer be any secret diplomacy — when nothing was ever more 
secret ; the pretence that small nations would get the same 
hearing as great nations, when sometimes they were not really 
heard at all, and more often they were given to understand 
that their interests could not be considered. But throughout 
this proof that human nature had not changed Mr. Lloyd 
George did his duty in seeing that this country obtained what 
she needed or wanted. 

While no one can add much to the delightful third chapter 
of Mr. Keynes's regrettable book, it is perhaps permissible 
to draw this distinction : Mr. Lloyd George often got the 
better of Mr. Wilson and sometimes of M. Clemenceau. But 
in the former instance Wilson either did not realise it or awoke 
to the fact too late; while Clemenceau always knew it, and 



LLOYD GEORGE— party POLITICS 159 

when he had to bow to it, did so, sardonically, as part of 
the game. 

It is undeniable that Lloyd George never consistently took a 
firm stand upon any higher ground than the interests of his 
own country. While sometimes he did not convince his col- 
leagues that he was even drawing a definite dividing line be- 
tween those national interests and his desire to assure his own 
political future. In matters which did not directly afifect Great 
Britain he generally took little or no interest. But such sub- 
jects as the punishment of German war criminals, and, above 
all, of the former Kaiser, always elicited from the Prime Minis- 
ter a support which he was far from giving to the claims of the 
smaller nations. He was at no pains to conceal that he was thus 
forging electoral weapons. Nevertheless, one of the few amus- 
ing consequences of the Peace Conference is the unending as- 
tonishment of French statesmen about Mr. Lloyd George's 
conduct on this subject. For their own part they then cared 
comparatively little about the question of punishment. At 
best it was to them a secondary matter. What they naturally 
wanted was some security for the future and some reparation, 
in money, for the past. But in order to conciliate Lloyd 
George on these points they seconded his every effort on what 
he seemed to have so much at heart — and even made the de- 
mand their own. His subsequent indifference at first amazed 
and then amused his former French colleagues. 

But it ill behoves any Englishman to complain that Lloyd 
George thought too much of the interests of his country. 

Still less is the Prime Minister open to any serious reproach 
upon the ground that he did not attempt to regenerate the 
human race. He had the great good sense to limit his efforts 
to achieving what was feasible. The short space of two years 
has shown that the one of the Four who had ideas of another 
nature is the person responsible for the state of Europe to-day, 
M. Alfred Capus has written (and with reason) that Wilson's 
greatest fault consisted in imagining that the war which had de- 
stroyed ten million men had, at the same time, made the human 
race perfect, whereas in fact it had only diminished its num- 
bers. While he justly blames the American President for hav- 



160 THE POMP OF POWER 

ing sacrificed the present generation to his own personal satis- 
faction, with having, in his exaltation, forgotten that there 
still existed Americans, English, Germans, and French, and 
that the differences and antagonisms of races could not be 
made to disappear by a flourish of his magic wand. "Des 
enfants de Japet, toujours une moitie fournira des armes a 
I'autre." 

After the General Election of 1918 some of Mr. Lloyd 
George's friends launched the genial idea that, for his own 
sake, he ought to retire, and thus be free to come back as a 
saviour when others had bungled and had disappeared. It 
was, I think, the newspaper of which Lord Astor is the prin- 
cipal proprietor and Mr J. L. Garvin the oracle which directed 
public attention to this odd notion. Certainly the task with 
which Lloyd George was faced was not a grateful one. While 
in some respects it did not suit his genius as well as manoeuvr- 
ing in Paris. But apart from the fact that there was no one 
else able to assume the burden, and that it would have been 
cowardly to refuse it, what would Mr. Lloyd George have 
done had he voluntarily left 10, Downing Street and abandoned 
politics? I always wondered what kind of a life Lord Astor 
and Mr. Garvin had planned for him. Mr. Lloyd George is 
hardly like Sulla, who, having exterminated his enemies be- 
cause he had to do so in order to avoid being exterminated 
himself, was delighted to turn aside from the political world, 
and to give himself up to the pleasures which very soon killed 
him. Nor could the last experiment of the kind in England 
be taken as an encouraging example. That was when Mr. 
Gladstone, after the defeat of his party, decided in 1884 that, 
at the age of sixty-five, he could fitly retire from public life. 
Apart from the weight of his years, Mr. Gladstone at least had 
the semblance of other pursuits to which he could devote him- 
self — the writing of theological tracts, the translation of the 
classics. In that he had the advantage of Mr. Lloyd George, 
whom one can only imagine perpetually playing golf on Wal- 
ton Heath and discussing the mistakes of his successors. But 
even Mr. Gladstone could not stand aside when power was 
within his grasp; and although after the next election the 



LLOYD GEORGE— PARTY POLITICS 161 

Queen sent for Lord Hartington, Mr. Gladstone promptly 
bundled him out of the way, and again took control. 

Mr. Lloyd George's friends went a step further since they 
announced openly that the plan was to resurrect him at an op- 
portune moment. The Prime Minister would certainly have 
found it somewhat difficult to get a locum tenens in the lead- 
ership of a party. Doubtless he himself never gave any heed 
to this mad scheme, 

Mr. Asquith's idea was simple, if nothing else. He pro- 
tested with vehemence, and even with bitterness, that the game 
was not being played fairly: that it had always been under- 
stood that the Coalition should be for the duration of the war 
only : that therefore it should cease automatically upon the 
conclusion of peace, and all politicians should return to their 
pre-war allegiance. The argument is curiously like that of 
Von Kliick, who has written complaining that had his op- 
ponent only observed the rules Germany would have won the 
war in 191 4. According to the German general it was an 
accepted military tradition that the garrison of an armed camp 
should not leave it except to repel an attack, which Gallieni 
had unfairly ignored in assailing his flank while he was skirt- 
ing around Paris. Hinc illce lachrymcc. 

Mr. Asquith apparently thought that parties were immut- 
able, and that party ties were as sacred as a priest's vow of 
celibacy. There were many who had likened Asquith to the 
younger Pitt as described in a notable passage of Macaulay — 
a great Prime Minister in time of peace, but incompetent as 
a War Minister; and had looked for his triumphant return to 
office soon after the struggle. But this pronouncement con- 
vinced the country at large that Mr. Asquith was hopelessly 
out of touch with the changing times. Bourbon-like, he had 
learned nothing and had forgotten nothing. The end of the 
war found him with exactly the same mental vision as he had 
in 1914. The interlude had only meant his exile from Down- 
ing Street. But now he seriously proposed that everyone 
should put themselves back to 19 14 and should resume the 
old fight side by side with those who had opposed them for 
more than four years, as if nothing had happened in the in- 



162 THE POMP OF POWER 

terval. He was unable to realise that opponents who had found 
a common ground which permitted them to work together 
during the war might in good faith find a common ground 
which would enable them to continue to work together in times 
to which the years before 1914 afforded no analogy. He may 
have thought it extraordinary that Lloyd George and Mr. 
Walter Long could continue to sit together on the same Front 
Bench. But he forgot that after all that had happened it would, 
for instance, have been even more extraordinary and much 
more inconsistent to find Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Pringle 
in the same party. Mr. Asquith on this occasion went out 
of his way to prove that his political claims rested entirely 
upon his ability as a parliamentarian. 

Mr. Lloyd George may have been amused by Mr. Asquith's 
proposal, but it is safe to say that it appealed to him even 
less than the idea that he himself should play the part of the 
Master of Ballantrae with Lord Astor as Secundra. 

Mr. Lloyd George began by having a General Election. It 
was the proper course to take. Had he not done so, had he al- 
lowed Parliament in time of peace to continue to give itself 
new leases of life in defiance of the law, he would have weak- 
ened his own authority and Great Britain's position at the 
Conference. It might even have been held — it would cer- 
tainly-have been alleged — that he did not represent the opinion 
of his country — while he might later have been obliged to fight 
a General Election with the Treaty of Peace in suspense — and 
might possibly have been repudiated as was Woodrow Wilson ; 
thus bringing to naught the work of months. In the actual 
result Mr. Lloyd George got a mandate which he executed. 
The Treaty of Versailles may not contain all that he promised 
during his campaign, but in the main it embodies what was 
guaranteed to the electors. 

Undoubtedly it accorded with Lloyd George's personal 
interest to have an election in December, 191 8. But the sug- 
gestion that he should have waited until an unfavourable mo- 
ment — until a moment that suited his opponents — sounds rather 
strange on the lips of Mr. Asquith and his supporters. 

The General Election sent to Westminster a House of Com- 



LLOYD GEORGE— PARTY POLITICS 163 

mons whom Mr. Keynes has described as "a set of hard faced 
men who looked as if they had done very well out of the war." 
From that one would be inclined to imagine that they were 
disciples of the Daily Nczvs, which, on the very eve of the war, 
urged, with all the vigour which Mr. A. G. Gardiner could 
command, that the proper course was for Great Britain to 
stand aside and to make money out of those who would be 
bleeding to death. But, in fact, the views of Mr. Gardiner, 
either those he held in 19 14 or those he holds to-day, find little 
echo in the present Parliament. It is said that it is a House 
of Commons which does not represent the country. The truth 
is that, just as it would have been an unrepresentative House 
in 1 91 4, so it is a House which would doubtless be unrepre- 
sentative in 1925. But, like the French Chambre des Deputes, 
it is quite representative of its period — of the transitional 
stage through which we are passing. 

Mr. Lloyd George thus gained time to consider the situation 
and to see what bargain he could make. 

To the credit of his account he could put the fact that the 
political party which was most united (though it certainly 
was not united on any fixed principles), which had most mem- 
bers in the House of Commons, and the best organisation in 
the country, was to all intents and purposes in search of a 
leader; while he was undoubtedly the one leader whom, as a 
matter of practical politics, any party would most covet. It 
was evident that, although Mr. Bonar Law might be a bril- 
liant second and a great leader of the House of Commons, he 
had neither the temperament nor the ambition to go further. 
Mr. Bonar Law has a nature which inclines him to attach 
himself to some stronger personality: and his loyalty is so 
sure and impeccable that that attachment is a precious and 
invaluable support to any Prime Minister. At one time his 
devotion seemed to be turned in the direction of Mr. Asquith, 
who, however, made nothing of it. Lloyd George, on the 
contrary, has, since December, 1916, nurtured it; so that when 
Bonar Law retired he was fairly counted as Lloyd George's 
man. 

Not only has the Prime Minister few competitors as a party 



164 THE POMP OF POWER 

leader, but there are only two people of whose opposition he 
has any great fear. 

For Mr. Winston Churchill's power to be unpleasantly 
pugnacious he has a wholesome respect. Churchill has all the 
moral courage which Lloyd George lacks; but none of his tact 
in negotiation, none of his caution in acting. In the excitement 
of speaking Mr. Lloyd George sometimes says things which 
he has reason to regret. But he rarely moves precipitately. 
No one is more careful not to do anything which is unpopular ; 
and presumably to follow public opinion is good politics al- 
though it may not be high principles. But Winston Churchill, 
to whom public applause is not the breath of life (luckily for 
him, since throughout his career he has been a target for at- 
tacks), is restrained by no such consideration. He acts im- 
petuously, and in the face of opposition maintains his posi- 
tion, often with more pluck than circumspection. 

He holds (and has held for many years past) one record 
of which the late Lady Randolph Churchill was wont to 
boast with justifiable maternal pride. He has been in office 
for more years than any man of his age in our political his- 
tory, always barring the younger Pitt. 

It is curious to reflect that small events may change the 
whole political history of a country. In 1902 both Bonar Law 
and Winston Churchill were possibilities for the post of Par- 
liamentary Secretary of the Board of Trade. Churchill wanted 
it and thought that it was his due. . Mr. Balfour gave it to 
Bonar Law. It was that, more than anything else, which led 
Churchill to cross the floor of the House. It convinced him 
that he would find no future in the Conservative fold. Party 
ties mean little to Churchill. He sincerely believes that the 
country has need of his services, and does not intend that it 
shall be deprived of them. He is first and foremost a great 
Winstonian. Other things being equal, his authoritative tem- 
perament inclines him naturally to Toryism; just as, on the 
other hand, Mr. Lloyd George, were the choice open to him, 
would rather be in power supported by the party which makes 
the most direct appeal to popular feeling. 

During Churchill's temporary political eclipse he served for 



LLOYD GEORGE— PARTY POLITICS 165 

some time with his regiment in France, But on his return 
he allowed Lloyd George to see both, I believe, by the line he 
took at a secret session of the House, as well as otherwise, that 
the choice was between a friendly colleague and a parliamen- 
tary opponent of a very different metal from Asquith. The 
Prime Minister capitulated, and Churchill came back to office. 
He will never be in opposition to Lloyd George if the latter 
is able to prevent it. Probably the only contingency is the re- 
mote prospect that Churchill may one day lead a party. 

The other person upon whom, for very different reasons, 
Mr. Lloyd George keeps a watchful eye is Lord Derby. The 
latter has neither the pugnacity nor the force of Churchill, 
who once upon a time was his own hete noir. But he has ex- 
actly what the other lacks, a following in the country. His 
work in recruiting during the war will always stand to his 
credit. It was not his fault if those who came in under the 
Derby scheme later possibly had some well-founded grievances. 
At the War Office he was known as a firm supporter of Gen- 
eral Robertson in the conflict of which that distinguished sol- 
dier was the centre. When Robertson was succeeded by Henry 
Wilson it was thought that Lord Derby would at once re- 
sign. But it was only some time later that left Whitehall to 
succeed the late Lord Bertie in Paris. 

The appointment was one which caused widespread surprise 
and interest. Obviously, if there was no diplomat suitable and 
available for the post (and Sir Rennel Rodd, who had some 
claim to it, could not be spared from Rome), it ought to have 
been given to a great peer. Lord Derby, of course, had that 
qualification in an eminent degree : and his acceptance was a 
deathblow to intrigues which might possibly have led to one 
or other of several unworthy nominations. But he was so little 
known in connection with foreign affairs that in some quarters 
there was doubt as to the result. 

I recollect asking the French Ambassador, M. Paul Cambon, 
at luncheon a few days after the appointment was announced 
if he knew whether Lord Derby spoke French, the current 
rumour being that he did not. "Oui," replied the Ambassador, 
with a characteristic movement, "Oui, il parle frangais comma 



166 THE POMP OF POWER 

je park anglais." As nobody, to my knowledge, has ever heard 
M. Cambon speak English, the certificate was, and was doubt- 
less meant to be, rather enigmatic. 

But if opinions were divided before Lord Derby went, there 
was perfect unanimity long before he returned. His success 
was immediate and complete. The French confidence in him 
was unlimited ; and even during the unpleasant and critical 
days which followed the Frankfort incident that confidence was 
unbroken and his popularity amongst all classes remained un- 
diminished. Lord Bertie was a man of great attainments who 
jealously guarded the interests of his country. He was re- 
spected and feared : but he neither was, nor apparently did he 
want to be, liked. Lord Derby awakened very different feel- 
ings. In Paris his name is and long will be linked with those 
of the only two other English ambassadors who left behind 
them any abiding memory — Lord Lytton and, to a somewhat 
less extent, Lord Dufferin. 

To be a peer is to-day a handicap in the political world. 
Some thirty odd years ago three comparatively young men 
— George Curzon, St. John Brodrick, and the then Lord 
Wolmer — realised that fact and cast about for a way in which 
they might avoid the soporific House of Lords. They were 
advised (by Lord James of Hereford, I think) to consult a 
lawyer who could help them if anyone could — H. H. Asquith. 
However, even Mr. Asquith's ingenuity was not equal to that 
task. It is apparently destined to be Mr. Lloyd George who 
will afford some relief to unwilling peers. 

But if Lord Derby has that handicap, it is, in his case, not 
without some compensating advantage. He is a peer with 
territorial influence; one of the last of them, and probably 
possessed of more influence of that kind than any two other 
peers in England. In Lancashire he is a power : and Lan- 
cashire is a power in England. 

Of still greater importance is the almost universal belief, 
at home as well as abroad, that Lord Derby typifies in a su- 
preme degree the English character, with its great qualities 
and its traditional limitations. The country may admire Mr. 
Lloyd George's extreme cleverness, but it does not altogether 



LLOYD GEORGE— PARTY POLITICS 167 

trust it. To the ordinary English mind he seems just a Httle 
too clever. In brief, his ability is useful to him for what it 
enables him to achieve more than for the confidence it inspires : 
for in a referendum on the latter point he would fall far be- 
hind Lord Derby. 

It was a foregone conclusion that Mr. Lloyd George would 
offer Lord Derby a place in the Cabinet when he returned 
to England. What was not so certain was the course which 
Lord Derby himself would take. He chose the middle, and, 
in the circumstances, the sensible one. He declined the Prime 
Minister's overtures. But at the same time he gave no en- 
couragement to those who, partly for their own purpose, 
tried to force him into leading some movement against the 
Government. 

He admits himself that he is credited with once having 
had two ambitions — to be Prime Minister and to win the 
Derby: and adds that only one of the two remains with him 
to-day. Lord Derby is still racing; and I trust that he may 
yet be successful. It is less likely that he will ever be Prime 
Minister. But he will always be a certain power, he can hold 
high office whenever he likes : and Mr. Lloyd George is dis- 
playing his habitual cautious wisdom in not neglecting him. 

On the Conservative side there is hardly anyone else to 
whom the Prime Minister need pay much attention. Lord 
Robert Cecil may become a nuisance. He is much less likely 
ever to be a rival. He is in one respect the Mr. Dick of poli- 
tics : the Church, like King Charles's head, may be brought 
into any question. Such a weakness puts him at a marked 
disadvantage as an opponent of opportunists. 

As Lord Chancellor Lord Birkenhead has had a success, 
both on the Woolsack and in the debates in the Lords, which 
has entirely delighted and somewhat surprised the whole po- 
litical world. It is well known that he has no intention of 
being restrained by any traditions as to what former Lord 
Chancellors should or should not do. In this respect his ideas 
correspond with those held by Brougham,'* whom he equals 

*The only reason why Brougliam never held any office after his 
Chancellorship was that after that experience no one wanted to work 



168 THE POMP OF POWER 

in brilliancy (although not so versatile) and excels in sanity. 
Lord Birkenhead will doubtless yet fill various offices. But it 
is not impossible that the former hope of the Tory party may 
one day lead it or its successor, 

Austen Chamberlain's present position does not seem to 
be quite clear. He leads in the House of Commons, but can 
hardly be considered the actual or definite leader of the party 
in the country. The fact that Lord Derby is pointing to 
Lloyd George as the logical leader of the Conservative party 
is indicative of the situation in which Chamberlain is placed. 

Amongst the new men there is only one of pronounced 
promise. Sir Robert Home has achieved a great position 
in a short time. He is certainly more of a Tory than was 
ever Mr. Bonar Law : whether that is an advantage or other- 
wise is another question. That he will go far is likely: but 
at the present day he is not a possible leader. 

In any event the Conservative party is in a condition of 
flux, if not actually in process of dissolution. The word 
"Unionist" has now ceased to have any application. The 
word "Conservative" has little more, except in so far as it 
may indicate the less extreme party in the State. 

Disraeli seems to have seen plainly enough what was com- 
ing, and to have found the only way for his party to keep 
even with the times without being submerged. The Tory 
Democracy of Lord Randolph Churchill, though somewhat 
crude, was entirely in keeping with Disraelism. But Lord 
Salisbury took a different stand. M. Paul Cambon once told 
me that Lord Salisbury always gave him the impression of a 
man who went on knowing that he was fighting a losing fight, 
but with no intention of yielding to the trend of the period. 
That was not Disraelism. But it is reminiscent of Bismarck's 
reputed comment at the Berlin Conference : "Lord Salisbury 
is a lath painted to look like iron, but the old Jew means busi- 
ness." 

To Lord Salisbury succeeded Mr Balfour, who completed 
the ruin of his party. He made no effort either to keep the 

with him. At one moment he had a fleeting idea of becoming a naturalised 
Frenchman so that he might be elected a Deputy. 



LLOYD GEORGE— PARTY POLITICS 169 

votes of one class or to get those of the other. He went back 
to country-house Toryism — a pleasant enough Hfe, but not 
one calculated to win seats in Parliament. Had the Con- 
servative party had another leader the progress of the Labour 
party would have been less rapid. But Mr. Balfour lost what 
used to be called the working-class vote (the basis of Tory 
strength once the franchise was extended) without doing 
anything to get the middle-class support which Gladstone had 
firmly riveted to the Liberal cause. Finally, he was guilty of 
the tactical error of refusing to go to the country when it was 
evident that his Government was discredited. 

By common consent Mr. Balfour has great charm of man- 
ner. But his detachment is something hardly human. I have 
heard him, at a critical period of the war, and while he was 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, discuss after dinner 
the prospects, the chances of our ultimately winning or los- 
ing, with the interest of a person observing a great phe- 
nomenon which in no way affected him personally : the interest 
one might have expected to be displayed by a week-end visitor 
from Mars. 

At the time Lord Queenborough went to the House of 
Lords someone who was staying at a country house where 
Mr. Balfour was also of the party mentioned the coming by- 
election in Cambridge, and Mr. Balfour asked how there was 
a vacancy. "What has become of Almeric?" he queried. And, 
when told, said that he was unaware that Mr. Paget had 
gone to the Upper House. 

I repeated this to the late Lady X., who to her last day 
maintained her lifelong interest both in politics and in racing. 
She said that she had never been able to determine how much 
of Mr. Balfour's attitude about not knowing what was tak- 
ing place in the world was pose, and how much simply a 
natural aversion to be bothered with such matters : and cited 
another instance; how, at a time when he was leader, he 
expressed his ignorance about a coming by-election (Peter- 
borough, I think) of some importance. Lady X.'s own im- 
pression was that what had originally been a pose had long 
since become a habit. 



170 THE POMP OF POWER 

I was therefore not surprised when a well-known French- 
woman told me recently that on the first day that Mr. Balfour 
attended the Peace Conference (it was, I think, the first day 
of the Conference) she lunched with Mr. Balfour, Lord 
Robert Cecil, and others. When Mr. Balfour was obliged to 
leave in order to go to the Conference she made a little dis- 
coitrs de circonstance: "An interesting and memorable his- 
toric occasion," etc. "Yes," agreed Mr. Balfour, with some- 
thing between a sigh and a yawn, "but what a bore!" 

When Mr. Balfour became impossible as leader of his 
party the choice fell (in circumstances to which I have al- 
ready adverted) upon a man for whom the general respect 
has increased year by year; but who was not really a Tory, 
and had not in him the making of a great leader except on 
the benches of the House of Commons. 

Upon this showing Mr. Lloyd George's prospects of strik- 
ing a bargain more or less on his own terms might appear 
favourable. But against that must be put the cold fact that 
he has no party organisation, and not a great many followers 
who have moderately safe seats. A party in search of a 
leader is in a bad way. But a leader in search of a party 
is in a still worse position. Nobody knows the force of that 
argument better than Sir George Younger, who doubtless 
has more than once used it in discussions with the Prime 
Minister. The end will probably be that Lloyd George will 
go somewhat further than he would like to proceed along 
the path to which Younger points. But needs must. The war 
and the ensuing coalitions only hastened an end which was 
inevitable. Neither the remnants of the party nor Mr. Lloyd 
George will lose by the bargain. What is more important, 
the country will gain; for it is never in the public interest 
that either of the principal political parties in the State should 
be derelict. 

Such was the position until a few months ago. But since 
the above was written there has been a change of atmosphere. 
Shortly before the Cannes Conference Mr. Lloyd George 
and those close to him had practically decided to have an 
early general election. Sir George Younger stoutly opposed 



LLOYD GEORGE— PARTY POLITICS 171 

this decision. But apparently Mr. Lloyd George thought that 
he held the stronger cards ; and that, if it came to an issue, 
the Unionist party would cede rather than forfeit his leader- 
ship. He therefore held firm. If there had been a party 
meeting (always an unsatisfactory affair) he might possibly 
have carried the day. But Younger kept the matter in his 
own hands; and, to the surprise and chagrin of Lloyd George, 
he accepted what almost amounted to a challenge, came into 
the open, and told the world that Unionists were entirely op- 
posed to a needless general election. Probably Mr. Lloyd 
George never regretted so keenly that the only following which 
he could absolutely call his own was in the minority. In the 
circumstances he was forced to retreat; and he therefore 
did his utmost to make out that he had never had any such 
idea. The doughty and debonair Sir George was for the 
moment left in the possession of the field, smilingly asking 
"Who said General Election?" 

Indeed, Younger went further. For in a subsequent speech 
he defined more clearly than had Mr. Chamberlain the inde- 
pendent position which, according to his conception, the Union- 
ists occupy in the Coalition. This led Mr. Lloyd George to 
serve notice upon Mr. Chamberlain that he would resign un- 
less his Unionist colleagues in the Cabinet could keep their 
followers in order. His letter was almost tantamount to de- 
manding that Younger should be ousted from his post as head 
of the party organisation. At first sight it might seem that 
the Prime Minister was merely making a stand for a reason- 
able measure of party discipline. But it is necessary to go 
a little further back in order to get a true light upon the sub- 
ject. What originated this trouble, and caused Sir George 
Younger to speak so openly? Simply Mr. Lloyd George's 
temporary insistence upon a general election against the 
wishes of the Unionists ; that is, in opposition to the views of 
those who are not of his own party, but who give him a ma- 
jority in the House of Commons. 

In reality, therefore, Mr. Lloyd George is going far beyond 
an appeal for party discipline. He is setting up the pretension 
that in the future he shall be an unquestioned dictator — as he 



172 THE POMP OF POWER 

has sometimes been in the past. Or at least he is making that 
the condition of his continuance in office. 

At the time I am writing the outcome of this crisis rests 
in doubt. But it is probable that Mr. Lloyd George has no 
sincere desire to retire; and that it was a threat which he 
would fulfil with regret. Nevertheless, if he did so upon the 
ground that he would not submit to be ruined by the Unionists, 
he would have every chance of leading another — and a more 
Radical — party within a short time. To be at the head of 
such a party is what he would most prefer; if only it could be 
accomplished without that unpleasant and uncertain interval 
which would follow his departure from Downing Street ! 

If Mr. Lloyd George remains as Prime Minister (which is 
likely) it will be a question of terms between himself and 
the Unionist party. Should the latter yield entirely it will 
simply mean that it has gone into voluntary liquidation 
and has had a sale. Truth to tell there would not then be 
much left to sell. It has no great leaders. Even the Morn- 
ing Post can only suggest that Mr. Balfour, now seventy- 
four years of age and in many respects out of touch with 
the present generation, should take Mr. Lloyd George's suc- 
cession. Its principles the Unionist party long ago threw 
overboard. In brief its chief asset is the number of seats 
it holds in the present House of Commons. 

Even if Mr. Lloyd George does not obtain the full assur- 
ances which he wants he will at least have divided the Union- 
ist in the same way as he has already divided the Liberal 
party, although not to the same extent. He will have in- 
creased his own independence, and his own political value, 
while correspondingly diminishing that of a great party. It 
is personal politics upon a high scale. 

Whatever the ultimate result, this crisis has hastened the 
end of the Coalition; and has exposed the weakness of Mr. 
Chamberlain. 

But if the Conservative party is in a state of dissolution 
the former Liberal party is dead and all but buried. With 
the rise of the Labour party it was obvious that one of the 
pre-existing parties would sooner or later disappear. Par- 



LLOYD GEORGE— PARTY POLITICS 173 

liamentary government originated in England; and its basis, 
its very essence, is that there should be two parties in the 
State holding contradictory opinions upon the vital issues of 
the day. More than two parties there have never been ex- 
cept when there has been a split in one of the two and the 
minority wing has not yet gone over or been reabsorbed — 
for instance, the Peelites — or when there has been a party for 
a single particular purpose, as was the Irish Nationalist party. 
The main reason why parliamentary government has not had 
the same success in Latin countries is attributable to an ap- 
parent inability to form and maintain parties, as distinguished 
from groups. It was, I think, Mr. Bodley who once aptly 
wrote that while the British constitution was a very excellent 
thing, yet, like the Blessed Sacrament, it was not to be carried 
around and worshipped. If either the Conservative or Radi- 
cal Party had to give away to the new Labour element it was 
clear that it was the Radicals who would be crowded out ; for 
there was nothing which they proposed to do which the Labour 
leaders did not promise to do more thoroughly. The elec- 
tion of 1918, coming as it did immediately after the end of 
hostilities, hastened the downfall of Gladstonian Liberalism. 
But the result would have been the same in any event, though 
the final issue might otherwise have been delayed. It is sig- 
nificant that since then there has been a sneaking desire on 
the part of Radicals to come to terms with Labour. But 
the old Liberal party has little to offer except a money chest 
— a very useful and even a necessary adjunct for any cam- 
paign, but not in itself all-sufficient. The party holds few 
seats. It has no leaders who can arouse any interest or excite 
any enthusiasm. Mr. Asquith is out of touch, not only with 
the country, but with a House of Commons which he does not 
understand. Lord Grey's renewed activity will raise the tone 
of public life. But any chance he ever had of becoming a 
great leader ceased the day he rather unwillingly went to the 
House of Lords. Sir Donald MacLean is held in sympathetic 
esteem even by his opponents, but he will never be dangerous. 
Mr. McKenna, a man who couples real ability with the knack 
of making himself disliked for no deep reasons, is not very 



174 THE POMP OF POWER 

likely to leave a certainty in the world of high finance for an 
uncertainty in that of politics. Mr. Masterman still dreams 
of an alliance between Liberalism and Labour. But his is 
a voice crying in the wilderness. Sir Herbert Samuel (at 
present occupied in governing Palestine) is ambitious. But 
his brain does not work so quickly as that of his cousin, Mon- 
tagu; nor, to do him justice, do his party and personal alle- 
giances weigh upon him so lightly. For of all desertions to 
Mr. Lloyd George, that of Montagu was the least excusable. 
He did not, like others of his then colleagues, go over in 
December, 191 6, when they took the risk of challenging 
Asquith's power. He stayed with Asquith then, and only 
left him later, when it was no longer a question of men group- 
ing together in the interest of their country to turn out an 
incompetent Prime Minister, but solely a question of Montagu 
getting into office. But the worst part of the transaction is 
that Montagu was Asquith's particular protege. It was the 
Liberal Prime Minister who opened to him the road to po- 
litical success, and who made him his youngest colleague. 
Truly Mr. Asquith, the most loyal of men, has not been over 
fortunate in the devotion of his followers. 

The fact that Liberalism has little to offer Labour is one 
to which the leaders of the latter movement are fully alive. 
Any amalgamation is unlikely unless it is one whereby Labour 
swallows the remnants of the Liberal party. On the other 
hand, the Labour party has not had during the present Par- 
liament the success which it anticipated. It has not produced 
many men of first-rate ability; but that is hardly the cause 
of its failure, since no other party has much to boast of in 
that respect. Winston Churchill's gibe that Labour is unfit to 
govern — unfit in the sense that it has not the administrative 
capacity — is absurd. A Cabinet of which no member had 
ever been in office before would certainly encounter many 
preliminary difficulties. But there are several Labour leaders 
who held Government office during the war. While as re- 
gards actual ability, what is to be said about the present Front 
Bench? Eliminate Lloyd George, Bonar Law, Winston 
Churchill himself, Sir Robert Home (who was a real find), 



LLOYD GEORGE— PARTY POLITICS 175 

and how are the others to be ranked ? Something can be said 
for, but also a great deal against, the administrative capacity 
of Mr. Chamberlain. Sir Worthington Evans as a solicitor 
was shrewd and capable, and will show the same qualities 
in any office. But Labour can produce as good as that. While 
if one takes the whole Front Bench, beginning with Home 
as the highest type of efficiency, and finishing with the un- 
fortunate and incompetent Dr. Addison at the other end,° 
it will be found that the middle is certainly not above the aver- 
age that any party might reasonably hope to possess. 

The present trouble with the Labour party arises from the 
transitional stage through which all parties are now passing, 
and also from the fact that it increased the number of seats 
it held too quickly for its own good. It is unlikely that there 
will ever be any retrogression; on the contrary, there will 
almost certainly be a progressive increase for some time to 
come. But the lack of power of assimilation, the lack of 
party discipline (discipline in the proper sense), the lack 
of even a minor George Younger, at present deprives the party 
of the influence it otherwise might have. A party of which 
the leaders preach their loyalty to the constitution, and their 
faith in constitutional methods, while one of its whips makes 
a fool of himself by trying to insult the sovereign, struggles 
under a certain disadvantage. 

But these are minor defects which will doubtless disappear 
as this new party settles down to prepare itself to take its 
turn of governing the country. The vital difficulty lies else- 
where. It is essential that the Labour party should appeal 
to the country at large. A party which merely represents 
trade unions will never come into power in England, for which 
one may be duly thankful, as that would be class government 
of the most pronounced kind. On the other hand, there is 
no possibility of increasing the number of trade unionists to 
anything like the requisite figure. 

There are at present about 8,000,000 members of Trade 
Unions in Great Britain. That is not sufficient to ensure 
a majority in the House of Commons. A great deal of the 
^ Written before Dr. Addison's severance from his salary. 



176 THE POMP OF POWEK 

talk about the absolute power of Labour is therefore nonsense. 
The power of Labour to cause inconvenience, to lose money 
for workers and employers alike, temporarily to interrupt 
the course of ordinary life, and to do harm to the country, is 
almost incalculable. But that is not enough, especially in 
England. For some time the superior organisation of the 
Trade Unions enabled the Labour party to show a front which 
gave an exaggerated idea of its real influence if it was put to 
a decisive test. But as the origin of this strength was realised 
other interests in the State also began to organise. While the 
railway strike of 1919, and the more recent coal strike have 
demonstrated clearly that so long as there is parliamentary 
government the country will not allow a minority to impose 
its will upon a majority. Direct action on a large scale would 
probably solve the question quickly — to the discomfiture of 
Labour; and the Labour leaders, who know that quite as 
well as anyone else, have, for the greater part, no stomach for 
a policy to which many of them are sincerely opposed, and of 
which many more doubt the sagacity. They realise that the 
country will not be bullied, and that any party in England 
which to-day openly says that a minority is to govern is 
simply slamming in its own face the door to office. The 
extremists will never admit that. But the recent strikes — 
and failures — have had their effect in convincing the rank 
and file that success does not lie that way. The only remain- 
ing course is to rest on the field of constitutional government 
and to augment their forces. To achieve the latter end they 
will be obliged to do what every other fresh party has done 
before it came into power — to compromise. If they do so 
now, before it is too late, whik the country is not satisfied 
with a one party power, and before anything else arises on 
the ashes of the Liberal pyre, they have every chance of form- 
ing the basis of one of the two great parties. 

The Labour leaders are therefore confronted with the 
problem of some way securing a large proportion of that 
middle-class vote which Gladstone always had behind him, 
and which stuck to the Liberal party until the War. That 
can only be done by having a policy as free as possible from 



LLOYD GEORGE— PARTY POLITICS 177 

any suspicion of class domination. It was the fixed idea 
that the landed classes were getting too much and giving too 
little to the State — that they were trampling on the others — 
which solidified the middle classes against Toryism. Un- 
fortunately for the Labour party the middle classes now have 
the idea that the Trade Unionists want to impose their su- 
premacy. Many things — such as ill-considered and arbitrary 
strikes — have fostered this conviction. While the way in 
which the rates have gone up in many municipalities where 
Labour rules seems to indicate that a Labour Government 
would be without a rival in lavish expenditure of the tax- 
payers' money. 

All these facts, and many more, are being brought to the 
attention of the middle classes by non-party organisations 
which hope to prevent that vote going to Labour. But if 
the Labour party has any sincere idea of a national role it 
will realise in time that it cannot, in these days, expect to carry 
the country in support of its class legislation merely because, 
in days gone by, others were so ill-advised as to enforce legis- 
lation in favour of another class. In order to broaden its 
policy it will have to rid itself of its extreme element. In re- 
turn it will probably get that much coveted middle class vote 
which will one day carry it to power. In the meantime it 
might advantageously adopt the suggestion of the Manchester 
Guardian that it should not oppose selected candidates, be- 
longing to other parties, who stand for progress. 

That the country will ever be converted to nationalism is 
doubtful. The great difficulty which Labour leaders meet in 
preaching that doctrine is that they are unable to point to 
any country where it has really been a success. It has been 
tried in many — but has always been found wanting, and some- 
times been practically abandoned. The State railways in 
France do not compare with those controlled by private owner- 
ship — except in the size of their annual deficits. The postal 
and telegraph services are lamentable. In the United States 
the period of Government ownership during the war brought 
confusion to every service it took in hand. For an essential 
point about national ownership and operation is not only that 



178 THE POMP OF POWER 

it costs more, but that it gives less; the lack of efficiency is 
always marked. One would naturally have expected the much- 
governed Germany to have afforded a useful example. But the 
German railways have never been up to the first-class standard 
as regards either comfort or speed. 

An opportunity to see how far the English character was 
in keeping with national ownership was given during the 
war. The result, once again, was to prove that Government 
control means extravagance and mismanagement.^ This could 
only be minimised by restrictions which the public would 
find galling in the extreme; while it is curious to reflect that 
during the war no section of the community objected so 
strongly to such restrictions as there were as did Labour. 

Again, the Labour party has yet to establish that it has 
some idea of economical administration, all the more so be- 
cause some of the extremists have made it rather too clear 
that they look forward to spending other people's money. 

Finally, another bar to success at the polls is the attitude 
of the party about the conduct of foreign affairs. The day 
will not soon come in England when a majority of the country 
will consent to foreign policy being controlled by any hybrid 
internationalism — by a congress at Berne or Amsterdam, any 
more than by dictates coming from Moscow. That is a taint 
of which the Labour party will have to purge itself before it 
achieves office. 

Neither in England nor in France will the last active in- 
tervention of Labour in international affairs be soon forgotten. 
That was a few days before the war, when German Labour 
leaders went out of their way to convince Jaures and their 
other French friends that there would probably be no dec- 
laration of war; but that if there was, the German Labour 
and Socialist members of the Reichstag would refuse to vote 
the necessary credits. For the greater part they voted like 

*The last Blue Book giving information on this subject (June, 1921) 
shows that the Government's experiments as a merchant were also 
disastrous, the losses upon various exploitations running into millions 
of pounds. 



LLOYD GEORGE— PARTY POLITICS 179 

Iambs and fought or worked like tigers.'^ The national feeling 
which that indicated is not (in my opinion) to their discredit. 
But it is not consistent with any pretence of internationalism. 

Everything the German Government did during the war 
was in the interest of their own capital and labour (for it 
was understood that they necessarily went hand in hand), 
and for the post-war extinction and oppression of the capital 
and labour of its enemies. The French Socialist party has 
lost all political influence precisely because of the horror 
which the country has of any tinge of internationalism under 
German auspices. No doubt English Labour leaders have 
already found instructive reading in The Industries of Occu- 
pied France. This was a book of 482 pages (containing 
many tables and plans), the work of 200 German officers 
serving in France, chosen on account of their technical knowl- 
edge of the various industries, which was published in Febru- 
ary, 1 91 6. It was sent to all the German Chambers of Com- 
merce and other financial and commercial associations through- 
out the country. A copy of this confidential publication was 
given to the Supreme Council in February, 191 9. Its ob- 
ject was to show how German capital and German labour 
might profit by the destruction which had been wrought in 
France; either that caused in the course of warfare or that 
which was systematic and deliberate. It abounds in state- 
ments such as the following : "Bleaching and dyeing. Every- 
thing in copper and all the driving belts have been taken down 
and sent to Germany. And an important outlet is thus opened 
for machines of German manufacture." "Wool spinning- 
mills. In the factories almost all the copper parts of the 
boilers and the leather belts have been taken away. . . . Ger- 
many ought to be in a position to recommence her full produc- 
tion at least two years before France." 

If the Labour party limits itself to a determination to main- 

^At the outset of the war even Liebknecht (who repented later) 
approved of the violation of Belgian territory. While in those early 
days, when a speedy victory seemed in sight, no political group was 
more pan-Germanist than was the Socialist party. It was only when 
the result became uncertain, and they realised that they might have to 
bear the penalties instead of sharing the spoils, that they again began 
to prate about the blessings of internationalism. 



180 THE POMP OF POWER 

tain peace and to frown upon designs of territorial expansion 
on the part of any country, it will rest on firm ground. But 
if it makes any brand of internationalisation a component part 
of its creed it is unlikely to be in power for years to come. 

The probability is that the Labour party will undergo great 
changes between a comparatively brief period. In its inner 
mechanism there is more to be admired than is generally 
known. Labour members represent their constituents more 
truly and more independently than do many on the other side 
of the House. Most of them are men of no private means 
and of small incomes who could, in these days, make much 
more if they were not in political life. During a recent in- 
quiry regarding members' salaries, a Labour member told 
how his parliamentary allowance was spent — in eking out an 
existence — and said that he gave in all £5 a year as subscrip- 
tions to charitable and other organisations in his constituency. 
For the people who send these men into Parliament pay the 
expenses of their own political associations without looking 
for assistance. They elect whom they want and owe nothing, 
and are under no obligation to their member. Yet how many 
who are to-day sitting on the right of the Speaker give part 
(or all) of their parliamentary allowance to support the party 
association in their own constituency, entirely aside from their 
manifold donations to charitable, religious, sporting, and other 
organisations. The men who form these Conservative or Co- 
alition associations are, upon the whole, much better off than 
those who send Labour members to Westminster. But they 
are also much less independent. They place so little value 
upon the franchise that they will not even pay their own way. 
The Lord Chancellor (in speaking of the divorce laws) told 
the Upper House that the Law was ingenious enough to cope 
with any conditions. Possibly a broad inquiry will one day 
furnish evidence which will lead to much needed legislation 
on this subject. 

While there are not many Labour members who have made 
any great mark in the House of Commons, there are some 
who can well hold their own with all comers. I will refer 
to two only. To Mr. Clynes, with his quiet manner and his 



LLOYD GEORGE— PARTY POLITICS 181 

lucid statements, the House always listens attentively. Per- 
haps more than anyone else in his party he would command 
confidence as a Minister of the Crown in a Labour Govern- 
ment. Mr. J. H. Thomas is forcible or persuasive at will, 
and generally throws a new light on every subject. That he 
has great moral courage he has proved time and again out- 
side of Parliament, when he has told Labour meetings, in 
plain language, what would be the outcome of unjustifiable 
strikes. As a negotiator in a difficult crisis he has more than 
once rendered great service to his country. But it is regret- 
table that Mr. Thomas, who is by no means so convincing 
when he writes as when he talks, was recently so indiscreet 
as to become an author. He drew a picture of the future — 
when Labour rules — which was undoubtedly distasteful to the 
great majority of his fellow countrymen. Whilst his fallacies 
and contradictions left him an easy prey to anyone who cared 
to analyse his rather shallow production. Unfortunately for 
the Labour leader, the Duke of Northumberland seems to 
have been sighing, "O that mine enemy should write a book !" 
He turned his attention to Mr. Thomas's and completely de- 
molished it, even in the opinion of many who would have 
preferred to have been able to agree with Mr. Thomas rather 
than with the Duke. It was not that the latter wrote anything 
very forcible, but Mr. Thomas's work was at once feeble and 
elementary. 

It is to be hoped that Mr. Thomas, who is a national asset, 
will take the lesson to heart; that he will remember that the 
cobbler should stick to his last. He excels in talking and per- 
suading, not in writing and pondering. Moreover, a leader 
of a progressive party stultifies himself when he attempts to 
write the last word of a political or social creed. The Duke 
of Northumberland had a right to do that because he holds 
opinions which neither time nor events will change. But Mr. 
Thomas has only created for himself a source of future em- 
barrassment. 

Undoubtedly the day will come when Mr, Thomas and 
Mr. Clynes, Mr. Hodges, Mr. Jack Jones, and others, will 
spend their week-ends at Chequers Court, waited on by the 



182 THE POMP OF POWER 

footmen or other stafif for whose payment Lord and Lady 
Lee have provided in making their generous gift. Money 
amassed in America has been spent in many strange ways 
Httle contemplated by its maker. But it is difficuh to imagine 
anything more fantastic than a fortune made in Stock Ex- 
change or banking transactions with and for capitahstic trusts 
being used to provide a country home for those who are the 
avowed enemies of such combinations. 

When all is said, it would seem that Mr. Lloyd George 
should still be able to sleep tranquilly at lo Downing Street. 
In the political world there is no one outside his net who can 
do him much present harm. His tenure of office would appear 
to be secure. 

Unfortunately for the Prime Minister's peace of mind, he 
has an enemy more powerful by far than any parliamentary 
opponent hitherto named, and whose voice reaches further 
than that of the loudest mouth orator. Lord Northcliffe 
and his numerous satellites are constantly on the alert; they 
neither give nor take any rest. 



CHAPTER X 
Lord Northcliffe and his Press 

It is almost a tragedy that the man who of all others is 
most sensitive to newspaper criticism should have made an 
enemy of the man who controls the most powerful and the 
most unsparingly outspoken newspapers in England. 

Lloyd George's weakness in this respect has long been a 
source of amusement to European statesmen. They are un- 
able to understand how anyone who has been in public life 
for so many years can worry unduly about comments or at- 
tacks in the Press. M. Painleve once mentioned to me this 
characteristic of Mr. Lloyd George, who, he said, particularly 
disliked the articles of a certain French journalist, whom 
Painleve cited by the pseudonym under which he writes. I 
mentioned his real name, whereupon Painleve remarked that 
the fact that he had never before known who it was indicated 
the degree of importance which French politicians were wont 
to attach to such articles. 

The only practical result of the Prime Minister's hyper- 
sensitiveness to newspaper criticism is that he has exposed 
his weak point as a target for those who are inimical to him, 
and has alienated others who were not disposed to be un- 
friendly. The French Press mocks (and not without reason) 
at the way Lloyd George winces under the comments of 
"Pertinax" in I'Echo de Paris and of M. Jules Sauerwein 
in Le Matin. He has from time to time tried to placate the 
former. While his aversion to the plain statements of the 
latter is so well known that at the time of the Conference of 
London in 1921 one Paris journal ^ reported that he had 
thought of having Sauerwein deported; although anyone con- 

^ Aux Ecoutcs, July 24th, 1921. 

183 



184 THE POMP OF POWER 

versant with English methods must know that whatever might 
have been Mr. Lloyd George's irritation there could be no 
solid foundation for that statement. 

It is not the differences between the British and French 
Governments which are primarily responsible for the dis- 
favour with which the French Press regards Mr. Lloyd 
George, but simply his system of sacrificing anything or any- 
body in order to safeguard his own susceptibilities. 

A few months ago Mr. Frank Simmonds, who is perhaps 
better known in England and France than any other American 
journalist, wrote that if the British Prime Minister attended 
the Washington Conference he would find himself an "object 
of suspicion." The reasons given were such incidents as 
Mr. Lloyd George's attempt to stop the publication in the 
New York World ^f an article which he regarded as politically 
embarrassing, as well as his conduct at the Peace Conference, 
where "his quarrels with the Paris Press are sufficiently no- 
torious to need no recalling." 

Mr. Simmonds said plainly that "if Mr. Lloyd George 
should come to the United States surrounded by the group 
of newspaper friends and Press agents who served his interests 
at Paris, and should employ the same methods — that is, should 
seek the suppression of news — almost incalculable harm 
would be done to the whole cause of Anglo-American 
friendship." 

Undoubtedly Lord Riddell is answerable for much. That 
excessively able man may have talents which qualify him to 
be an excellent Press agent. But he was grotesquely out of 
place in dealing with the foreign Press. He was lacking in 
both knowledge and experience. No doubt he sometimes 
prevented Mr. Lloyd George's sensibilities from being ruffled. 
But his methods did not make for good feelings amongst the 
Allies. For, despite much dining together, the truth is that 
when Lord Riddell did not amuse he exasperated those for 
whom it was his duty to act as intermediary. 

The whole question may be summed up by saying that the 
French and American Press are at one in their fixed objections 
to being either bullied or bamboozled. Apparently the Press 



LORD NORTHCLIFFE AND HIS PRESS 185 

is moderately indifferent to either the praise or the blame of 
Mr. Lloyd George, but is determined to report his doings as 
it sees them. 

But the fact remains that the Prime Minister will never 
realise that newspaper comment is fairly the lot of the 
politician. He both fears and resents it. Sometimes he 
blusters in reply. Sometimes he tries to cajole his critics or 
to stifle their criticism. 

When the Daily Chronicle, once his faithful supporter, 
began to annoy him by its attacks, his friends bought it and 
placed the control in safe hands. In brief, he will adopt any 
feasible method to avoid having a hostile Press. The one 
thing he is temperamentally incapable of doing is to accept 
any reproof gracefully. 

This was illustrated years ago in the unfortunate Marconi 
case. It will be remembered that Mr. Lloyd George (as well 
as Lord Reading, then Sir Rufus Isaacs) made very humble 
speeches in the House of Commons, admitting their grave 
error of judgment, but denying any conscious wrong-doing; 
and then, according to precedent, withdrew while the House 
decided their fate. In the result both the Prime Minister and 
the future Lord Chief Justice and Viceroy were saved from 
what was very nearly the consequence of their Marconi specu- 
lations — the closing of their political careers. But a few days 
later Mr. Lloyd George, being then out of the woods, delivered 
a speech at the National Liberal Club which can only be de- 
scribed as defiant in tone, and which doubtless would have 
turned the majority against him had he made it in the House 
of Commons instead of the more penitent discourse with which 
he wisely sought to conciliate that assembly. 

The Prime Minister's susceptibility to newspaper attacks 
arises partly from the fact that popularity is essential to his 
well-being (at which Clemenceau used to gibe behind his back, 
and of which he sometimes took advantage in his negotia- 
tions), and partly from his sense of the injustice of one who 
wants at any cost to please and to be applauded by the majority 
of his fellow-countrymen being assailed by them. 

Lloyd George is not naturally a maker of public sentiment. 



186 THE POMP OF POWER 

Upon one occasion — and the most critical of all — he did give 
a lead; and the memory of that will always be his greatest 
claim to renown. But leaving aside that notable instance an 
examination of his career will show that, while he has some- 
times excited the passions of a class, he has seldom formed 
the judgment of the country. He prefers to find out what is 
public opinion (and no one is more clever in the art of 
divining it early in the day), and to adopt it as his own. He 
is positively grieved when the force of circumstances obliges 
him to take a line which he knows will not be popular; and, 
unfortunately for Mr. Lloyd George, the conditions after a 
great war are such that any Government must do many things 
which tend to make it disliked. 

These characteristics of the Prime Minister have led him 
into a habit of reviling the Press whenever it disagrees with 
him or with his policy. No names are then too bad for it; 
no good motive is then imputed to it. The British Press is so 
free and incorruptible that it probably never takes such out- 
bursts seriously; and all the less so because it is common 
knowledge that no politician in our history has made such use 
of newspapers as has Mr. Lloyd George. But nevertheless it 
is an unhealthy state of affairs that any statesman, through 
an incapacity to bear blame, should impute unworthy ends to 
newspapers which may sincerely think that he is at fault. This 
situation has become at once graver and more ludicrous 
through other Ministers of the Crown copying the example 
of their Chief. After all, Mr. Lloyd George, with his great 
cjualities, with his weaknesses, and, above all, with his record 
of services to the country, is in a sense a person apart; and 
much allowance must be made for his foibles. But it becomes 
another matter when his colleagues feel bound to imitate him ; 
when, for instance. Sir Worthington Evans begins to lecture 
the Press, as he did last session in the House of Commons. 

Mr. Bonar Law, with his infallible good sense, has a much 
keener sense of proportion. Speaking in 191 5, he said : 

"It is the right, not only of every member of the House, but 
of every newspaper in this country, on every platform, if he 
honestly believes that a member of the Government is incom- 



LORD NORTHCLIFFE AND HIS PRESS 187 

petent or is not properly doing his work, to try to get rid of 
that member, even if his trying to do so does create a want of 
confidence in the Government." 

For the last few years Mr. Lloyd George's standing quarrel 
has been with Lord Northclifife. During the War their rela- 
tions varied. Sometimes they were at one. Sometimes the 
Northcliffe Press attacked Mr. Lloyd George. Sometimes the 
latter went out of his way to be conciliating. Lord 
Northcliffe was sent on several missions by the Government. 
He was, it is understood, offered the Air Ministry. The 
country was never apprised of this by any official or semi- 
official announcement — nor, curiously, was Lord Cowdray, 
who then held the office. But Lord Northcliffe published a 
letter he had written declining the post, and in which he had 
also embodied a little sermon upon the Cabinet's shortcomings. 
Later, he was at the head of the department in charge of 
propaganda work in enemy countries. But it was after the 
Armistice that relations became strained, until finally they 
reached the breaking point. It is said that Northcliffe wished 
to be one of the British representatives at the Peace Confer- 
ence, and that the Prime Minister refused to consider the 
suggestion. No direct proof has ever been advanced that any 
such overtures were made by Lord Northcliffe or on his 
behalf, though it is true that before the end of the War, in 
191 7, he was generally credited with cherishing that ambition. 
But it is significant that Mr. Lloyd George, speaking in the 
House of Commons on April i6th, 1919, intimated clearly 
that Lord Northcliffe (whom he did not mention by name) 
had asked for something which he had not seen fit to give 
him; and that that was the cause of the bitter hostility of the 
Northcliffe Press towards his Government. 

The offensive nature of the comments about Lord North- 
cliffe was aggravated by the fact that, when referring to him, 
Lloyd George touched his forehead, as if to indicate mental 
derangement. 

Such remarks, made in such a place and in such a way, 
would render any reconciliation difficult even between men 



188 THE POMP OF POWER 

with tough skins. Undoubtedly Mr. Lloyd George had 
provocation for his assault. But the general impression 
amongst those who heard the speech, amongst moderate men 
who were political supporters of the Government and by no 
means admirers of Lord Northcliffe, was that he had gone 
too far. It was thought regrettable that a Prime Minister 
should, on such an occasion, have used such language, or 
should have descended to reply to what he evidently considered 
were personal attacks. That, I believe, will also be the judg- 
ment when the incident has passed into history. 

Still more doubtful was the wisdom of the onslaught. The 
Northcliffe newspapers may not be able to do Mr. Lloyd 
George all the harm which many people seem to imagine (the 
degree of influence which newspapers have on the electorate 
is generally exaggerated), but it is quite possible that his 
continued depreciation by a powerful press with many rami- 
fications will have some adverse effect. Certainly it is not 
helpful. Moreover, the contest is unequal. For while 
Northcliffe may injure Lloyd George, the latter cannot in any 
possible way hurt Northcliffe. The basis of the prosperity 
and potency of newspapers is their circulation. The com- 
plaints of the Prime Minister and his colleagues about the 
alleged unfairness of the Northcliffe Press may find some 
echo in the political world and in a limited circle outside. But 
probably the principal and the most direct result of each of 
these protests is to increase the sale of the Northcliffe news- 
papers. Quite unconsciously Mr. Lloyd George has 
constituted himself one of Lord Northcliffe's most effective 
circulation agents. 

Of course, Northcliffe's immunity is dependent upon his 
keeping behind the barrier of his own press. He is like a 
man in a fortress. Lloyd George is outside, and from time 
to time is compelled to pass within range of his enemy's guns. 
He can do little in the way of counter-attack. For instance, 
the banning of Northcliffe by our Washington Embassy was 
simply a further advertisement of his power. But the situa- 
tion changes if Northcliffe steps into the open. Lloyd George 
is not the man to miss any such chances. Certainly he made 



LORD NORTHCLIFFE AND HIS PRESS 189 

the most of an opportunity which NorthcHffe's imprudence 
recently gave him. It will suffice to recall the facts briefly. 
On Friday, July 29th, 1921, the Prime Minister communi- 
cated to a somewhat astonished House of Commons a message 
from the King, denying the truth of certain statements at- 
tributed to him in an interview given in America by Lord 
Northcliffe, and published by the New York Times, and by 
one or more of NorthcHffe's own newspapers in England or 
Ireland. 

Lord Northcliffe, on his side, thereupon cabled to the King's 
secretary denying that he had ever used the words quoted by 
the Prime Minister, and adding, "I gave no such interview." 

Possibly he would have been well advised to show a little 
more candour. For it appeared later that while he had not 
given the interview, yet that the person directly responsible 
was Mr. Wickham Steed, the editor of the Times and Lord 
NorthcHffe's travelling companion, who had made the state- 
ments in question on the previous Monday. How it was 
attributed to Lord Northcliffe in his own newspapers is a 
matter which by this time has doubtless been settled between 
his henchmen and himself. But what the public would like 
to know is why his cable to the King's secretary did not tell 
the whole story; why it did not admit frankly that the state- 
ments in question had been made by NorthcHffe's editor; and 
why, although the interview was published on Monday in 
New York (where Northcliffe then was), he never made the 
faintest protest until the House of Commons was informed 
that the King had denounced the statements as untrue. 

The New York Times had rightly attributed the interview 
to Mr. Wickham Steed. But it maintained the accuracy of 
its report of what the latter had said. Mr. Wickham Steed 
promised to give explanations. The only one he gave publicly 
was a rather lame excuse to the effect that he had mentioned 
things which he had not thought would be published, thus 
leaving intact the fact that those statements, on the authority 
of the King, were false. After that Lord Northcliffe and Mr. 
Wickham Steed promptly left New York. The former crossed 
the Continent as quickly as possible ; and even his own diligent 



190 THE POMP OF POWER 

press could find no sayings of his to record until he had put 
the comfortable distance of three thousand miles between 
himself and this unfortunate incident. 

A Frenchman who, on account of his political connections, 
as well as for other reasons, has long been a figure in interna- 
tional politics, and who was on friendly personal terms with 
both Lloyd George and Northcliffe, told me that some time 
ago he was instigated to try and heal the breach. He men- 
tioned the suggestion to Lloyd George, saying that he would 
also approach Northcliffe if the Prime Minister consented. 
But the latter replied that he had come to the conclusion that, 
if he had to have an enemy, he would rather it should be 
Northclifife than anyone else. 

There may well have been many excellent reasons why Mr. 
Lloyd George did not want any overtures to be made to Lord 
NorthclifTe, but I doubt if that was the real one. 

Even those who have no special reason to like Lord North- 
cliffe (amongst whom I count myself) must admit that he is 
always a great national character, and at times a great national 
asset. A book by the late Mr. Kennedy Jones recently gave 
rise to some discussion as to whether he made Lord 
Northcliffe, or vice versa. One reviewer said that, from Mr. 
Kennedy Jones's story, one would imagine that it was a very 
lucky day for Northcliffe when they met, but that Fleet Street 
thought the fortunate one was Kennedy Jones. The truth 
probably lies in another direction. Doubtless Kennedy Jones 
excelled Lord Northcliffe in the management of a daily news- 
paper (he had, it is alleged, a peculiar talent for brutally 
eliminating all incompetents), and would have made a fortune 
even if he had never brought the Evening Nczvs proposal to 
Mr. Alfred Harmsworth; while probably Lord Rothermere 
is a shrewder man of affairs than Lord Northcliffe. But 
Northcliffe has a touch of genius or greatness which neither 
of the other two possesses, and which he certainly did not get 
through having Kennedy Jones as a partner or Lord Rother- 
mere as a brother. 

In France the political world was never in any doubt about 
Northcliffe. In the conversation to which I have already 



LORD NORTHCLIFFE AND HIS PRESS 191 

alkided, when indifference was expressed about Asquith re- 
signing, provided Lloyd George remained in office, the 
statesman who held this view added : "You have only two 
really great men in England — Lloyd George and Northcliffe." 
If, at the end of the war, Northcliffe did not rank so highly as 
Lloyd George in French public opinion, it was chiefly on 
account of the official position occupied by the latter. 

For my own part I think that Northcliffe as a personality 
is greater, infinitely greater, than his press, and that the way 
in which his newspapers constantly refer to him tends both to 
diminish his position and to lessen their influence. Nothing 
which he does is left unadvertised. No word of his is per- 
mitted to fall to the ground. The state of his health is 
recorded with meticulous care. But the only result of this 
misplaced zeal on the part of his satellites is to create a certain 
mild amusement both in England and on the Continent. 

Two instances of what I mean will suffice. One day not 
long ago one could read in the Times the following items of 
information : 

"The Earl of Lathom has returned to London. 

"The Earl and Countess of Scarborough return to London 
to-day after a short visit to the Earl and Countess of Midleton 
at Peper-Harrow, Godalming. 

"Viscount Northcliffe has arrived at Cap Martin in good 
health. 

"Lord Glentanar has left London for Scotland. 

"Lord Colum Crichton-Stuart has gone abroad for a few 
months. Lord Oueenborough has returned to 39, Berkeley 
Square from Nostell Priory, Wakefield." 

(The italics are mine.) 

The nuance is slight but typical. 

This solicitude to keep before the public the name of the 
principal proprietor must make Delane and all the Walters 
turn in their graves. Nor has it even the excuse of being in 
deference to the custom of the day. One will search the files 
of the Daily Telegraph in vain to find any such complete and 
minute accounts of the doings of Lord Burnham. The 



192 THE POMP OF POWER 

Morning Post rarely refers to Lady Bathurst. Lord Beaver- 
brook occupies no undue amount of space in the columns of 
the Daily Express. 

The same publicity is given to the doings of all members 
of the Harmsworth family who find favour in the eyes of 
Lord Northcliffe. In fact, it goes so far that the reports of 
the Northcliffe Press are not always easily reconcilable with 
those of other newspapers. 

On June 23rd, 1921, there was a debate in the House of 
Commons regarding Dr. Addison's salary. An interesting 
comparison, in which political predilections can play no part, 
may be made by putting side by side the accounts given in the 
Morning Post and the Northcliffe newspapers — both equally 
opposed to Mr. Lloyd George on this question. From the 
latter one would imagine that a successful attack on the Gov- 
ernment had been led by Mr. Esmond Harmsworth. From 
the former (as well as according to other newspapers) it 
would appear that the movement had been unsuccessful ; while 
the name of Mr. Esmond Harmsworth is not even amongst 
those mentioned in the many columns given to a report of the 
debate. 

The only result was to bring into ridicule one of the ablest 
and most promising of the younger members of the House 
of Commons; and to lend point to a comment by a French 
politician that the title of the Paris Daily Mail should be 
changed to the Family Herald. 

Some months ago the publication of a book entitled "The 
Mirrors of Downing Street" gave rise to much comment, 
which was increased by the fact that the name of the author 
was not disclosed. A small volume of 174 pages, it contained 
character-sketches of various personages, including, amongst 
others, Lloyd George, Winston Churchill, Lord Fisher, Lord 
Kitchener, Mr. Asquith, Lord Haldane, and Mr. Arthur Bal- 
four. Of the fourteen chapters one of less than nine pages 
was devoted to Lord Northcliffe. The book was reviewed in 
the Times of the 15th October, 1920. The Times reviewer 
is at pains to bring forward everything good said about his 
proprietor, while being content to leave in the background the 



LORD NORTHCLIFFE AND HIS PRESS 193 

more unpleasant comments. In brief, it is questionable 
whether the review conveys a fair or a misleading account of 
what the author actually said about Northcliffe. It is impos- 
sible to quote in full the article from "The Mirrors of 
Downing Street," but no violence is being done to its text in 
citing the following sentences : "I should say he has no moral 
scruples in a fight, none at all ; I doubt very much whether he 
ever asks himself if anything is right or wrong. I should 
say that he has only one question to ask of fate before he strips 
for a fight, Is this going to be Success or Failure? . . . But 
it is already apparent that, for want of balance and moral 
continuity in his direction of policy. Lord Northcliffe has done 
nothing to elevate the public mind and much to degrade it. 
He has jumped from sensation to sensation. He has never 
seen in the great body of public opinion a spirit to be patiently 
and orderly educated towards noble ideals, but rather a herd 
to be stampeded of a sudden in the direction which he himself 
has suddenly conceived to be the direction of success. . . . 
The moral and intellectual condition of the world, a position 
from which only a great spiritual palingenesis can deliver 
civilization, is a charge on the sheet which Lord Northcliffe 
will have to answer at the seat of judgment. He has received 
the price of that condition in the multitudinous pence of the 
people ; consciously or unconsciously, he has traded on their 
ignorance, ministered to their vulgarities, and inflamed the 
lowest and most corrupting of their passions; if they had had 
another guide his puise had been empty." 

It is true that the same sketch gives Lord Northcliffe such 
commendable qualities as being a good son and "a charming 
and most considerate host." He is pronounced to be romantic, 
generous, and boyish. Some of his mistakes are excused on 
the ground of his health ; others are attributed to his romantic 
disposition. The final verdict is "He cannot be a deliberately 
bad man." But it requires a reviewer who sees with one eye 
only to say of an article which accuses a man of having 
pandered to the lowest tastes in order to become rich ("he has 
traded on their ignorance, ministered to their vulgarities, and 
inflamed the lowest and most corrupting of their passions; 



194 THE POMP OF POWER 

if they had had another guide his purse had been empty") 
that it is benevolent. The exact words of the review in so 
far as it refers to the scatch of Lord NorthcUffe (and it is 
characteristic that whereas only nine out of 174 pages in 
the book are given up to Northcliffe, twenty-nine out of a 
review of 129 Hues, including quotations, are devoted to him) 
are as follows : "His Lord Northcliffe is subtle, occasionally 
very shrewd, and on the whole benignant. Apparently he will 
have to answer at the judgment seat for 'the moral and intel- 
lectual position of the world,' but his political purpose, from 
beginning to end, I am entirely convinced, has been to serve 
what he conceives to be the highest interests of his country. 
I regard him in the matter of intention as one of the most 
honourable and courageous men of the day.' And again : 
'All the same, it is the greatest mistake for his enemies to 
declare that he is nothing better than a cynical egoist trading 
on the enormous ignorance of the English middle classes. He 
is a boy, full of adventure, full of romance, and full of whims, 
seeing life as the finest fairy-tale in the world, and enjoying 
every incident that comes his way, whether it be the bitterest 
and most cruel of fights or the opportunity for doing some one 
a romantic kindness. You may see the boyishness of his 
nature in the devotion with which he threw himself first into 
bicycling, then into motoring, and then into flying. He loves 
machinery. He loves every game which involves physical 
risk and makes severe demands on courage. His love of 
England is not his love of her merchants and workmen, but 
his love of her masculine youth.' " 

The Northcliffe Press was at least consistent; for shortly 
afterwards it published several articles by "The Author of 
'The Mirrors of Downing Street' " ! The unknown writer 
was hardly equally so when he consented to take pay from 
the newspaper, which he condemned as degrading the public 
taste. So far as one could make out, these articles were meant 
to be a scathing criticism of the state of society as disclosed 
by the recent books of Colonel Repington and Mrs. Asquith. 
Indirectly it is, I think, the Northcliffe Press which is largely 
responsible for these works. For if that press had not for 



LORD NORTHCLIFFE AND HIS PRESS 195 

the last twenty-odd years fed the reading piibhc with personal 
articles there would never have been the market which there 
is to-day for such outpourings. 

Colonel Repington's book gives a fair idea of society in the 
sense that his relation of the usual kind of conversation which 
prevails at dinner or luncheon (and the greater part of the 
book is taken up with that) is sufficiently accurate. But the 
deductions which might naturally be drawn from such a bald 
account are such as to shock those whose opinion is based 
solely upon its perusal. The picture evidently was not to the 
taste of the author of "The Mirrors of Downing Street." 
At the risk of making an egregious error I am inclined to 
believe that that anonymous writer does not move in the same 
world as Colonel Repington. 

What is of more importance thaii that mysterious personage 
having been shocked is that this day-to-day story of life in 
war time has given a false idea to many of our Allies. It 
makes them think that English society was selfish and that 
the women of that society were heartless. It is true that in 
Paris no music was allowed during the War ; that dancing 
was a thing unknown ; that one did not dress for dinner; that 
the serious side of everything was given prominence. Any- 
thing else was mauvais ton. 

In such matters the different nations must be guided by 
their own views. In England it was considered bad taste to 
dwell too much upon one's own losses or sufferings. But as 
regards work actually done, sacrifices actually made, English- 
women of the set most mentioned in Repington's book have 
a record of things accomplished which is unequalled by the 
women of any other country. While the class to which they 
belong gave of its blood at least as liberally as any other section 
of the population of Great Britain. 

The publication of this book at this time was regrettable 
because it produced many misunderstandings and served no 
apparent purpose. A generation from now it might have been 
a useful and interesting record without doing any harm. But, 
above all, its publication to-day was a breach of confidence 
upon a wholesale scale. 



196 THE POMP OF POWER, 

During the period in question I was in the habit of meeting 
Repington frequently at several of the houses where he con- 
tinually lunched and dined. No one knows better than he that 
the conversation would have been somewhat different had 
everyone foreseen that within three or four years their remarks 
would be given to the world in print. No one knows better 
than Repington that the whole fabric of English society would 
be changed, tliat intercourse would be much less free and 
pleasant, if everyone felt that nothing was confidential, that 
talking at dinner was like declaiming from the housetops. 

Colonel Repington misstates (only, I am sure, because he 
misunderstood) several things I mentioned to him, in a way 
which caused me some embarrassment. My full compensation 
came in the delight I got from reading of the indiscretions of 
others. Nevertheless, the book recalls the rhyme which became 
current upon the publication of the first part of Charles 
Greville's diaries : 

"For forty years he listened at the door, 
He heard some secrets and invented more." 

Repington did not listen at the door, but in one way he is 
much more blameworthy than Greville. The latter gave noth- 
ing to the world in his own lifetime, and left his diaries to 
Henry Reeve to be published whenever the latter considered 
that the proper time had arrived, li they were published too 
soon, as Queen Victoria thought (though she probably 
believed that they should never have seen the light of day at 
all), the fault was Reeve's, not Greville's. 

Winston Churchill has written that Mrs. Asquith's 
"Autobiography might well find a place in the bibliography 
of the Victorian era," while, according to Mr. Charles Master- 
man, "the first thing to note is that this book is literature. 
Mrs. Asquith has produced a volume which in mere form and 
texture alone might be envied by the greatest of contemporary 
writers." 

It is uncomfortable to find oneself at variance with such 
distinguished critics. But it is not given to everyone to see 
this book in the same light. I think that what it does convey 



LORD NORTHCLIFFE AND HIS PRESS 197 

to those who (like myself) are not in Mrs. Asquith's intimacy, 
is her enormous vitality, her kindness of heart, her loyalty 
to her friends, and her amazing indiscretion. It would be 
difficult to say what good end could be served by recounting 
such incidents as her flirtation with Peter Flower, or the un- 
pleasant story about the man who followed her one night in 
Dresden, or the equally undelectable one about Charles Dilke. 
They are neither good literature nor history ; and they have not 
even the merit of being wholesomely amusing. 

One of the best things in the book is the single occasion 
when Mrs. Asquith is funny without knowing it. She writes 
(page 79) : "I shrank then, as I do now, from exposing the 
secrets and sensations of life. Reticence should guard the 
soul. When I peer among my dead, or survey my living 
friends, I see hardly anyone with this quality." It is said 
that Mrs. Asquith's friends (she names two exceptions apart 
from her own family) were not pleased to read that, compared 
with herself, they were lacking in reticence. But there is some 
sense of humour wanting in a woman who can aver that she 
shrinks from exposing the sensations of her life in the same 
book in which she recounts in detail her love affairs, and the 
most intimate events of her family existence; in which she 
analyses her inmost feelings and drags before the public the 
virtues and failings of her friends who are still alive. 

The truth is that both the Repington and the Asquith books 
were published because money was to be made by writing 
personalities for which the public appetite had been developed 
by the Northcliffe Press. 

I have suggested that Lord Northcliffe injures his own press 
by so closely identifying it with his own personality. As 
regards the majority of his newspapers that is so because 
everyone takes the opinions they express as being Northcliffe's 
own, which he is propagating for his own purpose. No doubt 
that purpose is generally high-minded and patriotic. But even 
Jove nods at odd moments. No one ever imagines that the 
policy advocated by the Daily News or by the Manchester 
Guardian is that of an individual. Although Lord Burnham 
is the proprietor of the Daily Telegraph no one thinks of that 



198 THE POMP OF POWER 

newspaper's statements as being his personl predilections. But 
the sayings of the Northchfife Press are invariably taken to 
express what Lord Northcliffe thinks and wants. This does 
not affect the circulation, but the result is that the influence 
of these newspapers in forming public opinion is not in pro- 
portion to their circulation. For in this country there is never 
a disposition to regard any one man as omniscient, or as 
having impeccable judgment; and if Lloyd George is some- 
times thought to be wrong, Lord Northcliffe is not always 
thought to be right. The only way in which personal 
journalism can have its full weight is when the proprietor 
himself is known to and popular with the mass of the people 
by whom his newspaper is read. That cannot be said of Lord 
Northcliffe, but it explains why the only English journalist 
who has successfully sunk his publication in his own identity 
is Mr. Horatio Bottomley. 

The case of the Times is different. Not only is it in many 
ways the greatest newspaper in the world, but in the last 
fifteen years it has improved more than any of its contempo- 
raries. Viewed merely from the standpoint of newspaper 
merit, no journal has lessened the gap which separated the 
Times from them all. Yet its influence on the Continent, 
which, even in our own day was enormous, is now little if 
any greater than that of two or three of its rivals. The main 
explanation of this is exactly the one I have already indicated. 
A European statesman with whom I recently discussed the 
question said : "The Times may, as you say, be the best news- 
paper, but it is the voice of one man, and although we often 
share that man's opinions we do not forget that fact." It is 
not the voice of a party, but the voice of a person seeking to 
influence parties or to form one. The Times and the Daily 
Mail say the same thing — at different length. Lord North- 
cliffe has not got two voices. Whether you read his views in 
one or in the other depends simply on the style you prefer, 
the time you have to spare, or the money you care to pay. 
When Northcliffe bought the Times, and gave it and the 
Daily Mail the same texts, he did not make the Daily Mail a 



LORD NORTHCLIFFE AND HIS PRESS 199 

little Times. On the contrary, he brought down the Times 
to the standard of a big Daily Mail." 

A Times correspondent in a European capital is no longer 
the power he once was. Naturally a de Blowitz, upon whom 
Prime Ministers used to call, does not appear twice in a 
generation. But the importance of the Times representative 
abroad is now not commensurate with the greatness of that 
newspaper. Few of them are quoted except perfunctorily. 
Their opinion carries no great weight. The unfortunate truth 
is that in regard to their knowledge of foreign affairs English 
journalists are for the greater part outclassed by their French 
colleagues, as well as by many German writers. 

Upon the whole, Northcliffe does not sacrifice any principle 
in order to vent his personal feelings against Lloyd George. 
A Prime Minister who takes upon himself the burden of office 
in the period following war must necessarily encounter many 
difficulties and make some mistakes. He has no right to 
expect that his enemies will overlook such errors. The North- 
cliffe Press has made a great deal out of alleged waste on 
the part of the Government. Obviously it is difficult to cut 
down expenses and reduce establishments as quickly as every- 
one would like; while criticism is easy and will always find 
favour with the taxpayer. But when all allowances are made 
it must be said that the Government showed no disposition 
to act vigorously until it was finally forced to do so by the 
country. In this matter Lloyd George played into the hands 
of Northcliffe. As, however, the Northcliffe Press has sup- 
ported his Government on other subjects, the fact seems to be 
that Northcliffe will not deviate from his own ideas merely 
in order to attack the Prime Minister; but that he is pleased 
when the latter lays himself open, and makes the most of the 
opportunity. 

Lloyd George can do little or nothing to hurt Northcliffe. 
The latter's independence is his strength. It is also his weak- 
ness, as it leaves him with no responsibility except to himself, 
a point which the electorate thoroughly appreciates. Yet it is 
idle to pretend that his imagination and his energy are not 
used for what he considers to be the good of his country. 



200 THE POMP OF POWER 

When one reads the account of Mr. Lloyd George's vacil- 
lations at the Peace Conference, his gloomy prediction that 
the Germans would not sign whenever he had been frightened 
by the conversation of a Labour leader, his desire to change 
all decisions and to yield to Germany on every important point 
at the last moment, when one remembers all that has happened 
since the Treaty was signed, one regrets that the Prime Min- 
ister did not have Lord Northcliffe by his side at Versailles and 
afterwards; the situation in Europe would to-day have been 
clearer and healthier. 



CHAPTER XI 

The Frankfort Incident and M. Krassin 

Two misunderstandings which have arisen between England 
and France since 19 19 — one a passing incident which, how- 
ever, nearly precipitated a crisis, the other a difference in 
policy which persists to this day — deserve separate notice ; the 
occupation of Frankfort by the French in April, 1920; and 
the commercial treaty made by the British Government with 
Soviet Russia. 

On August 19th, 1 91 9, Marshal Foch, acting as Chief of 
the Inter-Allied Staff, issued a protocol which limited the 
number of German troops in the Ruhr to 17,000 until April 
loth, 1920; and provided that, after that date no German 
troops whatever should be left in that zone. This protocol 
was accepted by the German Government. 

On March 28th, 1920, M. Millerand told the German 
Charge d'Affaires that the French Government, so far as it 
was concerned, would not authorise any increase of the num- 
ber of German troops in the Ruhr, unless the French 
troops also simultaneously occupied Frankfort, Darmstadt, 
Homburg, Dalou, and Dieburg. 

The following day M. Goeppert, the Envoy Extraordinary 
sent to Paris by the German Government to discuss this matter, 
assured the French Government that further troops would not 
be allowed to penetrate into this district unless consent had 
first been obtained. 

On April 2nd M. Millerand repeated to the German Charge 
d'Affaires the declaration he had already made to him on 
March 28th. 

Nevertheless, on the evening of April 3rd M. Goeppert ad- 
mitted that troops in excess of the number authorised by the 
Inter-Allied Protocol had been sent to the Ruhr. He asked 

201 



202 THE POMP OF POWER 

that a formal authorisation should then be given to cover what 
had already been done without authorisation; what had been 
done in violation of the Treaty; what had been done against 
the express refusal of the French Government to agree; and 
what had been done in breach of his own promise that no such 
step should be taken unless that consent had previously been 
given. 

Moreover, on the same day the German Under-Secretary 
for Foreign Affairs told General Barthelmy, in Berlin, that 
the German Government had given the Imperial Commissaire 
entire liberty of action regarding the employment of troops 
in the Ruhr, and that he assumed full responsibility for this. 

On April 6th French troops entered Frankfort and other 
German territory. 

It should be added that the question had already been con- 
sidered at a meeting of the Supreme Council in London, which 
on March 25th had expressed the opinion that the time was not 
opportune for the occupation of Frankfort and Darmstadt. 

The only reproach which could fairly be made to France 
(the country most affected and possibly menaced by this 
defiance of the Treaty) was that perhaps sufficient time was 
not given for a reasonable notice to all the Allies between the 
day when the occupation was decided upon and the date of its 
actual execution. 

When the news arrived in England Parliament had ad- 
journed for a few days on account of the Easter holidays. 
In many instances of German derelictions from the Treaty 
Mr. Lloyd George's Government had prudently (sometimes 
perhaps too prudently) avoided taking the public into its 
confidence until forced to do so by the House of Commons; 
and even then had done so only partially and with evident 
reluctance. But upon this occasion no advantage was taken 
of the fact that Parliament was not sitting. The Government 
did not wait to be asked its opinion about the French occu- 
pation of Frankfort. Much less did it wait to be pressed. On 
the contrary journalists were summoned in all haste, use was 
made of a press agency, and the Government itself issued a 
semi-official statement to the effect that there was no reason 



THE FRANKFORT INCIDENT 203 

why the whole world should not know that all the Allies dis- 
approved of what France had done. 

This extraordinary announcement was sent forth by a 
Government official, from a Government office, at the sole 
instance of the Government. The moving spirit was Mr. 
Philip Kerr, of the Prime Minister's secretariat, and his 
private adviser in the conduct of foreign afifairs. How far the 
Foreign Office was consulted beforehand, or how far it was 
faced with a fait accompli and was thus obliged to follow in 
the wake of Mr. Lloyd George's henchman, it is impossible to 
say. In any event, it would not have been the first time that 
Lord Curzon had seen himself ousted by Mr. Philip Kerr. 
Any more than it would have been the first time that the latter 
had given a startling example of his indiscretion. His lack of 
sagacity had already been demonstrated, to his own confusion, 
by the Bullitt episode. 

The most regrettable feature of this strange performance 
was that the facts stated were absolutely incorrect. It was 
untrue that all the Allies disapproved of what France had 
done. On the contrary, Belgium showed her approbation by 
placing her railways at the disposal of the French Govern- 
ment. While at the time the statement was issued to the Press 
neither Japan nor Italy had expressed any opinion whatever. 
It was, indeed, the first of several occasions in which Mr. 
Lloyd George's Government seemed to take the stand that in 
addressing France it could presume to speak alone in the name 
of all the Allies. 

At the outbreak of this disagreement Mr. Lloyd George had 
left London to meet the other Ministers of the Allied Powers 
at San Remo. Going by sea he was for some days able to let 
matters take their course. In the meantime Parliament 
reassembled. Mr. Bonar Law properly avoided various ques- 
tions of which notice had been given by undertaking to make 
a pronouncement in the name of the Government. The gist 
of his remarks was that even if the English and French point 
of view was different, it was, above all, important that there 
should be no discussion which should direct the attention of 
Germany to this passing disaccord. The idea was in itself 



204 THE POMP OF POWER 

well founded. But in the circumstances its expression by the 
spokesman of the Government was impudent. Its audacity 
could only be excused upon the plea that desperate cases 
demand desperate remedies. For it was the Government itself 
which had gone out of its way to do its utmost to draw the 
attention of Germany to the fact that it dissented from the 
French action in occupying Frankfort. 

Some days later Mr. Bonar Law was asked directly in the 
House of Commons whether or not the Government admitted 
its responsibility for the communication made to the Press — 
that there was no reason why the whole world should not 
know that all the Allies disapproved of the French occupation 
of Frankfort. There was no indignant denial on the part of 
Mr. Bonar Law. On the contrary his reply was "I must beg 
my honourable friend not to press the question." 

No admission could be more complete. 

The occupation of Frankfort was one of the rare instances 
in which German disregard of the Treaty and defiance of the 
Allies has been followed by prompt action, instead of by 
lengthy conferences, by temporising, and often by yielding. 
The effect was excellent. 

Moreover, the occupation itself was admirably conducted. 
There was neither disorder at the outset nor oppression of 
any kind during its continuance. When the French left 
Frankfort they were able to placard the town with posters in 
German reading: "The French keep their word." 

From this period there was ground for the impression that 
the sanctity which Mr. Lloyd George attached to the Treaty 
of Versailles varied in degree according as to whether or not 
what he had promised to his electors was involved. 

When the Prime Minister arrived at San Remo he followed 
his habitual course when embarrassed by his own actions;, he 
defended the position he had taken by himself attacking. He 
assailed M. Millerand, suggesting that by the occupation of 
Frankfort France had shown that she harboured designs of 
territorial expansion. He became white in the face (so M. 
Millerand afterwards related) as he denounced Great Britain's 
Ally for haying shown Germany that she could not with 



THE FRANKFORT INCIDENT 205 

impunity flout the Treaty of Versailles and the orders of 
Marechal P^och. 

It is difficult to believe that Mr. Lloyd George's explosion 
proceeded from any sincere belief that France had any 
covetous designs upon Germany, or had any intention to go 
beyond the terms of the Treaty. His advisers must have been 
singularly ill-informed and strangely deluded if they had con- 
ceived such ideas. They certainly had no facts in support 
of that theory; and M. Millerand was doubtless surprised that 
he should have been called upon to calm such unjustifiable 
alarms. 

But the whole scene is in keeping with the Prime Minister's 
procedure throughout the Peace Conference. According to 
the opinion of Mr. Lansing, the American Secretary of State, 
he acted more like a politician than a statesman, and was 
prone to attack his opponents whenever he himself had made 
a mistake. "He was better in attack than defence. . . . 
Sometimes, if he seemed to be getting the worst of the argu- 
ment, he assumed a scoffing and even blustering manner which 
did not harmonise with the sedateness of the Counsel of 
Ten. ... li shown that his argument was based on false 
premises he unblushingly changed the premises, but not the 
argument." 

M. Millerand was in such good faith regarding the Frank- 
fort incident that he had no trouble in making his position 
clear. Nor, indeed, did he take very seriously the attitude 
assumed by the Prime Minister upon this subject. It was, 
however, an inauspicious beginning for the San Remo Con- 
ference. Nor was the general situation improved by the tone 
which Mr. Lloyd George adopted in discussing the French 
reparation claims. In some quarters he was thought to have 
gone so far as to have shown absolute hostility to France. 
The secret Government report of the discussions which took 
place at San Remo created the profoundest surprise in Paris. 
Neither M. Deschanel (who was then President of the 
Republic) nor M. Poincare hesitated to express their amaze- 
ment and disappointment when they spoke of the subject some 
days later to an English politician. 



206 THE POMP OF POWER 

Undoubtedly, in this instance, Mr. Lloyd George did not 
give France the support which she had the right to expect, 
and by his conduct both impaired the Treaty and weakened the 
Entente between the two countries. 

It is, however, difficult to see how the Prime Minister can 
justly be criticised for adopting a policy which he thinks is 
in the best interests of Great Britain upon another matter not 
covered by the Treaty of Versailles. That the views of our 
Ally should be given due consideration goes without saying. 
But there is no reason why the Government should adopt the 
opinions of the Quai d'Orsay unless it is satisfied that they 
are to the advantage of Great Britain or of the Allies as a 
whole. 

The French Press has constantly blamed Mr. Lloyd 
George's Government for having made a commercial arrange- 
ment with Soviet Russia. It had every right to express its 
opinion when it was limited to suggesting that the agreement 
was futile or one which was inadvisable from a British stand- 
point. But the idea that the Government should have 
abstained from making any pact with M. Krassin merely be- 
cause France did not want to do likewise, is essentially 
ill-founded. Mr. Lloyd George may have been right or may 
have been wrong in his conception of the subject and in his 
belief of the results of the transaction. But there is nothing 
to prove that the French view was correct; and the British 
Government did its duty in carrying out negotiations for which 
it took full responsibility before the country. 

Such incidents as Mr. Lloyd George's message to Poland 
in 1920, sent without prior notice to the Quai d'Orsay, and 
the equally regrettable action of the French Foreign Office 
itself (due, it is said, to M. Maurice Paleologue, formerly 
Ambassador to Russia) in recognising Wrangel without 
frankly forewarning Downing Street, led to misunderstand- 
ings which were more stupid in their origin than serious in 
their consequences. The resulting disagreements were fleeting 
in their nature. But upon the subject of recognising or having 
any dealings with the Soviet Government the views of the 



THE FRANKFORT INCIDENT 207 

British and the French Governments were as far apart in 
June, 1 92 1, as they were a year ago. 

When the question arose during the Peace Conference M. 
Clemenceau expressed himself as being opposed to having 
any meeting or communication with representatives of the 
Bolshevist Government, fearing that the prestige of that 
regime would thereby be increased. Mr. Lloyd George had 
objected to various conditions which France wished to impose 
on Germany upon the ground that to exasperate the latter 
country would indirectly have the effect of strengthening the 
Soviet Government. Nevertheless, he did not see things in 
the same light when the idea of negotiations with Moscow was 
discussed. Finally, he was mainly responsible for the absurd 
Prinkipo plan, which in its sequence afforded Clemenceau more 
ironical amusement than serious anxiety. 

In respect to the Bullitt episode it may be dismissed by 
saying that if Mr. Philip Kerr was indiscreet and ill-advised 
in writing such a letter (even if it was marked "Private and 
Confidential") that does not in the slightest degree excuse 
Bullitt for making the public use which he did of it. 

The incident forcibly recalls the story (doubtless 
apocryphal) of the German submarine officer who was re- 
ported to have said to his British captor, "You know that we 
shall never be gentlemen, but you will always be fools." ^ 

The status of the Russian Government was again discussed 
at the San Remo Conference. It was then agreed, at the 
urgent instance of Mr. Lloyd George, that the Allies should 
have conversations with the representatives whom the Soviet 
Government were sending to England. But it was understood 
that these interviews should be strictly limited to negotiations 
for a commercial arrangement with, and not a political recog- 
nition of, the Bolshevists. 

The Prime Minister gave what at first seemed to be a 
liberal interpretation to this compact. For some time after 

* It was not only the indiscreet and unwary Mr. Philip Kerr who 
had cause to complain about Mr. W. C. Bullitt's disregard of the 
principles which generally prevail regarding confidential communica- 
tions. Mr. Bullitt's own countryman, Mr. Robert Lansing, censures 
him for a similar lapse. {The Peace Negotiations, pp. 240 and 241.) 



208 THE POMP OF POWER 

his return to London he himself, together with the Secretary 
of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Curzon, received M. 
Krassin. 

A few days later, on the Friday following, I had a long 
conversation with the latter. It was at that time agreed 
between us that, whatever might be the outcome, neither 
should then divulge what was said at our meetings. This 
understanding M. Krassin faithfully observed. On my side 
I now refer to the matter for the first time and without dis- 
closing any details communicated to me which were in any 
way confidential. I am bound to say that M. Krassin not only 
talked freely, but answered without undue reserve all pertinent 
questions, even when the replies were not such as to support 
his own case. It is perhaps unnecessary to add that I never 
heard a syllable of propaganda; nor, for that matter, did I 
ever exchange a word with anyone except M. Krassin. 

Krassin impressed me as being a man of affairs rather than 
a dreamer or a fanatic; and as one who would prefer to 
construct rather than to destroy. Nor did he appear to be a 
politician. This view was confirmed when he expressed his 
regret that the British Government had refused to allow 
Litvinoff to enter England, saying that while he himself was 
prepared to discuss commercial matters he did not feel equally 
at home in respect to the political and diplomatical considera- 
tions which might be raised by the question of the External 
Debt or otherwise. 

When the war broke out Krassin was the Russian repre- 
sentative of an important group of German electrical interests. 
His friendship with Lenin dates back many years. The late 
Joseph Reinach once told me that M. de Saint-Sauveur, who 
acted for the Creusot-Schneider firm in Russia, had business 
relations with Krassin which sometimes led them to lunch 
together, and that upon one such occasion M. de Saint- 
Sauveur remarked that possibly Krassin would be embarrassed 
by the recent announcement that someone bearing his name 
had become a member of the Bolshevist administration. 
Krassin replied that he himself was the individual, and that 
Lenin, who was a former schoolfellow, had previously pro- 



THE FRANKFORT INCIDENT 209 

tected him during a period when he was in some personal 
danger. 

Certainly Krassin's views have been a marked factor in 
Lenin's gradual evolution. 

The representative of the Soviet Government and myself 
naturally saw many things — most things — from an entirely 
different angle. However, we were not interested in debating 
political theories, but only in discussing whether or not it 
might be possible to arrive at a certain practical result. M. 
Krassin desired to enter into negotiations with France as well 
as with England. He admitted that France would never 
entirely abandon her claim to the repayment of the Russian 
loans floated in France; that no French Government could do 
so, even if it would. But he contended that any mode of 
eventual settlement was necessarily a matter for negotiation, 
and also that such settlement should be dependent upon some 
recognition of the Soviet Government by the French Republic. 
He complained that whereas Mr. Lloyd George and Lord 
Curzon had opened their doors to him, France had sent only 
commercial attaches who had no power or authority to go into 
the whole subject. 

M. Krassin did not hide from me that the result of England 
and France both absolutely refusing to have any dealings with 
Russia would mean a war with Poland. He admitted that 
such a war might be lengthy, and said that Russia was making 
preparations accordingly. 

Neither then nor later did I discuss with M. Krassin the 
Bolshevist doctrine, its aim, or its effect. But I did take it 
upon myself to lay stress upon the fact that if Soviet Russia 
was making application for re-admission to the General 
Society of Nations, it must be prepared to conform to the 
established rules and customs of international intercourse, 
and especially in respect to propaganda; that otherwise any 
arrangement would certainly only be temporary; and that its 
abrupt termination would leave the situation worse than it 
then was. I added that the attitude of the French Government 
was strictly in accordance with the San Remo Agreement — 
commercial but not political negotiations — and that it was no 



210 THE POMP OF POWER 

secret that the Quai d'Orsay was surprised that he had been 
received by the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary. 

Nevertheless, at my second interview with M. Krassin on 
the following day (Saturday), and after a conversation which 
I do not feel at liberty to transcribe fully from my notes, I 
agreed to see M. Millerand, and to submit certain proposals 
to him. I telephoned later in the same day to the French 
Foreign Office, got a reply that M. Millerand would receive 
me on Sunday, and crossed to Paris that evening. 

I am naturally obliged to refrain from repeating in detail 
what M. Millerand said in the course of our conversation at 
the Quai d'Orsay. The result may be summed up by stating 
that the French Prime Minister did not care to enter into 
any negotiations with the Soviet Government or to receive 
an envoy who would then place before him formally the pro- 
posals which were thus being unofficially submitted to him. 

Whatever the exact measure of the arrangement made with 
Mr. Lloyd George at San Remo it was evident that it had been 
largely due to the latter's insistence; that M. Millerand 
conceived that he had done his part in deputing commercial 
attaches to be present at interviews with M. Krassin ; and that 
he had no intention of going further. Apparently he counted 
upon some future developments in Russia, but without any 
fixed notion of what turn they would take. Upon the other 
hand, he was somewhat surprised that the Prime Minister and 
the Foreign Secretary should have seen M. Krassin, thus 
possibly according some political significance to his mission." 
The obvious answer was that in dealing with Russia it was 
difficult to define exactly where commercial questions ended 
and political questions began. 

My own part in the conversation, aside from placing certain 
proposals before M. Millerand and answering his queries on 
certain points, was limited to urging upon the President my 

" I returned to London on Monday evening and went to the House 
of Commons, as it was announced that Mr. Lloyd George was to speak 
on this subject. I arrived in time to hear the Prime Minister say that 
in all he had done, including his reception (together with Lord Curzon) 
of M. Krassin, he had acted in complete accordance with M. Millerand. 
This statement was inexact. M. Millerand had told me the day before 
that he had been amazed when he heard of that meeting. 



THE FRANKFORT INCIDENT 211 

conviction that Mr. Lloyd George would undoubtedly come 
to an arrangement with Soviet Russia; and that although 
there would probably be criticism in some quarters, yet that 
the Prime Minister would not be clashing with public opinion 
in doing so. While I ventured to suggest that the fact that 
France was Russia's heaviest creditor would not be considered 
in England an obstacle to commercial relations unless France 
herself could suggest a policy more feasible than that of mili- 
tary interference or more practical than that of doing nothing 
and letting events take their course. 

Nothing which has happened since has falsified those pre- 
dictions or changed my views. Mr, Lloyd George did make 
the agreement with M. Krassin, as he always intended to do. 
It is true that the brilliant campaign directed by General 
Weygand bred illusions in some quarters that the Soviet power 
was tottering. But the only real effect of the Polish success 
was a treaty which gave the Moscow Government time to turn 
around and to drive out of the country Wrangel, who had 
been recognised by the French Government.^ 

The practical wisdom of the French attitude may be ques- 
tioned. It is all the more doubtful because France is the one 
country in Europe which need have little fear of the inroads 
of Bolshevism. The primary effect of that political theory 
seems to have been the division of land amongst the peasants 
(it is said that more than 99 per cent, of it is now so held) 
while coupling with that division the theory of communism 
which deprives the holder of any personal property in the 
products. But in a country where nearly everyone is a 
proprietor there is little chance of success for a political 
doctrine which wishes to limit that already acquired ownership 
by the addition of communistic principles, which proprietors 
would regard only as a handicap. 

Perhaps more than any other country France should remem- 
ber that a revolution cannot be judged until the next 
generation. The French Revolution was accompanied by 

*Most of Wrangel's troops managed to escape to Turkey. For some 
time they were supported by the French Government; but finally they 
were faced with the option of being taken back to Russia, being sent to 
Brazil or elsewhere, or being left to shift for themselves. 



212 THE POMP OF POWER 

excesses which for a time almost debarred France from the 
society of nations. Yet it left its indelible mark upon Europe. 
When its results were sifted something remained, and has 
remained to this day. It was M. Clemenceau himself who, 
upon a memorable occasion, pronounced that the French Rev- 
olution had to be taken en bloc — the bad with the good. 

In Russia, a country so much vaster in its extent than 
France, so much more sparsely populated, and where the mass 
of the people in 191 6 was more ignorant and less interested 
in political development than were the French in 1789, it was 
obvious that any upheaval would be mightier and more 
appalling; and that the immediate result would be to place 
absolute power in the hands of some small group. 

M. Maurice Paleologue, in the diary he kept during his 
Ambassadorship at Petrograd, has repeated the words which 
a great Russian financier used to him in June, 191 5: 

"In our country the Revolution is bound to be destructive 
because the educated class represents only an infinitesimal 
minority, without organisation or political experience, without 
any contact with the masses. There, according to my opinion, 
lies the great crime of Tsarism ; it has refused to allow outside 
of its own bureaucracy any foyer of political life." * 

It is difficult to conceive how British loyalty to France 
exacted that she should have no dealings with Soviet Russia. 
Even if France had suggested some definite course it would 
have been the duty of the British Government to examine with 
great care how far it should sacrifice to the Entente a policy 
which it considered to be in the interests of Great Britain. 
But that point never arose, for France never advanced any 
practical plan. 

By standing aside and doing nothing France is not hasten- 
ing the date of the payment of the Russian debt. On the 
contrary, probably the main security which remains for that 
debt — the natural resources of the country — is thus being 
diminished in value. Certainly its realisation is being delayed. 

* La Russie dcs Tsars pendant la Guerre: Revue dcs Deux Mondes, 
May 1st, 1921, page 136. 



THE FRANKFORT INCIDENT 213 

While France does not gain by other countries getting the 
start in renewing relations with Russia and doubtless soon 
obtaining valuable concessions. Unfortunately no French 
Government has suggested any policy upon this question except 
"wait and see." That is exactly what other countries will 
not do. 

The situation would be different if there was any suggestion 
that the Romanoffs might be restored. But that is no longer 
within the realm of practical politics. Doubtless the Soviet 
Government does not represent the Russian People in a con- 
stitutional sense. But it is the de facto Government. While 
just as there is no restoration to be anticipated from outside 
so there is no immediate prospect of any proper constitutional 
development from within. What is much more probable is 
that the present regime, after some dissension between its two 
extreme elements, will adapt itself to the needs of the country 
and will continue to retain the actual power. 

During recent months the scission between Lenin and the 
Extremists has become more pronounced. Lenin's actions 
seem to show that he has deserted the principles of absolute 
communism. In a private letter which was published in 
August, 192 1, by La Vie Russe, the authenticity of which has 
not been denied, he explicitly admits the errors and the im- 
practicability of the views he formerly held. But the failure 
of his theories has doubtless sapped his energy; and it is 
improbable that he will have the same driving force in leading 
any reaction. 

The famine may well have no political effect other 
than eliminating the Extremist opponents of Lenin and 
Krassin, and possibly of indirectly paving the way to the 
revival of relations with the outside world. 

In the interval time is running against the interests of 
France. It is still to the advantage of the Soviet Government 
to enter into commercial relations with the French Republic. 
But it is less essential than when M. Krassin recognised its 
preponderating importance in June, 1920, and wished to obtain 
M. Millerand's consideration for certain proposals. It is less 
essential because the British Government has already made 



214 THE POMP OF POWER 

a treaty with Russia, because other Governments are on the 
verge of doing so, and because each of these arrangements is 
an additional assurance that France must sooner or later do 
likewise in order to protect herself. But the later France 
agrees to negotiate the less chance she has of imposing terms 
and conditions.^ 

° Since the above was written the French Government has begun 
(February, 1922) certain negotiations with the Soviet Government. It 
is worth noting that this possibility of some arrangement is seriously 
alarming the Wilhehnstrasse. 



CHAPTER XII 

The Treaty of Versailles 

Napoleon once said: "Vaincre n'est rien; il faut profiler 
du succes." What has happened since the Armistice illustrates 
the truth of that remark. 

Throughout the war there were in various countries clashes 
between the military and political powers. Upon more than one 
occasion, in more than one instance, each thought — and some- 
times said — that the other was limited in conception and unin- 
telligent in execution. This was simply a repetition of the dis- 
pute which always occurs, and which always will occur, when a 
country having parliamentary institutions goes to war. The ex- 
act balance of indispensability and usefulness between generals 
and statesmen will never be struck. The one undeniable fact is 
that in the last analysis no war can be won without the man at 
the Front who bears the brunt of the battle. 

But, since the Armistice, the politicians have had a free hand. 
They certainly have not made the most out of what the soldiers 
won. In their three years of talking they have even sometimes 
imperilled what was so hardly conquered by four years of fight- 
ing. 

In any attempt to fix responsibility one is faced by three pri- 
mary questions. Was the Armistice granted at the proper time, 
and did its conditions sufficiently safeguard the victory? Does 
the main fault for the present situation lie at the door of the 
makers of the Treaty of Versailles ? Or, in the alternative, is it 
those charged with the execution of that Treaty who are to 
blame ? 

The first point can be disposed of summarily and conclusively. 
This has already been done by more than one published state- 
ment. But, in view of an absurd legend which has found many 
adherents, the truth cannot be too widely spread. 

215 



216 THE POMP OF POWER 

On October 25th, 191 8, Marechal Foch (to whom the Allied 
War Council had referred the whole question) asked Petain, 
Haig, and Pershing to meet him at Senlis, and to express their 
views. Haig, who spoke first, thought that the chief considera- 
tion was to draft terms so moderate that the Germans would be 
certain to accept them. In his opinion the Allied Armies were 
out of breath, the military power of Germany was not broken, 
and it was therefore desirable not to miss this chance to end 
the combat. He suggested that it would suffice if the main con- 
ditions were the evacuation of Belgium, the invaded parts of 
France, and Alsace-Lorraine. 

Petain had an entirely different idea of what the Armistice 
should be. His proposal was that the German troops should 
retire to Germany without taking with them a single cannon 
or any war material except the arms they carried; while he 
thought it essential that the Allied Armies should occupy both 
the left bank of the Rhine and a zone of fifty kilometres on the 
right bank. 

Pershing agreed with Petain.^ 

Foch did not then intimate that he had arrived at any de- 
cision, but on the following day he sent M. Clemenceau a con- 
cise memorandum embodying the terms which he believed to be 
necessary. Briefly, it may be said that his plan, while going 
further than that of Haig, was not quite so stringent as that 
put forward by Petain ; the main difference being that it did not 
require that all the German artillery should be abandoned. 

Some days later (October 27th to 31st) this memorandum 
was considered by the representatives of the Allied Powers and 
of the United States. In the course of these conferences Foch 
was asked directly by Colonel House whether, as a soldier, he 
would prefer that Germany should accept or refuse the terms 
offered. Foch answered : "War is waged only in order to ob- 
tain results. If the Germans sign the Armistice upon which we 
have decided, we shall have got those results. The end being 

^General Gillain, Chief of the Staff of the Belgian armies, had 
also been asked to attend this meeting, but was unable to arrive in 
time. 



THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES 217 

attained, no one has the right to cause a single drop more of 
blood to be shed." 

While later, in reply to another query, Marechal Foch said : 
"The conditions proposed by your military advisers are the 
same which we ought, and should be able, to impose after the 
success of our next operations. Therefore, if the Germans ac- 
cept them now, it is useless to continue the battle." 

It is thus beyond question that it was upon the advice of 
Marechal Foch that the struggle was not prolonged, and that 
the conditions of the armistice were those which he himself 
proposed." 

It is true that later Foch disagreed bitterly with M. Clemen- 
ceau about certain clauses of the Treaty. But that dissension 
(to which I shall refer hereafter) had nothing to do with the 
Armistice, for which Foch is primarily responsible. It would 
be futile, upon a military question, to seek to go behind the 
high authority of the Commander of the Allied Forces, or to 
place in doubt the wisdom of an arrangement in favour of 
which he pronounced in such categoric terms. But it is worth 
remembering that M. Poincare was amongst those who always 
held the opinion that an armistice should not be granted before 
a final and decisive victory. Early in October the outline of 
the proposals which Foch then had in mind (they were prob- 
ably less severe than those he finally suggested) were communi- 
cated to the President of the Republic. The latter thought that 
they were so far from covering what the Allies had a right to 
exact that he strongly urged this view upon M. Clemenceau in a 
conversation which took place on October 12th or 13th. A 
day or two later he repeated his objections in a letter to Clem- 
enceau, protesting against an armistice which would "couper les 
jarrets de nos soldats." M. Poincare was in the habit of writ- 
ing frequently and at great length to the various Prime Minis- 
ters who held office during the war. As a rule, M. Clemenceau 
never answered these letters. But on this occasion he did so 
with some acidity; expressed his astonishment that the Presi- 
dent did not realise that the Cabinet, being alone responsible, 

' Some slight changes in Foch's original proposals were made during 
these meetings. 



218 THE POMP OF POWER 

had the sole right to decide as it saw fit ; and threatened to re- 
sign if he was troubled with further interventions of the same 
nature. 

It may be added that this view of the respective rights of the 
Executive and the Cabinet under the Constitution is not uni- 
versally acknowledged in France. 

Any criticism of the Peace Conference must be premised by 
admitting that it was confronted by a task of stupendous dif- 
ficulty. From the outset it must have been apparent to all (ex- 
cept, perhaps, to President Wilson) that no result could possibly 
satisfy all the nations interested. The very fact that in every 
country there is a strong body of public opinion dissatisfied 
with the Treaty, a feeling that its representatives were over- 
reached by those of other countries, is the surest sign that, if 
the Treaty is not perfect, at least it is not unjust and one-sided. 

The truth is that not one of the Four constantly got the bet- 
ter of his colleagues. As Clemenceau once remarked, the Con- 
ference showed each of them that they were more English, more 
French, more Italian, or more American than they had them- 
selves thought. In brief, that national feeling was as strongly 
implanted as ever in the human breast. 

Upon the whole, it may be said that Clemenceau got what he 
could, Lloyd George got practically all he wanted, while Wil- 
son sacrificed everything — including the immediate future of 
Europe — to his obstinate resolution to have the Covenant of the 
League of Nations incorporated as part of the Treaty. It 
would, indeed, have been much better for the whole world had 
the United States made more material demands (as it could 
fairly have done) in compensation for the part it had taken in 
the war. President Wilson would then, in the game of give 
and take, have been obliged to face practical questions in a 
practical way. 

By personally participating in the Conference, Wilson flouted 
the advice of some of those whose duty it was to counsel him, 
as well as the judgment of many other people. The view held 
by Colonel House is not yet generally known. But it would 
not be surprising if that discreet man thought from the very 
beginning that Wilson would have more power if he stayed in 



THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES 219 

Washington, and knew from the very beginning that it would 
be useless to urge that course. 

Woodrow Wilson has spent most of his life as a schoolmas- 
ter or as a professor. He is not a scholarly man according to 
the meaning which in Europe is generally given to that phrase. 
Mr. Keynes is quite accurate in his comment on that point. But 
he has all the characteristics of those who follow a calling in 
which, day in and day out, they can lay down the law to others 
who have no right of appeal : a schoolmaster. 

This was illustrated in a curious manner soon after Wilson 
became President. Theodore Roosevelt had a hold on his coun- 
try which Wilson never obtained. If Roosevelt fell ill — or 
when, for instance, an attempt was made to assassinate him 
during a political campaign — the daily state of his health was 
a question of national concern. When Wilson broke down dur- 
ing his tour to persuade the country to support what he had 
done in Paris, the general indifference amounted almost to bru- 
tality. Nevertheless, Roosevelt, with his great courage and his 
immense popularity, was never, upon domestic questions, able 
to control his own party as did Wilson. Time and again 
Roosevelt had to make concessions to those powerful person- 
ages known in America as "Party bosses." It was partly be- 
cause he finally decided to put up with that system no longer 
that he made the ill-advised attempt to form a third party, and 
•thus delivered himself into the hands of his political foes. 

But Wilson adopted, and with great success, the system of 
the schoolmaster. The last step which a headmaster takes with 
a refractory boy is to write to his parents. Wilson inaugurated 
the custom of going himself to Congress when he wished to get 
something done, and of announcing his intentions and his rea- 
sons to the assembled legislators. An hour later his words 
were published throughout the length and breadth of the coun- 
try. From that moment senators and congressmen were put 
on the defensive to explain to their constituents their opposition 
to the President. The case rested pretty well upon its merits. 
There was little room for the back-stairs methods of profes- 
sional politicians. Wilson's public statements at the Capitol had 



220 THE POMP OF POWER 

a more powerful effect than any number of private conferences 
at the White House. 

But this practice, like all others, had its limits of usefulness. 
Mr. Wilson made the vital mistake of trying to apply it in his 
intercourse with other nations : forgetting that all the world 
did not accept him as its headmaster; and ignoring that those 
with whom he was negotiating were not dishonest or tricky 
political bosses, but men inspired by as high a patriotism as his 
own, while possessed of a much more profound knowledge of 
the conduct of foreign affairs. 

Unfortunately Mr. Wilson not only failed to recognise this 
fact; he also lost all sense of proportion. M. Stephane Lau- 
zanne has published the account of an interview, which, before 
coming to Europe, Mr. Wilson gave in Washington to a num- 
ber of foreign journalists. At the time it was communicated 
only to the Allied Governments. It fully bears out the sugges- 
tion made above. The President of the United States talked 
as if he were the dictator of the universe. M. Lauzanne seems 
to have suspected that it presaged a physical or mental collapse. 
But a more public and more lamentable exhibition of the same 
nature was given some months later when Wilson outraged all 
decency by presuming to address the Italian people over the 
heads of its own Government. All this was perhaps the natural 
development of a man who had always been intellectually arro- 
gant; who never took kindly to opposition or even criticism; 
who, for many years, as a schoolmaster or professor, had, to a 
large extent, been exempt from either ; and who was suddenly 
placed in a position where he wielded more power than had 
anyone in modern history. 

Colonel House's opinion about the measure of sagacity shown 
by Mr. Wilson in going to Paris may possibly never be known. 
But Mr. Robert Lansing, who was Secretary of State in Mr. 
Wilson's Cabinet, and also one of the five American plenipoten- 
tiaries to the Peace Conference, has told the world that he fore- 
saw the difficulties that might arise, and that he advised the 
President to stay in Washington. 

Mr. Lansing's book throws a curious but not an unexpected 
light upon the way Mr. Wilson treated the other American 



THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES 221 

Commissioners. None of them, except Colonel House, ever 
knew fully what was taking place. Wilson acted without tell- 
ing Lansing (who, as Secretary of State, was to some extent 
equivalent to Minister of Foreign Affairs) ^ of what he in- 
tended to do ; any more than he communicated to him what he 
had done. Moreover, when Lansing, from time to time, wrote, 
urging his views on some important question, his letters gen- 
erally remained without even an acknowledgment. On De- 
cember 23rd, 19 1 8, Lansing sent the President a long letter, 
enclosing various memoranda regarding "The Power of Guar- 
anty proposed for the League of Nations." The letter was 
marked "Secret and Urgent," "But," writes Mr. Lansing, "I 
never received a reply or even an acknowledgment." Lansing 
rather maliciously suggests that this failure was because Wil- 
son's "Visits to Royalty exacted from him so much of his 
time that there was no opportunity to give the matter consid- 
eration." It seems, however, to have been Wilson's habit to 
ignore any letter from his advisers if they in any way pre- 
sumed to differ from him. In January, 19 19, Lansing again 
wrote, urging a certain policy. This letter also "was never 
answered or acknowledged, and he did not act upon the sug- 
gestion or discuss it, to my knowledge, with any of his col- 
leagues." 

On February 3rd, 1919, Mr. Lansing wrote to the President 
respecting the tribunals to be established under the League of 
Nations. This was a purely legal question, upon which Lan- 
sing's opinion was obviously of some value, not only because 
he was a distinguished jurist (while Mr. Wilson was a lawyer 
in name only), but because he had taken part in the proceedings 
of five international courts of arbitration. Nevertheless, this 
letter shared the fate of the others. "No acknowledgment, 
either written or oral, was ever made of my letter of February 
3rd:' 

Wilson's self-sufficiency led him into the mistake of choosing 
for his colleagues as plenipotentiaries men whom he could over- 
rule or ignore. He made equally grave errors in selecting his 

'But of course, according to the American Constitution, Lansing was 
not directly responsible to Congress. 



222 THE POMP OF POWER 

other advisers. The lamentable impression made in Paris by 
those who seemed nearest to the President persists to this day. 
Writing in Le Matin in July, 192 1, M. Stephane Lauzanne 
(whose acquaintance with American politics and politicians cov- 
ers more than a generation) said: "Wilson was an honest 
man; and if his mind was hazy it did not lack a sense of jus- 
tice. But beside him were his partners ; and behind him were 
the disturbing shadows of a Warburg, an international finan- 
cier ; of a Baruch, boaster and frivolous ; of a Tumulty, bustling 
and pleasure-loving; of a Creel, ignorant and vulgar"; and he 
compared these men, to their disadvantage, to Hughes, Harvey 
and Lodge, who, to-day, surround Harding, 

In the first of his famous "Fourteen Points," Mr. Wilson 
had laid down as essential to the world's welfare, "Open cove- 
nants of peace openly arrived at." M. Andre Tardieu, who, 
throughout his account of the Peace Conference, is scrupulously 
fair, and even generous, in his comments on Mr. Wilson, says 
that the latter explained that he had not meant public negotia- 
tions, but only public debates upon all decisions arrived at be- 
fore they should become final. Although this does not seem 
to be quite in accordance with Mr. Wilson's earlier declara- 
tion, it was a wise and practical reserve. But in reality the 
President seems to have concealed his own negotiations even 
from the majority of his colleagues. Mr. Lansing relates that 
"The American Commissioners, other than Colonel House, 
were kept in almost complete ignorance of the preliminary ne- 
gotiations (he is referring to the League of Nations)," and 
were left to gather such information as they were able from 
the delegates of other Powers, who, naturally assuming that 
the Americans possessed the whole confidence of the President, 
spoke with much freedom. . . . But in addition to the embar- 
rassment caused the American Commissioners, and the unenvi- 
able position in which they were placed by the secrecy by which 
the President surrounded his intercourse with foreign states- 
men, and the proceedings of the Commission on the League of 
Nations, his secret negotiations caused the majority of the dele- 
gates to the Conference, and the public at large, to lose in a 
large measure their confidence in the actuality of his devotion to 



THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES 223 

'open diplomacy' which he had so unconditionally proclaimed 
in the first of his 'Fourteen Points.' " 

Another dangerous phrase which Wilson had coined or had 
adopted as his own, was "self-determination." He had even 
gone so far as to state at a joint session of the Senate and the 
House of Representatives on February nth, 1918, that "Self- 
determination is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative prin- 
ciple of action which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their 
peril." 

Mr. Wilson, who is the author of a history of the United 
States, should have remembered that his own country, in four 
years of the most desperate civil war which the world has ever 
seen, denied that right. 

Nevertheless, in Article HI. of his original draft of the Cove- 
nant of the League of Nations, Wilson inserted these words. 
But they are not to be found in the revised Article VH. (which 
took the place of Article HI.), which he submitted to the Com- 
mission on the League of Nations; or in the corresponding 
Article X. in the Treaty of Versailles. Mr. Lansing suggests 
that the elimination was due to opposition on the part of Mr. 
Lloyd George and some of his colleagues.^ 

Be that as it may, Mr. Wilson had other opportunities of 
showing his belief in that "Imperative principle of action which 
statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril." Nevertheless, 
the Treaty which he signed denied the right of Austria to form 
any political union with Germany, in obvious contradiction to 
Wilson's perilous doctrine of self-determination. I pass over 
the notorious case of Fiume. But the Shantung Settlement de- 
serves notice, both because Mr. Wilson acquiesced in it, despite 
the outspoken protest of three of his four colleagues ; and also 
because Mr. Lansing states that Wilson did so solely because 
he thought that otherwise Japan would not adhere to the League 
of Nations. 

* Mr. Lansing says "The opposition of those statesmen who repre- 
sented the British Empire, in contradistinction to those who represented 
the self-governing British Dominions." The self-governing British 
Dominions are essentially part and parcel of the British Empire. Pre- 
sumably, when Mr. Lansing wrote "British Empire," he meant to indicate 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. 



224 THE POMP OF POWER 

To the justice or necessity of the Shantung decision itself 
I do not propose to refer further than to say that, while it 
may be supported on several grounds, no one can possibly con- 
tend that it is consistent with any theory of self-determination ; 
and to note that the immediate result was that China protested 
in the only dignified way open to her — by refusing to be a 
party to the Treaty of Versailles. 

On this occasion it was General Bliss who wrote to the Presi- 
dent. He stated that in doing so he was also expressing the 
opinions of Mr. Lansing and of Mr. Henry White; in other 
words, the views of three of the five American plenipotentiaries. 
General Bliss apparently chose his words with the single ob- 
ject of making his meaning abundantly clear to the President. 
The conclusion of his letter, which follows a sustained argu- 
ment, is worth quoting : 

"K it be right for a policeman who recovers your purse to 
keep the contents and claim that he has fulfilled his duty in 
returning the empty purse, then Japan's conduct may be 
tolerated. 

"K it be right for Japan to annex the territory of an ally, 
then it cannot be wrong for Italy to retain Fiume taken from 
the enemy. 

"It can't be right to do wrong, even to make peace. Peace 
is desirable, but there are things dearer than peace — justice and 
freedom." 

The last sentiment is curiously reminiscent of some of Presi- 
dent Wilson's own speeches. But his actions were based upon 
other considerations, Mr. Lansing says that the President ac- 
tually sent a letter to a member of the Chinese Delegation re- 
gretting that he had been unable to do more for China, and 
saying that he had been compelled to accede to Japan's de- 
mands in order to save the League of Nations. 

Mr. Wilson got his League of Nations as he wanted it : as 
part of the Treaty of Versailles. He made good his threat 
that he would weld them together in such a manner that his 
political opponents would be unable to accept the Treaty and 
reject the League. But in so doing he proved that his colossal 



THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES 225 

egotism had obscured any talent he may ever have had as a po- 
htical tactician. He knew that his party was in a minority in 
both Houses of Congress. The Democrats had been defeated 
in November, 191 8, probably because almost on the eve of the 
election the President had been so ill-advised as to issue a let- 
ter to the American people in which he practically asserted 
that it would be unpatriotic to support the Republican candi- 
dates. Wilson, unlike Roosevelt, never had any personal fol- 
lowing or influence in the United States; and this unwar- 
ranted suggestion turned the floating vote against his own 
party. 

Knowing that any treaty he brought back from Paris could 
only be confirmed provided it was supported by his political 
adversaries, elementary prudence would have suggested taking 
them into counsel and making them partly responsible for what- 
ever was done at the Peace Conference. But Mr. Wilson ig- 
nored the leaders of public opinion who were not of his own 
party and who could not be trusted to act as his instruments.^ 
He blindly relied upon forcing the legislature to ratify whatever 
he did. He went further. In a speech made in New York prior 
to his departure for France, he publicly threatened to compel 
the Republican majority to accept the Covenant of the League 
of Nations in the way above indicated — by making it part of the 
Treaty of Peace. Presumably he relied upon rousing public 
opinion to such an extent that Congress would not dare to dis- 
avow what the President of the country had done in Paris. 
In his fatuity he seems never to have imagined that the result 
of his manoeuvre would be the rejection of the Treaty itself, 
and that the Senate would have the country behind it in refus- 
ing ratification. Probably this fact first dawned upon the un- 
fortunate man when he saw what little success he was achieving 
in the tour he took upon his return from Paris — the tour which 
ended so tragically. 

President Wilson's part in the Peace Conference may be 
summed up by saying that he was responsible for between two 

* Certainly, if Mr. Elihu Root or Mr. Taft had been amongst the 
American plenipotentiaries, they would never have signed a treaty of 
which they disapproved upon several vital points; which, according to 
his own account, is what Mr. Lansing did. 



226 THE POMP OF POWER 

and three months being wasted in drafting, out of its time, a 
document which was rejected by his own country, thus leading 
to comphcations which might have been avoided had Congress 
ratified the Treaty itself. To achieve that end Mr. Wilson sac- 
rificed his own principles and the interests of the civilised 
world. 

Clemenceau got all he could for his country, yet finally he 
was not able to procure in the degree desired the two things 
which France most needed — military security and financial re- 
lief. The case for both seemed clear and overwhelming. But 
the interests involved were too conflicting. Probably no one 
else would have obtained so much as did M. Clemenceau. While 
it is likely that, had either he or M. Tardieu been in power, 
they would have made their own handiwork more productive 
than have their successors during the past two or three years. 

In respect to military security M. Clemenceau demanded the 
permanent occupation of the left bank of the Rhine. To this 
both Mr. Lloyd George and President Wilson were opposed. 
They suggested, as an alternative, treaties between France on 
the one side, and Great Britain and the United States respec- 
tively on the other, whereby the latter countries agreed to bring 
military assistance to the former in the event of German ag- 
gression. M. Clemenceau took some time to consider the pro- 
posal. Finally, in exchange for the promise of these treaties, 
he agreed that the occupation should be limited to fifteen years. 
As such treaties could only be effective if and when ratified by 
Parliament and Congress, it was provided that the obligation 
of either country should not become effective unless the other 
likewise agreed to a similar treaty. 

But, during this Conference, Marechal Foch had, at the in- 
stance of M. Clemenceau, submitted his views to the "Four." 
Foch read a report of which the conclusion was that, without 
permanent occupation, there was no certainty of disarmament ; 
and that the Rhine was the indispensable barrier for the safety 
of Western Europe, and, consequently, for the safety of civil- 
isation. 

When Clemenceau compromised upon an occupation of fif- 
teen years (the area being diminished after each five years), 



THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES 227 

Foch repeated his objections, first to the French Government,^ 
and later, on May 6th, 19 19 (24 hours before the Treaty was 
handed to the Germans), to the full Conference, He made it 
clear that what he demanded was the occupation of the Rhine, 
"From Cologne to Coblence, and to Mayence, and not of the 
Pays Rhenans." To some extent he based his argument upon 
economic grounds. This has given M. Tardieu the opportunity 
to retort that subsequent experience has proved that military 
occupation is not efficacious for obtaining payment. But, never- 
theless, the fact remains that Foch insisted that, from the 
purely military standpoint, permanent occupation, or a relatively 
independent "bufifer" State, was necessary for the safety of 
France and Belgium. The authority of Marechal Foch upon 
economic matters may be questioned. It is otherwise when he 
speaks of military necessities. But his advice, which was ac- 
cepted for the armistice, was rejected in regard to the Treaty.'^ 

Upon the whole I do not think that M. Tardieu's comments 
upon the facts, as he himself states them, throw a fair light 
upon this subject. 

When Germany asked for an armistice, Foch, as the supreme 
commander and military adviser of all the Allied and Associated 
Powers on the Western Front, was asked to draft the terms. 
He took full responsibility for doing so; and did not hesitate 
to bind himself without reservation of any kind whatever. To- 
day, when there are suggestions that the contest should have 
been prolonged, that Germany should have been driven further 
back, M. Tardieu and other political friends of M. Clemenceau 
cover themselves by referring to Foch's considered decision. 

When the question of the occupation of the Rhine was dis- 

'This meeting of the Cabinet was held on April 25th, Foch's previous 
demand to be heard by the French Delegation to the Conference having 
been refused. Foch gave each member of the Government a memorandum, 
and then himself spoke in support of it. His view^s were supported 
only by M. Poincare. Apart from members of the Cabinet, M. Jules 
Cambon, M. Tardieu, and General Weygand were also present. 

'As a matter of fact it was only in 1815 that Prussia got a footing 
on the left bank of the Rhine. Throughout the war French statesmen 
had this idea in mind, but were rather coy about putting it forward; 
and perhaps not altogether frank, for when M. Doumergue went to 
Russia in January, 1917, he got a formal promise that the Czar's 
Government would support France upon this point. This understanding 
was not disclosed to the British Government. 



228 THE POMP OF POWER 

cussed Foch was still the military adviser of the Allies. It was 
in that capacity that M. Clemenceau (as stated above) called 
him before the "Four" to give his views: views which Foch 
(at his own instance, I believe) repeated very forcibly before 
the whole Conference.^ M. Tardieu might well have made 
the point that, upon a matter affecting in varying degree all the 
Allies, the opinion of their military adviser was ignored. He 
might have done so with all the more reason because the long 
memorandum which he himself made early in 1919, and which 
served as the basis for the whole discussion at the Confer- 
ence, was (as he admits) the direct result of a note submitted 
by Foch to Clemenceau on November 27th, 19 18, the conclu- 
sions of which the latter had at that time decided to support. 

Tardieu's memorandum dwelt particularly upon the insuffi- 
ciency of any guarantees resulting from the limitation of the 
military forces of Germany, or the authority of the League of 
Nations. He himself concluded that it was military occupa- 
tion, and military occupation only, which could afford the 
necessary security against German aggression at some future 
time. There was then no question of occupation for fifteen 
years or any other limited period. According to M. Tardieu 
(M. Tardieu early in 1919), nothing except the fixing of the 
German frontier at the Rhine, and the holding of the Rhine 
bridges by Allied forces, would mean safety for France and 
Belgium — and, eventually, for the other Allies. 

At first sight one is inclined to regard M. Tardieu's memo- 
randum (fortified by the opinion of Marechal Foch) as con- 
clusive : and none the less because there is much to be said 
for the contention that, in the event of another war with Ger- 
many, the British frontier would practically be at the Rhine 
rather than at Dover. But it is rather disturbing, after having 
powerful arguments, to read that while, early in 19 19, he was 
certain that permanent occupation was a necessity, yet that 
he does not frankly admit that what was finally agreed upon 
was, according to his own thesis, a virtual denial of security 

* According to his own account Foch told Clemenceau that he was 
doubtful whether he could conscientiously be present when these treaties 
were to be signed at Versailles. He was finally persuaded by the late 
M. Jean Dupuy, whom Clemenceau sent to see him later. 



THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES 229 

for the future : that security which throughout the war France 
had contended was an essential condition of Peace. 

M. Tardieu intimates that to press the matter further would 
have been to break the Entente, and possibly to disrupt the 
Conference itself. "II etait impossible d'aller plus loin." 

That is doubtless true. But he would probably have been 
wise to rest his case upon that admission. 

Few will contend that what M. Clemenceau, seconded by M. 
Tardieu and M. Loucheur, was unable to obtain, anyone else 
would have been likely to get. But that does not affect the 
main fact. If M. Tardieu was sincere in his memorandum, 
then, according to his own view, the Treaty does not properly 
secure France from a future German attack. 

M. Tardieu only confuses the issue by controverting^ the 
accuracy of Marechal Foch's remark : "Occupons la rive gauche 
et nous serons payes." 

Foch might have been wrong on this point, although it is 
worth noting that M. Poincare has expressed his regret that no 
direct relation has been established between the occupation of 
the Rhine and the payment of the German debt — a relation 
similar to that established when, after 1870, General de Man- 
teuffel had his headquarters at Nancy. 

In any event, Foch's duties were those of a military adviser, 
and not of an economic expert. His counsel respecting the 
military aspect of the question was given clearly. It was 
adopted and expanded by M. Tardieu ; and it would have been 
more useful to have had M. Tardieu's opinion about the advice 
having been rejected than his comments upon Foch's view of 
occupation as a means of forcing payment. ^^ 

Certainly M, Clemenceau and his French colleagues did not 

' See La Paix, p. 268. 

"M. Tardieu recounts that, on May 6th, 1919, after Marechal Foch 
(who, with some indiscretion, had allowed his views to become public) 
had told the Conference in no uncertain language what he thought was 
necessary, Mr. Bonar Law remarked to one of his colleagues : "If an 
English general _ adopted such an attitude towards his Government he 
would not retain his command for five minutes." Mr. Bonar Law 
momentarily forgot that during the war the British Government was, 
on one occasion at least, defied by Haig; and that Mr. Lloyd George 
himself told a French minister that Haig's strength in the country 
was such that he could not force him to do what he would like. 



230 THE POMP OF POWER 

attach sufficient importance to the probabihty of the Treaty not 
being ratified by Congress. That appears clearly from M. Tar- 
dieu's own statement to the Chambre des Deputes on Septem- 
ber 2nd, 1919: 

"La question qui se pose a vous, apres s'etre posee a nous, 
est aussi simple qu'elle est grave. Elle se pose dans une seule 
formule que je vais mettre devant vos yeux, et sur laquelle 
de meme que le Gouvernement a decide, vous aurez dans quel- 
ques jour a decider aussi. Cette question, la voici : laquelle 
des deux solutions suivantes valait le mieux pour la France? 
Ou bien I'occupation d'une rive gauche du Rhin separee de 
I'Allemagne pour une duree non definie, mais avec nos seuls 
moyens, mais sous notre propre responsabilite, mais dans une 
position d'isolement politique et militaire en face d'un pays 
tou jours plus peuple que le notre, mais aussi sans droit con- 
tractuel de verifier ce qui se passait en Allemagne au point de 
vue militaire : mais enfin et surtout malgre les objections for- 
melles de la Grande Bretagne et des Etats Unis ; ou bien, I'oc- 
cupation de cette meme rive gauche qui demeure allemande 
dans les conditions qui definit le traite, mais avec le droit de 
prolonger I'occupation et de reoccuper, mais aussi avec la de- 
struction des fortresses Rhenanes et la neutralisation de la rive 
gauche de 50 kilometres sur la rive droit, mais aussi avec le 
droit d'investigation, mais aussi avec la participation de nos 
Allies a I'occupation Rhenane, mais enfin et surtout avec 
I'engagement d'aide militaire immediate de la Grande Bretagne 
et des Etats Unis?" 

This succinct statement proves clearly that either M. Tardieu 
did not take into account the possibility of the treaties being 
rejected by the United States (thus causing the alliance with 
Great Britain also to fall to the ground) ; or that he con- 
sciously did not place the matter fairly before the Chambre. 
The latter hypothesis is of course untenable. There remains, 
therefore, no doubt that the repudiation of the treaties by Con- 
gress was not seriously considered. Otherwise, would M. Tar- 
dieu have dared to direct the attention of the Chambre "Enfin 
et surtout" to the military engagements of Great Britain and 
France, without drawing attention to the fact that, in the event 



THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES 231 

of such rejection, France would be in the position of having 
irrevocably surrendered her claim to permanent occupation 
without getting any guarantee of assistance if attacked? 

Moreover, when M. Barthou, the rapporteur general of the 
Treaty, said : "Le Gouvernement f rangais ... a apporte a la 
France des garanties solides. Peut-on nier la force importante 
qu'elles representent ? EUes se completent les unes les autres," 
he was undoubtedly referring mainly to those military engage- 
ments which rested upon so flimsy a fabric. Indeed, M, Tar- 
dieu himself, elsewhere in his book,^^ states explicitly that it 
was "En echange de ce double engagement" (the military as- 
sistance of Great Britain and the United States) that M. Cle- 
menceau yielded on his contention that the German frontier 
should be at the Rhine. 

But if there could be any doubt, it is dispelled by the way in 
which M. Clemenceau himself posed the essential question. 
Speaking in the Chambre des Deputes on September 24th, 1919, 
he said, referring to the treaty of guarantee : "If the United 
States does not vote for it, if England had not voted for it, if 
nobody votes for it, then there will be nothing; that is under- 
stood, and the vote which you will have given will be null." 

It is, therefore, clear that M. Clemenceau fully realised the 
effect of non-ratification by Congress. But he never thought 
there was any prospect of the treaty being rejected. That is 
the best excuse which can be made for him. 

In brief, M. Clemenceau gave up something definitely in ex- 
change for the chance of getting something. The arrangement 
would have been what M. Tardieu seeks to make out that it is 
had the Treaty provided that the German frontier should be 
the Rhine unless the British and American legislatures ratified 
the Treaties. I do not suggest that that course would have been 
feasible, but simply am illustrating the inexactitude of M. Tar- 
dieu's statement. 

M. Tardieu says that the possibility of President Wilson 
not being supported by Congress was considered. He pro- 
tests that no course was open other than to treat with Wilson. 
Undoubtedly that was so. But as, according to M. Tardieu's 
^^La Faix, p. 233. 



232 THE POMP OF POWER 

own contention, the proposed Treaties were of such impor- 
tance that their offer had the effect of reducing the French 
demand for permanent occupation to one for occupation for a 
period of fifteen years, against the advice of their principal miH- 
tary adviser, one would have thought that the chances of Mr. 
Wilson being supported or otherwise would have been carefully 
scrutinised. For, although undoubtedly the Treaties ■ would 
have been a source of security to France, yet, as shown above, 
they were offered on condition that France's first claim for se- 
curity — permanent occupation — should be abandoned. 

Moreover, if Mr. Wilson had been warned that he ran a risk 
of not having his work adopted by the Senate, the British 
and French Governments also were not unaware of the posi- 
tion, M. Tardieu admits it. He asks what else the French 
plenipotentiaries could have done. The point at issue is plain. 
It is simply whether or not they staked too much upon the 
chance of getting something else. If it was to be done over 
again, would M. Tardieu waive all claim to any occupation 
beyond fifteen years if there was to be no defensive guarantee 
on the part of Great Britain and the United States? If the 
answer is "Yes," then the French representatives got what they 
wanted (although it is not what Foch thinks is necessary for 
safety), and took a legitimate gamble upon the prospect of get- 
ting some further security. If the answer is "No," then they 
risked too much upon a chance. 

My own conviction, based upon various conversations which 
took place at that period, is that, whatever M. Tardieu himself 
might have thought, the belief prevalent amongst both French 
and English statesmen was that Mr. Wilson would obtain rati- 
fication of the Treaty. They appeared to attach little impor- 
tance to the fact that the American Senate had on prior occa- 
sions rejected treaties signed by American plenipotentiaries. 
Nor were their views greatly influenced by the knowledge that 
Wilson was faced by a hostile majority, which he had done 
nothing to conciliate and had, indeed, further antagonised. 
They never seemed fully to understand what Roosevelt made 
clear in a statement published shortly before his death: that 



THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES 233 

the President, though a vehicle of negotiation, was only half 
the treaty-making power, and could bind nobody except him- 
self. The situation was the same as if King George per- 
sonally signed a treaty which he had every reason to know 
would be opposed by Mr. Lloyd George and his majority if it 
was submitted to the House of Commons. 

M. Tardieu relates that the possibility of non-ratification was 
discussed with President Wilson, and that, as a result. Article 
429 of the Treaty of Versailles was changed. Basing his con- 
tention upon the final paragraph of that article, he says that 
there is now a full guarantee. The paragraph reads as follows : 
"Si a ce moment (au bout de 15 ans), les garanties contre une 
agression non provoquee de I'Allemagne n'etaient pas con- 
siderees suffisantes par les Gouvernements Allies et As- 
socies, I'evacuation des troupes d'occupation pourrait etre re- 
tardee dans le mesure jugee necessaire a I'obtenir des dites 
garanties." 

M. Tardieu argues that one of the cases in which the guaran- 
tees would be considered insufficient in 1935 would be if the 
guarantee treaties between France and Great Britain and the 
United States was then non-existent. He contends that in that 
event, even if Germany had fulfilled her financial obligations, 
the occupation might be postponed until those treaties were rati- 
fied, or some equivalent treaty was given. 

M. Tardieu must necessarily know what this Article was 
meant to convey. For every reason I should like to be able to 
read it as he interprets it. However, the paragraph states that 
the prolongation of the occupation is to be dependent upon 
the decision of the Allied and Associated Governments. 

The year 1935 is a long way ahead. Surely what M. Tardieu 
sees in 1922 is not of a nature to reassure him that he can 
count with any certainty upon Great Britain and the United 
States agreeing to such occupation thirteen years hence. 

Since the above lines were written, M. Tardieu has asserted 
in a letter to Le Temps (September 13th, 1921) that France's 
right to continue the occupation after the fifteen years would 
not be affected even if the other Allies withdrew. Certainly 



234 THE POMP OF POWER 

neither the French nor the Enghsh version seems to bear that 
construction.^^ 

M. Tardieu also laid stress on the fact that no Ally had raised 
any objection to the interpretation which he had publicly given 
of this article, both in his book and elsewhere. But that seems 
to be begging the question. The Allied Governments are not 
in the habit of replying to statements made by those who no 
longer hold any official position. Nor do they go forward to 
meet difficulties. France has several rights under the Treaty 
which were not denied, but which were not fulfilled when the 
proper time arrived. In any event, the negotiations were un- 
necessarily prolonged if one negotiator is to-day sincerely satis- 
fied when he contemplates the possibility of French troops oc- 
cupying this territory, in disaccord with their former Allies, 
but without being forcibly ousted by them. 

Regarding the payments to be made by Germany under the 
Treaty, it is certain that they will not give France all she hoped. 
It is almost equally certain that they will not provide what 
France has a right to expect. While the defaults already made 
by Germany have aggravated the situation. 

Unfortunately, some members of the French Government 
had led the country to believe that German payments would 
relieve the financial strain almost immediately. In this respect 
M. Klotz, who was then Minister of Finance, was particularly 
to blame. In one speech he held out the hope that France alone 
would eventually obtain at least 400 milliards of francs from 
Germany. It is worth recalling that it was to M. Klotz that 
Marechal Foch, immediately after the Treaty was signed at 
Versailles, said : "Monsieur le ministre des finances de la Re- 
publique frangaise, avec un pareil traite, vous pourrez vous pre- 
senter aux guichets de I'empire allemand, et vous serez paye — 
en monnaie de singe." 

"M. Poincare, in replying to M. Tardieu (Le Temps, September 15th, 
1921), disagreed, and took the view expressed above. 

The English version of this article differs slightly from the French 
text. It reads as follows : "If at that date the guarantees against 
unprovoked aggression by Germany are not considered sufficient by the 
Allied and Associated Governments, the evacuation of the occupying 
troops may be delayed to the extent regarded as necessary for the purpose 
of obtaining the required guarantees." 



THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES 235 

It is true that Mr. Lloyd George had also said : "Germany 
will pay for everything," but with the British Prime Minister 
that was mainly an election cry, for at the Conference the same 
Lloyd George did not hesitate to protest against exacting from 
Germany the payments which the French plenipotentiaries 
wanted. It is curious to reflect that one of his arguments was 
that excessive demands might result in throwing Germany into 
the arms of the Bolshevists, and thus increasing the power of 
the latter. While later he himself paid no heed to the French 
contention that Great Britain would increase the prestige of the 
Soviet Government by making a commercial treaty with it.^^ 

Throughout the Conference the French representatives held 
firmly to one idea : they did not want the total of the German 
debt to be fixed then. In their opinion it was impossible to ar- 
rive at any fairly approximate figure without investigations, 
which would take many months. They gained their point, and 
the Treaty provided that the Reparations Commission should 
settle the amount before May ist, 1921. 

The French view was probably sound in theory. But it 
was apparent throughout the Conference that it was only by 
a daily struggle that France could get even part of what she 
asked. M. Tardieu has put it on record that France was the 
great suflFerer from Mr. Lloyd George's contradictions. More- 
over, what was won one week was often imperilled the next. 
Thus, after the British Prime Minister had agreed to the oc- 
cupation of German territory for fifteen years, he subsequently 
(when Germany had presented her objections) changed his 
mind, and, supported by Mr. Bonar Law and Mr. Barnes, 
wished to re-open the whole question.^^ 

It was only because M. Clemenceau held firm for three weeks, 
stating boldly that he would not agree to any change in the de- 
cision already arrived at after the fullest discussion, that Mr, 

*^I am not criticising the policy which led Mr. Lloyd George to 
make an arrangement with the Soviet Government. On the contrary, 
as stated in a former chapter, I think it was the right one in the 
circumstances. 

"Mr. Bonar Law summed up his view of this matter by saying: 
"The occupation has only two objects — to protect France and to guarantee 
the execution of the Treaty. In neither case is the period of fifteen 
years justified." 



236 THE POMP OF POWER 

Lloyd George and his colleagues finally yielded. But these ex- 
periences ought to have taught the French plenipotentiaries to 
settle matters once and for all, and, so far as possible, to avoid 
the necessity of future debates with their Allies. If the latter 
were not easy to convince in 19 19, there was no reason to sup- 
pose that they would become more so as their own interests un- 
der the Treaty were satisfied. This consideration applied with 
particular force to the payments to be made by Germany. For, 
although the exact division between the Allies was not fixed un- 
til some months later, it was always understood that the larger 
share would naturally fall to France. ^^ 

Thus, although it would certainly have been difficult to have 
settled the German indebtedness at the time the Treaty was 
signed, France probably lost more (and certainly ran a great 
risk of losing more) by leaving the question open than by ac- 
cepting, and having stated in the Treaty, a figure which doubt- 
less would have been inaccurate. It was one of the points in 
regard to which M. Clemenceau got his way, thanks to his 
strength of will and his consummate patience. Mr. Wilson, 
who had to be won over, said that he was in favour of the 
amount being named at once, not because he wished to make any 
concession to Germany, but only because he was advised by 
the American experts that, for reasons of a practical nature, 
it was better to settle it immediately. Subsequent events may 
be said to have confirmed that view. 

It is fair to add that neither M. Clemenceau nor M. Tardieu 
nor M. Loucheur foresaw that the Reparations Commission 
would become a body which the politicians in power would 
oust or would make use of as might best serve their purpose 
from time to time. 

Finally, the transcendent fault of the makers of the Treaty 
was not to include therein unambiguous and sufficient penalties 
for its infraction. M. Tardieu, in articles of singular force and 
lucidity,^*^ has protested with his usual vigour against the con- 
stant breach of the pact of which he was one of the principal 

" The division as finally agreed upon was as follows : 52 per cent, to 
France and 22 per cent, to Great Britain. 
"I refer to M. Tardieu's series of articles in L' Illustration. 



THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES 237 

makers. He contends that the Treaty does contain proper 
penalties. It certainly contains none which, in the opinion of 
successive French Governments, are adequate automatically to 
enforce the execution of the German obligations. Otherwise 
there would have been no necessity for any French participation 
in the various conferences between the Allies, provoked by vio- 
lations of the Treaty on the part of Germany. 

M. Tardieu is entitled to make out the best case he can for 
himself. Nevertheless, such comments do not come with the 
best of grace from one who, with his French colleagues, is 
largely to blame for the fact that the Treaty is incomplete in 
this respect. It is true that the same reproach might be ad- 
dressed to all the principal members of the Conference. But it 
is France who complains most loudly that the terms of the 
Treaty are not being carried out. It is France who is suffering 
most to-day from its non-execution. During the Conference 
her representatives argued time and again that they understood 
Germans and the German character better than any of the 
others. M. Clemenceau once said that he did not foresee a 
peace of kindness with Germany. He seemed to realise that, 
whatever she might say, whatever she might promise, Germany 
would react only to coercion. It is inconceivable that, holding 
that firm conviction, and with the knowledge that any discus- 
sion with some of the Allies upon this question meant a contest, 
the French plenipotentiaries should have left loop-holes leading 
to future conferences, whereby their claims might again be put 
in jeopardy. 

But if it is possible to indicate some points in which the 
Treaty of Versailles is defective, M. Clemenceau and M. Tar- 
dieu can retort that it is those charged with its execution who 
must bear the greater responsibility for the unsatisfactory posi- 
tion which prevails two years after its signature. 

M. Clemenceau gave them warning that the document itself 
with the signature of Germany alone would not suffice. "Ce 
texte, si complexe, vaudra parce que vous vaudrez vous memes ; 
il sera ce que vous le ferez'' were his words. 

If I have ventured to indicate certain omissions in the 
Treaty, omissions which were obviously bound to give rise to 



238 THE POMP OF POWER 

complaints that France was not being fairly compensated or 
properly protected, I admit that all criticisms of that nature 
are fully answered by the reply: "We could not get more." 
For throughout the Conference M. Clemenceau was deter- 
mined not to cause a rupture of the Entente or a premature dis- 
solution of the Conference itself. Any full account of the pro- 
ceedings will show how nearly that occurred on at least two 
occasions; and will prove that M. Clemenceau went as far as 
he could without causing an absolute breach. In avoiding that 
he was doing his best for his country ; for, rightly or wrongly, 
the world would then have pronounced that the French demands 
were responsible for the collapse. 

My slight criticism of M. Tardieu's book is that he does not 
rely enough upon this firm ground of the inability of his col- 
leagues and himself to get better terms ; and that he is led into 
the error (a very human one) of magnifying what they did 
get and of not throwing a full light upon what they failed to 
obtain. 

The fact is that the Treaty was necessarily the result of con- 
cessions on the part of each of the great Powers ; concessions 
sometimes of conflicting interests, often of conflicting views. 
It was a work produced by months of labour : during which 
divergences of opinion more than once reached the breaking- 
point. But throughout, the plenipotentiaries of the Allied and 
Associated nations kept in view the need of reaching an agree- 
ment which they could finally present to Germany as their 
unanimous decision. When such differences were overcome in 
order to achieve that end, one would naturally have thought 
that, having compromised among themselves, they would hence- 
forth have been equally at one in insisting upon a due perform- 
ance of that compromise by Germany. Unfortunately that has 
not been the case. 

M. Clemenceau and M. Tardieu may well plead that, had 
they represented France subsequently to signing the Treaty, 
they would have derived more from it than did others. Many 
will assent to this contention. More will admit that it is unfair 
to render the authors of the Treaty, who had nothing to do 
with its execution, responsible for the errors of others. 



THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES 239 

M. Clemenceau and Mr. Wilson both ceased to have any 
power some months after the Treaty was signed, the former 
absolutely, the latter to all practical intents and purposes. 

But there is one of the principal authors of the Treaty who 
has taken a part, and a predominant part, in all subsequent ne- 
gotiations : Mr. Lloyd George. No account of the peripathetic 
course of the Treaty, no examination of the causes of its com- 
parative failure, would be complete without a full considera- 
tion of the attitude of the Prime Minister, both at the Peace 
Conference and since. 

Mr. Keynes's picture of the three chief negotiators, Clemen- 
ceau, Lloyd George, and Wilson, will doubtless pass into his- 
tory when his economic views and predictions have long been 
forgotten. It is worth recalling here, if only because it lays 
stress upon Mr. Lloyd George's mental agility and his suscepti- 
bility to atmosphere. 

M. Clemenceau had principles to which he clung throughout. 
There was never any doubt in his own mind about what he 
wanted, and about what his stand would be upon any question. 
Once he had stated his opinion everyone knew that he would 
not replace it the next day by another one. Mr. Wilson was 
generally groping in the dark, and groping slowly and awk- 
wardly, as befitted his caution and mental rigidity. In the 
meantime, Mr. Lloyd George had arrived at his conclusion — 
for the day. 

But, apart from Mr. Keynes, there were two delegates to the 
Peace Conference, both of whom had a fuller and closer oppor- 
tunity of judging, who have made public their impression of 
Mr. Lloyd George: Mr. Robert Lansing, and M. Andre Tar- 
dieu. 

Mr. Lansing, as one probably far removed from the future 
conduct of European affairs, has recorded his recollections with- 
out reticence. M, Tardieu, doubtless mindful of the fact that 
he and Mr. Lloyd George may one day again find themselves 
in conference together, has written with more discretion, but, 
perhaps, also with more insight. 

Mr. Lansing ranks Lloyd George as third in importance 
and influence amongst those whom he calls the "Big Four," 



240 THE POMP OF POWER 

Clemenceau, Lloyd George, Wilson, and Orlando. He thinks 
that, more than any of the others, the British Prime Minister 
permitted the Parliamentary situation in his own country to 
govern his every action. Apart from his steadfastness in seek- 
ing fulfilment of his own popular election cries (such as the 
public trial of the ex-Kaiser), he seemed to have neither fixed 
principles nor a settled programme. Moreover, once the mat- 
ters affecting Great Britain were decided, he appeared to think 
that any other questions were of comparatively slight impor- 
tance, and that to study them carefully would be a waste of 
time and energy. His rapid decisions indicated "Alertness 
rather than a depth of mind . . . his logic, if one can use that 
word, was that of an opportunist, and was in no way convinc- 
ing. He was better in attack than on the defence, for the latter 
exacted a detailed knowledge of all the phases of a question, 
while in attacking he could choose the ground which suited him 
best." 

In Mr. Lansing's opinion, Lloyd George was a politician 
rather than a sagacious statesman. "His quickness in thought 
and speech, and his self-confidence, made him what he was, a 
great Parliamentarian. In certain respects he had talents which 
resembled those of M. Clemenceau, although the latter seemed 
to be more stable than his British colleague. In the Conference 
at Paris these qualities were in no way so efficacious as in the 
House of Commons or on the political platform. M. Clemen- 
ceau judiciously put them on one side. But Mr. Lloyd George 
could not banish them. Without them he would have been lost. 
In negotiations conducted by the heads of the Governments and 
by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Five Great Powers, 
precise knowledge counted for something, and intellectual 
weight took the first rank. Without the assistance of Mr. Bal- 
four and the constant advice of his subordinates, Mr. Lloyd 
George would, I fear, have been positively outclassed." 

Above all, Lansing was struck by Lloyd George's desire for 
secrecy, due to his fear of giving any weapon to his Parliamen- 
tary opponents. This was illustrated at a meeting of the Coun- 
cil of Ten, in April, 1919, when the Prime Minister urged that 
the Treaty should not be shown to the minor states before it 



THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES 241 

was given to the representatives of Germany. In the result, 
"the delegates of the smaller belligerent nations were not per- 
mitted to examine the actual text of the document before it was 
seen by their defeated adversaries. Nations which had fought 
valiantly and suffered agonies during the war were treated with 
less consideration than their enemies so far as knowledge of the 
exact terms of peace were concerned. The arguments which 
could be urged on the ground of the practical necessity of a 
small group dealing with the questions, and determining the 
settlements,^^ seem insufficient to justify the application of the 
rule of secrecy to the delegates who sat in the Conference on the 
Preliminaries of Peace. It is not too severe to say that it out- 
raged the equal rights of independent and sovereign states, and, 
under less critical conditions, would have been resented as an 
insult by the plenipotentiaries of the lesser nations. Even 
within the delegations of the Great Powers there were indig- 
nant murmurings against this indefensible and unheard-of 
treatment of Allies. No man whose mind was not warped by 
prejudice or dominated by political expediency could give it his 
approval or become its apologist." ^^ 

As has been already stated, Mr. Wilson explained or quali- 
fied the first of his Fourteen Points — "Open covenants of peace, 
openly arrived at" — by saying that he had never meant that the 
negotiations should be public, but only that there should be an 
opportunity for public debates upon the decisions at which the 
plenipotentiaries had arrived. But Mr. Lloyd George's pro- 
posal that the Treaty should be given to the representatives of 
Germany before it was shown to the delegates of the smaller 
nations went much further than anything Mr. Wilson had sug- 
gested. For what could be more futile than a Parliamentary 
debate in a country where no plenipotentiary could say that he 
had seen the Treaty as a whole before it was handed to Ger- 
many? That is the plan which Mr. Lloyd George suggested; 

" At the outset of the Conference M. Clemenceau, in answer to a 
protest made by Sir Robert Borden, had boldly stated that the settle- 
ment of the terms of peace was, in the final analysis, the business 
of the Great Powers. 

" Mr. Lansing is evidently referring to Mr. Wilson as being "Warped 
by prejudice," and to Mr. Lloyd George as being "Dominated by political 
expediency." 



242 THE POMP OF POWER 

that is the plan to which Mr. Wilson assented ; and that is what 
was done. 

I am far from being an advocate of open diplomacy as that 
treacherous term is generally understood. But it is difficult 
to justify these proceedings. While in view of their previous 
professions it is strange to find that those responsible for this 
policy were Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Wilson. 

In the meantime M. Clemenceau was wrapped in sardonic 
contemplation of his English and American colleagues nullify- 
ing in private their political utterances. Clemenceau believed 
that the Great Powers should decide all questions as they 
thought fit. He had said so boldly at the beginning of the Con- 
ference in reply to a protest made by Sir Robert Borden. But 
he had never compromised himself by any remarks about open 
diplomacy. On the other hand, if he had not talked in that 
sense, he had by his actions shown that he dreaded publicity 
much less than Mr. Lloyd George and criticism much less than 
Mr. Wilson. One of his first acts upon becoming Prime Min- 
ister had in fact been to abolish the censorship in respect to 
attacks upon himself. However, at the Conference he was 
obliged to take steps to protect the feelings of his more sensi- 
tive and less consistent colleagues. 

Mr. Lansing sums up the matter as follows : "The insistence 
of the British Prime Minister on secrecy was one of the mani- 
festations of that opportunism which distinguished his public 
career. He did not accept a principle, or showed no disposi- 
tion to apply it, unless it appeared to lead to some practical 
advantage for his Government, and if he found his anticipa- 
tion of the result was wrong he unhesitatingly abandoned the 
principle and assumed another." 

M. Tardieu likewise refers to Mr. Lloyd George's dislike of 
publicity and his intolerance of criticism. As early as January 
15th, 1919, the latter was complaining of the comments in the 
French Press. While a few weeks later he was threatening to 
withdraw from the Conference if various newspapers continued 
to publish certain statements about the proceedings. Fortu- 
nately for all concerned M. Clemenceau did not take him at his 
word. 



THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES 243 

M. Tardieu, like Mr. Lansing, remarked Mr. Lloyd George's 
insistence on the punishment of the ex-Kaiser and his accom- 
plices. In eleven sessions (February 3rd to March 29th, 19 19) 
of the Commission on the Question des Coupables, Sir Ernest 
Pollock maintained, in opposition to the American view, Mr. 
Lloyd George's contention that those accused should be sur- 
rendered for trial by the Allies. The Prime Minister himself, 
at seven meetings of the Council of Four (April ist to May 5th, 
1919), demanded that the conclusions arrived at by the Com- 
mission should be increased in severity. While on June i6th, 
191 9, his principal secretary, Mr. Philip Kerr, drafted the letter 
by which, in answer to the protests of Count de Brockdorfif- 
Rantzau, the Allies refused to allow those guilty to be judged 
by "The accomplices of their crimes." ^^ 

Nevertheless, a few months later, in February, 1920, Mr. 
Lloyd George was responsible for the first mutilation of the 
Treaty when he abandoned the clause which called for these 
men being handed over to the Allies. 

M. Tardieu states that Mr. Lloyd George gave away that for 
which he had so loudly clamoured because of an adverse by- 
election won by the Labour party. Whatever the reason, M. 
Tardieu's experience of the Conference should have habitu- 
ated him to Mr. Lloyd George's frequent changes and contra- 
dictions. 

Mr. Lloyd George's almost constant fear was that the Ger- 
mans would not sign the Treaty. No matter what agreement 
he had reached with his colleagues, they were never certain that 
he would not, on that plea, want to re-open the whole discus- 
sion. "Under the influence of certain of his associates, such as 
General Smuts, or after breakfast with a prominent Labour 
leader, he would arrive at the meeting with a gloomy air, an- 
nouncing, 'They will not sign !' " 

This tendency to yield was even more pronounced during 
the period after the Treaty had been handed to the Germans 
and their objections began to be presented, from May 25th to 
June 26th. It is fair to add that, in M. Tardieu's opinion, these 

" If Mr. Philip Kerr was right, then the Government is wrong now in 
assenting to the Leipzig farces. 



244 THE POMP OF POWER 

fears were then partly inspired, or were augmented, by the 
views of some members of his Cabinet. In any event, Mr. 
Lloyd George was so alarmed at the prospect that Germany 
might refuse to accept the Treaty that (while excusing himself 
for doing it so late in the day), he proposed making inadmissi- 
ble concessions upon every question — disarmament, occupation, 
reparations, Dantzig, Upper Silesia. ^^ 

Count de Brockdorff-Rantzau little knew Mr. Lloyd George's 
state of mind at the time. I have been told in Germany, by a 
high authority, that to this day he deplores that ignorance. Nor 
did the Prime Minister's subsequent speech in the House of 
Commons indicate that he had been the one who had lagged be- 
hind or that he had ever wavered about imposing what he him- 
self called a stern but a just peace. 

It is undeniable that the various mutilations of the Treaty — 
the serious changes to which the Allies made themselves par- 
ties, and also the German defaults which did not call forth any 
action at the proper time — gave Germany reason to believe that 
she could with impunity ignore her obligations. 

At the worst, it appeared to her that by repudiating her un- 
dertakings as they fell due, she could lose nothing, and might 
possibly gain something; and therefore to that practice she has 
faithfully adhered. 

Without attempting to give a complete list of these deroga- 
tions from the Treaty, I propose to enumerate a few of the 
most culpable. The necessity of German disarmament was a 
subject upon which all the Allies agreed, but obviously it was 
one of capital importance for France, as she would be unable 
to reduce her army to the final limits, and to turn her whole 

^^ Since the above was written, M. Andr^ Tardieu has stated cate- 
gorically in a letter to Le Temps (September 13th, 1921) that between 
June 2nd and i6th, 1919, Mr. Lloyd George continuously demanded 
(and stated that he was expressing the unanimous opinion of his Cabinet) 
that the Reparation Clauses of the Treaty should be made more favourable 
to Germany; that that country should be allowed to maintain an army 
of 200,000 instead of 100,000 men ; that she should be admitted to the 
Society of Nations almost immediately; and that there should be a 
plebiscite in Upper Silesia : but that it was only on the last point that 
M. Clemenceau could be induced to cede. 

M. Tardieu (who added that Mr. Lloyd George was throughout 
hostile to the occupation of the Rhine) disclosed much which the Prime 
Minister did not see fit to tell Parliament. 



THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES 245 

attention to the work of recuperation, until she was assured 
that the fangs of the invader had been drawn. 

According to the Treaty of Versailles, Germany should have 
abandoned to the Allies all arms and war materials, over and 
above what she was authorised to retain, not later than March 
loth, 1920. At that date there was no semblance of any ma- 
terial compliance. Nevertheless, no step was taken to remind 
Germany of her engagement, or to compel her to execute it. 
At the Spa Conference, some months later, in July, 1920, it was 
found that 15,000 guns and more than 9,000 aeroplanes (not 
to mention considerable quantities of other war material) had 
not even then been surrendered. A further delay until Janu- 
ary 1st, 192 1, was granted. But on May 5th, 1921, Mr, Lloyd 
George told the House of Commons that, although, in the opin- 
ion of the Allies, the destruction of the German big guns had 
been "most satisfactory," it was not yet complete. While the 
Prime Minister proceeded to admit that "There are still far 
too many rifles and machine-guns unsurrendered — enough ma- 
chine-guns to arm very formidable forces." 

In respect to the number of men under arms the tale is 
still more significant. By the Treaty Germany bound herself 
to reduce her army to 200,000 men of the Reichswehr by 
April loth, 1920, and to 100,000 men by May loth, 1920; 
and was likewise (in conformity to an Order of the Supreme 
Council, dated December ist, 1919) obliged by the latter date 
to suppress all the camouflaged forces organised by Noske and 
others. 

These engagements were not fulfilled, nor did the Allies do 
anything practical to enforce observance of the Treaty. Pre- 
sumably, therefore, no one was surprised to discover, at the 
Spa Conference in July, 1920, that conscription had not been 
legally suppressed, and that the hidden forces then numbered 
800,000 men. In this instance also the date for performance 
was extended to January ist, 1921. The threat was made that 
if there was then any default in respect either to war material 
or the men under arms the Ruhr would be occupied "auto- 
matically" without further warning. 

The appointed day passed. Four months later, on May 5th, 



246 THE POMP OF POWER 

192 1, Mr. Lloyd George told the House of Commons that 
while, since the Spa Conference, the German Army had been 
reduced from 200,000 to 100,000 men, yet that the situation 
was still unsatisfactory. In his own words: "Probably the 
most disquieting factor is that irregular organisations called 
the Einwohnerwehr and Sicherheitswehr and other names are 
still in existence in Germany. In Bavaria alone there is a force 
of 300,000 men called the Einwohnerwehr, a very considerable 
force in East Prussia, in Wurtemberg, and in other parts of 
Germany ; and these forces added together would no doubt be- 
come the nucleus of a most formidable army. They are armed 
with rifles, they have machine-guns, and it is suspected that 
they have a number of cannon." 

But Mr. Lloyd George's avowal does not tell the whole story. 
The Bavarian Secretary of State declared publicly in the Land- 
tag that the Bavarian Einwohnerwehr consisted of about 320,- 
000 men, that it had 240,000 rifles, 2,780 machine-guns, and 
forty-four cannon. There is every reason to believe that these 
figures were then below the reality. While, in defiance of the 
Treaty of Versailles and in mocking derision of the Allies, this 
force was openly subsidised by the State. For the year 1920- 
192 1 the credit allowed was 15,074,000 marks. The Technische 
Nothilfe, which is connected with the Einwohnerwehr, received 
a subsidy of 210,000 marks from the Reich. 

The Einwohnerwehr was armed gratuitously by the official 
organisation charged with the destruction of armaments, the 
Reichstreuhandgesellschaft. Its members were carefully di- 
vided into those who could be mobilised for service abroad, and 
those who would be useful only in home defence. 

This is the bare outline of a plan, each detail of which shows 
that these forces were meant to be the basis of a military ma- 
chine for future use, and that it was a deliberate attempt to 
render abortive one of the most essential provisions of the 
Treaty. The intent is all the more apparent in view of what 
happened when Napoleon made a similar attempt to disarm 
the most treacherously aggressive country known in the history 
of Europe. His plans were perfect on paper. They exacted 
that the Prussian Army should not exceed a fixed figure. The 



THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES 247 

order was observed in the letter. But its spirit was evaded by 
the ingenious device of Scharnhorst, who made soldiers of the 
whole male population by changing the personnel of the army 
at short intervals, and thus giving all a brief period of inten- 
sive military training. There was, therefore, every reason to 
imagine that the Germans would again try to elude their en- 
gagements, which renders all the more inexplicable the conduct 
of the Allies since the Treaty was signed. 

The desirability of disarming Germany was settled once and 
for all by the Allies at the Peace Conference. It rests with 
Mr. Lloyd George and others to explain why they have allowed 
their decision to be derided. The situation to-day is, indeed, 
much more in accord with the disarmament clauses of the 
Treaty. But, as M. Briand showed at Washington, France 
has still some ground for alarm about the future. She is left 
without that security for which throughout the war she stead- 
fastly contended, and which the Treaty of Versailles guaran- 
teed to her. It is idle to pretend that the League of Nations 
could form any barrier to German desires. Undoubtedly an 
organisation of that nature was necessary. Everything which 
makes it more difficult for war suddenly to break out, or which 
limits the area of any conflict, is so much gained for humanity 
and for the cause of civilisation. But there is no reason what- 
ever to think that at present the League has any practical power. 
It might possibly have been otherwise had not Mr. Wilson re- 
coiled from his own words on the day when he could have con- 
verted them into deeds. In 191 7 the President of the United 
States said : "There cannot be peace without concession and 
sacrifices" ; and he proceeded to suggest that after the war a 
force should be created which should be so superior to the 
forces of all nations and all combinations of nations that the 
edicts of the international body directing it could never be re- 
sisted. 

In effect that was a proposal for general disarmament, or 
for limitation of armaments. Whether such a plan is feasible 
may be questioned. But what is beyond all question is that 
without some species of disarmament no League of Nations 
will ever have a predominant power. 



248 THE POMP OF POWER 

M. Clemenceau, with his usual realisation of the practical, 
and his delight in the logical, carried Mr. Wilson's idea to its 
obvious conclusion. He suggested that the verification of arma- 
ments should be obligatory, and that military measures should 
be taken to enforce obedience to the decrees of the super gov- 
ernment which Mr. Wilson had in mind. Possibly Clemen- 
ceau was actually in favour of the proposal. I venture to 
think, however, that he merely wished to place Wilson face to 
face with the situation which his words created. In any event, 
the President would not agree.~^ 

Later Wilson expressly recognised that the League of Na- 
tions, as constituted, gave France no adequate protection. Dur- 
ing the discussion regarding the occupation of the Rhine coun- 
try, to which Wilson was at first opposed, Clemenceau said: 
"The Pact may be able to guarantee us the victory. But for 
the moment it is insufficient to guard us against invasion." 

The President assented and yielded. 

To-day the League of Nations is suffering from the effects 
of promising too much and accomplishing too little. It has 
made the average man reflect upon the wisdom of our fore- 
fathers, who, more practical if less idealistic, were content to 
pray "Give peace in our time, O Lord." 

The United States has resolutely stood aside. President 
Harding lost no time in indicating that he saw no solution, ex- 
cept possibly partial disarmament. The American Ambassador 
to the Court of St. James' was allowed to make it clear in his 
first public speech that the Administration intended to ignore 
the League. Mr. Harvey's words left no room for any doubt. 
"Inevitably and irresistibly our present Government could not, 
without the betrayal of its creators and masters, and will not, I 
assure you, have anything whatsoever to do with the League, 
or with any commission or committee appointed by it or re- 
sponsible to it, directly or indirectly, openly or furtively." 

All those who were in touch with American politics and with 

** Disarmament may or may not be practicable. But it is difficult 
to understand why military attaches, part of whose duty it is to ferret 
out the military secrets of the countries to which they are accredited, 
while pretending- not to do so, should not be used openly for the purpose 
of the verification of armaments. 



THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES 249 

American public feeling confidently predicted that this would be 
the result when it became apparent, in the autumn of 19 19, 
that the Republican party would probably come into power in 
1921. Although some with no knowledge of the United States, 
and others who thought they had acquired some from having 
passed a few months at the British Embassy in Washington 
with Lord Grey, tried to spread the conviction that Washing- 
ton would rally to the League after the presidential election. 

As a consequence of this stand many of the South and Cen- 
tral American republics have begun to treat the Society of Na- 
tions with scant respect. They realise that their safety and in- 
terest lies in the Monroe doctrine rather than in any universal 
formula. They look to Washington rather than to Geneva; 
while some of them have already begun to complain about 
the burden of contributing to support an institution which is 
occupied chiefly by the consideration of European questions, 
and whose decisions would probably be of little binding effect 
in the Americas. 

The primary result has been that the highly-paid officials of 
the organisation have been obliged to submit to a diminution 
of their salaries, despite the high rate of exchange which pre- 
vails in Switzerland. 

Certainly nothing which has happened since 1919 goes to 
prove that the League of Nations could bar the path to anything 
Germany wanted to do. It has even been powerless to pre- 
vent minor wars in various parts of Europe. Mr. Balfour put 
the matter in its true light. Speaking in the House of Com- 
mons on April 21st, 1921, he said: "The Society of Nations 
has no arms except universal public opinion." It may be re- 
marked that public opinion is rarely universal. But at the best 
it is not an arm which France considers (or which Mr. Wilson 
or Mr. Lloyd George considered) a sufficient protection against 
Germany. 

Another vital infringement upon the Treaty was the agree- 
ment made at Spa regarding coal. Under the Treaty Germany 
was obliged to deliver to the Allies 3,500,000 tons per month for 
six months. At Spa this amount was reduced to 2,000,000 
tons. Moreover, the Treaty provided that the price of this coal 



250 THE POMP OF POWER 

should be that which was payable at the mine. The Spa agree- 
ment increased this price by a fixed amount of five marks gold 
per ton, plus a variable augmentation, viz., the difference be- 
tween the price at the mine, plus the five marks added, and the 
exportation price, f .o.b. to a German or English port. 

This difference, according to M. Tardieu (and I see no criti- 
cism which can be made of his figures), worked out as fol- 
lows (of course the value in paper francs of the 5 marks gold 
varied with the course of the exchange) : 



British Exportation Price 


^ , 


frs. 240 


Domestic German Price 


, , 


frs. 70 


Premium allowed at Spa 


• 


" 13.75 

83.75 


Difference 


frs. 


156.25 per ton. 



In brief this change in the Treaty involved monthly pay- 
ments of about 27,500,000 frs. in respect to the fixed increase, 
and of about 312,500,000 frs. on account of the variable ad- 
vance allowed in the manner above stated. 

Of this amount, by virtue of the proportion of the German 
coal which was allotted to her, France had to pay 206,000,000 
frs. 

It was France more than any of the Allies which was ad- 
versely affected by this alteration. One of the very objects of 
these provisions of the Treaty was to compensate and protect 
a country in which the mines had been systematically destroyed 
by the invader, and which needed a plentiful supply of coal to 
re-start industrial life. The same clauses necessarily put 
France in a favourable position to compete with Great Britain. 
Neither English nor French Delegates to the Conference ig- 
nored that point. But the result of the Spa agreement was to 
eliminate or diminish that benefit, and to place a handicap upon 
France. No Englishman can deny that, at the time, the altera- 
tion made at Spa appeared to be to the advantage of this coun- 
try. But also, every fair-minded Englishman must admit that 
it was an advantage for which France paid the bill ; that it was 
a derogation from the Treaty ; that only Germany and England 
gained by that derogation; and that (leaving aside any higher 
ideal) it was a gain for which, perhaps, too high a price was 



THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES 251 

paid in view of the temporary ill-feeling which it engendered. 
The French Government had been afraid that there would 
be some attempt to alter the Treaty at the Spa Conference. The 
following extract from my diary, recounting a conversation I 
had with M. Millerand soon after his return from San Remo, 
shows the anxiety on this point of the President du Conseil: 
"M. Millerand told me that he had been entirely opposed to the 
Germans being called to Spa, and that eventually he said he 
would consent only on two conditions : first, that there should 
be no revision of the Treaty, and, secondly, that the Allies 
should agree amongst themselves what they should say at each 
meeting. He said that Lloyd George had first agreed to the 
conditions, had then said that he would not accept them, but 
finally did so. Nevertheless, M. Millerand says that before 
they meet at Spa he means to get it in black and white from 
Lloyd George, which is entirely right. His own opinion is 
that there should be no conversations with the Germans, but 
that they might be heard, and then any proper use might be 
made of anything they had to say. That, of course, is the 
proper view." 

I do not propose to recount the story of the meetings at 
San Remo, at Hythe, at Boulogne; meetings more instructive 
in lessons than productive in results. Nor the miserable idea of 
a conversation with the Germans at Geneva, which came to 
nothing because the French Government wisely and properly 
refused to have anything to do with it. 

These various and varied vacillations upon the part of the 
Allies may almost be said to form some excuse for the derelic- 
tions of Germany. She has been encouraged to think that if 
this particular Treaty was not a scrap of paper, at least it was 
something very flimsy. It would be a step backwards if civil- 
ised nations ever adopted the barbarous German conception of 
warfare, or the brutal German method of imposing peace. But 
a lesson might well be learned from the German system of en- 
forcing the execution of a treaty which has been duly signed by 
both victor and vanquished. One is thus logically led to inquire 
what is the basic cause of these changes and concessions, and 
who is primarily responsible for them. 



252 THE POMP OF POWER 

The Treaty of Versailles was ratified by the legislature of 
various nations, and especially by the Parliaments of the two 
countries whose relations to each other I am discussing — Great 
Britain and France. As the majorities in both these Assem- 
blies pronounced in favour of the Treaty there can now be no 
suggestion that either country considers it unjust. Moreover, 
the only complaint which France makes is that the Treaty is 
not being executed. 

When Mr. Lloyd George placed the Treaty before the House 
of Commons he claimed that he and his colleagues had done 
their work faithfully, and had brought their vast task to a 
creditable conclusion. Presumably, he still holds the same opin- 
ion. Otherwise, it would manifestly have been his duty to tell 
the country through Parliament that he had been mistaken in 
asserting that the Treaty was a good one and a workable one ; 
and to ask for a mandate to revise it. 

A revision (except upon the ground that the Treaty was ab- 
solutely unworkable) is open to the practical objection that 
an equally legitimate demand might be made for a revision 
of the revised Treaty. Even those who (like myself) concur 
in Mr. Lloyd George's favourable view of the Treaty of Ver- 
sailles, taken as a whole, freely admit that, like every humaij 
handiwork, it is defective in certain points. But any revision, 
while satisfying some strictures, would undoubtedly give rise 
to others. It would certainly be neither perfect nor entirely 
satisfactory to all the Allies. 

But if Mr. Lloyd George has never gone so far as to state 
that he wished to change the work upon which he prided him- 
self in June, 19 19, it is equally true that he is largely responsi- 
ble both for the failure to enforce its provisions, and also for 
the changes which have actually been made from time to time. 

Germany is the country which has derived the most benefit 
from these alterations, whether by various delays granted or 
otherwise ; while, on the other hand, these modifications have 
not injured England in anything like the same degree as they 
have France. I have already referred to the Spa coal agree- 
ment. In regard to payments to be made by Germany, al- 
though Great Britain is heavily overtaxed, yet the delay is even 



THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES 253 

more disastrous to France, both because she needs the money 
for reparations, and also because she receives 52 per cent., 
while England gets only 22 per cent, of these payments.^- 

Again, the failure of Germany to disarm may be disquieting 
to some British statesmen. But it neither keeps the country in 
a state of alarm nor costs the taxpayer a single shilling, whereas 
France is unable to betake herself to the work of restoration 
in complete tranquillity, and is also obliged to keep under arms 
forces superior to her needs if she were given the security 
guaranteed by the Treaty. 

But, if France is no more (and probably less) satisfied than 
any of the other Allies, the facts are distorted by those who 
suggest that she is trying to go outside the Treaty, or to obtain 
anything more than it .gives her. All that France demands 
is that she should get, without undue delay, the compensation, 
relief, and protection which is guaranteed by the Treaty. All 
that France asks is that the judgment which was pronounced 
by the Peace Conference shall not be ignored or repealed where 
it is in her favour, while it has already been largely executed 
where it is to the advantage of some of her Allies. 

Yet every one of the principal alterations of the Treaty has 
been either entirely or mainly at the expense of France. 

The history of the Peace Conference shows that throughout 
Mr. Lloyd George was insisting upon the importance to be at- 
tached to British public opinion. Time and again he objected 
to follow a certain course, giving as his reason that the country 
would be against him ; while upon at least one occasion he even 
sought on the same ground to reverse his decision upon ques- 
tions of prime importance — the occupation of the Rhine and 
reparations. 

This is not the place to discuss whether the Prime Minister 
of a country having parliamentary institutions should stand on 
fixed principles and try to mould public opinion : or whether 
he should allow himself to be governed by that opinion in the 
exercise of his mandate from day to day. It will suffice to say 
that M, Clemenceau belongs to the former school and Mr. 

^ I purposely made no reference to the recent dispute about the 
division of the first milliard. 



254. THE POMP OF POWER 

Lloyd George to the latter. But one thing which the British 
Prime Minister was always at pains to impress upon his col- 
leagues is the importance which he thought ought to be at- 
tached to the force of public opinion. 

It is, therefore, inconceivable that Mr. Lloyd George should 
not realise that "public opinion" exists in France as well as in 
England — a public opinion which is well informed (much more 
so in respect of foreign affairs than is the case in this coun- 
try), and which, upon the whole, is reasonable. 

When in February, 1920, Mr. Lloyd George himself sug- 
gested that it was expedient to abandon the clauses regarding 
the delivery to the Allies of war criminals, the French Govern- 
ment did not remind him that he himself was the author of 
those sections, for which he fought so long and strenuously, as 
has been related. The French thought, rightly or wrongly, 
that his change of heart was inspired by a by-election which 
had gone against the Government, thus reversing Mr. Lloyd 
George's view on the requirements of public opinion. He relin- 
quished in 1920 what he had struggled to obtain in 191 9. He 
was giving away what was his own. The French people were 
indifferent. The French political world was mildly amused. 

But it was natural that the feeling in France should be 
otherwise when Mr. Lloyd George began to give away the 
French rights under the Treaty. I say Mr. Lloyd George be- 
cause at the successive conferences he has never hesitated to 
make the most of two facts : his predominant personal position 
as the sole political survivor of the makers of the Treaty (a 
position, however, which began to count for less when he had 
to contend with M. Briand), and the desire of France to pre- 
serve the alliance and possibly get some compensation for the 
conditional support promised by the Treaty, which came to 
naught by reason of the American defection. 

In many speeches in the House of Commons, Mr. Lloyd 
George has referred sympathetically to the future fears and 
to the present position of France. But whatever may be the 
effect he makes in Parliament, he no longer deludes either 
France or Germany upon one point. Both of these countries 
know that his attitude at the conferences of the Allies and his 



THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES 255 

public utterances are often absolutely at variance the one with 
the other. 

M. Poincare wrote in November, 1920, that the desire of a 
certain political group in England to cultivate closer friendship 
with Germany did not constitute a sufficient reason for taking 
from French pockets the gifts it wanted to make to Berlin. 
The former President of the Republic suggested with irony, 
but with some aptness, that England, if she wanted to make 
presents to Germany, might give back her share of the German 
merchant shipping and some of the former German colonies. 
He admitted that Great Britain was entitled to the compensa- 
tions she had received, but protested that the losses of France 
were such as at least to entitle her to get what the Treaty 
guaranteed.-^ 

Writing six months later, in May, 1920, General de Castelnau 
was in accord with the prevalent feeling in France when he ex- 
pressed the same views in language equally precise : 

"Our Allies cannot fail to recognise the moderation of our 
demands as compared to the advantages which they have 

'^ The losses of the various Allies were: 
Dead on the field of battle :- 

Russia 1 ,700,000 

France 1,364,000 

Great Britain 754,000 

Italy 496,000 

Total dead (battles, results of wounds, and illness) :- 

United States 11 5,000 

Percentage of dead in proportion to the population: 

France 3.8 

Great Britain 1.35 

Italy 1 .24 

United States ,. • • o.io 

The expenses, counted in tnilliards of francs, were: 

Great Britain igo 

United States 160 

France 143 

Russia 92 

Italy 65 

These figures are taken from the PVar with Germany, by Colonel 
Leonard P. Ayres, of the United States Army. They are cited and 
adopted by M. Andre Tardieu in his book La Paix. They differ in no 
material respect from such official figures as are available. M. Mer- 
meix gives 680,000 and 1,398,000 as the respective English and French 
losses in killed and disappeared, and states that the latter figure is 
official {Foch et les Armies d' Occident, p. 119). 



256 THE POMP OF POWER 

acquired by the Armistice of November nth, and by the 
Treaty of Versailles. By these agreements England has in- 
creased, or rather, destroyed to her own profit, not the terri- 
torial fortune of Germany (about which she cared nothing), 
but the redoubtable maritime fortune of the German Empire, 
whose fleets boldly menaced and hotly contested the political, 
industrial, and commercial destinies of the United Kingdom. 
England further obtained fruitful 'mandates' which enlarged 
the extent of her former colonial possessions, and naturally 
permitted her to contemplate with serenity the ever increasing 
value of oil-producing territories. France, on her part, limits 
her modest ambitions to the temporary seizure of a tangible 
political and substantial security which will safeguard the repa- 
ration of her ruins, threatened by the quibbles and the tricks of 
a Germany who was listened to with too much complacency. 
The country is undeceived, and is tired of conferences, pro- 
tocols, agreements, and default notices, of which the high- 
sounding names have until now masked the desolating empti- 
ness." 

These statements by M. Poincare and General de Castelnau 
throw into bold relief the point which is too often lost sight 
of or ignored when the French claims are discussed in Eng- 
land. It is not a question of France protesting that the Treaty 
gives her less than her Allies. As a matter of fact, every coun- 
try seems to think that the result of the Peace Conference was 
to her own comparative disadvantage, which in itself is a 
healthy sign and a testimony to the all-round fairness of the 
Treaty. But the stand taken by France to-day is : "Whatever 
our hopes may have been, we are not complaining about the 
Treaty of Versailles. We accepted it when we signed it. All 
we ask is that we should be paid under that agreement — paid 
exactly as you have already been paid. That the provisions 
that happen to be in our favour should be executed as were 
the provisions which were in your favour. We want nothing 
more than what is given us by the Treaty. We will accept 
nothing less." ^^ 

In another way Mr. Lloyd George irritates public opinion 

^General de Castelnau in L'Echo de Paris of May nth, 1921. 



THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES 257 

in France by either arrogating to himself personally, or by as- 
suming for Great Britain a position to which the Prime Min- 
ister has no right, and for which his country has no desire. 
Mr. Lloyd George is in the habit of setting himself up as an 
arbitrator between France and Germany. He forgets altogether 
that the spirit of the Treaty is that England and France should 
be Allies in obtaining its execution just as much as they were 
in waging the war which led to it. One can easily imagine 
Mr. Lloyd George's fiery indignation if, for instance, M. Bri- 
and should have had the opportunity (and should have been so 
ill-advised as to take it) to speak in the Chambre des Deputes 
urging England to patience and moderation in respect to getting 
possession of the German colonies and ships given to her by 
the Treaty; and setting himself up as one who (his own coun- 
try having been already largely satisfied) wanted to be equitable 
between England and Germany. Yet that was exactly the 
language of Mr. Lloyd George on May 5th, 1921, when telling 
the House of Commons of the result of the Conference held 
in London. While some weeks later he used the same tone in 
speaking of the trouble in Poland — an episode to which I shall 
refer hereafter. Undoubtedly this attitude is in some degree 
personal to Mr. Lloyd George. But when the French are 
exasperated by it, they may well regret that they were so hasty 
in exiling M. Clemenceau from public life — in preventing him 
from taking any further part in securing the execution of the 
Treaty which was so largely his own work. Mr. Lloyd George 
would have acted differently had he been faced by the fixity of 
purpose, the patience, and, at times, the sardonic irony of 
M. Clemenceau. 

But it is interesting to consider what is, in fact, British pub- 
lic opinion upon the question of the execution of the Treaty. 

Li the first place the public is not well-informed: partly by 
reason of its own neglect, and partly on account of the omis- 
sions of the Government. Upon one occasion at the Peace 
Conference Mr. Lloyd George's spokesman protested against 
the proposed occupation of the Rhine, saying (inter alia) that 
the English public would not understand the necessity for that 
action. To this M. Tardieu very aptly replied : "You say 



258 THE POMP OF POWER 

that the Enc^hsh piihlic does not understand this question. It 
is the business of the British Government to make the country 
understand. The English people did not, any more, understand 
in 1914 the necessity for conscription. The war taught it many 
things." 

Secondly, public opinion in England is absolutely opposed to 
participation in any plans or undertakings for the territorial ag- 
grandisement of France : partly because of the burden which 
would be imposed upon the taxpayer, but above all because the 
country hopes to avoid further warfare in this generation at 
least. 

Simply in order to make my argument clear, I state here that 
I am unreservedly in accord with that view. 

The stand tal-cen upon the question by the Manchester Guard- 
ian and the Daily News (from which I entirely dissent) is at 
least comprehensible and logical. Those journals thought from 
the outset that the Treaty was imperialistic, and in some re- 
spects unfair, and have always been more or less opposed to 
the execution of many of its terms. 

But the Prime Minister has never said that he thought the 
Treaty was unjust : on the contrary, he pronounced it a just 
one. He is therefore unable to make the same plea. Yet M. 
Millerand told me some days after the meeting at San Remo 
that Mr. Lloyd George had become white in the face when he 
accused France of having territorial designs because she had 
occupied Frankfurt. While in the following year he asked M. 
Briand to make some statement to a press agency whereby he 
would place himself on record as having no such intentions. 

All that France has ever asked is the fulfilment of the Treaty. 
Possibly Mr. Lloyd George may find these demonstrations use- 
ful in order to conciliate a certain political section which he 
does not wish to antagonise. But he certainly has never been 
able to indicate one single instance in which France has sought 
to go beyond the conditions of the Treaty. 

At the time of the Frankfurt incident in 1920, the one occa- 
sion when his Government (or anyway his secretary, Mr. Philip 
Kerr : it is difficult to say how far Lord Curzon was responsi- 
ble) was so ill-advised as to make the attempt, Mr. Bonar Law 



THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES 259 

(as told in a former chapter) was forced to ask that he should 
not be compelled to explain fully the conduct of the Government 
in giving a certain statement to the Press. 

Similarly, invidious attempts have been made to convince 
the public, first, that France was not working, as every coun- 
try must now work, for her own self-preservation; and sec- 
ondly, that she was not taxing herself sufficiently. 

Both suggestions are easily refuted. 

Since 1919 — since the conclusion of the war in which she 
lost 1,364,000 in men killed, 740,000 mutilated, and 3,000,000 
wounded, a war which increased her debt from 35 to 221 mil- 
liards — France has, without outside assistance, and without the 
aid of payment by Germany, spent 25 milliards on the work 
of reconstruction ; has brought back to the destroyed regions 
75 per cent, of the population driven out by the German in- 
vasion ; has repaired her railways, 52 per cent, of her roads, and 
84 per cent, of her canals ; got on a working basis 26 per cent, 
of her destroyed factories ; has brought again under cultivation 
6S per cent, of her devastated land; and, finally, has reopened 
99 per cent, of her schools. 

Taxation is purely an internal question. It has nothing what- 
ever to do with the execution of the Treaty of Versailles. 

Under that Treaty certain compensations were guaranteed to 
France. They were guaranteed unconditionally. There were 
no reservations to the effect that the clauses of the Treaty af- 
fecting France would be operative only if she taxed herself as 
heavily as England (or any other country) thought was proper. 

That point being clear, it may be added that, if France does 
not impose sufficient taxation, she herself will be the ultimate 
sufferer. At the present time French taxation, especially di- 
rect taxation, is very much less severe than that which prevails 
in England. But that does not tell the whole story. I leave 
aside the fact that a country which has not only for some years 
been partly in the possession of the invader, but which has 
been purposely despoiled by that invader, is in a special cate- 
gory for taxation purposes. For there is another, a deeper rea- 
son, which renders heavy direct taxation almost impossible in 
France. 



260 THE POMP OF POWER 

I recall a conversation with M. Jean Dupuy a few months 
before his death. M. Dupuy was a practical politician in the 
best sense of that phrase and an astute man of affairs. He 
said that he did not exactly see how France could surmount 
her financial difficulties, that he could perceive no way out of 
what he called a vicious circle ; and that he would despair, were 
it not for his unalterable conviction that his country must in- 
evitably triumph, that France could not be crushed. 

I referred to the matter of direct taxation. M. Dupuy 
pointed out that it would be difficult to collect a very heavy 
income tax anywhere in France, and impossible in the country 
districts: that it was a tax so opposed to tradition (which in 
France means more than it does in England) that its payment 
would be systematically evaded. 

The obvious retort is that conscription was opposed to the 
traditions of Great Britain. But there is a vast difference be- 
tween war-time measures and enactments operative in time of 
peace. 

Finally, I am convinced that British public opinion is not in 
favour of Great Britain taking advantages under the Treaty, 
and preventing or in any way being an obstacle to France get- 
ting what the Treaty guarantees her. The truth is that the 
whole matter has become so complicated by various confer- 
ences, which have been the signal for a cloud of official and 
semi-official announcements, that the country is far from be- 
ing clear about where the matter rests to-day. But if the 
point was put plainly — are we to take our part and not support 
France in getting hers — the answer would undoubtedly be in 
the negative. There is the strongest aversion to any further 
war. But the country is equally at one with France about the 
execution of the Treaty, as it was about the waging of the war. 

Nor is any such stand openly taken by the Manchester 
Guardian and the Daily Neios. Their opposition, as stated, 
is rather to the Treaty as a whole. 

The only newspaper which to-day says that England should 
get what she can and let France make the best of it is the Daily 
Express. This is the organ of Lord Beaverbrook, who is at all 
times one of the most insidious enemies of France. Many in- 



THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES 261 

stances might be given. It will suffice to refer to one of the 
most recent. After the London Conference in May, 1921, the 
Daily Express blamed Mr. Lloyd George for having allowed 
France to impose her views ; and added that the policy of the 
Government ought to be inspired solely by England's own in- 
terests. 

But after all France looks not so much to British public 
opinion as to the British Prime Minister, who made the Treaty 
with that public opinion in view, always repeating that he alone 
understood it, always considering it, and always protesting 
about the allowance which should be made for it. 

In the result the French view is that since the Treaty was 
signed Mr. Lloyd George has subordinated the interests of 
France to the exigencies of his own political situation. Un- 
fortunately the Prime Minister's conduct at the Peace Confer- 
ence, as well as his subsequent attitude, have given some ground 
for this suspicion. 

It would be unfair to judge Mr. Lloyd George solely upon 
the evidence of French witnesses. But we have the testimony 
of Mr. Robert Lansing, the American Secretary of State, and 
also one of the plenipotentiaries to the Conference. Referring 
to Mr. Lloyd George's insistence upon the inclusion in the 
Treaty of certain of his election promises, he proceeds : 

"He was, besides, resolved to obtain the cession of the prin- 
cipal German colonies in Africa, and of the German Islands in 
the Pacific, south of the Equator; the control of Mesopotamia; 
a protectorate over Egypt, and a protectorate over Persia if the 
affairs of Persia were to be settled by the Conference; the de- 
struction of German naval power, and the elimination of the 
German merchant marine, the rival of Great Britain in the 
commerce of the world. The British Prime Minister clung 
tenaciously to these precise and essentially concrete and egoist 
aspirations of his country; and by his adroit way of manoeu- 
vring was able to get satisfaction upon almost all. But he 
seemed to think that once these ends were attained, the decisions 
regarding other questions were of relatively slight importance 
unless they directly interested Great Britain, and that to study 
them carefully was a needless waste of time and energy." 



262 THE POMP OF POWER 

Mr. Lansing's unprejudiced account proves once again that 
Mr. Lloyd George deserves the gratitude of his country. He 
neglected no opportunity to get for her what he thought was 
right. 

But, on the other hand, if an American observer thought that 
Mr. Lloyd George cared for nothing except getting what he 
wanted for his own country, it is not surprising that Frenchmen 
with equal opportunities of observation came to the conclusion 
that if the British Prime Minister was indifferent to their 
claims during the Conference, he could hardly be relied upon to 
enforce the fulfilment of the Treaty in favour of their coun- 
try once his own had actually been paid. 

What has happened since has strengthened this conviction. 
The destruction of the German Fleet, the dispersal of the Ger- 
man merchant marine, the possession of the German colonies — 
upon all these points, which Mr. Lloyd George made his chief 
concern at the Conference, Great Britain has already received 
full satisfaction. But in respect to the clauses of the Treaty 
guaranteeing France that the things to which she, on her part, 
attached most importance — disarmament and payment for re- 
paration — Germany has long been in default. Nor has Mr. 
Lloyd George been a firm or consistent friend in supporting 
France in her efforts to obtain fulfilment. 

It is admitted that his parliamentary statements sometimes 
leave little to be desired, but it is thought that his actions at the 
decisive moments have not been consistent with his speeches. 

Without having recourse to any of the extreme (and some- 
times unjust) criticisms of Mr. Lloyd George, I will quote two 
from sources which are moderate. M. Andre Tardieu, who 
throughout his book is scrupulously fair to Mr. Lloyd George, 
says : 

"Aucun Frangaise n'oublie, ni n'oubliera le role immense que 
la Grande Bretagne a joue dans la Guerre, et, dans le role im- 
mense, le role immense de son premier ministre. Mais aucun 
Frangaise non plus ne se resignera a souscrire a la fagon dont 
M. Lloyd George a concu I'execution de la paix. Passionement 
amoureux des solutions rapides, impatient des long efforts, M. 
Lloyd George s'est laisse prendre en 1920 aux formules de 



THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES 263 

moindre energie qu'il avait repudiees in 1919. De ce fait, TAn- 
gleterre est apparue a la France comme moins soucieuse que 
celle-ci d'imposer a TAllemagne le respect de ses devoirs. Trop 
d'Anglais ont oublie que leur pays, si magnifiquement qu'il ait 
travaille pour la victoire, n'a ete ni envahi ni saccage. Trop 
d'Anglais ont meconnu qu'a la France saignante et ruinee autre 
chose etait du que le conseil quotidien de renoncer a son droit. 
L'immense majorite du peuple brittanique, ni, j'en ai I'assur- 
ance, M. Lloyd George lui-meme, n'ont varie dans leur senti- 
ments de loyale fraternite a I'egard du peuple frangais. Mais 
tant de gens ont affirme que la France seule retarde I'avenement 
de la paix, en reclamant I'execution d'un traite qui lie les vain- 
queurs entre eux, comme les vaincus par rapport aux vain- 
queurs ; si peu ont explique notre ineluctable necessite d'obte- 
nir reparation sous peine de plier, pour un demi-siecle, sous le 
faix in juste d'une charge ecrasante que I'equivoque orale dres- 
sait entre les deux pays a irrite le nerfs et trouble les espirits. 
Reduit a ses elements de base, le probleme est simple. Si les 
chefs responsables de la politique britannique infligeant un 
dementi aux engagements souscrits par eux en 191 9, pensent 
que les clauses de reparations sont inexecutables, ils avaient, en 
conseillant a la France de reduire une revendication sanctionee 
par leurs signatures, le devoir de lui offrir les compensations 
financieres en leur pouvoir et la garantie du minimum auquel 
ils le pressaient de se resigner. lis ne I'ont point fait." ^^ 

Again, Le Temps, after having expressed the opinion that 
Mr. Lloyd George's attitude towards France would have a per- 
manent effect on the Entente, returned to the subject a few days 
later (May 6th, 1921), saying: "The speech made yesterday 
by Mr. Lloyd George will not suffice to efface the impression 
produced in France by the decision of London, even though 
the British Prime Minister spoke before the House of Com- 
mons as one would have liked to hear him speak during the Ses- 
sions of the Supreme Council." 

France is to-day convinced that Mr. Lloyd George has two 
voices. This sentiment was in no degree impaired by the Lon- 
don Conference of May, 1921. It was recognised that what- 
ever had been obtained was due more to M. Briand's firmness 
'^ La Faix, p. 494. 



264 THE POMP OF POWER 

than to Mr. Lloyd George's sincerity or goodwill. Moreover, 
the actual result of that Conference was not regarded with any 
great satisfaction. The arrangement seemed to be better than 
the Paris plan in respect to the amounts of the earlier pay- 
ments. But an element of uncertainty was introduced by mak- 
ing the trend of German imports a basis of calculation. In 
other ways, and as an agreement between the Allies themselves, 
it was considered to be upon the whole an improvement upon 
former efforts. 

But when these and all other arguments in favour of the last 
ultimatum were admitted, the fact remained that it might re- 
sult only in another promise being made by Germany. There 
was no desire in France that Germany should reject it. But 
there was no illusion about the true import of acceptance. It 
was realised that it meant another German signature ; that pos- 
sibly it might mean that and nothing more ; that the signature 
of May, 1921, might prove to be of no more practical value than 
the German signature of June, 1919.^'^ It was not an encourag- 
ing sign that a large section of the German Press urged ac- 
ceptance upon the ground that an opportunity might thus be 
found for later discussion of various points. The fact that 
the German Government would have to guarantee execution 
"without conditions or reserves" seemed to mean nothing to 
these newspapers ; whilst they held out the hope that before 
complete execution there might be differences of opinion be- 
tween England and France by which Germany would profit. 

M. Poincare wrote, after the London Conference, that M. 
Briand had had to contend against a prejudice on the part of 
some of France's Allies which carried everything before it; 
and that in the result, not only had further delay been granted, 
but that the conditions presented to Germany had been attenu- 
ated in various ways. Further, he alleged that it was under 
the pressure of those Governments that the Reparations Com- 
mission, which was summoned to come from Paris to London 
during the Conference, withdrew the demand it had previously 

'^ This has been borne out by much which has occurred since these 
words were written. 



THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES 265 

made regarding the milliard marks gold deposited in the Reichs- 
bank.^'^ 

Moreover, the character of Mr. Lloyd George's speech in 
the House of Commons on May 13th, 1921, regarding the 
trouble in Silesia, had the unfortunate but natural effect of cre- 
ating the impression that he was inclined to be more concerned 
about infractions of the Treaty when Germany stood to lose 
than he was when they were at the expense of France, 

The British Prime Minister spoke with solemnity about the 
necessity of observing the Treaty of Versailles. The French 
comment was that it was regrettable that he had not always 
censured with equal severity and promptitude lapses on the 
part of Germany more grave and more clearly proved than 
those charged against the Polish Government. 

Indeed, subsequent developments have shown that on this 
occasion neither Mr. Lloyd George's statement of present oc- 
currences nor his summary of Polish history would stand 
very close scrutiny. 

It was, however, more difficult to take seriously the sequence 
of his discourse. For the Prime Minister proceeded to draw 
a picture of Germany at some future time declining to carry 
out her obligations, and basing her refusal upon the example 
of Poland having with impunity defied the Treaty. Hence, ac- 
cording to Mr. Lloyd George, the imperative necessity to com- 
pel Poland instantly to conform to its terms. 

It would be difficult to give a better illustration of an inverted 
argument. Did it never occur to Mr. Lloyd George that if 
Poland was, in fact, evading the Treaty of Versailles (which 
has not yet been proved), it might well be because he had for 
many months allowed Germany openly to set at naught the 
same Treaty? It will suffice to refer to the troops maintained 
in Bavaria and elsewhere, after repeated summonses. 

" Whether or not M. Poincare's specific allegation is correct, it is 
undeniable that the London Conference demonstrated publicly what had 
long been known in certain circles, viz., that the Reparations Com- 
mission had been deprived of all independence, and was used or ignored 
as the majority of the Allies desired from time to time. It will be 
remembered that M. Poincare himself resigned the Presidency of that 
Commission when he came to the conclusion that he could serve his 
country more usefully otherwise. 



266 THE POMP OF POWER 

The Prime Minister's regrettable outburst was not allowed 
to pass without a speedy retort. Those who read it one morn- 
ing, and who knew M. Briand, realised that Mr. Lloyd George 
would undoubtedly hear some plain speaking in reply. Indeed, 
that same afternoon, M. Briand made to the correspondents of 
the Foreign Press who came to see him at the Quai d'Orsay, a 
statement equally as pointed, and more founded on facts than 
that of Mr. Lloyd George. After questioning the exactitude 
of the Prime Minister's history,-^ M. Briand warned Germany 
with impressive sternness that she would take any action in 
Silesia at the risk of war with France. While finally he said, 
without any ambiguity, that it was not within Mr. Lloyd 
George's province to assume to settle these matters alone. "We 
are great countries who can talk looking each other in the 
face. Neither of us has the right to give any orders to the 
other. The British Prime Minister cannot alone take the initia- 
tive to authorise German troops to penetrate into Upper 
Silesia." 

In brief, M. Briand intimated to Mr. Lloyd George that 
France would not accept the role of a brilliant second. In so 
doing he both assuaged the wounded feelings of his own coun- 
trymen, and also once again directed British public opinion to 
the point from which Mr. Lloyd George had been leading it 
astray (the point which I venture to think is undoubtedly the 
most important in considering the present relations between 
the two countries) : that France wants only that by which Great 
Britain has already benefited — the execution of the Treaty of 
Versailles. 

In all these circumstances — in view of what has happened in 
the past, and of the atmosphere created in the present — French 
public opinion would greatly have preferred to have some solid 
security which this time might have bound Germany to her 
engagements. 

It was not M. Briand's fault that he returned to Paris 
empty-handed. Upon that point Mr. Lloyd George was ada- 

'^The Polish Prime Minister, M. Witas, speaking in the Diet on May 
19th, 1921, challenged the accuracy of Mr. Lloyd George's history even 
more bluntly, and referred him to "Volume 25, Page 90, of the 
Encyclopcedia Britannica, a British work of reference." 



THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES 267 

mant. Nevertheless the London Conference may be regarded as 
a step in the right direction. But it is a step of which the ulti- 
mate result depended mainly upon the policy pursued by Down- 
ing Street. 

Unfortunately it has since become known that at least one 
political party in Germany withdrew its opposition to the ac- 
ceptance of these conditions (and doubtless also to the fulfil- 
ment of them) by reason of assurances given through the 
British Ambassador, Herr Stresemann, the leader of the Peo- 
ple's Party (of which Hugo Stinnes is the mainspring), who 
was a competitor with Herr Wirth for the Chancellorship, sub- 
mitted, through the British Embassy, several questions which 
he desired to have answered by Mr. Lloyd George himself. 
According to his own version of this transaction ^^ neither 
Herr Stresemann nor his party considered that the reply made 
by Lord d'Abernon, giving his personal impression in respect 
of the questions, was sufficient to modify their attitude towards 
the ultimatum : but that the day after it had been accepted "an 
official reply" arrived which was communicated to Herr Strese- 
mann by Lord d'Abernon. This answer of "the English Gov- 
ernment" was esteemed to be satisfactory in regard to the with- 
drawal of the penalties ; and not unsatisfactory respecting 
Upper Silesia and the other points in question. 

When the story of this extraordinary proceeding first be- 
came current an official communique was issued to the effect 
that there was not the least foundation for the assertion that 
the Prime Minister had been in private communication with 
Herr Stresemann or with any German statesman upon the sub- 
ject of Upper Silesia. This was true to the letter. But the 
announcement was lacking in amplitude. For to the ordinary 
mentality, a German statesman who hands a Hst of questions 
to the British Embassy asking that they should be forwarded 
to the British Prime Minister for an answer, and is subse- 
quently given by the British Ambassador a reply which the lat- 
ter has received, and states that he has received, from Down- 
ing Street, is fairly entitled to say that the reply comes from 

^In a letter to the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung: quoted in Le Temps, 
August 1st, 1921. 



268 THE POMP OF POWER 

the Prime Minister. While it is significant that after Herr 
Stresemann had published the exact facts, as above recounted, 
there was no further official denial, or even explanation. The 
fact, uncontroverted and uncontrovertible, is that Mr. Lloyd 
George or his Cabinet (if he prefers to shelter himself be- 
hind that barrier), did make an independent official communi- 
cation to the leader of a German political party, upon a question 
affecting all the Allies, and especially France. 

The questions and answers were as follows: 

Question : Will acceptance by Germany of the Allies' condi- 
tions involve cancellation of the sanctions imposed in March 
last after the Conference in London? 

Answer: The sanctions imposed on March 8th, especially 
those involving the occupation of Diisseldorf, Duisburg, and 
Ruhrort, and the establishment of a Rhineland Customs barrier, 
ought, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, to be can- 
celled in the event of the acceptance of the Allied demands. 
The opinion of His Majesty's Government on this point is be- 
ing communicated to the French Government. 

Question : Can His Majesty's Government give an assur- 
ance to the effect that they will not allow any solution of Up- 
per Silesian questions other than the one founded on the report 
already made by the British representative of the Plebiscite 
Commission ? 

Answer : The German Government may rely on the desire 
of His Majesty's Government to pay due regard to the impor- 
tant German interests involved, and, although it is not possible 
without prior consultation with Great Britain's Allies to give an 
assurance in the sense desired, the German Government may 
rest assured that His Majesty's Government will press for an 
equitable settlement on the basis of strict, impartial execution 
of the Treaty of Versailles. 

It was at this very period that Mr. Lloyd George was urging 
that France ought not to send another division to Upper Silesia 
(to ensure the safety of the troops she already had there) with- 
out a prior agreement with Great Britain. It has been per- 
tinently asked whether it was more serious to send a few thou- 
sand men to Silesia, which could not affect British interests, or 



THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES 269 

to promise Germany an abrogation of penalties, thereby pos- 
sibly causing a grave injury to French interests and French 
security. 

Leaving aside all question of fidelity to the country's en- 
gagements, I propose now to examine the effect of Mr. Lloyd 
George's counsels from the standpoint of whether or not it is 
in the interests of Great Britain — irrespective of every other 
consideration. When I refer to Mr. Lloyd George's "policy" I 
allude to what he actually has done, not to what he has said : for 
I am fain to agree with the French statesmen who affirm that 
upon this matter the Prime Minister's acts and words are not 
always reconcilable. 

For the past year or more Mr. Lloyd George has uncon- 
sciously been doing his utmost to prove that M. Caillaux was 
a true prophet. Caillaux consistently maintained that a clash 
with Germany would be disastrous for France, because even if 
she were victorious, thanks to English assistance, it would be 
England who would reap the major benefit, while France would 
be left saddled with the greater burden. 

What M. Caillaux years ago foretold would happen is exactly 
what many Frenchmen to-day say has happened. Moreover, 
those most forward in making such statements are not jour- 
nalists whom Mr. Lloyd George imagines are prejudiced 
against him, not violent writers in the Press, not confirmed 
opponents of M. Clemenceau, who denounce the results of the 
Treaty because it was partly his handiwork ; but they are men 
who have borne the same burden of office as Mr. Lloyd George, 
who are too patriotic to be inspired by personal feelings, and 
who, finally, certainly have no traditional sympathy with 
M. Caillaux: they include M. Poincare, who was Presi- 
dent of the Republic throughout the war; M. Andre Tardieu, 
who was Mr. Lloyd George's colleague at the Peace Confer- 
ence; M. Barthou, and General de Castelnau, to recapitulate the 
names of those only whose words I have cited textually. 

Poincare, Tardieu, Barthou, and de Castelnau stop short in 
their complaints. But others who hear them go one step fur- 
ther and say, "Eh bien ! Apres tout, Caillaux avait raison." 

In 1920 Mr. Lloyd George was warned that M. Barthou in- 



270 THE POMP OF POWER 

tended to speak in the Chambre des Deputes, assailing his policy 
(and, in fact, by chance M. Barthou spoke the same day as 
the Prime Minister made a conciliatory speech in the House 
of Commons) ; and was, I believe, told at the time that it was 
muttered in a high political circle in France that: "If Lloyd 
George means to turn to Berlin, we had better go there before 
him." 30 

In my opinion, this is an exaggeration of anything which 
is likely to happen. But what is true is that Mr. Lloyd George's 
policy is beginning to breed a party which sincerely believes 
that France is getting little or nothing from the Entente. There 
is no question about the great value placed upon a close under- 
standing and upon close co-operation with Great Britain. In- 
deed, it is exactly because so much was expected from those re- 
lations that the disappointment is so bitter. It is known that 
Clemenceau said: "In exchange for the two Treaties I have 
reduced the period (of occupation of the Rhine country) which 
I at first demanded," and that in the result France did not get 
the guarantee. It is known that Great Britain has already 
realised most of the advantages or compensations which accrued 
to her under the Treaty. It is known that France cannot rely 
even upon the full and undivided moral support of Mr. Lloyd 
George's Government in enforcing execution of the provisions 
which most vitally affect her. 

It has been said that Englishmen are wont to forget that 
they are also Europeans. In previous generations that may 
have been an error. To-day it is almost a crime. For with 
the changed mode of warfare and the development of engines 
of war (a development which is still in progress), England in 
time of conflict now has few of the advantages of being an 
island, while retaining all the disadvantages, and notably that 
of an island which cannot feed herself. 

The conditions under which invasion might be possible is a 
tempting subject, barred to those who can profess no compe- 
tence in military speculations. But not many soldiers will dis- 

^ Since these lines were written, M. Loucheur, the most practical and 
one of the ablest of French statesmen, has taken the indicated path by 
negotiating directly with Herr Rathenau. 



THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES 271 

sent from the suggestion that the situation would be parlous 
were Calais, Boulogne, and other Channel ports in hostile 
hands. 

Any policy of isolation, so far from being "splendid" would 
be alike fatal to this country and disastrous for the cause of 
peace in Europe. 

When General Smuts recently made such a suggestion the 
Times pointed out that there was no such poHtical tradition as 
General Smuts imagined; and that, on the contrary, from the 
days of the Tudors downwards, Great Britain had been forced 
to take an active part in the affairs of Europe for the sole pur- 
pose of ensuring her own safety. 

For the reasons already stated, that necessity is even stronger 
to-day than ever before. While the manner in which we some- 
times in the past participated in Continental arrangements (by 
temporarily aiding one Power against another, such assistance 
ranging from moral support to the payment of subsidies, as 
circumstances might demand) is to-day neither feasible nor in 
harmony with the spirit of the times. 

John Bright once called the system of the Balance of Power 
a gigantic scheme for the out-door relief of the aristocracy 
of Great Britain. There is now neither demand nor room 
for any balance of Power of that nature. But our only 
security in the event of war is a Continental alliance. 

What is more important, and what is more desired by British 
public opinion, is some security against war. That again can 
only be obtained by an alliance with a country which has ports 
within a certain distance of England. Only two countries come 
within that category: France and Germany. 

If Mr. Lloyd George sincerely believes that France has 
ideas of territorial expansion he is right in rejecting the idea 
of any closer understanding.^^ That might mean a war of 
aggression, and Great Britain is almost unanimously opposed 
to any participation in conflicts of that nature. 

But it must be said in passing that even that sincere be- 
lief would not relieve Mr. Lloyd George from the obligation 

"Written some six months before the Cannes Conference. 



272 THE POMP OF POWER 

of seeing that France gets justice in the execution of the 
Treaty. 

If the Prime Minister thinks that an alhance with France 
might commit the country, then he must look elsewhere. He 
can only look towards Germany, While if he does not look in 
time he may look there in vain. 

To-day such statements may seem fantastic. But the face 
of foreign affairs changes quickly, and the cardinal error 
of statesmen in power from the days of Greece until our own 
time has been to think that the present must always continue. 
For instance, who would have said in 1900 that Japan, a 
country into which, fifty years earlier, no foreigner was al- 
lowed to enter, would, as the result of the war, be to-day one 
of the four Great Powers of the world? 

Who would have said ten years ago that Poland, that king- 
dom dead for two centuries, would be a national entity in 1920? 

Or, if such examples fail to convince Mr. Lloyd George 
that it is difficult to see the future in foreign affairs, that what 
seems fanciful to-day may be a fact to-morrow, he might re- 
call the statement he himself made in January, 19 14, that the 
idea of the possibility of war with Germany was absurd, and 
that the peace of the world was so assured that the strength 
of the British Navy ought to be reduced without any further 
delay. 

M. Tardieu has asked — and has answered — the question 
whether or not it is too late to repair the faults committed 
since the Treaty was signed at Versailles. He naturally and 
properly regards the question from the standpoint of a pa- 
triotic Frenchman. No doubt he endorses what M. de Frey- 
cinet said in his "Souvenirs" : "The security of a great peo- 
ple ought not to rest upon the goodwill of others, but upon the 
precautions which it takes by its armaments and its alli- 
ances." Looking at it from the other side of the Channel, 
I am convinced that the prosperity of Great Britain depends 
upon the prompt execution of the Treaty, and the conclusion 
of a defensive alliance with France. 

Mr, Charles Schwab, a firm friend of the Allies from the 
early days of August, 1914, and one of the greatest economic 



THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES 273 

authorities in the United States, speaking at a recent meeting 
of the New York Chamber of Commerce, said: 

"I have just returned from Europe and I have come with 
renewed admiration for the courage, enterprise, and determi- 
nation displayed by France, England, Belgium, and Italy. 
These nations were wonderful as our Allies in the war, and are 
marvellous in meeting the tasks of peace; but if there is one 
thought above all others that was borne in upon me by my ob- 
servations in Europe, it is that Germany has gone back to work 
as has no other nation in Europe. 

"Believing as I do that the strength and prosperity of a 
nation depend on the efficiency of its labour, I had something 
of a shock in contemplating this thought : Is it possible, after 
having won the war, we of the Allied nations, with everything 
in our hands, will allow Germany to win the peace through the 
efforts of her labour? 

"Germany to-day can put a ton of steel into England twenty 
dollars cheaper than it costs England to make it. Germany 
to-day is selling pneumatic tools in Detroit, where formerly we 
made such machinery and shipped it to Germany to be sold 
cheaper than she could make it. The difference is solely a 
matter of labour costs." ^^ 

Every time it appears that Great Britain and France are 
not absolutely unanimous in their determination to compel Ger- 
many to honour her signature; every time that Mr. Lloyd 
George publicly sets himself up as an arbitrator; every time 
that the Berlin Press has reason to announce that France 
cannot persuade England to assist her in forcing Germany 
to execute the Treaty — the commercial superiority indicated by 
Mr. Schwab is confirmed and enhanced; and Germany is en- 
couraged to evade her obligations. 

The only safe policy for Great Britain is a strong defen- 
sive alliance. If Mr. Lloyd George impairs the understanding 
with France the chances are that he is conducting his country 
to a fate which will obscure to posterity the great services he 
rendered during the war.^^ Opportunism may sometimes be 

'^ But the question of exchange plays a great part in that. 

^ I have admitted that, failing an alliance with France, the most 
logical and, in the end, the safest policy, would be an alliance with 
Germany, but do not desire to consider the prospect further. 



274 THE POMP OF POWEK 

temporarily profitable in party politics. But in the conduct of 
foreign affairs it can only create confusion and breed bad 
feeling. In that domain a settled policy is essential; and no 
sporadic displays of clever manipulations can inspire the same 
degree of confidence or ensure the same measure of security. 
Unfortunately it cannot be denied that at present, instead of 
going towards a closer and more formal understanding with 
France, he is contributing to the degeneration, if not to the 
dissolution, of the Entente. 

Some months ago the Times said that the true results of 
the war depended absolutely upon the cordiality and the in- 
timacy of our relations with France; that an official under- 
standing was not sufficient ; what was necessary was a friend- 
ship, penetrating men and women of all classes and condi- 
tions in both countries. 

More than that, what is necessary for the security of Eng- 
land, for the peace of Europe, and for the immediate future 
of civilisation is an absolute defensive alliance between the 
two countries, 

Victor Hugo, referring to a peace conference, once wrote: 
"Le congres, c'est I'Angleterre serrant la main a la France, 
c'est I'Amerique serrant la main a I'Europe." That is equally 
true to-day, and in existing circumstances the first step lies 
with the British Government. 



INDEX 



INDEX 



Accambray, M. Leon, 50 
Addison, Dr., 175 

Debate on doctor's salary, 192 
Agadir, turns the tide in 

France, 3 
Lloyd George's warning to 

Germany, 191 1, 5 
Crisis, 191 1 ; plans regarding 

British troops, 7 

140, 145 
Aitken, Sir Max, afterwards 

Lord Beaverbrook, 112 
Albert Gate, 13 
Alenson, d', 67 
Algeciras, 1906, 3 
Allenby, 105 
Alsace-Lorraine and treaty of 

1892, 2 
Bismarck's opinion, 15, 216 
America, 7 
American view of disarmament, 

248 
Amiens, 13 
Amsterdam, 178 
Armistice, 42 

Artois, second battle of, 63 
Asquith, Mr., 10, 94 

Brilliant career at Oxford, 

no 
Practically deserted by Bonar 

Law and Balfour, 112, 114, 

116, 118, 119 
His passing sounded knell of 

Gladstonian Liberalism, 

121, 154, 155 



Argued Coalition only ar- 
ranged for duration of 
war, 161 
Party ties, 162, 173 

Asquith's, Mrs., book, 194-197 

Auberive, 72 

Austrian and German Ambassa- 
dors and English neutral- 
ity, 12 

Austro-Hungary treaty with 
Central Powers, 1879, 2 
Annexes Bosnia and Herzgo- 
vinia, 1908, 3 

Aux Ecoutes, 183 

Ayres, Leonard P., 255 



B 



Balfour, Mr., 117, 120, 154 
Not appreciated by French 

politicians, 157, 164 
Succeeds Salisbury, his char- 
acter, 168 
On prevention of war, 249 
Bannerman, Campbell-, no 
Bapaume, 66, y2 
Barnes, Mr., 235 
Barthelmy, General, 202 
Barthou, M., 4, 125, 131, 150, 
231 
On France after the War, 
270 
Bathurst, Lady, 192 
Beauchamp, Lord, opposed to 
intervention, 1914, 11 
In favour of neutrality, 12 
Beauvais, G. H. Q., 65, 7:^ 



277 



278 



INDEX 



Beaverbrook, 112, 113, 114, 
192, 260 

Belfort to Mezieres line, 24 

Belgian attitude to France be- 
comes known, 10 

Belgium, 5, 9, 13 

Results of invasion, 16 
Violation of neutrality, 29 
Opinion of French General 

Staff, 38 
Places railways at France's 
disposal, 203 

Berenger, Senator Henry, 73 
Report on result of two days* 
offensive, 83 

Beresford, Lord Charles, 100 

Berlin, 2, 4, 11 

Berne, 178 

Bernhardi, 15 

On the offensive, 23 

Berthelot, Andre, 127, 128 

Berthelot, General, 21, 34, 52 

Berthelot, Philippe, 114, 127 

Bertie, Lord, 60, 128, 166 

Birkenhead, Lord, Lord Chan- 
cellor, 167 

Bismarck, i, 2, 15 

Alteration of Kaiser's tele- 
gram, 15 
And peace terms, 15 
On fidelity of nations, 16 
On Lord Salisbury, 168 

Bliss, General, 92, 224 

Bloch, 22 

Blowitz, de, i, 199 

Bodley, Mr., 173 

Bonnal, General, 18 

Bordeaux, 41 
Sept., 191 4, 46 

Borden, Sir Robert, 241 

Bosnia, annexation of, 1908, 3 

Bottomley, Mr. Horatio, 198 

Bouillon, Franklin-, came to 
London, Oct., 1917, 92, 
150 



Boulanger, General, 47 

Boulogne, 15 

Bourgeois, M. Leon, 140 

Brazil, 211 

Briamont, projected attack on, 

84 
Briand, M., 4 

Supports Joffre, 49 
Resignation of Ministry, 53 
At Calais, 67 

Message to British Govern- 
ment regarding Haig, 68 
Downfall of Government, 69 
Resignation of, 69, 70 
Resigned, Dec, 1916, 126, 
128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 
134, 135, 138, 146, 148, 
150, 152 
Rated Lloyd George's quali- 
ties at proper value, 155 
On alarm for future, 247 
Briey, 29 
Bright, John, 271 
British Empire, 16 
British Fleet, 13 
British Government, decision 
regarding support of 
France, 10, 16 
British Mission at G.Q.G., ()"] 
British War Cabinet met in 

London, March 4, 68 
Brodrick, St. John, 166 
Broglie, due de, 139 
Brougham, 167 
Buat, Lieut.-Colonel, 24 

And Plan XVH., 25 
Bullitt episode, 203, 207 
Billow, von, 25, 42 
Burnham, Lord, 191, 197 
Burns, Mr. John, 11 
Byng, 105 

C 

Cabinet and Lord Haldane, ii 
Meeting, Aug. 2, 1914, 12 



INDEX 



279 



Second meeting, Aug. 4, 

1914, 12 
Division of opinion in 1914, 
10 
Cadorna, 92 
Caillaux, M. Joseph, 61, 125, 

138, 139 
Pre -War policy of, 140, 141, 

^43 
Accused of having negotia- 
tions with German Em- 
bassy in Paris, 144, 145 
Character and temperament, 

146, 147 
Opinion of Great Britain, 148 
Sent on commercial mission 
to Brazil and the Argen- 
tine, 149, 150, 151 
Forecast of the future, 152 
Accused of treachery, 153, 
269 
Calais, 15 

Allied conference, 67 
Agreement, Briand's blunt 
statement, 68 
Cambon, M. Jules, 132, 142, 

227 
Cambon, M. Paul, French Am- 
bassador, 5, 10, 12, 13 
Hope and fear regarding 
Great Britain, 1914, 13, 17, 

94, 95, 144, 145 
On Lord Derby, 165 
On Lord Salisbury, 168 
Cambrai — Le Cateau zone, 13, 

104 
Cannes, 126 

Conference, 170 
Caporetto, 92 
Capus, M, Alfred, criticises 

Woodrow Wilson, 159 
Carson, Sir Edward, 114 

A mystery to French politi- 
cians, 157 
Casablanca deserters, 3 



Castelnau, General de, 7, 8, 17, 
21, 32, 46 
Return from Salonica, 48 
Suggested Commander-in- 
Chief, 57, 67 
In Russia, 67, yj, 136, 255 
On France after the War, 269 
Cecil, Lord Robert, much re- 
spected in France, 157, 167, 
170 
Central Powers, 2 
Chamberlain, Austen, 112 

Present position, 168, 171 
Chamberlain, Joseph, 117 
Champagne, Battle of, 63 
Chantilly, French G.H.Q., 44 

JofTre at, 45 
Charleroi, Battle of, 34, 36, 37, 

39 
Cherche-Midi, 20 
Churchill, Lord Randolph, 116, 

118, 168 
Churchill, Mr. Winston, 10, 157 
Character of, 164 
Opposition to Lloyd George, 
164 
Churchill, Late Lady Randolph, 

164 
Clemenceau, M., 3, 4 
Support of Gallieni, 42 
And de Castelnau, 42 
Succeeds Painleve, 58 
Fierce attack on Painleve, 70, 
93, 103, 106, 108, 109, 122, 
123, 125, 128, 131, 135, 
136, 150 
Remained in office till end of 

War, 150 
Methods clash with Caillaux, 

Small appreciation of Lloyd 
George, who reciprocated, 
156, 158 

And Bolshevist Government, 
207 



280 



INDEX 



Report on Senlis, 216 

And Peace Conference, 226 

And occupation of the Rhine, 

227 
Ratification of Treaty by 

Congress, 231 
Holds firm on occupation of 

Germany, 236 
And League of Nations, 248 
Clynes, Mr., 180 
Combes, M., 126 
Commission d'Enquete sur la 

role et la situation de la 

Metallurgie en France, 7 
General Ruffey's testimony, 

22 
On Briey, 28 
Jofifre's evidence on Marne, 

39 
General Percin's evidence, 26 
Jofifre on Belgium's attack, 34 
Compiegne, 35 

Council, April 6, 1917, T], 
107 
Concentration allemande, La, 24 
Conseil, President du, yj 
Conseil Superieur de la Guerre, 
20 
Records about heavy artillery, 

26 
Gallieni's resignation, 26 
Constantin, Sarrail's lack of 

confidence in, 59 
Council of Ten, 1919, 240 
Cowdray, Lord, 187 
Craonne, 66 

Crewe, Lord, Mr. Long's amia- 
ble criticisms of, 118 
Critique des Travaux du Grand 

Etat-Major, 23 
Cromer, Lord, 117 
Cunliffe, Lord, 12 
Curragh, 94 
Curzon, George, 166 
Curzon, Lord, 203, 208, 258 



D 



Daily Chronicle, 185 
Daily Express, 192, 260 
Daily Mail, Paris edition, 192, 

199 
Daily News, 163, 197, 258, 

260 
Daily Telegraph, 191, 197 
Dalou, 201 
Darmstadt, 201 
Daudet, M. Leon, 4 
Delane, 191 
Delcasse, M., i, 3 
La Depcche de Toulouse, 46 
Derby, Lord, 95, 99, 128, 165 

In Paris, 166 

Returns to England, 167 
Deroulede, Paul, 4 
Deschanel, M., 123, 136, 205 
Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 

267 
Dieburg, 201 
Dilke, Charles, 197 
Direction of Control, 19 
Disraeli, 118, 168 
Dominique, rue St., 24 
Douamont, 64 
Doullens meeting, 55, 107, 

109 
Doumer, Paul, 52 

Receives news of Joffre at 
Neuilly, 53 

Opinion of Nivelle offensive, 

87. 132, 133. 134 
Doumergue, M., 126, 150, 227 
Downing Street, 11 
Driant, Colonel, 47 
Dubail, General, 26, 44 
Dubost, Antoine, President of 

the Senate, 76 
Dufiferin, Lord, 166 
Dunkirk, 31 
Dupont, General, 38 
Dupuy, M. Jean, 149, 228, 260 



INDEX 



281 



L'Echo de Paris, 183, 256 
Ecole Polytechnique, 27 
Ecole Superieure de Guerre, 24 
Einwohnerwehr, 246 
Emperor Wilhelm II., 27 
Ems, 15 

Engerand, M. Fernand, 17, 35 
England, i, 3, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12, 

16, 17 
Refusal to reinforce Salo- 

nica Expedition, 59 
English Fleet, 6 
English and French views about 

the War, 1914, 5 
English General Staff, 8 
English Government, 8 
English Offensive, April 9, 82 
Entente, The, 1904, i, 8 
Epinay, 14 

Esperey, Franchet d'. 78 
Etienne, M., 54 
Europe, i 
Evans, Sir Worthington, 175, 

186 
Evening News, 190 
Expeditionary Force, 13 



Falkenhayn, 51 
Fallieres, 124, 133 
Family Herald, The, 192 
Favre, Albert, 74 
Ferry, M. Abel, report on offen- 
sive, 83 

Most reliable statistics, 88 
Fifth Army, 33, 35 

Under Lanrezac, 37 
First Army, 33 
Fleming, Sir Stamford, 113 
Fleuriau, M. de, Charge d'Af- 

f aires, 11 
Flower, Peter, 197 



Foch, Marechal, 

Respect of German com- 
mands, 42 

Removed by Joffre from 
command, 54 

Style of conversation, 55 

And Macedonian crisis ; con- 
sidered as Joffre's suc- 
cessor, 62 

Created Chief of General 
Staff, 62 

To remain Chief-of-Staff, 
Dec, 1917, 93, 95 

With Wilson proposed for- 
mation of Executive War 
Committee, 97, 99, 100 

Organised reserves for 191 8 
campaign, 104-6 

Suffers from Clemenceau's 
dislike, 106, 108, 109, 
122 

Limits German troops in 
Ruhr, 201 

The Senlis Conference, 216 

On the Armistice, 216 

Occupation of the Rhine, 227 
Fondere, M., 143, 144 
Foreign Office and War Office, 

16 
Forgeot, M., 136 
France, i 

Emerges from twenty years 
of isolation, 1892, 2 

Depression after 1870, 4 

Agrees with political leaders 
that war is inevitable, 4, 6, 
7, 12, 14, 16, 17 

Prepared for war with Ger- 
many, 18 

Expenditure on Army from 
1872-1912, 18 

Ore and cast iron, 28 
Dissatisfaction with Ver- 
sailles Treaty, 253 

Taxation in, 259 



282 



INDEX 



Franchet d'Esperey, General, 

Suggested modification of 
plans to Nivelle, 73 
Frankfort incident, 166 

Occupation by French, April, 
1920, 201 
French, Sir John, 9, 13, 35 
And Lanrezac, 36, 39 
Suggestion re Marne, 42 
Anticipated end of War too 

soon, 45 
Called away from luncheon, 

54, 95 
French Ambassador, 13 
French Army, 17 
French Channel coast open to 

German assault, 12, 13 
French Fleet, 6 
French General Stafif, 7, 9, 13, 

Defective strategy, 18 

And Joffre, 21 

Error in estimating German 

shock effectives, 25 
And Plan XVII., 25 
Blames Lanrezac for retreat- 
ing, 35 
French Government at 19 19 
Peace Conference, 7 
Ignorance of Belgium's atti- 
tude, 9 
French military attache and let- 
ter re Kitchener, 24 
French Military Mission, 13 
French Parliament, 27 
French War Office, complicated 

system, 18 
Freycinet, M. de, 125, 272 

G 

Galiffet, General, 26 
GalHeni, 20 

Warning re Mauberge, 26 



Draws attention to need for 

heavy artillery, 26, 30 
Reaches age limit, 33 
On German attack, 34 
Battle of the Ourcq, 39 
At Paris, 41, 95, 108, 123, 

134 
Gambetta, 139 
Gardiner, Mr. A. G., 163 
Garvin, 160 
General Election, 191 8, 162, 

173 
General Staffs of France and 
England, 12, 17 

Unprepared in 1914, 27 

Defence of, 27 
George, Mr. Lloyd, derides idea 
of possibility of war, 1914, 
5, 10, 12, 60 

Impressed by Nivelle, 66 

At Calais, 67, 80, 81 

Impressed by disputes be- 
tween politicians and gen- 
erals, 91 

Recognises weakness lying 
in lack of unity, 92, 96 

Dislike of Robertson, 98, 100, 
loi, 103 

The antithesis of Mr. As- 
quith, 1 1 1 

Supported by Lord Beaver- 
brook, 112, 113, 116, 

Made his ultimatum and 

Asquith resigned, 119 
Formed a Government, 120 
Man made for the occasion, 
121, 128, 129, 130, 135, 

136, 153 

Party politics, 154 

Portrait drawn by anonymous 
critic, 154 

The only man capable of in- 
spiring enthusiasm, 154, 
156, 158 



INDEX 



283 



Did good work at Peace Con- 
ference, 158 
Upheld interests of his own 

country, 159 
Limited his efforts to what 

was feasible, 160 
Friends advised him to retire 

after General Election, 

1918, 161 
And General Election, 19 18, 

162 
Opposition to Winston 

Churchill, 164 
Opposition to Lord Derby, 

Sensitive to newspaper criti- 
cism, 183 
American and French Press, 

184 
Northclift'e Press, 187 
At San Remo, 204 
Message to Poland, 1920, 206 
On German payments, 235 
Since Peace Conference, 239 
Love of secrecy, 241 
Alarm at Germany's objec- 
tion, 243 
Derogations from Treaty, 244 
Treaty of Versailles, 252 
And public opinion, 254 
Irritation of France, 256 
Speech on Silesia, 265 
And Poland, 266 
German ambitions disclosed, 

1875. 2 

German and Austrian Ambassa- 
dors and English neutral- 
ity, 12 

German Government and 
French post-War activities, 
179 

German offensive, March 21, 
1918, lOI 

German retirement, March 16, 
72 



Germany, i, 2, 3 

Obtains retirement of M. 

Delcasse, 1905, 3 
Realisation of bond between 

France and Great Britain, 

1908, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 13, 14, 

15. 16 
Expenditure on Army, 1872- 

1912, 18 
Declaration of war, 18 
And metals, 29 
Buat's imaginary journey, 

Evasion of Treaty, 245 
Gillian, General, 216 
Gladstone, A man of many in- 
terests, 160, 176 
Goeppert, M., 201 
Goltz, von der, 15 
Gortchakoff, Prince, i 
Goschen, Sir Edward, 13 
Gosse, Edmund, 154 
Gough, 104 
Grand Couronne, 58 
Grandmaison, Colonel Loyseau 

de, 22 
Great Britain, i, 3, 4, 6 

France's plans against Ger- 
man invasion, 7 

Intervention in 1875, 15, 16 
Greece, Sarrail and, 60 
Greville's, Charles, diaries, 196 
Grey, Sir Edward, 1912, 5 

Letter of 1912, re views on 
war, 5, 6, 10, 12, 17 

Renewed activity, 174, 249 
Grouard, Lieut. -Colonel, 38 

H 

Haig, Sir Douglas, 13 
Fails Lanrezac, 37 
And Nivelle, 66 
At Calais, 67, 68 
Much criticised, 68, 79, 80 



284 



INDEX 



Wished offensive to continue, 

Subordination to N i v e 1 1 e 
ended, 91, 95, 97 

Wilson thought him pre- 
eminently suited to de- 
fence, 99, 107, 108 

Sent for Lloyd George and 
advocated unity of com- 
mand, 107 

At Senhs, 216 
Haldane, Lord, 3, 10 

His part during the War, 10, 

II, 94, 95 
Hankey, Colonel, 66 
Hanotaux, M., 33, 35 

On Lanrezac's command, 36 
Harding, President, 248 
Harmsworth, Mr. Alfred, 190 
Harms worth, Mr. Esmond, 192 
Hartington, Lord, 161 
Harvey, Mr., 248 
Heilbronner, Colonel, 72 
Hennessey, M. Jean, originated 

plan of unity of command, 

1916, 92 
Hermeix, M., 12 
Herve, Gustav, 58 
Herzgovinia, annexation, 1908, 

3 

High Command, 15 
Hindenburg, 51 
Hirschauer, General, 40 

Ordered to resume Craonne 
attack, 84 
Hirson, 24, 31 
Hodges, Mr., 181 
Holland, 14 

Hollweg, Bethmann-, 142 
Homburg, 201 
Home, Sir Robert, 105 

Man of pronounced promise, 
168 
Hotel des Invalides, Joffre at, 
53 



House, Colonel, 52, 216 

Opinion of Wilson, 220 
Hue, M., 46 
Hugo, Victor, 274 
Huguet, Colonel, 13 
Humbert, Charles, 149 



I 



L'nhistration, 236 

Industries of Occupied France, 

The, 179 
Italy, 2 

Crisis in 1914, 46 
Refusal to reinforce Salonica 
expedition, 59 

J 

James, Lord, of Hereford, 166 
Jamieson, Sir Starr, 117 
Jaures, 178 
Joffre, Marechal, 7, 8, 17, 18 

Offered post as successor of 
Michel, 20 

Vice-president of Conseil 
Superieur de la Guerre, 21 

Chief-of-Staff, 22, 26 

On preparation in peace time, 

27 
Defence of, 27 
On Briey, 28 

Explanation of Briey catas- 
trophe, 29, 31 
And Lanrezac, 33 
Advises British of danger, 35 
Acknowledges failure, 38 
Greatest value, 40 
Citation of Gallieni, 40 
And Dubail at Conference, 

44 
And the Driant affair, 47 
Refusal to resign, 52 
Resigns command at Chan- 

tilly, 53 



INDEX 



285 



Named Marechal of France, 
54, 70, 96, 108, 134 
Jones, Mr. Jack, 181 
Jones, Mr. Kennedy, 190 
Jouvenal, M. de, 136 
Jowett, no 

K 

Kerr, Mr. Philip, 203, 207, 243, 

258 
Keynes, Mr., 158, 163, 219, 239 
Kitchener, Lord, 13 

Warning to France, 1914, 23 

Pronounces against Salonica 
Army, 50 

His silence, 55 

At Fashoda, 66 
Klotz, 132, 234 
Kliick, von, 25, 35 

Explanation of change in di- 
rection of his Army, 42 

On German retreat, 43, 161 
Koeltz, Captain, 42 
Krassin, M., 208, 209 
Kriegspiel, 42 



Labour, prospects of success, 

175 
And Liberalism, 175 

Lacaze, Admiral, jj 

Lancken, M. de, 144 

Landwehr, The, 25 

Lanrezac, General, 6, 21, 33 
Receives Joffre's telegram, 35 
Relieved of his command, 36 
On Joffre and Dubail, 45 
Opinion of Joffre's silence, 

55 
Lansdowne, Lord, i, 11, 95, 

118, 154 
Lansing, Mr. Robert, 205, 207, 

220, 223 



Opinion of Lloyd George, 

240, 261 
Laon, 50, 76 

Not reached by Nivelle, 83 
La Russie des Tsars pendant 

la Guerre, 212 
Lassigny, 66, 72 
Lauzanne, M. Stephano, 220, 

222 
Law, Mr. Bonar, 11, 95, 112, 

114, 117, 119, 129 
Character, 163, 186, 229 

On occupation of Germany, 

235 
Lee, Lord and Lady, 182 
Lenin, 208, 213 
Lc Plan XV 11. (Payot, Paris), 

22 
On General Staff, 24 
On unpreparedness in 1914, 

28 
Le Revcrs de igi^ct scs Causes, 

27 
Leygues, 126, 150 
Liebknecht, 179 
Lille, 30 
Litvinoff, 208 
Lloyd, Mr. George, 95 
London meeting r.c Nivelle and 

Haig, 68 
Conference, 19 
Long, Mr. Walter, 112, 114, 

115, 116, 117 
Reminiscences of Disraeli, 

118 
Made Colonial Secretary, 

120, 162 
Longuet, 149 
Loubet, M., 124 
Loucheur, M., 29 

Came to London, Oct., 191 7, 

92, 108, 138, 229, 236, 

270 
Lucerne, 22 
Ludendorf, 51 



286 



INDEX 



Criticism of Petain's work, 

90 
Lyautey, General, 54, 65 
At Calais, 67 
Speech in Chambre de 

Deputes, March 6, 69 
Criticism of Nivelle, 70 
Expressed doubts to Pain- 

leve, 79 
Lytton, Lord, 166 

M 

Macaulay, 161 

Macedonia, Sarrail in, 59 
Critical situation, 60 

MacLean, Sir Donald, 173 

MacMahon, Marechal, 124 

Madagascar, 20 

Maginot, M., 'j'j 

Minister of the Colonies, 85 

Maine, Sir Henry, epigram, 124 

Malmaison, Battle of, 90 

Malvy, 150 

Mamers, 146 

Manchester Guardian, 177, 197, 
258, 260 

Mandel, 106 

Mangin, General, 26 

On Batde of Marne, 40 
Captures Douamont, 64, 66 
Criticises Nivelle, 74, 81 
Admitted difficulties in ad- 
vancing, 81 
Hostile criticism of, 85 
Regarded as a victim, 86 
Finally dismissed for other 
reasons, 87 

Mantoux given post in League 
of Nations, 157 

Marconi case, 185 

Marne, Battle of, 28, 30, 38, 40, 
95, 107, 147 

Martini, Signer, 148, 150 

Masterman, Mr., 174, 196 



Le Matin, 41, 183, 222 

Mauberge, 13, 26 

Maud'huy, General de, 37 

Maunoury, 41 

Maxse, Mr. Leo, 94, 95 

Mazel, doubt of Nivelle's suc- 
cess, 71, 79 

McKenna, Mr., 173 

Mediterranean, 6 

Meline, 126 

Mermeix, M., 71, 255 

Messimy, Minister of War, 19, 
20, 21 
Explanation of Briey catas- 
trophe, 29 
Message from Berthelot, 

34 
Orders to Joffre on retreat, 

39. 77, 80 
Metz, 29 
Meuse, The, 9, 16, 19, 24, 26, 

Mezieres to Belfort line, 24, 

26 
Michel, General, submits plan 

of campaign to Messimy, 

19 
Conference, 19 
Micheler, recommended pru- 
dence, 75, 77 
Against offensive in Messimy 
note, 80 
Millerand and Joffre, 47, 93, 
122, 123, 125, 126 
On Ruhr troops, 201 
At San Remo, 204 
On Soviet Government, 209 
Milner, Lord, substitute for 
Lloyd George at Doullens, 
March 2^, 1918, 107, 117, 

157 
Minotto, 148, 152 
Mirmeix, M., 50 
The Mirrors of Downing 

Street, 193 



INDEX 



287 



Moltke, von, i, 14 

Views on France and Russia, 
1870, 14 

The Younger, 14 

And Peace terms, 15 

On an offensive, 23 

Followed by von Kliick, 42 
Monastir, Sarrail takes, 59 
Monis, 126 
Mons, 94, 95 
Montagu, 174 

Moranville, General de Selliers 
de, letter in Puurquoi Pas, 

9 
Chief of Staff, 9 
Morgan, J. P., 117 
Morley, Lord, 11, 154 
Morning Post, 172, 192 
Morocco, 54 
Moscow, 178 
Mun, Comte Albert de, 4 

N 

Nancy, 47 

Neuilly, 53 

New York Times, 189 

New York World, 184 

Nivelle, 44 

Succeeds Joffre, 53 

Career of, 64 

Offensive, 66 

At Calais, 67, 68, 69 

Promise of support from 

Pamleve, 72 
Warned of German retire- 
ment, March 13, 72 
Confidence in his plan of of- 
fensive, 74-78 
Appointment disapproved by 

Painleve, 79 
Informed by Painleve of 
Petain's views, April 3, 80 
Unprepared for enemy ma- 
chine-guns, 8^ 



Himself ended offensive, 83 
Conflict with Painleve, 83 
Usefulness hampered by in- 
terference, 85 
Superceded by Petain, April 

29, 85 
Further allegations against 

Painleve, 86 
Finally displaced Mangin, 87 
Numbers casualties, 88 
Estimate of German losses, 89 
Nivelle et Painleve, 71 
Noailles, 63 

Northcliffe, Lord, puffed by his 
own press, 197 
Strong prejudice against Mr. 

Walter Long, 120 
Quarrel with Mr. Lloyd 

George, 181 
Mirrors of Downing Street, 
194 
North Sea, 6 

Northumberland, Duke of, 181 
Noske, 245 



O 



Oissel, General Hely d', 38 
Ourcc|, Battle of the, 39, 42, 108 



Paget, Mr,, 169 
Painleve, M. Paul, 58, 60 

Resigns, 61 

Member of Academic des 
Sciences, 69 

Met Clemenceau in connec- 
tion with Dreyfus case, 69 

Difference with Clemenceau, 
70 

Minister of Public Instruc- 
tion, 191 5, 70 

Inspired lack of confidence in 
Nivelle, 70 



288 



INDEX 



Conversation with Nivelle, 72 

Interviewed Micheler, March 
28, 1917, 76 

Called Nivelle to a confer- 
ence, 'jj, 78 

Refused to remain in Briand 
Government, 79 

Unready to assume responsi- 
bility for offensive, 79 

Accused of stopping offen- 
sive, 80 

Wanted result without risks, 
81 

Friction with Nivelle, April 
22, 83 

Confirmed Poincare's tele- 
phone message to Nivelle, 
.84, 85 

Dispute continues about Man- 
gin's dismissal, 86 

Came to London, Oct., 1917, 

Resignation, 93 
Should have demanded com- 
plete unity of command, 
93, 127, 134, 150, 151 
Closer knowledge of Lloyd 
George than either of his 
predecessors, 155 
On Lloyd George and news- 
papers, 183 

La Paix, 229, 255, 263 

Paleologue, M. Maurice, 128, 
206, 212 

Pams, M., 123 

Panther, The, 3 

Paris, I, 12, 39, 59 

Pau, 20 

Peace Conference, 1919, 7, 200 

Peace Negotiations, 207 

Pelletan, M. Camille, 4, 123 

Percin, General, 26 

Pershing at Senlis, 216 

Pertinax, 183 

Petain, 19 



Summoned to Verdun, 49 

Suggested as Commander-in- 
Chief, 63 

As Joffre's successor, 70 

Advised attack, 76, yy 

Approved by Painleve, 79 

Approved of the offensive, 
though not very sanguine 
of result, 80, 82 

Appointed Chief of General 
Staff, 84, 85 

Considered Nivelle offensive 
unsuccessful, 87 

First work to restore disci- 
pline and morale of French 
armies, 90, 105, 108, 109 

At Senlis, 216 
Pichon, 132, 149, 156 
Pierrefeu, M. de, 47 
Pitt, the Younger, 161, 164 
Plan XVIL, 28, 31, 33, 38 
Plumer, 105 
Poincare, M., 4 

On Gallieni, 41 

At Elysee, Nov., 1916, 52 

And Petain, 64 

Asked Ribot to form Minis- 
try, 69, yy 

Telephoned to Nivelle to de- 
lay attack, 84 

Told by Nivelle that offen- 
sive was a success, 87, 107, 
124, 128, 131, 134 

Determined that France must 
get what the Treaty gives 
her, 135, 140 

And San Remo, 205 

On the Armistice, 217 

On the English friendship 
with Germany, 255 

On London Conference, 264 
Poland, 209 

Pollock, Sir Ernest, 243 
Presidential decree regarding 
Joffre's duties, 53 



INDEX 



289 



Pringle, Mr., 162 
Prinkipo Plan, 207 

Q 

Quai d'Orsay, 3, 7, 206 
Quatre mois de guerre, 25, 40 
O leenborough, Lord, 169 
St. Ouentin, 39 

Battle of St. Quentin, great- 
est defeat sustained by the 
British, 107 

R 

Rantzau, Count de Brockdorff, 

243. 244 
Rapallo, 92 
Rapport dc la Commission de la 

M ctallurgie en France, 24 
Ratenau, 132 
Rathenau, Herr, 270 
Reading, Lord (Sir Rufus 

Isaacs), 185 
Reeve, Henry, 196 
Reflections and Reminiscences, 

I 
Reinach, M. Joseph, 139, 208 
Repington, Colonel, 97 

Belief in Robertson and 

avowed enmity to Wilson, 

lOI 

Prejudice caused amazement 

in France, 102 
Conversation w^ith Foch at 

Compiegne, 105, 113 
Book, 194, 195 
Revelstoke, Lord, 67 

In Russia, 67 
Reircrs de 1914 et ses Causes, 

Le, 25 
Revue Militaire Frangaise, La, 

Revue de Paris, 39, 42 
Rheims, 66, 72, 104 



Rhine, 33 

Rhine Boundary, Memorandum 

on, 7 
Ribot, 68 

Appoints Painleve to be 
Minister of War, 69, 77, 
125, 128, 150 
Distrusted Lloyd George 
from the outset, 155, 156 
Riddell, Lord, 155, 184 
Robertson, Sir William, 56 
At Calais, 67 
On Haig's letter re Nivelle, 

Haig's position under French 
Commander-in-Chief, 67, 

92, 95, 96 
Breaks with Lloyd George, 97 
Lack of confidence in Lloyd 

George, 98 
Lloyd George objects to coun- 
try being represented in Su- 
preme War Council by its 
Chief-of-Stafif, 97, 100, 
loi, 103, 165 
Rodd, Sir Rennel, 165 
Rome meeting in January, 191 7, 

60 
Roosevelt, Theodore, 219 
Root, Mr. Elihu, 225 
Roques, General, 49, 51 
Sent to Salonica, 59 
Rothermere, Lord, 190 
Rothschild, Lord, 12, 117 
Roumanian Fiasco, 51 
Roure, Colonel, 103 
Rouvier, M., Prime Minister of 

France, 3, 146, 147 
Roye, 66, 72 

Ruffey, General, 22, 26, 30 
Russell, Sir Charles, no 
Russia, I, 2, 3, 14 

Intervention in 1875, 15 
Held back by France, 27 
Haig in, 68 



290 



INDEX 



Saint Dominique, rue, i8 

In 1914, 44 
Saint-Sauveur, Mde., 208 
Salisbury Lord, 100, 115, 

168 
Samuel, Sir Herbert, 174 
San Remo, 135, 203 
Sarrail, 46 

Campaign in favour of, 191 5> 

49 
Given command of the Army 

of the Orient, 50 
Suggested as Commander-in- 
Chief, 58 
Offered Governorship of 

Paris, 61 
Placed on Cadre de Reserve, 

62 
Warns Clemenceau of 
Retain, 63 
Sauerwein, M. Jules, 183 
Sauvigny, Berthier de, 66 
Scharnhorst, 247 
Schluffen, von, 14, 15 

Opinion on v^ar with Ger- 
many, 22 
Schoen, M., 144 
Schwab, Mr. Charles, 272 
Secret dcs Frontieres, Le, 35 
Selves, M. de, 140, 143, 144 
Shantung Settlement, 223 
Simmonds, Mr. Frank, 184 
Smuts, General, 243, 271 
Soissons, 22, 66 
Somme, Battle of the, 51, 

66 
Sonnino, 60 
Spa Conference, 245 
Stanley, Sir Albert, 114 
Steed, Mr. Wickham, 189 
Stinnes, Hugo, 267 
Strasbourg, 45 
Sulla, 160 



Supreme War Council to meet 
at Versailles every month, 
92 



Taft, Mr., 225 

Tardieu, M. Andre, 4, 6, 46, 
131, 222 

On Rhine occupation, 227 

On reparations, 236 

On ratification of Treaty by 
Congress, 238 

Opinion of Lloyd George, 239 

On coal crisis, 250 

On France after the War, 
269 
Temps, Lc, 24, 233, 244, 263 
Tirpitz, 27 
Thomas, Albert, yy 

Influence on Lloyd George, 

Given post in League of 
Nations, 157 
Thomas, Mr. J. H., 181 
Thomasson, Lieut.-Colonel, 23, 

Le Rcvcrs de 1914 ct scs 

Causes, 25 
On artillery, 27 
Three Years" Service, 4, 30 
Times correspondent, de Blow- 

itz, I 
Times, The, 189, 191, 192 

Merit, 198, 271, 274 
Tirpitz, von, 15 
Toul, 14 

Trade unions, 175 
Trentino, 76 

Triple Alliance, formation of, 
1879, 2 

U 

United States, 16 



INDEX 



291 



Verdun, 26, 41, 63 

Important positions retaken, 
90 
Versailles Council represented 

by Sir H. Wilson, 93 
Versailles, Treaty of, 162, 215 
Victoria, Queen, i, 196 
La Vic 'Riissc, 213 
Vimy, 63, 66 

Violette, M. Maurice, 8, 39, 74 
Viviani, 126, 134, 145 
Vosges, 33 

W 

Waechter, M. Kiderlen, instiga- 
tor of Agadir affair, 141 
Characteristics of, 142, 144 

Waldersee, Count, 14 

War Council, April 6, for 
which Ribot was probably 
responsible, 80 

War Office, 11 

War zvith Germany, 255 

Wetterlee, I'Abbe, 122 

Weygand, General, 93, 211, 227 

White, Mr. Henry, 224 

Wilhelm I., Emperor, 2, 3, 11 



Wilhelm II. and Douamont, 64 

Wilhelmstrasse, 3, 11 

Wilson, Sir Henry, 13, 55, 67, 

93 
Protege of Lord Roberts, 93, 

94, 95, 96 
Appointment to succeed Rob- 
ertson, 99, 100, lOI 
Meeting with Beresford, loi, 
103, 105, 157 
Wilson, Woodrow, President 
U.S.A., 52, 123, 125, 158, 
162, 218 
Character, 220 

And fourteen points, 223, 241 
And League of Nations, 225 
Peace Treaty, 232 
Wirth, Herr, 267 
Witas, M., 266 
Wolmer, Lord, 166 
Wrangel, 206, 211 
Wright, Captain P. E., 105, 154 



Ybarnegary, M., received by 
Poincare at Elysee, April 
22, 84 

Younger, Sir George, and 
Lloyd George, 170 



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